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Large technological systems produce new capabilities that allow innovative solutions
to social, engineering and environmental problems. This trend is especially important
in the safety-critical systems (SCS) domain where we simultaneously aim to do more
with the systems whilst reducing the harm they might cause. Even with the increased
uncertainty created by these opportunities, SCS still need to be assured against
safety and security risk and, in many cases, certified before use.
A large number of approaches and standards have emerged, however there remain
challenges related to technical risk such as identifying inter-domain risk interactions,
developing safety-security causal models, and understanding the impact of new
risk information. In addition, there are socio-technical challenges that undermine
technical risk activities and act as a barrier to co-assurance, these include insufficient
processes for risk acceptance, unclear responsibilities, and a lack of legal, regulatory
and organisational structure to support safety-security alignment. A new approach
is required.
The Safety-Security Assurance Framework (SSAF) is proposed here as a candidate
solution. SSAF is based on the new paradigm of independent co-assurance, that is,
keeping the disciplines separate but having synchronisation points where required
information is exchanged. SSAF is comprised of three parts - the Conceptual
Model defines the underlying philosophy, and the Technical Risk Model (TRM) and
Socio-Technical Model (STM) consist of processes and models for technical risk and
socio-technical aspects of co-assurance. Findings from a partial evaluation of SSAF
using case studies reveal that the approach has some utility in creating inter-domain
relationship models and identifying socio-technical gaps for co-assurance.
The original contribution to knowledge presented in this thesis is the novel approach
to co-assurance that uses synchronisation points, explicit representation of a technical
risk argument that argues over interaction risks, and a confidence argument that
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On July 3rd, 2014 a video was released that shows a vulnerability test performed on
a power grid generator. Exploiting the vulnerability causes the 27 tonne generator
to jolt, emit enormous amounts of smoke, then culminates in an explosion leading to
widespread damage of the generator; all this occurs in less than four minutes [105].
This exploit is noteworth because it has the potential to disrupt large parts of the
national power grid and cause catastrophic safety consequences. However, the more
concerning fact is that this footage, along with 840 pages of documents with the
classification "unclassified, for official use only", was obtained in error. Scott Ainslie,
a user of a news site1, submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to
the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) regarding a different
vulnerability with the same name - Operation Aurora2 [14].
This example encapsulates many of the reasons why assurance for both safety and
security is so troublesome even with the multitude of available approaches and
standards3. Through exploring the Operation Aurora case, five overarching themes
can be established as to why this safety-security problem persisted over two decades
after it was first discovered [24]. These themes allow us to understand some of the
general challenges for co-assurance:
1.1.1 Identifying Risk Interactions
The first theme centres around the challenge of identifying the interactions in a
complex system that could lead to cross-domain risk impact. Often, knowledge of the
system mechanisms for security exploits that affect safety is specialised and requires
effective communication between engineers to understand the relationships.
For example, Figure 1.1 shows a power plant which is run by a SCADA system.
The main components are the power source generator, remote terminal unit, and
1https://www.muckrock.com/about/
2Ainslie wanted information on DDOS attack on Google servers also named Aurora
3See Chapter 3: Review of Technical Approaches and Standards
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Fig. 1.1 Typical Power Plan (from [35])
the programmable digital relays. The relays are a safety mitigation intended to
stop the breakers closing when the generator is out of phase with the grid. If an
out-of-phase condition did occur the generator would be subject to over-torque stress.
The analogy given in [104] is of a car shifting into reverse whilst being driven on a
highway. This immense stress is what caused the generator to explode.
The Aurora vulnerability exploits an existing gap in electric power grid protection.
Weiss [429] concluded that Aurora is not a cyber event but an electrical one, however
Figure 1.1 shows a system where it is possible for a security attack that exploits
power engineering to result in a safety accident. Therefore, when we consider risk
assurance for safety and security it is not enough to look at just one domain in
isolation, there is a need for some joint approaches throughout the system lifecycle
to discover attribute risk interactions and analyse different types of loss events.
1.1.2 Temporal Significance and Change
The second theme is concerned with the change of risk levels over time in relation to
the Aurora vulnerability. A publication from the Idaho National Laboratory4 [35,
p 33] foreshadowed Aurora-type vulnerabilities in 2004. In addition to discussing
how they worked, measures to prevent these vulnerabilities were discussed. In 2013,
six years after the original Aurora test, only two relay protection suppliers provided
an Aurora mitigation devices [399]. In 2016, nearly ten years after the original
Aurora test, applications and research were still ongoing as to how to avoid the
vulnerability [352].
For many of the existing approaches to safety-security analysis there may be the
implicit assumption that once a risk is identified, measures can be put in place
to manage that risk. However, for security vulnerabilities, there is commonly a
long lag time between a vulnerability’s discovery, a targeted mitigation, and the
implementation of that mitigation which can take years due to constraints on safety-
related systems - such as the need to re-certify significant changes.
4The same research centre that performed the Aurora test
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The implications for risk interactions is that security concerns have the potential to
increase the overall level of risk during operation, and there are sometimes conflicts
with safety goals of the system. Therefore there is a need to manage change in risk
interactions over time, and to not rely solely on analyses that provide only a snapshot
of system risk.
1.1.3 Conflict Resolution and Trade-Off
This theme is concerned with the processes and decision guidance for resolving the
conflicts that might arise during safety and security co-assurance. There are multiple
types of trade-offs that exist on multiple system levels. The previous theme was an
example of a system objectives conflict between updating for security and certification
for safety. Another example of a potential conflict that affects safety and security
is deciding the amount of resource available for single-domain assurance especially
considering the increased uncertainty associated with security risk.
Many existing approaches consider the problem from a specific perspective (e.g.
technical risk analysis only) and do not have the capability to consider many of
the trade-offs that need to be made in order to assure a system for both safety and
security. There is therefore a need for an approach that allows for trade-offs to occur
from many perspectives of a system - technical, behavioural, social, regulatory, etc.
1.1.4 Unintended Outcomes and Impact Propagation
This theme is concerned with understanding the more subtle inter-domain risk
relationships and their unintended consequences. In the Aurora case, we see that it
was in fact a safety mitigation that presented a new attack vector. Further analysis
of the system after the implementation of the mitigation may have revealed the
new vector, however there are some instances where the unintended consequence is
not as obvious. An example is attempting assess the impact of losing confidential
information, and how or if an attacker might use it to cause a safety incident, e.g.
the release of the Aurora test documentation.
In addition, it took at least 6 years from the time the Aurora vulnerability was
discovered for NERC5 to release an Aurora alert to industry [80]. Many of the existing
approaches for safety-security assurance rely on expert knowledge to identify and
evaluate these relationships and risk impact propagation. This may be problematic if
experts are using incomplete knowledge, or when trying to understand the relationship
between analyses performed at different times by different experts6. Therefore, there
is a need for an approach that supports explicit reasoning about inter-domain
relationships and supports identification of risk impact propagation.
5North American Electric Reliability Corporation.
6Aurora has several different causes, so re-engineering the system may have different solutions
and different time-frames for implementing the mitigations [447, 448].
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1.1.5 Socio-Technical Influences on Assurance
Lastly, this theme is concerned with the influence factors that affect co-assurance,
but which are not captured in technical risk analysis. Schneier7 states that security
problems cannot be ‘solved’ by a single technology or approach, and the type of
security we care about involves people, what they know, and their relationships [367].
This idea is applicable when looking at the response to the Aurora test.
One of the Directors leading the Aurora test stated that a big challenge was education
and "selling" the ICS security solution to non-technical policy makers [329]. The
physics and the vulnerability itself are simple from an engineering perspective, what
was more difficult was providing empirical evidence to show how a cyber attack could
destroy physical equipment and convincing policy makers to influence regulation [329].
Furthermore, six years after The Aurora test, it was argued that the Obama-era
executive order to improve critical infrastructure cyber-security was a recipe for failure
because it relied on voluntary participation and an insufficient risk framework [257].
This argument is echoed in [399] which states that that there is already a “complex
and highly regulated regime of compliance” but more is needed to assure against risk.
What this reveals is the human element to safety and security assurance. This
involves individuals as well as larger structures which means it would likely be naïve
to consider only the technical approach to co-assurance. Therefore, there is a need for
an approach that helps practitioners to reason about all the socio-technical influences
on co-assurance such as distribution of responsibility, communication, knowledge
sharing and decision support.
Safety-Security Problem Themes Summary
Whilst these five themes were derived from the Aurora example, they begin to capture
some of the challenges of assuring a system for safety and security, and help define
some of the requirements for a co-assurance solution. From the theme analysis, there
is a need for any co-assurance solution to:
• provide joint approaches to safety-security assurance throughout the system
lifecycle to identify risk interactions and loss events
• manage changing risk interactions over time
• allow for safety-security trade-offs from may perspectives of a system
• support explicit reasoning about inter-domain relationships and impact propagation,
and lastly
• help practitioners reason about socio-technical influences on co-assurance
7Known as the godfather of cryptography and widely recognised for his contribution to thinking
around modern cyber security.
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1.2 This Thesis
In the previous section, some of the challenges of co-assurance were explored. This
section frames the research to address these challenges. It is in the context of the
themes that the following hypothesis was developed.
1.2.1 Hypothesis
The hypothesis for research in this thesis is:
Using a framework that explicitly considers both technical risk
and socio-technical factors results in a more robust safety-security
co-assurance argument.
It has two parts; the first is concerned with the construction of the framework and the
second makes a quality claim on the resulting argument from using the framework.
Many of the terms in the hypothesis have multiple interpretations, these are the
definitions that will be used for this research:
framework – this encompasses the processes and models for co-assurance. In this
thesis the framework is comprised of a conceptual model, processes and models
that define both syntax (structure and connections) and semantics (nature of
relationships) of co-assurance.
technical risk – refers to the negative consequences that we try to minimise for a
particular system. It is characterised by conditions such as hazards, faults,
threats, etc. and the causal relationships between them. It is often calculated as
the product of the severity of a consequence and the likelihood of it occurring.
socio-technical factors – these are the set of factors, including activities, structures,
knowledge, technology etc. that support assurance and provide confidence in
the technical risk argument.
explicitly considers – the framework provides support to practitioners to create
argument models and relationship models for inter-domain relationships between
safety and security.
co-assurance argument – this is the structured reasoning (claims, arguments and
supporting evidence) about the interactions between safety and security. Every
safety-related system has a co-assurance argument even if it is not recorded in
a document or model.
more robust – robustness appears in many domains including engineering and
argumentation. In this thesis the definition used is derived from [241] which is
the property of a system to remain stable despite variation (perturbations), in
this context it relates to the stability of the co-assurance argument over time8.
Note that the focus of the hypothesis in the current form is not risk reduction for
safety and security, but to improve the argument.
8There is further discussion on robustness in the the Evaluation Chapter 7.
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1.2.2 Research Objectives
Whilst each of the thesis chapters has its own focus and research questions, the
overall research that contributes to this thesis can be viewed from the perspective of
four objectives:
Research Objective 1. Explore the challenges of co-assurance, and understand
the gaps in current approaches.
Research Objective 2. Taking in to account the gaps identified in RO1, engineer
a framework that assists with the creation of robust co-assurance arguments.
Research Objective 3. Evaluate the framework to understand the extent to which
it meets its objectives
Research Objective 4. Explore the implications of using such a framework for
co-assurance, and propose future work.
1.3 Contributions
The original contribution to knowledge contained in this thesis is the new theoretical
understanding of the syntax and semantics of technical risk interactions across
domains, the nuanced interpretation of the confidence concept applied to socio-
technical factors of the assurance process to improve the overall argument, and
supporting the theories with a practical understanding of the processes and outcome
required for co-assurance.
1.3.1 Conceptual and Theoretical Contribution
The first contribution to knowledge presented in this thesis relates to the underlying
theory, concepts and construction of the co-assurance framework:
Independent co-assurance - this concept describes the nature of the relationship
between safety and security. When considering assuring safety and security together
there are multiple elements that need to be considered such as the information
available, artefacts available, the expertise of the engineers, the regulatory framework,
the engineering process, the system characteristics - whilst these might have similarities
between safety and security there are many points of divergence. Co-assurance can
be viewed on a scale from unified to siloed, independent co-assurance falls somewhere
in the middle of these. It does not advocate for the complete unification of the
attributes but allows for communication of required information to be shared in a
timely manner.
SSAF Conceptual V-Model - this is a traditional V-development process with
synchronisation points between safety, security and engineering activities. One of
the primary challenges for co-assurance is shared understanding and communication
across the domains, this model presents an easy-to-understand medium for communication.
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1.3.2 Co-Assurance Technical Risk Contribution
A second contribution is the SSAF Technical Risk Model (TRM) which defines
a causal model and a process for creating links between safety and security. The
TRM uses a technical risk argument to reason about co-assurance, and utilises link
models to provide evidence for the claims. To support technical risk argumentation,
the TRM also provides syntactic link patterns for creating relationships between
safety and security conditions, and semantic argument schemes to assist practitioners
in the argumentation.
1.3.3 Co-Assurance Socio-Technical Contribution
The third major contribution of this thesis is the SSAF Socio-Technical Model
(STM) which provides a process, influence model and argument schemes to support
technical risk argumentation through the development of a co-assurance confidence
argument. This is an improvement on many existing co-assurance approaches which
only consider technical risk aspects.
Mapping Contributions to Co-Assurance Themes
Figure 1.2 shows the major contributions of this thesis and the co-assurance themes
which they address. The next section provides further detail about the thesis
structure.
Fig. 1.2 Mapping Thesis Contributions to Co-Assurance Themes.
1.4 Structure
This thesis consists of eight chapters divided over three parts depicted in Figure 1.3.
Each chapter satisfies a different research objective.
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Part 1: Context for Co-assurance
Chapter 1: Introduction - aims to motivate the safety security co-assurance
problem, and give an example which shows difficulties of bringing safety
and security together for safety-related systems. In addition, this chapter
sets out the hypothesis and research questions objectives. The original
contributions to knowledge are also articulated here, and a structure is
provided for the rest of the document.
Chapter 2: Developing a Theory of Co-Assurance - starts to develop a Theory
of Co-Assurance. It discusses the core ideas around risk, engineering and
assurance, and establishes part of the conceptual framework that will be
used throughout the thesis. This chapter provides the conceptual building
blocks for the rest of the argument.
Chapter 3: Review of Approaches, Standards & Challenges - this chapter reviews
current state-of-the-art approaches, standards and guidelines for co-assurance,
as well as some of the socio-technical challenges.
Part 2: The Safety-Security Assurance Framework
Chapter 4: Introduction to the Safety-Security Assurance Framework - is a brief
introduction and overview of the framework. It describes what it is
comprised of, how it functions, how it is applied, and what the expected
outcome is. Briefly discussed in this chapter is how SSAF addresses many
of the problems outlined in previous chapters.
Chapter 5: SSAF Technical Risk Model - contains one of the core models for
SSAF - the Technical Risk Model which determines the inter-domain
causal links between conditions such as vulnerabilities to hazards, attacks
to accidents, etc. The outcome of applying the TRM process is the
safety-security technical risk argument for the system under analysis.
Chapter 6: SSAF Socio-Technical Model - introduces the Socio-Technical Model
which addresses the gaps in the argument identified in the previous chapter.
These are related to the primary and secondary confidence off the argument.
The unique perspective of the STM is that it addresses issues with the
co-assurance process itself and not this system under analysis as with
other approaches.
Part 3: Evaluation & Conclusion
Chapter 7: SSAF Evaluation - case studies are used to evaluate the STM
Schemes, TRM Process and TRM Patterns.
Chapter 8: Concluding Remarks - a summary of the thesis is provided in this





Fig. 1.3 Thesis Structure.

Chapter 2
Developing A Theory of
Co-Assurance
Introduction
There are recognised commonalities and differences between system safety and cyber
security such as related concepts of loss [259], common engineering models [132],
differences in rating consequences [332], and differences in risk approaches for specific
application domains [146]. Several novel aspects of safety and security assurance are
presented in this thesis which draw on existing assurance practice and knowledge.
The purpose of this chapter is to begin to develop the underlying theory for the
co-assurance framework. Some existing ideas, commonalities and differences related
to assurance, risk and engineering will be explored with the intent of developing a co-
assurance conceptual framework1 i.e. the theorectical building blocks for co-assurance.
This will be done by:
(i) defining essential terms that will be used for co-assurance
(ii) structuring those terms in an ontology
(iii) establishing the concepts that will underlie the framework
Chapter Contributions. The main contributions of this chapter to the overall
thesis are: developing the theoretical framework, establishing the similarities and
differences between safety and security assurance, as well as discussing some of the
existing challenges to assurance. Many existing approaches rely on analogy, therefore
it is important to understand to what extent this analogy can be used. These
conceptual building blocks, "reasoning toolkit" and language for co-assurance will be
used throughout the rest of the thesis.
1Conceptual framework used to mean the set of ideas, concepts, theories, methods, values and
motivations on which a piece of research is based [348, p 5].
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2.1 Terminology for Assurance
Even for single-domain assurance and engineering there is often conflict about
definitions of terms [333]. The objective of this section will be to provide definitions
of assurance terms from existing standards and guidelines.
2.1.1 Assurance Terms
In safety and security, there are multiple standards with varying definitions for the
same terms or different terms that have a very similar definition. In addition to
the standards, there have been attempts to reconcile terminology across the domain
boundaries [34, 132]. Definitions for important terms for assurance have been selected
from the standards for use in this thesis. Those terms are:
assurance
grounds for justified confidence that a claim has been or will be achieved
(Source: ISO/IEC/IEEE 15026-1:2019 [210, cl 3.1.1]). This can be the process
or outcome of managing risk.
risk management process
systematic application of management policies, procedures and practices to
the activities of communicating, consulting, establishing the context, and
identifying, analyzing, evaluating, treating, monitoring and reviewing risk
(Source: [200, cl 3.1]).
assurance case
reasoned, auditable artefact created that supports the contention that its top-
level claim (or set of claims) is satisfied, including systematic argumentation
and its underlying evidence and explicit assumptions that support the claim(s).
Note 1 to entry: An assurance case contains the following and their relationships:
• one or more claims about properties;
• arguments that logically link the evidence and any assumptions to the
claim(s);
• a body of evidence and possibly assumptions supporting these arguments
for the claim(s); and
• justification of the choice of top-level claim and the method of reasoning.
(Source: ISO/IEC/IEEE 15026-1:2019 [210, cl 3.1.2]).
assurance argument
set of structured assurance claims, supported by evidence and reasoning, that
demonstrate clearly how assurance needs have been satisfied (Source: ISO/IEC
TR 15443-1:2012 [209, cl 3.24]).
confidence argument
provides the justification for [assurance] argument assertions (Source: Hawkins
et al. [158]). This reasoning that supports the claims, inferences and evidence
in an assurance argument.
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argument pattern
an argument structure that captures abstractions of fundamental strategies
and good practice (Source: Hawkins and Kelly [157]). This use of argument
model to encapsulate common reasoning.
2.1.2 Risk Terms
The following terms are from risk engineering and management:
risk – effect of uncertainty on objectives (Source: ISO Guide 73:2009 [200, cl 1.1])
• Note 1 to entry: An effect is a deviation from the expected — positive
and/or negative.
• Note 2 to entry: Objectives can have different aspects (such as financial,
health and safety, and environmental goals) and can apply at different
levels (such as strategic, organization-wide, project, product and process).
• Note 3 to entry: Risk is often characterized by reference to potential
events and consequences, or a combination of these.
• Note 4 to entry: Risk is often expressed in terms of a combination of the
consequences of an event (including changes in circumstances) and the
associated likelihood of occurrence.
• Note 5 to entry: Uncertainty is the state, even partial, of deficiency
of information related to, understanding or knowledge of, an event, its
consequence, or likelihood.
This definition of risk was selected because it is a broad definition that captures
the essential characteristics of both safety and security risk.
safety freedom from unacceptable risk (Source: IEC 61508-4:2010 [188, cl 3.1.11])
security (Source: IEC 62443-1-1 [190, cl 3.2.98]):
1. measures taken to protect a system.
2. condition of a system that results from the establishment and maintenance
of measures to protect the system.
3. condition of system resources being free from unauthorized access and
from unauthorized or accidental change, destruction, or loss
4. capability of a computer-based system to provide adequate confidence
that unauthorized persons and systems can neither modify the software
and its data nor gain access to the system functions, and yet to ensure
that this is not denied to authorized persons and systems [14].
5. prevention of illegal or unwanted penetration of or interference with the
proper and intended operation of an industrial automation and control
system.
• Note: Measures can be controls related to physical security (controlling
physical access to computing assets) or logical security (capability to login
to a given system and application.)
dangerous condition (Source: ISO/IEC/IEEE 15026-1:2019 [210, cl 3.4.11]):
state of a system that, in combination with some states of the environment,
will result in an adverse consequence
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• Note 1 to entry: A hazardous situation in IEC 61508-4 can be a dangerous
condition. A threat in the ISO/IEC 15026 series is also an example of a
dangerous condition . A concept of dangerous conditions is introduced in
order to cover not only hazardous situations in the safety context but also
errors in the reliability, integrity, confidentiality or dependability contexts
and other states of a system which can lead to adverse consequences.
• Note 2 to entry: Occurrences of failures in the context of reliability or of
a definition in IEC 61508-4 often lead to dangerous conditions but not
always do.
• Note 3 to entry: A dangerous condition therefore has at least the following
attributes:
a) the associated adverse consequences,
b) the trigger events that lead to the dangerous condition, and
c) the trigger events that lead to the adverse consequences from the
dangerous condition
harm (safety) physical injury or damage to the health of people or damage to
property or the environment (Source: IEC 61508-4:2010 [188, cl 3.1.1])
vulnerability flaw or weakness in a system’s design, implementation, or operation
and management that could be exploited to violate the system’s integrity or
security policy (Source: IEC 62443-1-1 [190, cl 3.2.131])
threat potential for violation of security, which exists when there is a circumstance,
capability, action, or event that could breach security and cause harm (Source:
IEC 62443-1-1 [190, cl 3.2.124])
2.1.3 Engineering Terms
The last category of terms comes from systems engineering:
system - is an integrated collection of data components, hardware components,
software components, human-role components (also known as wetware or
personnel), and document components (also known as paperware) that collaborate
to provide some cohesive set of functionality with specific levels of quality
(Source: Firesmith [132])
(quality) attribute - is a high-level characteristic of something that captures
an aspect of its quality.There are many different quality attributes such as
availability, extensibility, performance, reliability, reusability, safety, security,
and usability (Source: Firesmith [132])
discipline discrete branch of engineering reflecting a single aspect in the project
(Source: ISO 19901-5:2016 [196, cl 3.13]) e.g. safety or security
domain specific field of knowledge or expertise (Source: ISO/IEC 2382-36:2019
[203]). Engineering domain example - safety or security. Application domain
example - aerospace, rail, maritime, etc.
dependability - is the degree to which various kinds of users can depend on a
work product. Dependability includes the following quality factors: availability,
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reliability, robustness, safety, security and survivability (Source: Firesmith
[132])
survivability - the degree to which both accidental and malicious harm to essential
services is prevented, detected and reacted to (Source: Firesmith [132])
2.2 Defining Co-assurance Terms & Ontology
Whilst there are many definitions relating to safety, security and engineering, there are
very few definitions that consider all three. Using adaptations of existing definitions,
terms for co-assurance are developed in this section and structured in an ontology
to demonstrate their relationships. Whilst this is not a complete or definitive set
of terms for co-assurance, it provides a starting point for a common language for
communication between safety and security.
2.2.1 Safety-Security Co-assurance Terms
These are the co-assurance terms that are introduced as part of this thesis:
co-assurance – the process and outcome of managing risks that originate in two or
more domains
co-assurance technical risk argument – the set of structure assurance claims,
supported by evidence and reasoning, that demonstrate clearly how co-assurance
needs have been satisfied
loss – the state of absence of something valuable. Safety loss is often strictly defined
as harm, security loss is a broader concept that includes financial, reputation,
intellectual, etc.
causal model
"A causal model is a formal device intended to represent a part of the causal
structure of the world. It comprises several variables and specifies how (and if)
these variables are causally connected to each other. Causal models are used
in many disciplines to study cause-effect relationships" [144].
independent co-assurance this is the separation of concerns and processes for
co-assurance with planned synchronisation points for information exchange
between domains
synchronisation describes the process by which communication of information
occurs across domain boundaries to align attributes
interaction risk these are the risks that have part of their causal chain in the other
domain. Figure 2.1 shows a depiction of interaction risk.
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Fig. 2.1 Depiction of Interaction Risks for Safety and Security
2.2.2 Technical Risk Ontology
Having established key terms for co-assurance, Figure 2.2 shows the SSAF ontology.
It is derived from the definitions in the previous sections and Firesmith’s work on the
commonalities between safety and security [132]. There are two layers of conditions
present in the model - risk conditions and entities related to systems. The risk
conditions include the idea of Loss, Trigger, Incident, Weakness, and Failure. Each of
these is an abstract condition that must be instantiated as shown by the inheritances.
For example, Weakness can be a hazard or vulnerability.
Two conditions that present interesting instantiations are Loss and Failure. These are
strongly related to which philosophy is adopted. For example, in traditional safety,
loss strictly considers physical harm to human beings and possibly environmental
damage, whereas from a security perspective loss is tied to the value of an asset.
Security analysis considering many aspects such as risk appetite and asset value is
needed to understand what loss is, as this is not always clear. For example, loss
be when information is accessed without authorisation, or when that information
is exfiltrated or used in an exploit. The second condition that is interpretation-
dependent is the notion of Failure, which can be a hardware or software fault or, for
both safety and security, a failure of intent during design which brings into scope
systematic failures and failures in reasoning.
The second layer of entities in this model belong to systems: Asset, Assurance
Requirement, and Assurance Mechanism. Because safety and security are emergent
properties of the system, it can be argued that they have no direct functional
requirements, instead they rely on requirements that are derived from other sub-
attributes such as performance and reliability2.
2A counterargument could be that encryption is an example of security functional requirement,
however even that is preserving another sub-attribute (integrity).
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Fig. 2.2 SSAF Ontology of Co-assurance Terms
The last important aspect of the ontology is the representation of relationships
between the entities. Loss is caused by an Incident and relates to an Asset. Weakness
and Trigger lead to an Incident, however their presence in a system can also increase
the level of Risk. During assurance, part of the objective is to derive Assurance
requirements to manage the Risk. Those requirements are satisfied by certain
Mechanisms such as controls or operational policies. These relationships can be
adapted to speak about linear, complex or emergent causality.
The relationships exist to conceptualise how these entities might relate to each
other for co-assurance and should be adapted for an application according to the
shared stakeholder goals and the regulatory requirements. The reason that these
relationships and entities must be adapted is because they capture some information
about causality for a particular system, therefore practitioners must elicit, negotiate
and decide what the causal relationships are for that system. The purpose of
this ontology is to provide the basis for shared thinking, and provide structure for
reasoning between the domains and facilitate identifying shared goals which will be
used as a basis for co-assurance activities.
2.3 Co-Assurance Conceptual Foundations
Figure 2.3 shows the concepts that are used as a basis for the safety-security framework.
This section reviews these concepts and discusses how they support co-assurance.
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Fig. 2.3 Conceptual Building Blocks for the Safety and Security Co-Assurance
2.3.1 Assurance Process
Fig. 2.4 Simplified Representation of an Assurance Process
Figure 2.4 shows a simplification of the assurance process. It consists of five stages,
four of which are part of the risk process and an additional stage for reporting.
The objective of following this process is to identify and address unacceptable
risks. Definitions of "unacceptable" are usually provided in guidance from regulatory
authorities such as FFA3 and EASA4, or in legislation such as the Health and
Safety at Work Act which is enforced by HSE5. Risk reduction occurs through a
variety of means such as engineering risk out of a system, implementing controls or
creating procedural mitigations. There is a step to accept risk, and a validation and
verification step to monitor for any new or missed risks, as well as to monitor the
effects of the reduction mechanisms. The final stage is that of reporting, which can
occur internal to the organisation creating the system or can be external as part of
certification or accreditation.
This risk process is instantiated in many standards. A general standard example
is ISO 31000:2018 [199] with risk assessment steps of identifying, analysing and
evaluating risk. Most security standards follow the Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA)
3Federal Aviation Authority - US regulator for civil aviation.
4European Union Aviation Safety Agency - EU regulator for civil aviation.
5UK Health & Safety Executive - regulator for workplace health, safety and welfare.
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cycle which maps onto the risk assessment part of Figure 2.4, an example is ISO/IEC
27000:2020 [204] with risk steps for risk identification, assessment, management and
monitoring. For safety, an overview of the steps from 4+1 assurance principles6 [159]
are to (i.) identify risk, (ii.) decompose to contributing components, (iii.) satisfy
requirements to address risk, and (iv.) analyse for risks introduced.
There is some commonality in the assurance processes on a high level of abstraction.
There is the potential for conflict, however, when the details and emphasis of the
stages are considered from each of the domains. Take, for example, the Check-Act
part of the security risk process; there is a lot of emphasis on these phases because
of the uncertainty introduced by the presence of an intelligent adversary.
2.3.2 Assurance Cases & Argumentation
Assurance case definitions in the standards:
• ISO/IEC/IEEE 15026-1:2019 [210] [assurance case] reasoned, auditable artefact
created that supports the contention that its top-level claim (or set of claims)
is satisfied, including systematic argumentation and its underlying evidence
and explicit assumptions that support the claim(s)
• Def Stan 00-56:2007 Issue 4 [91] [safety case] a structured argument, supported
by a body of evidence that provides a compelling, comprehensible and valid case
that a system is safe for a given application in a given operating environment
• ISO/IEC TR 15443-1:2012 [209] [security assurance argument] set of structured
security claims, supported by evidence and reasoning, that demonstrate clearly
how security assurance needs have been satisfied
From the definitions above we see that the assurance case is an instantiation of the
assurance argument. Some interpret the assurance case as a living document that
captures the reasoning of the assurance argument over the (safety) lifecycle [47].
Others interpret the assurance case as the artefact produced to demonstrate assurance7 [210].
Regardless of the interpretation, the assurance case instantiates the assurance
argument.
To provide further context for the discussion of assurance cases, the Safety 4+1
Principles will be used. Hawkins et al. [156] state that these are invariant assurance
principles that are the "immutable core of any software justification":
Principle 1: Requirements Validity
Software assurance requirements shall be defined to address the software contribution
to system hazards. Requirements must be defined in a concrete and verifiable
manner [156].
Principle 2: Requirements Decomposition
The intent of the software requirements shall be maintained throughout requirements
decomposition.
6These principles were identified from common safety standards.
7Sometimes this is called the assurance case report [91].
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A counter-example to this principle is where an aircraft does not brake when
deceleration is needed because the braking systems implemented are not
appropriate for the environment - wheel brakes on an icy runway. The intent
of the braking requirement is not maintained.
Principle 3: Requirements Satisfaction
Software assurance requirements shall be satisfied.
The requirements must be clearly defined in sufficient detail that they are
verifiable. Verification level is commensurate with the criticality of the system,
the novelty of the technology and the development stage. A counter-example
to this principle is the loss of the Mars Polar Lander due to inadequate testing
and requirements specification [156].
Principle 4: Hazardous Software Behaviour
Hazardous behaviour of the software shall be identified and mitigated.
Assessment techniques e.g. Fault Tree Analysis, Hazard and Operability
Studies must be used to evaluate and understand the contribution of software
to assurance risk. In the SoS Assurance Case we have two types of risk
relating to hazards and threats [156]. Technical risk and the safety and security
techniques used to support the assurance case process will be reviewed in depth
in Chapter 3.
Principle 4+1: Confidence
The confidence established in addressing the software safety principles shall be
commensurate to the contribution of the software to system risk.
The confidence argument documents the reason for trusting assurance argument
correctness. Confidence arguments address only the structure of the safety
argument. Standards make use of assurance and integrity levels to reflect
this principle [156]. Confidence arguments will be reviewed later in this
section. Examples of what varies confidence are: i. Appropriateness of evidence.
ii. Limitations of the evidence. iii. Accuracy of the evidence. iv. Achievable
coverage of testing.
[235] used the 4+1 principles to reason about where and how confidence is lost in
safety certification. Three approaches to certification are discussed: risk, confidence
and compliance which map to the 4+1 principles [235]. When applied to safety and
security, this gives six assurance argument structures. These are the six argument
types that we will need to consider for co-assurance. Figure 2.5 depicts these six
argument types and their derivation.
Safety assurance, for the most part, follows these 4+1 Assurance Principles. Principles
1-3 are concerned with the definition, decomposition and satisfaction of safety
requirements. Principle 4 is concerned with ensuring that no hazards have been
introduced as a result of the preceding principles. Finally, Principle 4+1 is orthogonal
to the first four, and it deals with confidence of each of the principles. To a lesser or
greater extent, most standards and codes of practice conform to these principles.
These principles help to maintain understanding of overall system assurance and
provide a reference model for cross-sector certification. The principles also give a
good model for the assurance development process. However, they do not (yet)
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Fig. 2.5 Safety and Security Assurance Argument Types (derived from [235])
provide further detail that would be needed for domains other than safety. For
example, it is unclear how to handle trade-offs between system quality attributes,
and to what extent the requirements must be satisfied in Principle 3.
Currently, the majority of security assurance is process based, and most security
standards and codes of practice conform to the Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) model
described in the security standard ISO/IEC 27001:2017 [205]. The Check-Act parts
of the PDCA model can be mapped to the 4+1 Principles, however the sense of
dynamic change and temporal significance is lessened. In addition, the very things
that make the 4+1 Principles insightful (abstraction and decomposition) can make
the framework seem reductionist in its approach. This is problematic for security
where an intelligent adversaries may exploit emergent properties of a system to
achieve a goal thereby making decomposition challenging.
Compliance Argument
Compliance with standards aims to provide assurance that software functions attain
the level of confidence which is commensurate to the safety and security criticality of
those functions and the risks that they pose [189, 385]. That is, if a system has the
potential to cause harm, injury, death or damage to property must have high levels of
confidence in their functions. The aim of certification is to demonstrate that a system
has a set of properties which are recorded in a certificate [212]. Software safety
and security certifications are available for systems in domains such as automotive,
aerospace, medical and transport. Assurance is often demonstrated by compliance
with national or international safety standards.
Developers show a technological system is acceptably safe and secure by appealing
to the satisfaction of the set of objectives set out in the standards [159]. Some
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standards are very prescriptive and/or process-based in nature and include a lot of
detail regarding the specific processes and techniques required to be compliant.
There has been debate comparing the relative merits of goal-based and process-
based standards. There has been effective use of each within different contexts.
For process-based standards there are concerns about the adequacy of guidance
provided for the creation of assurance arguments which comply with the objectives.
There are few worked examples of generating evidence for such standards [154, 331].
Assurance cases and compliance with prescriptive standards are complementary when
demonstrating, through reasoned justification, how software contributes to system
safety [159].
Risk Argument
The main premise of risk-based arguments is that each of the risks are identified,
then managing those risks forms objectives or goals. The safety or security of a
system is demonstrated by meeting the objectives. There are examples of risk-based
standards in safety [385] and in security [195].
Fig. 2.6 Simplified Representation of a Risk-based Assurance Argument
Figure 2.6 depicts a simplified risk-based argument that is an example of an outcome
of an assurance process. It consists of a Top-level Claim of either safety or security.
This is followed by a number of sub-claims that address individual risks n. This
reasoning approach of addressing each of the identified risks is labelled Strategy,
and it is in the context of a set of identified risks. This structure of claims, inferences
and evidence is an example of an assurance argument.
The advantage of this type of argument structure over a compliance structure is that
reasoning about the safety of a system occurs first hand, that is for a specific system
in a specific context risks must be identified and claims made directly about their
management. Whereas with the compliance argument, sometimes the management
of risks is implied or assumed if the prescribed processes are followed.
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One major drawback of risk argument structures is that they require immense
amounts of application domain knowledge and strong reasoning skills. In order to
understand the risks that are possible, how they occur and to formulate causal chains
is a significant task, especially for a new area or application. This is the case for
co-assurance. Practitioners tend to have a lot of knowledge about risks within either
safety or security, but it is the risks that cross those discipline boundaries that are
the subject of co-assurance, and for which there is much less knowledge.
There are similarities between safety and security risk-based arguments. Weinstock
et al. [428] demonstrated this when he used a risk argument structure to create
a security argument that considered vulnerabilities that could be introduced at
different stages of the lifecycle. He did note that the presence of an adversary makes
construction of security cases different to safety because they "attack where you least
expect" therefore the level of certainty you can have in the security argument is less
because it may have its assumptions unexpectedly violated.
Confidence Argument
Hawkins et al. [158] propose assured safety arguments, "a new structure for arguing
safety in which the safety argument is accompanied by a confidence argument
that documents the confidence in the structure and bases of the safety argument". They
go on to state that the "separation gives both arguments greater clarity of purpose,
and helps avoid the introduction of superfluous arguments and evidence" [158].
[158] recognises that arguments and evidence are often imperfect, therefore the
concept of an assurance deficit is introduced to describe any knowledge gap that
prohibits total confidence. Identifying and managing assurance deficits then becomes
the goal of the confidence argument. The assurance deficits or residual uncertainties
are linked to assurance claim points (ACP) in the safety risk argument. ACPs refer
to asserted inferences, assumptions, context, evidence, etc. The central idea is to
reason about each of the ACPs and systematically manage confidence.
2.3.3 Technical Risk & Causal Models
Fig. 2.7 The Effect of Security on Safety
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In the UK, the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 (HSE, 1974) states it is the duty
of employers to ensure the safety of its employees “so far as is reasonably practicable”.
This philosophy is better known in the safety community as the ALARP principle:
safety risk should be As Low As Reasonably Practicable. Depicted in Figure 2.7(a)
is the ALARP carrot diagram. The idea is to identify the level of a particular risk,
then systematically reduce that risk until it is ALARP and in the acceptable region
of risk. It is possible to reduce risk in one of three ways: i. Designing it out of a
system, ii. Engineering in controls, or iii. Having procedural mitigations.
Alongside the risk value is a window of variation which is analogous to a statistical
confidence interval; this represents the uncertainty in the estimation of risk. Several
factors affect this interval such as the competence of the practitioners, the rigour of
their processes, the limitations of the tools they use, etc. Safety is concerned with the
higher portion of this interval, and the potential for variance into the unacceptable
risk region. Thus, it is often a requirement by regulators for a confidence argument
to be provided with the safety risk argument or safety case.
Figure 2.7(b) shows the first problem of safety-security alignment. Practitioners
and engineers might follow an ALARP process and use their expert judgement to
estimate the level of a particular risk; however due to the presence of an intelligent
and motivated adversary the level of risk might be substantially higher in reality.
Therefore, models and artefacts used to support a safety case are inaccurate and
the safety argument is fundamentally under-mined. There are ways that this can be
minimised, for example verifying estimates made at design time against operational
data, however this is not always feasible.
Figure 2.7(c) shows the second problem for the safety-security interaction: there may
exist an estimation of risk, but the level of uncertainty may be high due to security
concerns. This could be the result of socio-technical factors, such as inadequate
processes, or the judgement of a practitioner with insufficient training.
Whilst the underlying reason for these two co-assurance problems is the uncertainty
introduced by security concerns, there are different treatments of uncertainty. Most
existing technical approaches focus solely on the uncertainty introduced in Problem 1
above, i.e. they attempt to improve the accuracy of risk level by considering security
sources of risk, but do not consider the implications of other assurance factors.
In addition to modelling risk levels, it is possible to model the relationships between
risk conditions such as faults, failures and risk to understand risk causation. In safety,
the three main types of causal model (accident model) are identified [404]:
simple linear - these are models that assume accidents are the "culmination of a
series of events which interact sequentially"
complex linear - these models presume that accidents result from "a combination
of unsare acts and latent hazard conditions with a system which follow a linear
path"
emergent - this model is non-linear and accidents occur as a result of "combinations
of mutually interacting variables"
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Conclusion
This chapter provided the core concepts for co-assurance used in this thesis. The
essential terms for assurance and risk were defined, as well as the concepts for
managing risk and creating technical risk arguments. Several co-assurance concepts
were proposed such as interaction risks and the SSAF Ontology. In the next Chapter,







The objective of this thesis is to develop a framework for co-assurance of system
safety and cyber security. Development began in the previous Chapter 2 where the
essential concepts needed for co-assurance were defined and discussed. To identify
knowledge gaps and inform further framework development, this chapter will review
existing standards, approaches and challenges.
Chapter Structure. The chapter is structured in four sections. Section 3.1 provides
details about the research processes followed, sources of information and intended
outcomes of the review. Sections 3.2-3.4 provide the output from each of the
review stages - namely, the approaches review, standards review, and socio-technical
challenges review. The chapter concludes with a discussion about the existing gaps
for co-assurance, and the desirable properties of a co-assurance framework.
3.1 Review Methodology
When considering the hypothesis:
Using a framework that explicitly considers both technical risk
and socio-technical factors results in a more robust safety-security
co-assurance argument.
there are two predominant threats - (i) there already exists a framework or approach
for creating robust co-assurance arguments, and (ii) the challenges for co-assurance
are unclear or unknown, therefore the framework’s utility and robustness cannot be
evaluated. To address these threats, a three-phase review approach shown in Figure
3.1 is adopted.
Phase 1: Approaches Review - this phase is concerned with identifying existing
approaches to co-assurance, co-analysis, co-engineering, and modelling safety
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Fig. 3.1 Outcomes of Three-Phase Review
and security. The process steps are - (1) A general search using broad search
terms such as "cyber security and system safety" and "security for safety-critical
systems" to obtain a set of over 200 research papers. (2) The approaches in the
papers are reviewed, analysed and categorised. Papers that referred to just one
domain AND did not add new information about underlying causal models were
excluded. (3) A refined search of adaptations to existing techniques is done,
and the approach categories are expanded or refined further. The outcome
of this phase is a set of approaches for safety and security with benefits and
limitations for each.
Phase 2: Standards Review - this phase is concerned with identifying approaches
and philosophies of existing guidance documents and frameworks. It consists of
three process steps similar to Phase 1: (1) General search to identify popular1
standards for safety and security. (2) Describe and analyse the standard, giving
detail about the underlying philosophy or principles where possible. (3) Refined
search per application domain (e.g. healthcare, nuclear, aerospace, industrial
control systems, etc. ) to identify sector-specific guidance. The outcome of this
phase is a set of descriptions of existing standards, guidelines and frameworks
for safety and security.
Phase 3: Challenges Review - the previous phases have mainly explored risk
analysis, failure modelling and the process for handling inter-domain risk. This
phase is concerned with exploring socio-technical challenges of co-assurance;
that is, the factors that would impact the safety-security process or artefacts.
The review process for this phase consists of steps: (1) Identifying socio-technical
factors from literature and qualitative research data. (2) Describing, analysing
and categorising the factors and using the analysis to identify additional factors.
1These are standards that are widely adopted in either engineering domain.
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(3) Searching the literature using terms related to the categories, and iteratively
refining the search. The outcome of this step is a descriptive list of socio-
technical challenges.
Sources - research search engines such as Google Scholar and CORE are used to
obtain the academic literature. A general engine (Google) is used to discover
grey literature (e.g. reports, white papers, unpublished articles, Government
guidance). The keywords selected were initially wide to get a broad picture
of the field of safety-security co-assurance, but later refined based on findings
during analysis of papers.
Outcomes - the outcomes for each of the review phases are structured in categories
to organise the information. The categories for Phases 1 and 2 were adapted
from categories used in by Kriaa [253] and Paul et al. [326] respectively. The
categories for the socio-technical challenges are adapted from the socio-technical
systems model proposed by Bostrom [56]2. The stopping criteria for each phase
are determined by the coverage and balance of the category3. Table 3.1 lists
the review categories for each phase.
Table 3.1 Categories for each Review Phase
Review Phase Approaches Standards ST Challenges
Categories Bowties General Concept
Guidewords Aerospace Structure
Graphical Models Healthcare People




3.2 Safety and Security Review
This section contains the output from Phase 1 review of safety-security approaches.
Further detail about the approaches discussed here can be found in Appendix B.1.
3.2.1 Approaches using Bowties
Bowtie analysis is a risk analysis approach that allows practitioners to reason about
risks, their causes, effects as well as prevention and recovery mechanisms. It is
so-called because of the shape of the many-to-one, one-to-may relationships that
individual risks have with their causes and effects. Due to its easy-to-understand
representation and ability to capture the core elements of risk analysis and mitigation,
bowties have been adopted in many instances for co-engineering. Abdo et al. [7]
present a unified approach using bowties, extended attack trees and a global industrial
2Further justification for using Bostrom’s model is given in Chapter 6.
3If a category is sparsely populated, the review process steps are followed to balance the numbers
of review items in each category. The intent is to minimise bias towards an approach or challenge.
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risk definition to analyse undesireable events caused by both safety incidents and
security breaches. Bernsmed et al. [46] use bowties to integrate security impact
on safety risk into a single modelling environment that uses simple, visual red,
amber, green indicators. Domain specific examples of bowties include application to
cyber-physical systems [437] and healthcare [289].
The primary benefit of using bowties for risk analysis is the simple diagrammatic
representation of sources, barriers, risks and their outcomes. In an experiment,
Meland et al. [291] found that, although the identification of mitigations differed,
non-experts’ identification of risks was similar to that of experts. The approach is also
very flexible and can be adapted to suit the needs of a project or system. However,
this flexibility can also be a disadvantage - the variability and subtle differences
between various bowties makes it difficult to objectively compare the sufficiency of
the models. The models are also linear, therefore it is difficult to capture emergent
risks, common causes or the development of risks over time for co-assurance (such as
would occur with advanced persistent threats).
3.2.2 Approaches using Guidewords
One common way to reason about potential causes of risks is to use semi-structured
brainstorming with specialised guidewords. Several techniques in both safety and
security are based on this premise, examples include Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis (FMEA) [310], Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOPs) [183], and
STRIDE [238].
FMEA
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and its adaptation to consider criticality
of consequences - Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) is a
forward-search approach that uses guidewords for structured reasoning about the
consequences of system or component failures occurring [310]. Common guidewords
related to failures of omission and commission, as well as timing and sequence failures.
There are several guidance and standard documents that include information about
the process and model for FMEA [8, 12, 28, 185]. The approach has also been adapted
to many sectors such as engine systems [436], automotive [85], healthcare [65, 73],
and manufacturing automation [18].
For safety-security co-analysis, FMEAs have been used in diverse applications.
Schmittner et al. [363] and Chen et al. [70] consider vulnerabilities along with
the safety failures in the FMVEA approach. Schmittner et al. [362] further expand
on this idea by using STRIDE analysis to create FMEVA which considers the
vulnerability cause-effect chain in more detail and interweaves safety and security
concerns more closely. Silva et al. [376] and Li et al. [270] utilise FMEA for single-
domain information security risk management, using dimensions such as access,
communication, infrastructure, etc.
FMEA is simple and effective at generating potential failures for a system or
component. Given that knowledge of these failures comes mainly from experts,
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and that FMEA provides a systematic way to elicit those failures [77, 185], this
approach is well suited to reasoning about safety and security in diverse contexts
by a team or single analyst [95]. However there are some limitations to using the
FMEA approach for co-assurance, such as
• the constraint of analysing single causes [362] and unclear dependencies between
failures may be an issue for combinatorial, multi-stage attacks on a system
• because it is often based on system processes, functions or components, FMEA
may not elicit failures in safety behaviour or intent [268] and there may be
difficulty determining the completeness of the failures that are identified
• inconsistency of analysis between teams dependent on factors such as training,
knowledge, bias and competence [398]
• for experts it is time consuming and repetitive to analyse each failure in this
way, especially when many failures may not have a high safety or security risk
impact [95, 398]. Even though the process can be partially automated, the
number of failure modes is exponential with the complexity of multi-layered
systems
HAZOP
Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP) is an approach originating in the process
industries for structured examination of deviations in behaviour or flows. The
approach involves a multi-disciplinary team using a set of guidewords such as
(omission, commission, early, late, too much, too little) to produce a list of hazards [183,
242]. Like FMEA, HAZOP has many adaptations for safety and security, such as
organisation analysis [60], analysing risks in the supply chain [9], and analysis of
security requirements [383] and causation in hardware and software [87, 433]. For co-
assurance, Raspotnig et al. [347] introduce the Combined Harm Assessment of Safety
and Security for Information Systems (CHASSIS), which uses a HAZOP-like process
to elicit joint requirements. HAZOP-like analyses have also been applied to general
security [138, 426] and to specific safety-related domains such as automotive [114, 364].
The benefits of HAZOP include that it provides a thorough, systematic examination
of deviations from normal system behaviour, including those caused by humans or
that are difficult to quantify [77, 337]. HAZOP is also a widely adopted approach,
therefore competence and understanding its limitations is more common amongst
practitioners; this potentially improves risk analysis and management [96]. HAZOP,
does however have some limitations, such as
• generating deviations may be time-consuming and may become a check-list
activity [43]
• when considering security threats, the approach may generate a lot of text
and may be tedious [433], especially considering deviations for variations on
scenarios: different locations of components, data transfer options, etc.
• there is a high reliance on expert judgement [43] – application of CHASSIS
suggest that more expert knowledge is required than FMVEA [364] and that
elements of CHASSIS are not reusable
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• stopping criteria for considering combinations of deviations and recognising
when ’sufficient completeness’ has been reached is difficult for analysts using
HAZOP [426]
STRIDE
STRIDE analysis is a security guideword approach developed by Microsoft researchers [244].
It derives its name from the security guidewords it uses to prompt analysts: Spoofing,
Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service, and Elevation of
privilege. STRIDE helps to identify ’things that might go wrong’ for security [374, p
62-64], however the it does not provide threat information or the exact mechanisms
for how this might occur - it is often used in combination with other approaches such
as Attack Trees.
Due to its similarity to safety guideword approaches, STRIDE has been adapted
several times for co-analysis. Strandberg et al. [394] use four-phase risk assessment
approach that incorporates STRIDE. In automotive, Security-Aware Hazard and Risk
Analysis Method (SAHARA) uses a combination of STRIDE security analysis and a
HAZOP-like process for safety [278]. Baron et al. [36] use STRIDE to understand
the security aspects of "Internet of Wings", and Kaur et al. [231] apply STRIDE in
a quantitative risk management process for automotive and nuclear respectively.
DREAD analysis is often used alongside STRIDE for risk assessment [54]. The
name derives from the attack consequences guidewords used in the analysis: Damage
potential, Reliability, Exploitability, Affected users, and Discoverability. It can be
used to create a risk priority number (RPN) to classify threats [279]. DREAD has
been found to be useful in industrial contexts to include threat analysis into systems
development. However, similar to STRIDE, one of DREAD’s major limitations is
the lack of rigour [260] and the fact that the analysis and classification is strongly
dependent on the beliefs and understanding of the analysts [372].
There have also been more general co-assurance adaptations such as using STRIDE
for security extensions of safety architectural patterns [339] and cyber-physical
systems [238], as well as augmenting FMEA [335] and STPA [89, 229] analyses with
security aspects. The major benefit of STRIDE is that it is a lightweight analysis [238]
that helps to discover interaction risks that may not have been reached with standard
safety risk analysis approaches alone [89]. However, there are some limitations of
this approach which include:
• the approach can be resource-intensive [373] and may require a high degree of
competence and system knowledge to be effective, which make it unsuited for
analysing very complex or networked systems-of-systems in great depth [278]
• although there are some clear benefits due to STRIDE’s flexibility, rigour may
be lacking as a result [260], and the flexibility in how the approach is applied
and represented may obscure the nature of dependencies for co-assurance, for
example if the guidewords are used in different ways
• there may be repetition of threats in multiple STRIDE classes, difficulty in
establishing objective measures of sufficienty and completeness, and difficulty
classifying threats [373, p64]
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• although the safety analyses that are augmented by STRIDE provide a ligthweight
approach to integration or unification, they are often silent on when or how
often this integration should occur and
• it does not appear that the analysis can be done iteratively or incrementally
- understanding the effects of new vulnerabilities in relation to the overall
analysis is unclear
CRAF
The Cyber Risk Assessment Framework (CRAF) presents a four-step process for
aligning safety and security using data properties [31]. The steps are: (i) Single
domain risk assessment (security) (ii) Communicating a decision (iii) Raising conflict,
and (iv) Resolving conflict. Conflict between safety and security is identified by
using a mapping between safety and security data properties derived from safety
guidance [368] and a security standard [306]. Even with though this approach
provides clearer semantic guidance about attribute mapping between domains, the
focus is currently security-informed safety and there is a question about the sufficiency
and completeness of the mappings created.
3.2.3 Approaches using Graphical Models
Graphical approaches to safety and security include those co-analyses that are
represented in directed, acyclic graphs such as Fault Trees, Event Trees, Attack Trees
and Bayesian Belief Networks. The primary advantage of graphical models over
guidewords is the ability to capture properties of the nodes and their relationships in
a model.
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
FTA is a ’backward search’ analysis approach for understanding failures that
contribute to a top level event [357]. It is a systematic analysis approach with
established standards for the process [123, 357] which results in a hierarchical tree
structure of events (nodes) connected by logic gates (AND and OR). Through the
concept of failure space, FTA provides a view of the system that demonstrates the
causal dependencies between abnormal and undesired conditions [123, 274, 357].
Although it originates in the analysis of hardware reliability, Fault Tree Analysis
has been adapted for many applications within safety and security. Two of the most
used adaptations are Event Trees and Attack Trees.
Event Tree Analysis
In safety, Event Trees use a similar logical structure to FTA of events connected
by Boolean logic. The purpose of Event Trees is to qualitatively reason about
the outcomes and consequences of a particular event occurring. This systematic,
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structured approach can be partially automated [410] or adapted to include dynamic
events [213] thereby increasing effectiveness of the analysis.
Attack Tree Analysis
In security, Attack Trees represent a ’backward search’ starting from an attack top
level event and reasoning about the attacks, threats, vulnerabilities and conditions
that led to it [286, 366, 367]. The top event represent the global target, and the
child nodes are refinements of subgoals. Attack trees have been extensively used
for multiple security applications such as threat trees [118, 261, 284, 312, 400],
fault trees for attack modelling [386] and extensions of and tools for attack tree
modelling [248, 360, 366, 403]. The approach has also been applied to security for
diverse application domains such as automotive [13, 164] and understanding social
attack modelling [33, 122, 350].
Combined Trees
The unambiguous semantics of the hierarchical tree structure provides a good basis
for combining safety and security aspects. Whilst it is a challenge to create uniform
likelihood for notes and traversal paths, tree analysis has been used to quantitatively
and qualitatively integrate cyber attacks with fault trees [140, 388–390], for attack
fault trees [254], for human engineering attacks in safety-critical systems [239]. Failure-
Attack-Countermeasure (FACT) Graphs are an approach proposed by Sabaliauskaite
and Mathur [358] which consists of a process and model for combing attacks, failures,
faults and countermeasures. The process is based on processes in the ISA 84 and
ISA 994 industrial control standards for safety and security respectively [358]. The
approach involves separate risk analysis and assessment processes with one major
joint activity for safety and security alignment; the outcome of this activity in FACT
graphs which capture relationships to attack trees, fault three, safety and security
requirements, and countermeasures [358].
Benefits and Limitations of Tree Approaches
Using trees for co-analysis highlights multiple types of weakness in systems [75, 94].
The systematic process and logic-based structure provides a common modelling
language for safety and security analysts, and a way to understand cross-domain
relationships between failure and attacks thereby promoting more collaborative
work. The graphical representation also visually maps out the relationships between
conditions which may help practitioners to understand the connections better than
the text-based analyses previously mentioned. Trees are particularly effective for
complex systems with many interfaces [77].
However, even with these benefits, tree approaches to co-analysis present some
challenges related to analysts’ assumptions and modelled dependencies:
4ISA 99 is the predecessor to IEC 62443 security for IACS.
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• Generalisations and Inferences
– for combined trees there is a requirement for nodes to have uniform
likelihood and equal traversal paths which may be a resource-intensive
task for experts; for example [315] found creating fault tree proofs time
consuming because of the need to find the right inductive arguments
– even when modelled, tree analyses may miss important scenarios [267]; for
example it is difficult determining the capabilities of a malicious actor [107]
– for combined trees, a major difference between their component safety
and security trees is the intent of the actors [440], this may mean that
extra work is needed to understand the effect of malicious actors on the
confidence of independence assumptions
– pathways and initiating events must be discovered or predicted by the
experts performing the analysis, and only one initiating event can be
considered at a time [75] which may be ill-suited to emergent co-assurance
concerns
• Decomposability and Independence
– related to the previous challenge points, tree approaches make an assumption
about independence of nodes and the decomposability of events to order
them hierarchically [53] which may not be accurate
– due to the constraint of analysing one top event at a time, trees may be
inefficient for combinatorial consideration of events, and may have limited
utility identifying cross-domain systematic failures [94]
– whilst it is possible to have phase-dependent tool support [419], trees are
generally static models which do not address the time dependencies [77,
281, 357]
• Traceability
– also related to the previous challenge points, there is often difficulty
relating the trees to the system models [53] and difficulty relating goal
nodes of multiple trees, therefore other analyses may be needed to elicit
these relationships
– lastly there is a need for greater tool and method support for sharing
resources and expertise [107] to create more collaborative analyses
3.2.4 Approaches using Systems Theory
The previous approaches discussed in this chapter have linear or complex causal
models which may make it difficult to identify systemic risks. This section discusses
two approaches with emergent causal models which have been used for system risk
co-analysis.
STPA
Systems Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) is a risk analysis approach that uses
control structures to determine system-level risks [266, 267]. It originates from the
safety domain and uses the STAMP model of accident causation. Leveson et al. [264]
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state that important factors are often missing from commonly used approaches5
which leads to overlooking the underlying cause of a hazard. Unlike the independence
assumptions of the previous approaches, STPA "assumes that not only can causal
factors be dependent, but also that the behavior of (non-failed) components might be
highly influential on other aspects of the system" Leveson et al. [264].
Due to its underlying emergent causal model, and its ability to allow analysts to
structure top-down reasoning about system risk, STPA has been adapted multiple
times for co-analysis: (i) STPA-Sec considers insecure control actions and losses
due to security [440]. STPA-Sec has been improved by use in combination with
other approaches [405, 406] and with NIST controls [228]. (ii) STPA-SafeSec also
proposes a process to include security concerns in STPA [141]. (iii) Systems-Theoretic
Likelihood and Severity Analysis (STLSA) is a risk assessment that combines FMVEA
and system control analysis. (iv) SafSecTropos is a method that combines STPA and
Secure Tropos [232]. (v) STPA has also been combined with ADTs (attack defence
trees) for explicit consideration of threats [19]. (vi) Security-aware STPA has been
applied to many safety-related domains such as space systems [282], automotive [371,
441], autonomous mining [375], and analysing the industrial control Stuxnet [308].
The key advantage of this approach is that it takes a systems view of risk and allows
for analysis of emergent conditions for safety and security. The relationships between
the control models used for the analysis and the system models can also be defined as
they often use the same components. Another advantage is that it facilitates human
review which can reduce potential incompleteness of risks [440]. However, even with
the number of adaptations of STPA for security, and the benefits it presents, there
remain some challenges:
• the relationship between the security and safety aspects of security-aware STPA
is implicit, therefore it may be difficult to reason about incremental change
• security STPA may present a limited view of those risks in a system that cannot
be modelled in the control structure, for example time-dependent attacks
• due to its reliance on abstraction and refinement to determine what is important
for system risk, security-aware STPA is very dependent on the competence of
experts performing the analysis
• due to the focus on control structures, some security information may not be
incorporated such as threat information or confidentiality vulnerabilities. [440]
states ". . . the physical (or proximate) cause of a disruption does not really
matter. What matters is the efficacy of the strategy in dealing with (controlling)
the effects of that disruption on overall system function”, however there may
be instances where the proximate causes are relevant to co-analysis
• STPA-Sec was found to be most applicable during the concept-phase of a
system, and has a strong focus on intended control, however tends not to cover
more information-centric considerations [365]
5Such as FTA and FMEA.
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FRAM
The Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) [168, 169] was developed to
analyse safety by looking at success factors and functional variability and resonance.
FRAM consists of four steps [168]: (i) Identify essential system functions and
characterise them using the six basic aspects which are {time, inputs, outputs,
control, preconditions, and resources} (ii) Check model completeness and consistency
(iii) Characterise variability (iv) Define functional resonance based on dependencies.
The output of the analysis is represented with hexagons with relationships between
the function representations. The objective is to understand not only the human
error mechanisms for a system, but the criteria for success. FRAM has been applied
to Safety, Security and Resilience Objecives of an off-shore wind application [245]
and had some success in identifying interrelations and dependencies of stakeholder
goals. However, there are some constraints to using this approach such as:
• due to modelling the six aspects for each system function and the relationships
between them, FRAM models can be quite complex for systems with a large
number of functions
• creating the FRAM model requires expertise and understanding of the process
and the aspects of the analysis
• the underlying causal model for risk analysis is not stated explicitly [269]
3.2.5 Approaches using Architecture
This section presents approaches to co-analysis that rely on the system architecture
and models for safety and security.
ATAM
Architecture Trade-off Analysis Method (ATAM) [233] is a process for expert
stakeholders to identify and manage architectural risks early in the System Development
Lifecycle. It does not originate from either safety or security, but from systems
engineering. Stakeholders meet to perform 8 steps [234, p 7-8]:
1. Present the ATAM
2. Present the business drivers
3. Present the architecture
4. Present architectural approaches
5. Develop quality attribute utility tree
6. Analyse the architectural approaches against the attribute refinement
7. Prioritise scenarios
8. Analyse the architectural approaches against the scenarios
There are several advantages to using this approach as it engages multiple stakeholders
at design stage, and provides a systematic process for sharing knowledge and making
architectural trade-offs for multiple attributes. However there are some limitations:
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• whilst the process helps to structure trade-off it does not provide heuristics of
guidance on how to make those trade-off decisions
• the resources and knowledge of the system required for this method may not be
available after a system has been in use and a new vulnerability is discovered
• the process is time-consuming with some evaluations taking several days to
weeks [234, p 43]
DDA
Dependability Deviation Analysis (DDA) [99] is a safety and security analysis method
developed to identify concerns, joint risk analysis, identifying applicable deviations
and creating a dependability case [99]. The approach identifies failure conditions and
loss from the perspective from each attributee [103] and can be applied to complex
systems [100]. DDA relies on modular GSN to represent the dependability case, and
has associated methods such as the Trade-Off Method (TOM), Factor Analysis and
Decision Alternatives (FANDA) for establishing the bouds of risk acceptability and
handling conflicts. DDA trade-off between the attributes is reliant on the concept of
operational tolerance and compromise [101].
Whilst DDA presents several advantages such as a unified, modular process for
considering safety and security using system models as a basis, there are some
constraints:
• due to the lack of a universal definition of loss, the process does not provide
guidance on defining loss and issues [99, p 110] however when considering safety
and security this may be an essential part of composing the dependability case
• as with other approaches, the analysis is dependent on the competence and
expertise of the analysts participating
• the roles, responsibilities and accountability for each DDA step is unclear, and
this may be important when defining cross-domain risk and deviations
3.2.6 Approaches using Argumentation
For the attribute distinction, there are many single-domain arguments discussed in
the literature. There are assurance arguments for
safety – Safety cases in [49, 47, 159, 236]
security – Security cases in [50, 130, 131, 273, 428]. and
dependability – Dependability cases in [51, 99, 100]. which includes safety and
security as well as other attributes. However, what we are concerned with for
co-assurance is the interactions between the arguments.
Whilst many of these argument examples are useful and help with understanding
reasoning, their presence does not automatically improve co-assurance. An example
of connecting the arguments is Johnson’s [215] integration of security claims in the
form of contradictory evidence to a safety case using an extension of GSN. This is
promising progress, however there is still work needed to understand the linkages
across domains.
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3.3 Standards and Guidance Review
This section contains a critical review of the standards and guidance that are either
directly applicable to a safety-security assurance framework, or they encapsulate
valuable information that can be used to inform the framework. During the review a
trend emerged related to how the standards and guidance documents aligned safety
and security, shown in Figure 3.2. Some standards and guidance are general and
make little or no reference to the other attribute. Some standards and guidance are
specific to a single attribute, either safety or security, but have defined relationships
to the other attributes as shown in Figure 3.2 (a) and (b). Lastly, Figure 3.2 (c)
represents those standards and guidance documents which are purposefully created
to address both safety and security.
Fig. 3.2 Types of Co-Assurance Guidance and Standards
Table 3.2 provides an overview of the standards reviewed by category (application
domain) and type (alignment approach). These will be discussed further in this
section. A full review of each standard and guidance document can be found in
Appendix B.2. By the end of this section the aim is to understand the underlying
principles and philosophies driving each of the standards, with a view to use this
knowledge to help towards a solution.
3.3.1 General
IEC 61508:2010 [189] is a functional safety standard originally developed in an
industrial control context for electrical/electronic/programmable electronic (E/E/PE)
systems. The standard has since been adapted to several other safety-related domains
such as rail (EN 50128), automotive (ISO 26262), medical devices (ISO 14971) and
aerospace (ARP 4754A). IEC 61508 consists of an entire lifecycle process and
requirements for system, hardware and software safety divided into seven parts; for
example Part 1 [186] provides the overall concept and scope, Part 3 [187] contains the
software safety process and requirements, and Part 4 [188] contains terminology. The
risk process includes steps such as determining hazards and their contributors, the
consequences of a hazard occurring, defining tolerable risk and developing measures
to address the hazards. One of the methods it uses to achieve this is the definition
of Safety Integrity Levels (SILs) and target failure measures.
Security concerns are explicitly mentioned in three objectives clauses in IEC 61508-
1:2010 [186]. This includes the requirement to consider malevolent and unauthorised
actions during risk analysis, preventing unauthorised persons adversely affecting
the system, and that specifying security policies is out of scope of the standard.
There are several clauses which are affected by security implicitly such as 7.4.2.3
which states that hazards shall be determined under all "reasonably foreseeable
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Table 3.2 Standards and Guidance for Co-Assurance
Domain Safety Security Joint
Common Criteria
ISO 27K-Series IET Code of Practice




Aerospace ARP 4754A DO-326A
DO-178C
J3061
Automotive ISO 26262 ISO 21434 PAS 11281
PAS 1885
Def Stan 00-56 JSP 440
Defence Mil-Std-882E CMMC
ASEMS
Forensics HSE Guidance ISO 27043
Healthcare ISO 14971 AAMI TIR57
FDA Safety FDA Security
IEC 62443 IEC TR 63069
Industrial Control HSE IACS ISA TR 84.09
NIST 800-82
Maritime SOLAS MSC-FAL.1
Nuclear IAEA Safety IAEA Security
ONR SAPS ONR SyAPS
EN 50126
Rail EN 50128 TS 50701
EN 50129
circumstances including misuse"[186, p 27]. Several references are made to IEC 62443
the international security standard for industrial control systems.
Even though IEC 61508 was "conceived with a rapidly developing technology in
mind" the intent is unlikely to have included the pace of change and volume of
new vulnerabilities introduced by security. In addition, the standard’s failure
model is primarily based on systematic failures and random failures which, in
some circumstances, may not cover those security concerns where no failures occur.
There are several security standards that are generally applied to safety-related
systems and the wider systems that they are connected to, such as enterprise systems.
ISO 15408 also known as Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
presents functional and assurance requirements for systems. It assists practitioners to
develop Protection Profiles for different types of safety-related systems. The Common
Methodology presents a complementary process for security. Common Criteria has
three parts: Part 1 provides the general model, Part 2 provides functional security
requirements, and Part 3 provides security assurance requirements.
The ISO 27000 family of standards and guidelines is one example. ISO/IEC
27001:2017 [205] presents requirements for human, organisation and risk management.
ISO 27001, ISO 27004 and ISO 27005 are predominantly process focused, however
there are standards that propose security controls, requirements and objectives such
as ISO 27002. Risk management standard ISO/IEC 27005:2011 [206] adheres to the
Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) process model and provides general information about
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identifying risk, implementing controls, risk acceptance and monitoring throughout
system operation.
The NIST 800 series is another family of security standards and guidelines to address
both general and application-specific security. Examples of guidance in the series
include NIST SP 800-12 which provides an overview of information security, roles,
responsibilities, threats, risk management and assurance. NIST SP 800-30 provides
further guidance on conducting risk assessments and NIST SP 800-53 provides
controls. The NIST 800 guidance also follows a PDCA model for the process.
In addition to international standards and guidance, there are several cyber security
frameworks proposed by governments such as NIST Cybersecurity Framework
for Critical Infrastructure [305] in the US, and the UK NCSC Cyber Assessment
Framework (CAF) [300]. The NIST Framework is based on the functions Identify-
Protect-Detect-Respond-Recover, and CAF presents four objectives for minimising
risk in national infrastructure: Managing risk - Protecting against cyber attack -
Detecting events, and - Minimising impact.
3.3.2 Security-Informed Safety
Security-informed safety standards and guidance are those where safety takes
precedence in risk management and assurance. The application-domain specific
guidance that is security-informed safety is:
Aerospace - For the safety of aircraft, standards and guidance ARP 4754A/ED
79A [27], ARP 4761 and DO-178C provide processes for system and software
assurance, as well as supporting methods. The assurance process is based on a
V-model system lifecycle and involves assessing risk and allocating Development
Assurance Levels (DALs) for assurance. ARP 4754A also defines roles and
responsibilities for the associated activities. There are no explicit requirements
to address security in either ARP 4754A or ARP 4761, however in a similar
way to IEC 61508 there is implicit inclusion of security contributors to safety
risk.
Automotive - ISO 26262 [198] is the 10-part automotive standard for functional
safety based on IEC 61508. It provides processes and requirements for the entire
system lifecycle including development of hardware and software components.
PAS 21448 is automotive Safety of the Intended Function (SOTIF) [382]
which manages risk related to the intended behaviour of the system including
situational awareness, foreseeable misuse and environmental factors. SOTIF
addresses the fact that hazardous behaviour might arise in the absence of faults;
many security concerns would relate to this type of risk.
Defence - Defence standards for the development and procurement of safety-related
systems tend to be country or region specific. An example is the UK’s Def
Stan 00-56 [90] which provides safety requirements and a risk process for
procurement of products, services and systems. Def Stan 00-56 refers to security
directly and obliges the contractor to consider cyber security risk that may
contribute to a hazard. The standard is supported by frameworks such as
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ASEMS6 [92]. MIL-STD-882E [293] is the US DoD standard for eliminating
hazards and minimising risks; whilst there are no explicit requirements for
security in the standard, consideration of cyber contributions to safety risk is
expected.
Forensics - Due to legal obligations, there are many standards and guidance
documents for post-incident activities for safety which are often application-
domain specific. The UK HSE7 has released guidance related to learning
from incidents [48] which contains the core processes that are found in safety
forensic standards: incident reporting, prioritisation, characterisation, detailed
assessment, proactive interpretation and dissemination. There is no explicit
mention of security, however some level of coordination would be required
between forensic processes if a cyber incident led to a safety consequence.
Conflicts between information handling and recording would most likely need
to be negotiated and resolved prior to an incident.
Healthcare - Legislation, governance and regulation of healthcare systems usually
occurs at national or regional level. For medical device safety there is the ISO
14971 [194] standard which is partially based on the risk management process
outline in IEC 61508. There are no explicit requirements for cyber security,
however like other safety standards there is the implicit need to consider security
contributions to safety risk.
Maritime - The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) [379]
provides safety requirements for ships. It contains 14 chapters of objectives,
however there is little security focus even though it is increasingly recognised
as a challenge for safety.
Nuclear - IAEA8 has released several Safety Standards containing principles,
requirements and recommendations for nuclear safety [176]. This contains
principles relating to aspects such as responsibility, roles, leadership, justification,
protection and emergency preparedness [178]. Specific Safety Requirements
standard SSR-3 [181] requires that the interfaces between safety and security
are addressed throughout the reactor lifetime, and Specific Safety Guide SSG-
48 [182] requires that implementation of requirements will satisfy both safety
and security objectives. A similar approach to IAEA has been adopted by
national regulatory bodies such as UK ONR Safety Assessment Prinicples
(SAPS) [313] which provides guidance on leadership, regulation, engineering,
protection and decommissioning.
Rail - The International EN 5012X family of rail standards provides guidance on
risk process, system and hardware elements. Amendement 2 of EN 50128 [121]
explicitly states that the standard doe snot provide security requirements, but
it does refer to security standards.
6Acquisition Safety & Environment Management System.
7Health & Safety Executive
8International Atomic Energy Agency.
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3.3.3 Safety-Informed Security
Safety-informed security standards and guidance documents are those where security
is the focus, however interactions with safety are defined or their intended use is for
a safety-related system:
Aerospace - DO-326A/ED202A [108] the Airworthiness Security Process Specification
was developed to address the security aspects of aircraft certification. DO-
326A provides a process and methods for aligning security activities with both
the system development activities and safety process. STRIDE analysis and
DREAD assessment are two security methods that have been applied as part
of activities in DO-326A [36]. Even though this standard provides interaction
points and data flow between safety and security, information tends to flow
from safety to security with no explicit flows from security to safety or guidance
on how to make trade-offs when conflicts. arrive.
Automotive - SAE J3061 [211] is the Cybersecurity Guidebook for Cyber-Physical
Vehicle Systems which provides guidance on identifying security risks and
designing for cybersecurity throughout the system lifecycle. J3061 defines
processes, analysis techniques, templates for work products and controls. Many
activities in the defined process mirror the safety activities outlined in ISO 26262,
such as TARA9 being complementary to the safety HARA10. The standard
ISO/SAE 21434 [197] for Cybersecurity Engineering of Road Vehicles is
currently still under development, however it is intended to supersede J3061.
ISO 21434 framework aims to present a risk process decoupled from, but related
to, safety and to foster a cybersecurity culture. Based on these standards,
several synergies have been identified between safety and security [20, 83, 377].
Other automotive guidance that is relevant to co-assurance is PAS 1885 [323]
which provides principles for security governance and risk management, and
PAS 11281 [322] which provides guidance on police and management of safety
and secure design of connected autonomous vehicles.
Defence - JSP 440 [226] the UK Defence Manual of Security, which is referenced
by Def Stan 00-56, has several parts to manage several aspects of security
including protective policies, physical security, risk management, information
and communication security. The standard provides extensive guidance for
security, however what remains unclear is when interactions with security
should occur. Whilst there are no explicit requirements for security in MIL-
STD-882E, the DoD expects all acquisitions to adhere to the Cybersecurity
Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) [415] which is based on the NIST
framework and guidance.
Forensics - There exist multiple standards and guidance documents for forensic
activities after a security incident, examples include NIST SP 800-61 [74]
for organising incident response capability and handling the incident, and ISO
27043 [207] which provides processes for readiness, planning and executing
post-incident activities. The guidance in both of these documents allows for
9J3016 Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment.
10ISO 26262 Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment.
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their application to safety-related systems, however there may be a challenge
in synchronising activities with safety forensic processes and challenges around
responsible disclosure for security.
Healthcare - There are currently no international standards for cyber security of
healthcare systems, however there are laws that determine how cyber risk
should be handled such as those introduced by GDPR and the NIS Directive.
Some regional bodies such as ENISA11 have released guidance on security
services and functional requirements for the health sector [124]. At national
level, examples of guidance includes the UK NHS standards for security [412]
which includes principles for risk management, confidentiality, handling cyber
attacks and strategies for protecting healthcare IT systems. For security of
medical devices there is guidance such as AAMI TIR 57 [6] which provides
a risk management process with interactions with the process in ISO 14971,
and guidance from FDA [133, 134, 136] which defines requirements for security
of COTS, pre- and post-market security.
Industrial Control - For security of industrial control systems there is the IEC
62443 [5] series of guidance and standards. The guidance is based on the ISO
27000 guidance. IEC 62443 considers different perspectives such as governance,
functionality, systems, interfaces, activities and criteria based on assets [190].
It uses the PDCA process and the risk model proposed in Common Criteria
for three types of assets - physical, logical and human. Whilst IEC 62443
is the security counterpart to the IEC 61508 there is little detail about the
nature of the relationships between safety and security. The UK HSE has also
released Operational Guidance 86 - HSE OG-86 [174] on the cuber security
of IACS. HSE OG-86 proposes a systematic process for risk throughout the
lifetime of a system [174, p 8], and recommends the use of a Cyber Security
Management System (CSMS) based on risk management, protecting against
attacks, detecting security events and minimising impact [174, p 10]. Whilst
there is progress for IACS co-assurance there remain some challenges such as
modelling compliance, evaluating risk posture and resolving the subjectivity of
risk assessments [243].
Maritime - MSC-FAL.1 [296] and MSC.428 [297] is guidance with the purpose of
providing recommendations for cyber risk management. The recommendations
are based on the Identify-Protect-Detect-Respond-Recovere cycle and apply
to various maritime systems such as bridge systems, communication, cargo
handling, etc. The guidance references ISO 27001 requirements and the NIST
Framework. This guidance focusses on people, process and technology aspects.
Other guidance for ships exists such as the IET Code of Practice for Cyber
Security [2] which recommends developing a security plan including supply
chain security, and has a similar conceptual model to PAS 1885. ENISA has
also produced guidance on Port Cybersecurity [3, 4] which provides information
about the regulatory landscape, port infrastructure security, policies and
practices for cyber risk.
Nuclear - IAEA has released Nuclear Security Standards [177] that contain essential
elements [179] such as state responsibility, regulatory framework, identification
11European Union Agency for Network and Information Security.
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and management of nuclear security threats, planning and preparedness. Whilst
there are some joint safety-security requirements, there are some areas where
the relationship to the safety principles is unclear. A similar approach to nuclear
security has also been adopted by UK ONR who developed Security Assessment
Principles for the Civil Nuclear Industry [314] which provides guidance on
responsibilities, lifecycle, requirements and security plan development. In
addition there are international guidance on information security aspects of
nuclear power plants - BS EN 60880 [62].
Rail - The Technical Specification TS 50701 [409] is the guidance for Railway
Applications Cybersecurity based on IEC 62443. A major benefit is the rail-
specific requirements for security.
3.3.4 Bi-Directional Approaches
The most relevant standards and guidance for co-assurance are those that are designed
specifically for the interactions between safety and security during the system lifecycle.
The IET Code of Practice (CoP) - Cyber Security and Safety [192] is guidance
that proposes 15 shared principles for safety and security. The IET CoP describes the
challenges for safety and security, as well as principles for organisational structures,
governance, processes, competence and risk management. Whilst the guidance
provides solid principles for aligning safety and security at all levels of a system and
organisation, however the current guidance does not provide a workflow or process
with interaction points for the attributes.
The SafSec Approach is a standard [110] and guidance [109] for combined certification
of safety and security for complex systems. The approach is goal-based, module and
incremental and aims to reduce cost and effort through unified risk management.
The SafSec Method uses operational requirements, threat and hazard information
for Unified Risk Management, Risk Directed Design and Modular Certification [338,
p 4]. SafSec provides a Sufficient Dependability Process [109, p 31] that defines
interactions between safety and security and is centred around determining and
managing Loss, and arguing about safety and security in a modular Dependability
Case. However, even considering the benefits of this modular approach, there remain
some identified limitations such as SafSec has little support for trade-offs [127, p 47]
and more guidance could be provided around the cultural, epistemic and economic
challenges of combining safety and security [17].
IEC TR 63069 [191] is a technical report developed by the same Technical
Committee who developed IEC 61508. The intent is to provide a framework for
aligning safety and security of IACS make the relationship between IEC 61508
and IEC 62443 clearer. The underlying paradigm for this guidance is creating a
security environment and performing safety management within that perimeter.
Interactions in the risk assessment process defined are a description of the safety
details for threat assessment, and principles for aligning safety design and the security
environment. Whilst TR 63069 states the importance of trade-off decisions for co-
engineering [191, clause 7.2], it does not provide any further detail about how to
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make those decisions. In addition, the plausibility of the security perimeter paradigm
has been challenged [256].
ISA TR 84.00.09 [193] is technical guidance that orginates from the industrial
control domain which aligns cyber security with the safety lifecycle by defining
interaction points between the NIST Framework and the functional safety process.
Summary of the Technical Approaches & Standards
The previous two sections have reviewed approaches, standards and guidance for
safety-security co-assurance. Whilst there are many approaches that focus on different
aspects of co-assurance, there remain several technical challenges that are unaddressed.
These were highlighted in the analysis of the Approaches and Standards. However,
alongside these technical risk challenges there were several challenges related to
socio-technical factors.
Socio-Technical analysis plays an important role for single-domain assurance, however
it has increased importance for co-assurance because many of the factors have the
potential to be barriers to co-assurance. For example, poor communication or lack
of expertise is a challenge for single-domain assurance, however due to the increased
skill needed to understand inter-domain causal relationships for co-assurance if these
two factors are missing then there is the potential to undermine the concept of
synchronisation points and communication of key information between safety and
security teams.
Thus some of these socio-technical challenges that are likely to affect co-assurance
activities must be identified so that they might be addressed in the development of
the framework. The following section presents some of these challenges identified
from review the literature.
3.4 Socio-Technical Challenges Review
This section contains a summary of the review of socio-technical challenges. It is
structured using and adaptation of the Bostrom and Heinen [56] model which is
discussed further in Chapter 6. The categories used to classify the socio-technical
challenges are: General, Conceptual, Structure, People, Process and Technology.
Several factors have already been identified in the preceding sections, such as the
differences in risk representation, responsibility and competence. The objective
of this exploratory review is to identify new factors that may be challenging for
co-assurance.
3.4.1 General
Several regulatory bodies and organisations have released guidance on socio-technical
factors for co-assurance. However, few have enumerated the challenges for safety-
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security interactions. The SCSC Security-Informed Working Group [369] identified
several open questions for co-assurance:
• Supply chain issues for co-assurance - There is uncertainty of how to align
safety and security processes for as end of life, disposal, return to manufacturer
and integration of multiple systems.
• Governance challenges for co-assurance - It is unclear who has the responsibility
of assessing that the security aspects of safety are addressed. There may be
duplication or conflict with existing assessment processes.
• Assurance case separation - The extent to which safety and security cases need
to be integrated or separate is not defined. There is a need to understand how
to meet shared assurance case goals and have compatability for those.
• Integrity levels - Both safety and security have the concept of integrity levels.
In principle there could be mapping between the two, however the standards
do not provide any indication of what this is.
• Assurance obligation - Even with high complexity and differences in processes
leads to negative effects such as probative blindness or not having adequate
policies, safety and security still need to considered.
• Operation - There are in-service conflicts between maintaining safety and
maintaining security in dynamic environments, especially around updating the
system.
• Maintenance costs and proportionate response - There is a significant cost
associated with updating safety certified systems, and conflict with the need to
respond to identified security concerns in the systems e.g. vulnerabilities. Risk
trade-off decisions must be made to manage this, however financial cost is not
a common unit for risk balancing in safety.
• The sufficiency of existing architectures - It is unclear whether common system
architectures are able to address both security and safety, and whether symbiosis
can be found during the development of these.
In addition, Fenn [127] identified several socio-technical issues as part of the SafSec
Coherence Study such as:
• Differences in risk analysis - the presence of a malicious, intelligent adversary
for security engineering; however safety is based on statistical error and failure
analyses
• SafSec loss definition is "The state of the system that has the potential to lead
to an external undesired effect", however this may cause confusion because loss
might refer to actual harm or damage
• Trade-off challenges for safety and security, and for security clearance during
assurance - approaches to negotiating elements such as requirements needed,
as well as understanding what assurance information must be kept secret for
security purposes
• Assurance levels - there may be some common measure that would enable reuse
across the domains e.g. using EALs and SILs
• Frequency of change - there is a disparity between the rate of change for safety
and security
• Culture - "There is a cultural boundary between safety and security that needs
to be well understood in order to bridge the gaps. Defining common terms is a
significant first step, but undoubtedly not sufficient" [127, p 54]
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3.4.2 Conceptual
This category is concerned with the conceptual differences that may present themselves
in both single domain and inter-domain assurance.
Materiality and Complexity - Styre [397] argues that materiality matters when
considering the management of safety-related systems. The idea that analyses and
knowledge is imperfect and that the real-world is a lot more complex and dynamic
than can be captured by models [397] is an interesting point that may pose issues
when considering that models are the main way that stakeholders communicate
technical detail to each other.
Epistemology - Downer [113] presents an interesting perspective on engineering
and the (insurmountable) epistemological problems of trying to reason about the
assurance of ultra-high reliability systems. The title of the paper "Why we can
’know’ jetliners but not reactors" alludes to the fact that, regulatory calculations
that predict reliability in airframes should not work, but they do in practice because
because it is related to the type of complexity of the system [113].
Language - There is ambiguity in the standard concerning several common terms for
co-assurance which may lead to misunderstanding when attempting to communicate
between domains. An example is the definition of assurance:
• IEC 62443-1-1 [190] attribute of a system that provides grounds for having
confidence that the system operates in such a way that the system security
policy is enforced
• ISO 15408-1 [195] grounds for confidence that a deliverable meets its security
objectives
• RTCA DO-178C [356] the planned and systematic actions necessary to provide
adequate confidence and evidence that a product or process satisfies given
requirements
Probative Blindness- Rae and Alexander [343] discussed the phenomenon where
safety assurance activities provide unwarranted assurance. They ascribe this to
probative blindness – "an activity that provides stakeholders with subjective confidence
in safety disproportionate to the knowledge it provides about real problems" [343].
They present a model for classifying probabtive blindness that includes failure to
identify hazards, incorrect attribution of anomalies, motivated sckepticism and
inability to communicate uncertainty [343]. Each of these factors is likely to have a
significant effect when considering assurance of two attributes.
3.4.3 Structure
This category is concerned with the legal, regulatory and organisational structures
that facilitate assurance.
Assurance Insufficiencies - Johnson [217] highlights some of the political, financial
and regulatory insufficiencies that lead to a issues for safety and security assurance.
Amongst many other reasons identified, the ways in which cyber threats undermine
safety risk assessments, challenges safety incident reporting and undermines safety-
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critical developed were explored [217]. The conclusion was that superficial similarities
between safety and security had lead to policies that "cannot be sustained using
existing engineering techniques"
3.4.4 People
This category is concerned with individuals and teams performing co-assurance.
Understanding Teams - Pentland [330] challenges the assumption that the individual
is the correct unit of analysis for understanding intelligence, and evidence is presented
to support the notion of "network intelligence". The assertion is that humans must be
understood as social animals as well as individuals to improve cognition and decision
making [330]. The findings presented in this paper present interesting questions
about the influence of safety and security teams on their individual members, and
whether there is sufficient homogeneity between the teams.
Expert Judgement - Due to the lack of confidence assessment techniques there
is a pervasive and predominant reliance on expert judgement [299]. Experts play
a vital role due to their domain knowledge and ability to quantitatively assess the
plausibility of arguments.
Accountability - For risk, there has been a shift from personal to organisational
responsibility; with the general public placing more of its trust in "expert judgement"
for risk related to complex technological systems [268]. Complete abdication of
personal responsibility is not always advisable as observed during the Bhopal disaster
(December 1984) where the public were reliant on experts to plan for and respond
to emergency situations [55]. The tragic results were that over 500,000 people were
exposed to toxic chemicals and sustained injury, and the official immediate death
toll was around 2,250.
Responsibility - Sommerville et al. [381] presents a model for understanding
responsibility in socio-technical systems. This is likely to be an important factor
because the hierarchies of responsibility in safety and security have been traditionally
separate. The questions that are suggested to understand responsibility are: 1. What
information is required to discharge this responsibility? 2. What channels are used to
communicate this information? 3. Where does this information come from? 4. What
information is recorded in the discharge of this responsibility and why? 5. What
channels are used to communicate this recorded information? 6. What are the
consequences if the information required is unavailable, inaccurate, incomplete, late,
early?
3.4.5 Process
This category is concerned with the processes for single-domain assurance and
inter-domain co-assurance
Reaching Consensus - Kowalski [251] introduces the Security By Consensus (SBC)
Static and Dynamic Classification Schemes shown in Figure ??. The static classes
are derived from social and legal aspects, whilst the dynamic states are derived
52 Review of Approaches, Standards & Challenges
from the system development lifecycle. The two models are integrated together
through mappings of principles, policies, codes, guidance documents, requirements,
specifications, etc. [251]. Kowalski [251] used the schemes to classify trends from a
US conference on computer security and identify major shifts.
Method Transferability - Baxter and Sommerville [41] analysed the reasons why
more organisations did not adopt a socio-technical systems approach to system
development despite the many benefits. They reviewed existing approaches and
found that there is limited transferability between available methods and that those
which have had the most success were designed in the early 1980s [41]. In addition they
identified eight problems with existing approaches [41]: 1. Inconsistent terminology
2. Levels of abstraction 3. Conflicting value systems 4. Lack of agreed success criteria
5. Analysis without synthesis 6. Multidisciplinarity 7. Perceived anachronism, and
8. Fieldwork issues They advocate sensitisation and awareness as a remedy for these
problems.
Understanding Work - Havinga et al. [155] made some of the considerations
required for research of "everyday work", that is the positive reasons why systems are
safe instead of investigating accidents. They describe three ways that investigations
into everyday work can take place: 1. Normative approach – prescribes how work
should or should not be done, 2. Descriptive approach – analysing how a job is
done and why, and 3. Formative approach – finding new ways of doing things
This classification of safety research approaches has interesting implications when
considering multiple domains of expertise, and which is best to adopt.
Requirements Engineering - In relation to security requirements, Elahi et al.
[120] found that organisations attempt to consider security from early in the lifecycle,
however security is often built into the system much later. This effect might cause an
imbalance with safety requirements, where they are often mandated and part of the
system before any implemented part, as is the case with DALs in ARP 4754A [27].
3.4.6 Technology (Tools)
This category is concerned with the conceptual tools and software tools to support
assurance.
Dependability Tools - Despotou and Kelly [100] lists these challenges for assuring
dependable systems: 1. Balancing safety and security representation and analysis
within a system 2. Addressing conflicting system requirements 3. Managing changing
requirements 4. Ensuring traceability within system design
Review Chapter Conclusion
This chapter contained a review of the technical approaches for co-assurance,
standards and guidance for co-assurance and socio-technical factors that would
potentially affect co-assurance activities. Findings were that whilst there are many
emerging methods and standards for aligning safety and security, there were significant
limitations to their adoption. For example, many approaches relied on performing one-
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time analysis and did not have recommendations on how to update the models - this
is likely to cause problems during operation when security risk changes and evolves
and what is needed is a fast way to understand the impact of the change. In addition,
there were standards and guidance documents that did make recommendations about
interactions between safety and security processes, however many did not provide
detail about how to implement these interactions or how to identify gaps between the
process. Lastly, socio-technical factors that might affect co-assurance were reviewed.
Whilst this review was not extensive, it did reveal several challenge factors that would
need to be addressed or reasoned about such as responsibility and accountability. In
the next chapters, a candidate solution is proposed to address the challenges and










Part I contained an in-depth analysis of technical approaches, standards and guidance
that are applicable in the context of co-assurance. Challenges were identified which
were related to both the technical risk and socio-technical factors of the assurance
process, and its outcome. In this part, which consists of three chapters, the objective
is to introduce the framework that was engineered to address the challenges, and is
the subject of the hypothesis. The intent of this chapter is to provide an overview
of SSAF and its underlying philosophy, as well as providing a clear concept of its
constituent parts and the relationships between them.
4.1 SSAF Conceptual Model
The Safety-Security Assurance Framework (SSAF) is a structure to facilitate the
reasoning about the alignment of system safety and cyber security goals on multiple
levels of abstraction. SSAF has three parts which consist of concepts, models and
processes for systematically reasoning about the technical risk argument and the
socio-technical factors affecting co-assurance.
SSAF is based on the new paradigm of independent co-assurance, that is, maintaining
separate assurance processes, but sharing the right information, with the right people,
at the right time. Thus, gaps in assurance can be managed in a more deliberate,
systematic and demonstrable way than simply unifying co-assurance processes and
artefacts. Figure 4.1 is the SSAF Conceptual V-model which shows independent
co-assurance throughout the lifecycle of a system.
Figure 4.1 shows safety, security and system processes running in parallel to each
other with synchronisation points established for interaction between domains and for
information exchange. The core idea is to keep the disciplines (with their knowledge,
approaches, conceptual models and expertise) separate but aligned using touch points
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Fig. 4.1 SSAF Conceptual Model illustrating Independent Co-assurance
where divergence is resolved. This has the benefit of maximising on current best
practice within each domain whilst allowing flexibility and work to occur with the
other discipline.
These sync points might be dictated by regulatory bodies in standards1. However, it
is more likely that practitioners will need to establish these points themselves. Work
is needed to understand how many sync points are needed and what information
should be exchanged. The model relies on several assumptions:
Model-based Design SSAF was created in the context of model-based design with
the idea that functions are allocated to parts of the system, and the models
representing the system are what drive the design. This is not true for many
systems which pre-date the concept of model-driven engineering (MDE). Whilst
SSAF has very specific foundations, SSAF does not preclude co-assurance using
other types of systems development models.
V Lifecycle Phases Figure 4.1 shows the V-model for systems development with
design and decomposition on the left and integration and testing on the right.
SSAF does not rely on the real-world accuracy of this model, rather the
model serves the purpose of clearly depicting milestones when tasks need to be
completed and information delivered. What is important is that the V-model
shows synchronisation during the lifecycle of the system, including operation
where there is likely to be the most change introduced primarily by security,
e.g. patches for new vulnerabilities, etc. It is also possible to use the model in
more cyclical processes such as Agile Development, where instead of a single
parse of the process, there are multiple smaller "Vs" during different phases.
1Currently, there are few standards that speak directly to the interaction points - see Section 3.3.
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Impact Propagation The previous assumption stated that change was expected
from security. In fact, change is expected for both attributes, however the rate
is expected to be faster for security due to the the presence of an adversary.
Thus, SSAF advocates for structured mechanisms to propagate the inevitable
change impact to the other attribute and other parts of the system. Part of
this assumption includes that change can be identified, and more importantly
represented in such a way that it can be propagated.
Communication using Artefacts Communication due to impact propagation or
information exchange during systems development is assumed to take place
through models2. Whilst all models belong to the system, including risk
analyses, a distinction is made in the conceptual model in Figure 4.1 for co-
assurance artefacts because those are the subject of the co-assurance framework.
Separation of System, Safety and Security Functions Finally, the framework
assumes that there is an intent and a means of decoupling concerns for
safety, security and systems development. It is possible that a good system is
engineered without separating concerns, however for complex systems there
may be significant benefit to adopting a divide-and-conquer approach.
Although SSAF does have implicit assumptions, they do not preclude adaptation of
the framework if any of the assumptions is invalid for a particular project. For example,
if MDE is not being used, then synchronisation points can still be established.
4.2 The Safety-Security Assurance Framework Overview
The Safety-Security Assurance Framework is comprised of three parts - the Conceptual
Model consists of the ontology and V-model; the Technical Risk Model which
facilitates development of the technical risk argument and allows for communication
of risk and impact across disciplines; and the Socio-Technical Model which helps
to identify those factors that affect technical risk co-assurance. Figure 4.2 shows a
block diagram of the framework, its inputs and outputs. SSAF takes as an input
the system information and the assurance context such as governance or regulatory
requirements. SSAF output is a system-specific technical risk co-assurance argument
that uses attribute link models as support for the claims, as well as a socio-technical
confidence argument to support the technical risk argument.
Within the framework, there are two parts, each with their own models and processes.
The Technical Risk Model is probably the portion of the framework that most aligns
with approaches discussed in Chapter 3. The Socio-Techncial Model supports the
technical risk activities, and gives confidence to the co-assurance process:
The Technical Risk Model (TRM) – This is the process, causal model, link
patterns and argument patterns for aligned technical risk co-assurance. It is based
on the explicit modelling of the causal relationships between attributes, which link
the artefacts in one domain to those of the other. Chapter 5 explores the TRM in
greater detail.
2SSAF concept of a model is broad - including but not limited to reports, mathematical equations,
UML models, etc.
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Fig. 4.2 SSAF Two-part Framework for Co-Assurance
The Socio-Technical Model (STM) – This recognises that the SSAF Technical
Risk Model, or indeed any technical approach, is limited by the socio-technical
factors that influence it. The STM has its own influence model and process that
runs alongside the TRM process. The influence model considers factors along
five dimensions - Conceptual, Structure, People, Process and Tools based on the
interacting variable classes identified by Bostrom and Heinen [56]. Chapter 6 expands
on the theory for STM. An important point for co-assurance is that socio-technical
decisions have the potential to constrain any activities that are performed as part of
technical risk analysis, thus the second part of SSAF is required.
4.3 Independent Co-Assurance
The goals for co-assurance can be diverse. On one end of the spectrum is the
silo’ed approach where all activities and even the organisational structure has very
little contact between safety and security. On the other extreme is a completely
unified approach where a single team (and sometimes even a single practitioner) is
responsible for both safety and security of a system. The analyses include concerns
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from both domains. Whilst independent co-assurance does not rest at either of these
extremes, it does occupy a large portion of the space between them. SSAF allows for
goals to be defined and the level of interaction defined to be commensurate with the
alignment goals. For independent co-assurance the target is for loose coupling for
processes, expertise and artefacts across disciplines.
Separate but interdependent is the idealised form of alignment, however it is difficult
to achieve in a nominal development environment due to the challenges associated
with identifying interaction risks. In addition, Socio-technical factors, such as
temporal misalignment, mean that it is very difficult to ensure that that this level of
interdependence is maintained.
Independent co-assurance allows for work to continue within the single domains, but
for stakeholders such as analysts, engineers, managers and auditors to understand
the information needs for co-assurance. It is analogous to ’tagging’ single-domain
artefacts and processes to indicate that information is required from the other domain.
The solution thereby provides a process for separate safety and security development,
but facilitates synchronised co-evolution through the system development lifecycle.
This includes the use of models to link conditions across domains to demonstrate
how safety and security relate to each other. The intent of this approach is to limit
the separate analyses from diverging from each other but will allow for teams to
work in the way they currently do.
4.4 Assurance Surface
The Assurance Surface Model is a conceptual model proposed as part of SSAF
that is useful for thinking about the relationships between the technical risk and
socio-technical confidence in assurance. The model is shown in Figure 4.3.
Fig. 4.3 Assurance Surface Concept: Layers of Abstraction
The security risk concept of an attack surface3, was introduced by Microsoft researcher
Michael Howard in 2003, and later formalised to create a Relative Attack Surface
Quotient (RASQ) that explored different attack opportunities along specified dimensions [173].
This idea that risk can be explored and managed in different dimensions is a powerful
one.
3i.e. the ways that a system can be compromised.
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The assurance surface concept that is proposed here is analogous to the attack
surface; however, instead of representing attack vectors, it represents the ways
in which uncertainty can be propagated. For example, from a technical risk
perspective, different methodologies have different limitations; using a combination of
complementary techniques would address different concerns on the assurance surface.
Much like reducing the security attack surface, it is difficult to ensure coverage of
the assurance surface because of the existence of epistemic uncertainties.
There are five tiers in the model. The first is Tier 0, the System layer which contains
all the models of the system (this includes risk analysis models). Next, on Tier 1 is
the SSAF TRM model which is a meta-model of the interactions of the conditions
on the system layer. Tier 2 is the technical risk argument, or the assurance case
that refers to artefacts on Tiers 0 and 1 to provide evidence for its claims. Tier 3 is
the STM influence model which is a meta-model of processes, people, structure and
tools that support the creation of the technical assurance argument. Lastly, Tier
4 is where primary and secondary confidence arguments are made, although their
representation is often implicit or embedded in organisational governance policies.
To assure a system, risk and uncertainty must be managed at each of the layers.
The concept is similar to Reason’s risk model of accident causation [349, p. 9].
However, unlike Reason’s model, SSAF has specific focus on the integration of safety
and security, is not constrained to only linear interactions, and explicitly models
those interactions between the two domains. The objective of this approach is
to systematically and demonstrably reduce the uncertainty propagation, maximise
assurance coverage, and increase confidence at each layer for safety and security.
Evolution of SSAF
Development of the theoretical basis for SSAF began in Chapter 2 with definition
of the terms and ontology needed for co-assurance. The following chapters further
develop the concepts for co-assurance and present the TRM and STM.
Chapter 5
SSAF Technical Risk Model
Introduction
As discussed in Part I there exist challenges that pose potential barriers to developing
and co-assuring complex, interconnected systems for safety and security. To address
the challenges, a systematic and rigorous approach must be adopted to manage
the interaction of technical risk between safety and security. SSAF Technical Risk
Model (TRM) is presented as a candidate solution to provide the structure and
deliberateness required to reason about technical risk for co-assurance.
Fig. 5.1 SSAF Technical Risk Model.
Chapter Structure. This chapter elaborates on the three parts of the Technical
Risk Model and its output for a system shown in Figure D.1: (i) Process - Five-step
process for setting up links across the domains, described in 5.1. (ii) Causal Model
- The condition-to-condition model that is the foundation of the TRM’s approach,
explained in 5.3, and (iii) Link Patterns - Syntactic and semantic inter-domain
relationship patterns, presented in 5.4. In addition, the considerations and concerns
when following the TRM approach are discussed.
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5.1 Process Overview
Figure 5.2 shows the five steps of the TRM process, and Table 5.1 shows an overview
of the inputs, outputs and activities of each step. Also represented in the process
diagram are additional single-domain assurance activities such as assurance case
maintenance, documentation, etc. that are essential for co-assurance but are not
part of the TRM process. The following section provides further detail about each of
the steps.
Fig. 5.2 SSAF Technical Risk Model process steps.
5.1.1 Step 1: Establish Goals, Ontology & Sync Points
The first step of the TRM process requires the stakeholders1 to gather to establish
shared goals, a shared language and to define where the synchronisation points will
be for the system. To achieve this they will need to know the single domain assurance
processes and other related processes being followed and their outputs. Stakeholder
goals will also need to be known.
Figure 5.3 provides further detail about the specific activities and artefacts associated
with Step 1. The objective of the first step is to establish shared goals, shared
language2 and synchronisation points. This is the information that will enable
the stakeholders to separate but still work together i.e. independent co-assurance.
Establishing synchronisation points does imply that the stakeholders know some
of their information needs at this early stage e.g. safety practitioners will need to
know at what point they are likely to need security risk information. There is no
requirement for detailed knowledge, however, that can be refined at later stages.
The ontology and dictionary will be an important strategic resource during work
in individual domains. It will provide guidance and remove some of the ambiguity
around similar terms, as well as making positions clear across domain boundaries.
Note that the dictionary of terms does not have the requirement for unified terms
only, it can contain definitions for safety risk and security risk separately3, the only
constraint is that the relationships between the terms are understood.
1Most likely safety and security practitioners, but may include systems and software engineers,
managers and project leads.
2In the form of a shared ontology or dictionary of terms.
3In fact, this is encouraged because the risk reasoning between domains often differs.
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Table 5.1 Table showing the activities, inputs and outputs of SSAF Steps.
Prerequisites. Activities. Outcome.
Step 1
– know the assurance process for
a single domain
– establish information needs and
synchronisation points
– agreed synchronisation points
during SDLC
– know applicable definitions and
key terms
– establish an understanding of
common goals & language
– shared objectives, ontology or
dictionary of terms
– know the types of information
required from the other domain
– begin to create a causal model
(completed in Step 4)
Step 2
– know the single domain
assurance process
– plan specific tasks & assign
resources proportional to task
– process model linked to the
assurance artefacts
– know the information
requirements for each activity
– plan inputs to each task and
resolve any missing
– potential gaps in assurance
that will need to be argued
– know the relationship between
the assurance and SDLC
– assign techniques to activities
and record gaps in assurance
Step 3
– know the high-level assurance
argument (single attribute)
– build and model the assurance
argument for technical risk
– model of assurance artefacts
linked to the argument
– know types of evidence that
can be used to support that
argument
– create a confidence argument
Step 4
– ontology of terms – link artefacts – integrated causal model
– causal model (single domain)
Step 5
– system assurance arguments,
and causal models
– updating the system artefacts
to reflect new information
– up-to-date and more dynamic
assurance arguments
– triggering activities in response
to change impact
– managed complexity and
uncertainty
This step, much like the other steps in the TRM process, is unlikely to be linear or
a one-time activity, however attempting to perform each of the activities may be a
useful process for achieving shared goals and understanding between stakeholders
which is essential for co-assurance.
5.1.2 Step 2: Model Assurance Process
Prerequisites.
— know the single domain risk management and assurance processes
— know the information requirements for each activity
— know the relationship between the assurance and systems engineering process
Activities.
— plan specific tasks - assign resources proportional to task
— plan information inputs to each task and resolve any missing
— assign particular techniques to each stage
— record any gaps in assurance
Outcome.
— process model linked to the assurance artefacts that it generates
— potential gaps in assurance that will need to be argued
Step 2 - Process Modelling and Step 3 - Argument Modelling are performed within a
single domain to assure either safety or security. Whilst these steps do not form a
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Fig. 5.3 TRM Step 1 Activities
core contribution of the TRM, they are necessary for co-assurance4. This separation
has multiple benefits and accommodates different delivery timescales that are often
present on industrial projects, and removes the need to try to unify assurance
processes completely.
4Not having these steps would be the equivalent of attempting to do a single domain risk analysis,
e.g. safety analysis on a system for which no information is known - no capabilities, functions
components, etc. Knowing some information from single domains is a prerequisite for co-assurance.
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The steps are presented sequentially, however it is more likely that modelling the
assurance process and assurance argument will be done in parallel and incrementally.
Specific information is required at the synchronisation points agreed in Step 1, outside
of that, there is flexibility for the single attribute assurance to be optimised e.g.
to address their individual concerns for certification or accreditation. For most
safety-related systems there is already an existing standard that provides a risk
management process, and this is increasingly the case for application-specific security
standards, as with ISO 14971 [194] and AAMI TIR57 [6] for medical devices.
The purpose of this SSAF step is to resolve any issues regarding the information
dependencies for a single attribute. For example, conflicts arise between the
traditional "V" assurance process and modern agile development processes where
there are differences in the information needed and the information available5. This
could lead to incomplete analyses and incorrect assurance arguments if they use
those analyses to support claims.
Even if there are gaps in assurance, such as missing information for single domain
tasks, the TRM still works. In this case, it is recommended that the gap be explicitly
recorded and either resolved at a later stage, when the system model is more mature,
or the reasons why it is an acceptable gap should be argued in the single-domain
assurance case. Modelling the tasks explicitly allows for strategic assignment of tasks,
people and time to meet co-assurance goals. It also means that in future tasks, the
impact of gaps undermining certain claims can be reasoned about.
5.1.3 Step 3: Model Assurance Argument
Prerequisites.
— know the high-level assurance argument (single attribute)
— know types of evidence that can be used to support that argument
Activities.
— build and model the assurance argument for technical risk
— where possible, create a confidence argument
Outcome.
— model of assurance artefacts linked to the argument
The objective for this step is to link the artefacts generated in the previous step to
the assurance argument for a single attribute. The benefit of this approach is that the
risk impact of the conditions in the artefacts is explained. Artefacts generated from a
risk management processes e.g. Hazard List, remain unexplained until an argument
is created about how and why that artefact is relevant, and what it contributes to
the top level claim of safety or security.
There are several questions that may arise at this step, such as why not have a unified
co-assurance argument? or why perform the step at all? especially considering the
resource overhead that might be better committed to technical risk reduction. Both
5For example, Functional Failure Analysis requires information about all the functions of a system
to be available at the start of the analysis, if an iterative and incremental model-based system
development process is being used such as MBSE, then all the failures required may not be available
at the time the FFA is performed.
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these questions are valid, however a unified assurance argument may be difficult
to co-ordinate and construct due the differing goals, argumentation styles and risk
appetites of the attributes.
This separate approach to the arguments allows for work to progress in a single
domain, e.g. if safety risk management begins several months before the security
programme then valuable progress can be made and security results incorporated6.
Not explicitly modelling the assurance argument means that later in the lifecycle,
especially during operation, it is difficult to understand the impact of change to the
artefacts; this is especially important for security where there is the potential for
tens of vulnerabilities to be discovered for complex systems.
5.1.4 Step 4: Link Artefacts
Prerequisites.
— ontology of terms (single domain)
— causal model (single domain)
Activities.
— link artefacts from one domain with those in the other
Outcome.
— integrated causal model for safety and security artefacts
This SSAF Step is deceptively simple, but is in fact, the core contribution of the Safety-
Security Assurance Framework TRM. The activity is to link the artefacts generated
in the previous steps with those of the other domain at the set synchronisation
points. This may be enacted in a real-world system development by experts from
safety and security teams meeting to reconcile requirements, or to determine which
vulnerabilities contribute to a hazard. The difference with SSAF TRM linking is
that the causal model connecting conditions across safety and security is represented
explicitly. The links are used as the basis for a risk-based co-assurance argument
with claims made about each of the interaction risks.
Interaction risks are defined in the SSAF terms in Chapter 2, and they are the
risks arising from the assurance of two or more quality attributes. Interaction
risks propagate the impact of negative consequences from one domain to another.
The approach adopted by SSAF for interaction risks is to follow a standard risk
management process, where instead of hazards or security concerns, interaction risks
are identified and argued over. Figure 5.4 shows further detailed about the activities
performed at this step.
5.1.5 Step 5: Update Model
Prequisites.
— system assurance arguments, and causal models
Activities.
— updating the system artefacts to reflect new information
6This only works if SSAF Step 1 – establishing information needs and synchronisation points has
been completed.
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Fig. 5.4 TRM Step 4 Activities
— triggering assurance or engineering activities in response to impact
Outcome.
— up-to-date and more dynamic assurance arguments for safety and security
— managed complexity and uncertainty surrounding technical risk
The purpose of the Safety-Security Assurance Framework is to provide the structure
for through-life co-assurance. This kind of structure is essential to the success
of any co-assurance activities during the operational phase of a system. Without
knowledge of the assurance arguments for both safety and security, the technical risk
co-assurance argument, or the supporting causal relationships between the two, the
problem of determining the impact and meaning of change becomes challenging7.
7This is important because security concerns are updated and change at a rate that is a lot more
dynamic than the rate of change of safety concerns.
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Process Overview Summary
The aim of this section was to provide an overview of the steps in the TRM process,
their inputs, activities and outputs. Whilst the steps have been presented linearly,
it is not expected that this is what will happen on a real-world project. There are
likely to be cycles within steps and refinements made at different stages. However,
the benefit that presenting the TRM processes steps in this way provides an overview
for co-assurance process which can be adapted and tailored. In the following section,
the TRM is applied to an insulin pump example to demonstrate its use.
5.2 Insulin Pump Case Study
To better understand the TRM Process, and to capture the detail of the inter-domain
modelling, an explanatory case study of an insulin pump will be used. Insulin
pumps are portable medical devices whose primary purpose is to deliver correct
dosages of insulin to a diabetic patient. This option is often chosen instead of
multiple insulin injections a day. The technology used in the pump allows for more
intelligent programming and decision-making from the embedded controller based on
the patient’s prior information and real-time data. This, however, does introduce
new safety risk to the patient, as there are new avenues for harm to occur - whether
unintentional or intentional. Therefore, risk must be explicitly considered and safety
must be engineered into the system.
5.2.1 System Description
Fig. 5.5 Insulin Pump Structure.
Figure 5.5 shows a simple structure diagram adapted from Hu & Li’s paper [175] on
intelligent insulin pump design. The pump consists of an embedded controller which
receives input from the patient8, and delivers a dosage of fast or slow-acting insulin
by controlling the motor and infusion. The potential benefits of these devices need
to be balanced against the risk. Some risks are safety-related such as physical harm
(getting burned by the device battery), or harm relating to the incorrect delivery of
insulin (hypo- and hyperglycaemia); and some risk is security-related as demonstrated
by weaknesses in devices that are currently available on the market [413, 414].
8Such as last meal data via the keyboard.
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The following sections will apply the TRM Process to the Insulin Pump. As far as
possible, assurance artefacts (hazard analyses, safety arguments, security analyses)
that are already existing in the literature will be used. The reasons for this are
two-fold - the first is for accuracy of the artefacts. The second reason is to evaluate
the plausibility of the Framework to handle assurance information from separate
teams.
5.2.2 Step 1: Ontology and Sync Points
Using the standards as a base, practitioners applying TRM Step 1 could use the
language in the standards to establish a shared dictionary. This will enable them
to discuss their shared goals and information needs at the synchronisation points.
Examples of terminology that they might agree on from the standards are:
risk combination of the probability of occurrence of harm and the severity of that
harm [IEC Guide 51 definition 3.2 cited in both ISO 14971 [194] and AAMI TIR57 [6]]
security likelihood of occurrence weighted factor based on subjective analysis of the
probability that a given threat is capable of exploiting a given vulnerability. Note 1 to
entry: Likelihood of occurrence combines an estimate of the likelihood that the threat
even will be initiated with an estimate of the likelihood of impact (i.e. the likelihood
that the threat even results in adverse impacts). [Source: CNSSI-4009, modified -
the phrase "In Information Assurance risk analysis," was removed. cited in AAMI
TIR57 [6]]
harm physical injury or damage to the health of people, or damage to property or the
environment [ISO/IEC Guide 51:1999, definition 3.3 cited in ISO 14971:2012 [194]]
threat any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact organisational
operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organisational assets,
individuals, or other organisations through an information system via unauthorised
access, destruction, disclosure, modification of information, and/or denial of service.
NOTE 1 to entry: Identical to NIST definition (SP 800-53) with the phrase “or the
Nation” redacted. [SOURCE: SP 800-53; SP 800-53A; SP 800-27; SP 800-60; SP
800-37; CNSSI-4009 cited in AAMITIR57 [6]]
From the subset of possible definitions listed above, note that terms such as security
likelihood of occurrence can be defined separately to safety. In this case the need for
separation is being driven by the fact that security likelihood is a subjective estimate
of threat initiation and the probability of it resulting in adverse impact. This is in
contrast to the safety likelihood which might be derived from in-service reliability
data for similar systems, etc.
For synchronisation points, the standards, particularly AAMI TIR 57 [6], presents
three synchronisation points in the process, shown in Figure 5.6. However these
are the minimum required for certification and more synchronisation points must
be introduced to satisfy all of the shared co-assurance goals. Examples of where
additional sync points might be introduced are security controls contributing to new
or existing safety hazards, safety requirements creating additional vulnerabilities, etc.
.
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Fig. 5.6 AAMI TIR57:2016 Risk Management Process [6].
5.2.3 Step 2: Single-Domain Process
This is the first of the two steps where safety and security separate to do work within
individual domains before reconciling the work at the next sync point. As mentioned
in the previous step, the security process is provided in the AAMI TIR57 standard,
and that was modelled from the ISO 14971 [194] safety process for medical devices.
Whilst they differ in their focus and detail, the basic risk analysis and requirements
decomposition process is quite similar. For safety, risks are identified, allocated to
functions, safety requirements are then determined for those functions, then assigned
to a component that will satisfy those requirements.
For security, the process appears very similar on the surface, but there is a focus
shift to guarding the system during operation. Risks are identified and classified
in similar way to safety, however the classification is based on an additional factor
i.e. the value of the asset9. The security process also has a larger focus on creating
procedures if a security risk is present during operation.
What this step achieves for the case study is understanding the differing information
needs of each of the domains. They are then able to approach systems development or
the other domains and request information that they know is missing, or communicate
what is valuable to them because of the results of the risk assessments.
9Asset value was implicitly provided for safety in tables describing severity. This is an additional
step for security to determine the value, and impact of loss of that asset and only then classify the
severity.
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5.2.4 Step 3: Single-Domain Argument
Also performed within a single domain, Step 3 focuses on mapping the artefacts
present in the technical risk argument to the steps that generate them. The reason
for this is to resolve any discrepancies between evidence needed for claims and the
artefacts generated during the risk processes, such as hazard list. Artefacts such as
the hazard or threat list, supporting tests or analyses required in the risk argument
are linked in a model to the process.
A pre-requisite to linking to the assurance process is understanding the claims that
make up the argument. Figure 5.7 shows an example safety assurance argument for
the insulin pump. It is divided into five levels of claims (denoted by G*), context
elements (C*) and argument strategies (St*). The contents of the the argument
are derived from the structure shown in [158] and from the hazard lists contained
in [135]. The risk argument presented is decompositional, and argues over each of
the safety hazards for the insulin pump. The leaf claim G12. Commanded excess
infusion adequately mitigated. is supported by evidence provided using Fault Tree
analysis. Part of that Fault Tree is shown in Figure 5.8 and is discussed in the next
section.
5.2.5 Step 4: Synchronisation & Linking
Figure 5.8 shows one causal link between safety and security for the insulin pump
example. On the left is the safety artefact - the fault tree which has information
about failure behaviour from a safety perspective. On the right, the security artefact
- the attack defence tree (ADT) - is depicted. ADTs are directed, acyclic graphs that
are based on fault trees [246]; however they contain much more information such as
potential mitigations to prevent reaching a particular node.
For this TRM step, expert judgement is used to determine the causal link that
failure event F5. Malicious issuing of commands is connected to the attack node
A1. Malicious issuing of command node. The primary benefit of approaching the
problem in this way is that, due to the implicit causal model represented by the
fault tree and the ADT, the link between the attributes is optimised and instantly
provides the analysts with more information without having to know the details of
the other domain.
For example, if there was a new attack vector discovered where a wired command
could be executed that by-passed mitigation M1. Physical access to wired connection
restricted, then the causal link allows us to know that safety event F5. Malicious
issuing of commands would return true. Through the fault tree failure path, F1.
Pump commanded to infuse more insulin than user intended would be true. If this
fault tree was used as a solution to the claim G12. Commanded excess infusion
adequately mitigated from Figure 5.7, then that claim is now undercut by that evidence.
Thus, it is possible to see, in a semi-automated way, the impact propagation of adding
another security condition.
This may enable improved risk management in the real-world context of new
vulnerabilities being added to vulnerability databases at a fast rate. The TRM
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Fig. 5.7 Safety Argument for Insulin Pump.
causal link provides a way of seeing the impact of one attribute on another without
the requirement to resolve the issue i.e. in the insulin example, it is now demonstrated
how claims in safety argument may be invalidated, therefore resources can be allocated
proportional to severity - if the risk of excess insulin infusion is too great then the
pump manufacturers might recall the product.
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Fig. 5.8 Assurance artefacts. Left. Safety. Right. Security.
5.2.6 Step 5: Update
Figure 5.9 is a conceptual representation of the causal links between safety and security
for the insulin pump. It is possible that in actuality this model is instantiated in a
fault tree/attack tree or using any other modelling notation where relations can be
formed between nodes. The TRM Causal model allows for risk to be propagated
from one domain to the other - in the case of new vulnerability Vuln1, a new link
can be added to the model and the effects on patient health can be seen.
The introduction of new vulnerabilities is precisely what happened for a real-world
Insulin Pump. In October 2016, three new vulnerabilities for the Animas OneTouch
Ping Insulin Pump were released [342]. It was revealed that the insulin pump used
cleartext rather than encrypted communications, and a weak pairing between the
pump and its set-up device enabled a remote adversary to connect with, and spoof
the pump to trigger patient uncommanded insulin infusion.
Considering the impact of these new vulnerabilities in the context of the ADT in
Figure 5.8 - both vulnerabilities enable an adversary to bypass the mitigations and
lower levels of the tree, and exploit new paths to reach the node A2. Attacker executes
wireless command. These vulnerabilities challenge and undermine the assumptions
made about the attack vectors that an adversary could exploit at the time when the
ADT analysis was performed. Thus there is a path to malicious issuing of commands
which affects the "mitigated excessive infusion" safety claim.
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Fig. 5.9 Insulin Pump TRM Causal Link Model (Conceptual)
If the artefacts are modelled as they are in Figure 5.9, then the new vulnerabilities
can be added to the ADT and the impact propagated and flagged in the safety
argument. The propagation does not indicate how the change should be managed,
however it does give a clear indication where the assurance argument has been
affected, therefore allowing experts’ time to be spent on determining the best course
of action rather than attempting to identify change or assess impact.
Of course, these are two vulnerabilities, and it is possible for a complex system to
have hundreds of new vulnerabilities disclosed daily. The TRM causal models do not
trivialise the need to manage the gaps in assurance once they are known. They do,
however, allow for more effective impact propagation and SSAF provides a practical
structure to manage the assurance gaps i.e. the known unknowns.
Another example of change during operation is the last insulin pump vulnerability
disclosed in [342] - the lack of replay prevention, i.e. due to the lack of timestamps,
sequence numbers or other similar defences. An adversary could replay a legitimate
message to the insulin pump without special knowledge or detection. This is a
problem for the traditional model of insulin pump, but would completely undermine
both safety and security arguments if the embedded controller module (Fig. 5.5)
was replaced with a component that uses adaptive machine learning algorithms to
manage insulin and glucose, and function as an artificial pancreas [10].
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The introduction of ML expands the attack surface and creates new motivation for
potential adversaries, for example - a well established insulin pump manufacturer
may spend a lot of resource training a particular ML model and an adversary, with
no knowledge of the internal architecture of the component, could use blackbox
probing to recover training data and steal (i.e. duplicate) the model.
This attack is not obviously safety-related, rather it is more to do with confidentiality
and intellectual property, however if an attacker used the replay vulnerability to
learn the ML model then it is possible that excessive insulin infusion commands
could result as a by-product of the primary attack goal.
Currently it is very difficult analyse the causal models for these "indirect" security
conditions and their effect on safety. They require a high level of domain knowledge
and expert judgement to determine and model. This, however, is not an argument
to discourage modelling the causal relationship; indeed, it is more important that
these relationships are captured in a way that they can be incrementally managed
and developed. It is recommended that specialised models e.g. causal relationships
in UML, are created for assurance purposes.
5.3 Causal Model & Technical Risk Argument
The TRM Process has been presented, along with an exemplar of inter-domain links
in the form of attacks related to faults, which in turn are related to hazards. However,
this is just one instance that may not be applicable to the majority of situations
because of the type of system, the amount of information known about the risks, the
type of modelling used, etc. Thus, a more reliable and generalisable model is needed
for co-assurance. The TRM causal model was created to address this need.
5.3.1 Causal Model
Fig. 5.10 SSAF Causal Model
The causal model in Figure 5.10 and the concept of synchronisation points are
arguably the most important contribution of the SSAF and this thesis. Why such
a simple model has such significance is because it provides a vehicle for explicitly
reasoning about co-assurance. Without it, the inter-domain connections are still
present, but our capacity to understand or manage the risk associated with those
connections is greatly reduced10.
10In many ways it would be the equivalent of attempting to reduce safety risk without explicitly
reasoning about safety conditions such as hazards and solely concentrating on systems engineering.
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Figure 5.10 uses notation similar to UML Class Diagrams to express the relationships.
It contains two classes: Condition and Causal Relationship which are abstract and
would need to be instantiated. The model relations between these two classes mean
that each Causal Relationship links one or more source conditions with one or more
target conditions. For the insulin pump example an instantiation of this model was
shown in Figure 5.9 where security attacks were linked to safety faults.
When discussing accident models11, Hovden et al. [172] state that "Accident models
affect the way people think about safety, how they analyse risk factors and how they
measure performance". The underlying reasons for having causal models in a single
domain are very similar to the reasons across two domains, therefore Hovden et al.’s
statement should apply to co-assurance causal models, and in particular the TRM
Causal Model. Figure 5.11 shows the added detail of the types of causal relationships
that can occur and the types of conditions.
Fig. 5.11 Causal Model for Safety and Security Co-Assurance
To the left of the original classes, classes are added to describe more fully the types
of conditions that will be reasoned over; they are represented as inheritances from
the Condition. The outermost layer of inheritance consists of the safety and security
risk conditions, of which a subset of attack, vulnerability, hazard and failure mode
are shown. The complete set of conditions can be expanded and refined to be made
more specific to an application, project or system.
A significant aspect communicated by the first layer of inheritance, the classes
Modelled and Actual, is that for any co-assurance activities12 our ability to reason
about a system is limited by our representation of it. Even the best model of the
system is limited by the constraints of the modelling notation, goals of the model,
its representation, the knowledge and expertise of the person who created the model,
how up-to-date it is, etc. This distinction between modelled and actual is important
when considering inter-domain risk between safety and security because modelling
inherently introduces new uncertainties that impact risk and its propagation.
To the right of the original classes, the types of causal relationship are decomposed
into three types: linear, complex and emergent. Each of these adjectives describes
the physics of the causal links, and how the end event comes into being. These
11Accident models are a type of causal model where the end event is one that results in safety
harm.
12Or indeed any engineering activities.
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are based on the existing models of causation13. Their application to this model is
expanded on in Section 5.3.4.
The Causal Model is the foundation of the synchronisation steps of the TRM Process:
Steps 1, 4 and 5. It provides a shared perspective with which to discuss risk impact
across safety and security and facilitates explicit modelling of the condition links.
This model is the basis for reasoning about inter-attribute links, so it is arguably the
most important part of co-assurance14. It defines not only syntactical information
such as the type of causal relationship (the "how?" of risk impact propagation), but
also provides a clue as to the semantics of the relationships between domains with
the modelled conditions (the what and why of inter-domain risk).
The beauty of this abstraction is that it enables the relationship between safety
and security to be explicitly modelled and analysed. For many of the existing
co-engineering and co-assurance approaches reviewed in Chapter 3 the causal links
have to be inferred by the practitioner, and the assurance gaps that the relationship
introduces are obfuscated. This lack of clarity is counter-productive to the goal of
successful and rigorous co-assurance of the two attributes.
The following sub-sections discuss further the underlying theory of the causal model
(5.3.2), how it applies to risk argumentation (5.3.3), and the types of links that might
be encountered when co-assuring a system (5.3.4).
5.3.2 Interaction Risks
To understand the causal model better, the generalised risk argument structures for
safety and security must be revisited15. Figure 5.12 appears to be a complex model,
it is two models; one superimposed on the other. The first model is of the generic
risk structures, the safety risk argument on the left and the security risk argument on
the right. In this model we see the pattern of risks identified, mitigated, decomposed
to requirements then in another package they are satisfied.
The second model is shown in using red and green. This model shows the connections
between the artefacts of the risk argument structures. There are different types of
relationships. Vulnerabilities are used as an example to demonstrate the concept.
Each of the relationships show how vulnerabilities introduce new hazards or contribute
to existing ones. Vulnerabilities can also influence safety requirements, for example
if a security control affects a function of the system that maintains a safe state.
Vulnerabilities can also alter the software’s contribution to overall risk.
In addition to the direct influences that security concerns can have on safety conditions,
it is also possible that new vulnerabilities can undermine the very reasoning pattern
i.e. argument structure itself. Three examples of how it can do this are shown in the
diagram. The first is that vulnerabilities can challenge the ways in which software
may contribute to a hazard by introducing new risk propagation paths than what is
identified or modelled.
13An overview of the types of causation models is presented in [404].
14And central to this thesis!
15These structure were discussed in Chapter 2.
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The other two ways involve the argumentation process. New vulnerabilities can
challenge the inferences that practitioners make when constructing their assurance
argument. From the insulin pump example, it was assumed that claims for all
the commanded and uncommanded infusion modes were made. However after the
discovery of the new vulnerabilities it was clear that there were risk paths, previously
unknown to the practitioners creating the argument, for which no claims were made.
Some challenges to inferences can be understood as challenges to assurance confidence
points.
Even though these interactions were shown from the perspective of security-informed
safety, it is possible to look at the condition and artefact interactions from a safety-
informed security perspective with safety constraining, challenging, limiting or
undermining parts of the security argument structure.
IEC 31010:2019 [184, p 11] states that "Risk is often described in terms of risk
sources, potential events, their consequences and their likelihoods". A concept that is
introduced here as part of SSAF is the idea of interaction risks. Security firewall
prevents safety-related message from being transmitted on a network is one example
of an interaction risk. The firewall, which is a security control implemented in the
system as a policy and/or requirements, has an effect on a communication that is
intended for a safety service, e.g. a "stop" command. In this case the interaction risk
originates from security and changes the likelihood of a safety risk16.
By conceptualising interaction risks in this way, and using the causal model to
describe precisely the risks that we are concerned with17 it is possible to narrow
down the total list of safety and security risks to those that are shared in some way
across the domains. These are the risks that need to be resolved and reasoned about
at synchronisation points when the two disciplines come together.
16The safety command is likely part of the risk reduction for safety. Without this command, the
system may be put in an unsafe state with higher potential for an accident.











Fig. 5.12 Example: Relationships Between Safety and Security Arguments.
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5.3.3 Risk Argument
Identifying the interaction risks alone is insufficient for technical risk co-assurance.
Inter-domain links without argument are unexplained therefore it can be unclear how
co-assurance objectives have been satisfied18. Enumerating the interaction risks or
links between domains is a useful activity for reasoning, but to understand whether
the objectives for co-assurance are being met it is necessary to make an argument
for co-assurance.
Fig. 5.13 TRM Safety-Security Technical Risk Argument
Figure 5.13 shows such an argument. It is a generalised risk structure with a
top level claim that safety and security interaction risks are acceptably managed.
Claims are then made about the management of each interaction risk identified.
Then requirements for the management of those risks are decomposed and allocated
through i levels of abstraction. The model of the inter-domain interaction is then
18The original statement in Kelly’s thesis reads "Evidence without argument is unexplained - it
can be unclear that (or how) safety objectives have been satisfied". Here the links are the artefacts
that support co-assurance reasoning i.e. evidence for co-assurance claims
5.3 Causal Model & Technical Risk Argument 83
used as evidence to support the leaf claim. For the insulin pump example, the fault
tree-ADT link model would be used to support a co-assurance requirement.
This argument structure has the definition of "acceptable management" of interaction
risks and the single-attribute arguments as context. It is possible for a stronger
claim of risk mitigation to be made19. Without the single-attribute arguments it
would be impossible to understand the sources or the consequences of risk, or their
significance20.
Another important artefact is the interaction risks log which is assumed to be
"sufficiently complete". Sufficient completeness is dependent on many factors including,
but not limited to, the risk appetite of both attributes, the regulatory landscape, the
resources available, legal ramifications, etc. .
The top claim has an equal focus on safety and security. However if one attribute
were to take precedence, then the top level claim would be "Risk contributions of
Domain X from Domain Y are acceptably mitigated". This narrows the number of
interaction risks in scope down to only those that originate in Domain Y and have a
consequence in Domain X, i.e. security-informed safety or safety-informed security.
The top level claim is determined by the co-assurance objectives.
The co-assurance technical risk argument can be likened to system integration in
that, on its own it does not have much value, but taken in the context of other
components (or arguments) it has the power to create an interface between two
domains. Reasoning about the interface and the propagation of risk across domain
boundaries is one of the main purposes of co-assurance. Much like the causal links,
explicitly representing the technical risk argument allows for a more systematic
approach that can be evaluated by others.
Up to this point, with the exception of the insulin pump example, interaction risks
and the link models that represent them have been described at quite a high level of
abstraction. The following section provides more detail about the types of links that
can occur before Causal Patterns are discussed in Section 5.4.
5.3.4 Types of Links
When discussing inter-domain causal links21 and interaction risks, many perspectives
can be taken. The lens used determines the focus and framing of the co-assurance
problem. There are three lenses that are important for co-assurance:
– Causal Relationship Type describes the nature of the link or its inherent qualities.
It can be thought of as the mechanics of the underlying causal model.
– Causal Relationship Pattern is the structural representation of the causal link in
model form. From this perspective we are concerned with the entities in the model
and their linkage.
19The difference between management and mitigation of interaction risks is the amount of effort
required. Management does not imply redesign, however this might be desirable.
20Note that it is not in the context of single-attribute assurance cases - that form of justification
is rarely used in security. Argument here can be represented only in the minds of the safety and
security practitioners doing co-assurance activities.
21Note that causal relationships, causal links and links are used synonymously.
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– Causal Argumentation Scheme describes the meaning of the links. It can be thought
of as looking inside the "boxes" in the causal pattern models.
Causal Patterns and Argumentation Schemes are discussed in the next Section
5.4. This section is dedicated to understanding the underlying mechanics of the
inter-domain links, and the long tradition of modelling causal models that they are
associated with.
The different types of links are intrinsically connected to the evolution of thought
about, in particular, safety causal models. Safety has a long history of accident
investigation and understanding the causes of accidents, which is often motivated by
legislation. Security does have the notion of causal models, however those models
are still evolving at a fast pace because of the uncertainty introduced by intelligent
malicious actors and complex attack vectors. Security causal models must, to some
extent, include some highly uncertain information22 which makes the causal models
a lot less certain than those found in safety.
This does not, however, detract from the usefulness of having causal models for
co-assurance. Indeed, there is always a causal model present when analysing risks
even it is not articulated. Explicitly representing the causal model facilitates better
reasoning about risk because it allows for more minds to work on the issues.
Figure 5.14 shows three sets of connected dots, with the dot furthermost to the right
in each set representing the outcome or consequence. Each of these sets represents
three types of causal relationships: linear, complex and emergent. Each of these
are associated with particular schools of thought around causal modelling23. Their
meaning in the context of co-assurance is discussed below.
Fig. 5.14 Types of Relationship in the Causal Model
Linear - This type of causal relationship is characterised by sequences of conditions.
The most significant limitation of this causal model is that through creating simplicity,
much of the information related to complexity is abstracted out of the model.
Uncertainty is reduced, not because of the analysis itself but because the representation
does not have the capability to capture it. However, the simple linear model of
causality should not be disregarded. It is quite a powerful model and a useful way
to manage and communicate about uncertainty when reasoning about inter-domain
condition-to-condition links. Because the model requires only the most essential
22Such as the assumed operation of the attacker’s mind.
23The labels of linear, complex and emergent come from Hollnagel’s conceptualisations of causal
models in safety [168, p 11-16] and [169, p 128-134].
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information, practitioners in each domain are obliged to condense the complexity
of models in their own domain into digestible representations for the other domain.
This model should be used with caution for the appropriate goals24, and with full
knowledge of its limitations.
Complex - This model is an elaboration of the linear model. Instead of having
one sequence of events or conditions, complex models are characterised by multiple
contributors to a single consequence which are often populated over multiple layers.
Reason’s Swiss Cheese model25 with conditions occurring in multiple layers is an
excellent example of a complex linear model. When applied to co-assurance, this
model is able to capture more detail and technicalities about the inter-domain
interactions. For example, the effect of an insider threat, their motivations, the
company personnel policy, safety conditions related to roles all can be included in
the same model. This model often encourages a layered defence, sometimes called
defence-in-depth, which is well-suited to many of the principles in both safety and
security defence strategies. Whilst this model is an improvement on the simple linear
model for communication of technical detail, it still lacks some of the granularity
and complexity required for safety and security co-assurance.
Emergent - the last category are emergent causal relationships. These are characterised
by the consequence not having a linear path to the source conditions or events. This
is sometimes stated as "the whole is greater than the sum of its parts" - that is,
the consequence only occurs when all the required conditions are present, yet its
occurrence cannot be attributed or partitioned to individual conditions. For co-
assurance this model is the most suited to capture the complexities of inter-domain
interactions, such as understanding the impact of a confidentiality breach for one
third-party supplier of components on the safety of the entire system. The main
challenge using this model is a pragmatic one; there are currently very few, if any,
documented ways of reasoning about emergence between safety and security. Using
this model is a resource intensive exercise that requires deep expertise from both
domains. Depending on the co-assurance goals, the resource used might be counter-
balanced by the detailed and nuanced understanding gained by using an emergent
model.
Causal model selection is determined by a number of factors. Already mentioned
are the assurance goals; they determine whether the causal model captures sufficient
information for communication at synchronisation points. Another factor is the
information available; for many inter-domain interactions very little prior information
exists, therefore using models where the complexity and detail is high might require
a lot more expert judgement and still have a very high level of uncertainty, rendering
them of little use.
Figure 5.14 is useful for understanding the underlying causal model, however it
only partially expresses what the interactions are. Firstly, important syntactical
information is missing - what exactly are the conditions or dots that are being
connected? Secondly, and much more of a difficult concept is, what do the connections
mean for co-assurance? The TRM patterns in the following section go some way to
answering these questions.
24Usually goals centred around high-level understanding rather than conveying technical detail.
25Discussed in Chapter 2.
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5.4 Causal Patterns
Bass et al. [38, p 203] state that "There are many ways to do design badly, and just
a few ways to do it well". The same can be said for co-assurance arguments. Because
of the novelty of the problem, the complexity of the systems and the socio-technical
context of the co-assurance process, knowledge is still being discovered about how to
bring safety and security together and reduce risk for a system.
To enable capture and reuse of hard-won architectural engineering knowledge, Bass
et al. [38, p 203] advocate patterns and tactics to capture good design structures. An
analogy will be used in this section with argument and causal relationship structures.
There is a need for the SSAF to go beyond simply stating that information needed
to be exchanged at synchronisation points. Instead, a richer approach that captured
useful knowledge for co-assurance was adopted by cataloguing common structures
and arguments found in co-assurance.
The co-assurance patterns discussed here were found in the literature, standards, best
practice and methodologies. Each pattern attempts to capture the characteristics
that lead to different goals. There is no claim to completeness with this collection of
patterns, instead they are presented as a useful resource capturing the structure or
meaning of common co-assurance arguments.
The structural (syntactic) patterns are discussed in Section 5.4.1, and the argument
(semantic) patterns are discussed in Section 5.4.2.
5.4.1 Link Patterns
The insulin pump example in Figure 5.8 is just one example of an artefact links.
However, the example artefact is addressing a very specific problem in a specific
context, i.e. linking attacks with faults in graph structures. This model will not be
appropriate for all co-assurance goals because of the nature of the models used, their
causal link type, information known, etc.
There are many more co-assurance problems, goals and contexts for which solutions
need to be found. Table 5.2 shows twelve more common co-assurance causal
relationships captured as Causal Link Patterns. Figure 5.15 shows the structure of
the knowledge captured for each link pattern.
Each link pattern consists of core information that must always be listed, and
additional information that may be included in the model, but is more changeable
over time. Each link pattern has a unique identifier, a name or label, a description,
source and target conditions and what the causal type is.
The way that this catalogue of Link Patterns is intended to be used is in conjunction
with synchronisation points. Once the information needs for each synchronisation
point is understood, then an appropriate link pattern can be selected to create a co-
assurance artefact. That artefact represents one or many links or causal relationships
that are connected to particular interaction risks. A technical risk argument can
then be made over reduction of interaction risks.
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Fig. 5.15 Causal Link Pattern Structure
The following sections provide an overview of the link patterns and the co-assurance
goals they satisfyNote that the patterns vary from linking risk conditions to system
requirements trade-off. They have been included in the same catalogue because their
context of application can be inferred from the source and target.
5.4.1.1 Bi-Directional
CR1 and CR2 are examples of bi-directional links using the Architecture Trade-Off
Analysis Method (ATAM) [233]. ATAM relies on stakeholders for a system having
a structured meeting and evaluating the benefits of using different architectures,
then negotiating the best architecture based on a set of scenarios. This method was
found to be effective in meeting its goals and good at creating open communication
channels, including between government and contractors [224]. A limitation of this
method however is that it is resource intensive26. It is an emergent form of linking
system artefacts.
5.4.1.2 Security-Informed Safety
CR3 and CR4 show how Systems Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) [265], and
adaptions STPA-Sec [440] and STPA-SafeSec [141] integrate security conditions to
system level hazards and safety requirements. Initial industrial evaluations have
found that Security-Aware STPA has limitations with regards to analysis of security
26The case study in [224] took two days and not all scenarios were covered.
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Table 5.2 Causal Link Patterns
CR.ID Condition Causal RelationshipSource Target Label Method
CR1 Safety Requirements Security Requirements trade-off ATAM
CR2 Security Requirements Safety Requirements trade-off ATAM
CR3 Security Condition Safety Requirements influence STPA-Sec
CR4 Security Condition Safety Requirements influence STPA-SafeSec
CR5 Vulnerabilities Failure cause FMVEA
CR6 Vulnerabilities Hazards contribute to SAHARA
CR7 Vulnerabilities Hazards contribute to DDA
CR8 Vulnerabilities Hazards contribute to UML
CR9 Vulnerabilities Hazards contribute to FTA
CR10 Safety Effect Attack motivates ADT
CR11 Threat Condition Hazard safety impact Standard
CR12 Security Controls Safety Requirements conflict with ad-hoc
concerns which were not directly safety-related such as privacy or confidentiality.
This link uses an emergent structure.
5.4.1.3 Vulnerabilities Contributing to Hazards
CR5-9 all show the different ways in which vulnerabilities can contribute to hazards
or failures. The methods used for CR5-7 27 are based on the bowtie (complex linear)
causal model. In this case, a security condition leads to a safety hazard. They rely
on using expert judgement and guide words to structure the discovery of the effects
of interaction risks.
CR8 shows that a causal link can be defined in UML [311], for example using expert
knowledge of a particular application domain to describe a complex relationship. CR9
is similar to the insulin pump example in Figure 5.8 of vulnerabilities contributing
to hazards.
5.4.1.4 Safety-Informed Security.
There a many methods currently that investigate the impact of security on safety.
However, the reverse relationship: the impact of safety on security is just as worthy of
study. With the increasing threat from well-resourced adversaries, and the increasing
integration of technology into critical national infrastructure, how a safety risk might
motivate a particular attack and thus increase security risk is worth analysis in its
own right. CR10 shows one example of this, by incorporating safety effects (possibly
from a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis) into an Attack Defence Tree.
27Failure Modes and Vulnerabilities Effects Analysis (FMVEA) [362], SAHARA [278] and DDA [98].
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5.4.1.5 Application Domain-Specific
CR11 demonstrates how causal relationships can be derived from the standards.
CR11 shows the safety impact relationship between threat conditions and hazards
that is defined in the aerospace safety and security complementary standards ARP
4754A[? ]/DO-326A[? ].
The last causal relationship CR12 shows how the interaction between the attributes
can be analysed in an ad-hoc way, for example a domain expert doing an analysis
in a spreadsheet. The reasons for a this are many and varied, however the most
common might be that there does not exist a causal link in the standards or with
existing approaches that allows for the appropriate causal relationship to be modelled.
Performing this ad hoc analysis using a text-based tool is discouraged, a modelling
environment would be better suited for future update of the link.
5.4.1.6 Project-Specific
The causal link patterns discussed in this section are a small subset of the causal
relationships that can exist between safety and security. It is unlikely that any
one method will sufficiently address all the concerns for both attributes, especially
when they are sometimes conflicting (even within a single domain). With its causal
model and synchronisation points, SSAF TRM proposes a way forward that enables
work to continue under uncertainty by using combinations of these patterns to
tailor a project-specific co-assurance solution. Compared to existing approaches for
co-assurance, TRM link patterns allow for updates in knowledge to be more easily
incorporated. Borrowing the idea of an attack surface from security, SSAF TRM
enables the assurance surface, i.e. all the ways that safety and security uncertainty
and risk can be reduced, to be managed in a systematic, strategic and rigorous way.
5.4.2 Attribute Schemes
Thus far, SSAF has introduced the concept of independent co-assurance using
synchronisation points. The TRM has expanded on that idea for technical risk
by providing a causal model, causal relationship types and link patterns. These
are already a significant contribution to the knowledge base for co-assurance. But
something more can be done.
Unlike previous approaches which mainly present models and conditions on a syntactic
level, an objective of the TRM is to provide semantic information about inter-
domain links. Note that many approaches do have some detail about the types of
vulnerabilities and threats that can occur, or detail about safety conditions such
as hazards, but few (except maybe specialised standards) talk about semantics of
the links, that is, what risk is being propagated. It is the intention for SSAF TRM
to encapsulate some of the knowledge about the meaning of connections28 for use
during co-assurance. It does so in the form of attribute schemes.
28Looking inside the boxes of the models.
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Attribute schemes are patterns of reasoning about interaction risks and their underlying
causal relationships. A paradigm used for the schemes is that of attribute decomposition
from systems engineering, where safety and security can be represented by sub-
attributes. In addition, the attribute schemes are framed as schemes and not
patterns because they draw heavily on work in argumentation. The following sections
explains these further.
Attribute Decomposition
The first concept that allows us to traverse from high-level safety and security
goals to specific claims and requirements about interaction risks is that of attribute
decomposition. This is an approach to making goals more concrete, and is an
improvement on many existing co-assurance approaches which do not provide details
about interactions because their language and entities are at too high a level.
The idea of attribute decomposition is not a new one. The SEI29 published multiple
documents related to systems and architecture development in the early 2000s that
had variations of the concept. Two exmaples of this are Firesmith’s 2003 [132, p
15] decomposition of security into quality subfactors such as access control, attack,
integrity, recovery, etc. . Even earlier in 2000, Kazman et al. [234, p 16-17, 29]
presented utility trees which use attribute decomposition to "provide a top-down
mechanism for directly and efficiently translating the business drivers of a system
into concrete quality attribute scenarios"[234, p 16].
So the core premise that is being adopted by the TRM Attribute Schemes is that
safety and security can be decomposed30 into sub-attributes or subfactors. These
sub-attributes make it easier to reason about interaction risks and how they can
occur because they break the problem down into categories to be considered.
It is possible to recursively apply attribute decomposition until a concrete scenario
or requirement is created, as is done with utility trees31 [234]. This would be using
attribute decomposition for defining co-assurance requirements. However, there are
instances when little is known about the interactions and attribute decomposition
needs to be used in conjunction with argument schemes for exploratory analysis.
Argumentation Schemes Applied to Co-Assurance
In Chapter 2 we saw how, in the area of informal argumentation, Walton has made
great epistemological advancements by capturing reasoning patterns in argumentation
schemes [425]. A common example is the argument from authority scheme in Table
5.3 which is an appeal to expert opinion. The component parts of the scheme are
the premises which lead to the conclusion or claim. The unique, and one of the
most valuable, contributions of the schemes are the critical questions that challenge
29Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon Univeristy
30Note that Firesmith [132, p 15] represents this as an aggregate decomposition which in UML is
a weak association that means the sub-factors exist independently of safety and security
31Utility trees are used as part of the ATAM process (see Chapter 3 in Step 5 to elicit requirements
from multiple stakeholders.
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different parts of the argument. These critical questions act as prompts to assist
with evaluating the argument.
Table 5.3 Argument From Authority Scheme: Appeal to Expert Opinion[423]
Major Premise Source E is an expert in subject domain D
containing proposition A.
Minor Premise E asserts that proposition A (in domain D)
is true (false).
Conclusion A may plausibly be taken to be true.
Critical Questions
CQ1 Expertise: How credible is E as an expert source?
CQ2 Field: Is E an expert in the field that A is in?
CQ3 Opinion: What did E assert that Implies A?
CQ4 Trustworthiness: Is E personally reliable as a source?
CQ5 Consistency: Is A consistent with other experts’ assertions?
Yuan and Kelly extended the concept of argumentation schemes to apply to safety
engineering. In Yuan and Kelly [442, 443] several safety schemes are presented32
each with their own critical questions.
In summary, this approach to argumentation allows for semantic exploration of
arguments. It does so by identifying structures (i.e. argument schemes) that capture
patterns of reasoning. In addition, the argumentation schemes provide two devices
for the assurance process that increase confidence [442]: 1. They provide a catalogue
of (good) argument patterns during argument construction. 2. They provide a set of
critical questions for each pattern that can be used to explore or validate an argument
used.
The TRM adopts this idea, and adapts it for application to co-assurance. The
hypotheses this is based on is that there are underlying argument structures for
co-assurance, and that it is possible to capture those structures33. Using the
schemes paradigm, and attribute decomposition as a way to both identify and bound
exploration of co-assurance argument structures results in the concept mapping
shown in Figure 5.16.
The idea of Critical Questions to examine the claims being made remains the same.
However, Walton’s framing of premises and conclusion increased in complexity when
attempting to apply them directly to the co-assurance context. For example, many of
the claims that are used for co-assurance are yet unknown or the implications of these
detailed claims being in the public domain are too great34. Therefore, Sub-Attributes
represent the set of claims about system characteristics that are associated with
safety and security; and Common Conflicts is the set of common negative conclusions
that should be avoided during co-assurance.
32Such as Argument from hazard avoidance, Argument from functional decomposition and
Argument from formal verification
33In the same way that Walton captured patterns for informal logic, and Yuan and Kelly did for
safety argumentation.
34Publishing claims of a co-assurance case in the public domain may increase risk in the safety-
related system because the basis for safety is open.
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Fig. 5.16 Mapping Concepts from Walton’s Schemes to TRM
The TRM Argumentation Schemes are a lot more generalised when talking about
structure compared with Walton Schemes. Where Walton analyses structure at unit
level (premises, conclusion), TRM Schemes use system attributes to analyse argument
structure at a much higher level, but still provide detail about the interactions.
Figure 5.17 shows the change to the Technical Risk Argument instigated by considering
sub-attributes. An additional strategy (Argument over each Sub-attribute) and claim
(Interaction Risks for each Sub-attribute have been acceptably managed) have been
added. This decomposition can be made multiple times, as denoted by k++.
The intended use of the schemes is to supplement the syntactic models in Steps 1,
4 and 5 of the TRM Process with semantic information about the links. Instead
of considering only the conditions, the schemes can be used as prompts to elicit
interaction risks. This can be done in several ways, the simplest being using attribute
decompositions as guidewords similar to HAZOPS or Functional Failure Analysis.
The following sections describe two sub-attribute argument schemes.
5.4.2.1 Normative CIA Scheme
Common Criteria, a standard for security assurance, states that it "addresses
protection of assets from unauthorised disclosure, modification, or loss of use.
The categories of protection relating to these three types of failure of security
are commonly called confidentiality, integrity, and availability, respectively"[195, p
11]. So a seemingly obvious starting point for attribute decomposition is using the
CIA (confidentiality, integrity and availability) sub-attributes. Historically, security
policies typically cover CIA of system assets [191] and safety has similar concepts
even though the definitions may vary.
Using a few definitions of the CIA properties from several common standards the
attribute overlap between safety and security will be discussed.
confidentiality
– assurance that information is not disclosed to unauthorized individuals,
processes, or devices IEC 62443-1-1 [190, 3.2.28]
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Fig. 5.17 Attribute Decomposition in the Technical Risk Argument
– property that information is not made available or disclosed to unauthorized
individuals, entities, or processes ISO/IEC 27000:2020 [204, 3.10]
integrity
– quality of a system reflecting the logical correctness and reliability of the
operating system, the logical completeness of the hardware and software
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implementing the protection mechanisms, and the consistency of the data
structures and occurrence of the stored data. Note 1 to entry: In a formal
security mode, integrity is often interpreted more narrowly to mean protection
against unauthorized modification or destruction of information IEC 62443-1-1
[190, 3.2.60]
– property of accuracy and completeness ISO/IEC 27000:2020 [204, 3.36]
– (safety integrity) probability of a . . . safety-related system satisfactorily performing
the specified safety functions under all the stated conditions within a stated
period of time. Note 3 to entry: In determining safety integrity, all causes of
failures (both random hardware failures and systematic failures) that lead to
an unsafe state should be included IEC 61508-4:2010 [188, 3.5.4]
availability
– ability of an item to be in a state to perform a required function under given
conditions at a given instant or over a given time interval, assuming that the
required external resources are provided. Note 1 to entry: This ability depends
on the combined aspects of the reliability performance, the maintainability
performance and the maintenance support performance IEC 62443-1-1 [190,
3.2.16]
– property of being accessible and usable on demand by an authorized entity
ISO/IEC 27000:2020 [204, 3.7]
Safety standards typically do not have a definition for confidentiality, and from the
two definitions presented above it becomes clearer why this is the case. Typically
confidentiality has dealt with the disclosure of information to unauthorised entities.
It has been unlikely for confidentiality to be the source of a hazard (harm) therefore
many safety standards have been silent on the matter.
Integrity and availability are very different on the other hand. Here we see a lot
of overlap in definitions. IEC 62443 and ISO 27000 frame integrity as a property
of the system or asset which reflects its correctness, accuracy, completeness and
reliability. Safety integrity, as defined in IEC 61508, also mentions reliability-related
characteristics, however this definition of integrity has a large overlap with security’s
definition of availability. Both IEC 62443 and ISO 27000 define availability in terms
of accessibility and usability i.e. an item performing a required function.
If the characteristics of the definitions presented above were added to a Venn Diagram
for safety and security, there would likely be many that fall within the intersection.
Whilst its possible to get mired in establishing generalised definitions35, that is not
the objective of looking at the intersection. In the TRM, the aim is to understand
the overlaps sufficiently to create links for co-assurance.
A simple way of achieving that is by using the CIA sub-attributes (as one would do
with guidewords) to understand the interactions between safety and security, and
derive inter-domain causal relationships. Figure 5.18 shows part of the linking process.
The resultant links include, but are not limited to, hazards related to safety-critical
messages being linked to vulnerabilities on the network which they use because they
both overlap for availability. Another example is the integrity of information used
35This is most likely one of the activities that uses the most resources when establishing standards.
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for safety critical services can be linked to vulnerabilities related to code corruption
and network tampering because they involve the integrity quality attribute.
Fig. 5.18 CIA Inter-Domain Linking
Part of the reasoning while performing this analysis is captured in the CIA Scheme in
Table 5.4. It is argued here that this scheme is a normative argumentation scheme for
co-assurance because the CIA attributes and their characteristics are so widely used
and understood in both domains. The CIA Scheme is by no means a comprehensive
or complete list of conflicts or critical questions. That, however, does not preclude
this scheme from being used as the starting point for the semantic analysis of causal
relationships at synchronisation points.
Firesmith [132] has called the CIA attributes "popular subfactors", but notes that
security is complex and cannot be adequately addressed solely by using CIA. However,
until there is industry-wide standardisation of sub-attributes and their taxonomies,
this simple scheme can be used to assist with creating causal links using semantic
information between domains.
5.4.2.2 Refined Attribute Scheme
Admittedly, the CIA attribute decomposition is still at quite a high level, and
may contribute less to interaction risk identification when applied to highly complex
systems. Being cognisant of Firesmith’s observation, and understanding its implications
has led to the second TRM argumentation pattern - the refined attribute scheme.
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Table 5.4 CIA Scheme
Confidentiality - claim that no information is disclosed
Common Conflicts:
- safety services require information to be open and available
- security policy requires that information is hidden
Critical Questions:
- What information is used or referred to by both safety and security?
- What are the requirements for hiding information?
Integrity - claim of accuracy, correctness and completeness
Common Conflicts:
- information used for a safety or security is incorrect, corrupted or inaccurate
- system compromised by using requirements conflict
- What are the sources of corruption or inaccuracy affecting
(i) security that originate from a safety condition?
(ii) safety that originate from a security condition?
Availability - claim that an item is accessible and can perform a required function
Common Conflict:
- a security control limits availability for a safety service or function
- a security requirement is ’outranked’ in precedence by a safety requirement
- Which of the high impact safety risks have associated security requirements?
- What is the intent of the security control disrupting availability?
This scheme takes CIA as a starting point and further decomposes them into sub-
attributes in the same way that was done with safety and security → CIA36. The
sub-attributes identified for CIA are Communication, Failure Behaviour, Recovery,
Resource Use, Detection, Diversity, Timing, and Trust. These are shown in Figure
5.19 in a structured tree37 38. The concerns of each of the Sub-Attributes are as
follows:
Communication This is concerned with interactions between messages or information
that are used for safety critical applications and services, and the security
aspects of communication such as access, network protocols, etc. When used in
the context of more detailed analysis the content of the communication should
be considered; for example, if several safety systems reveal small amounts of
information that are not significant in themselves, but cumulatively result in a
higher security risk.
Failure Behaviour This is concerned with the interactions between both fail-safe
and fail-secure behaviour. There are multiple types of interactions for failure
behaviour; the types of interactions that can occur are fail-secure behaviour
negatively impacts safety, fail-safe behaviour negatively impacts security, or
both behaviours complement each other. It is the first two that increase
interaction risk, and therefore it is essential that they are considered during
co-assurance.
36This is the equivalent of k = k + 1 in Figure 5.17.
37Note that the decomposition type is still an aggregate association similar to safety and security
decomposition to CIA.
38Structuring this figure was inspired by the utility trees used in ATAM Step 5 [234] discussed
earlier in the chapter.
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Fig. 5.19 Relationships between CIA attributes and Scheme
Recovery This is concerned with interaction risks due to both safe state recovery and
recovery after a security incident. The interactions that can arise in this space
are varied and complex because in many cases stating what recovery behaviour
is for a system involves hardware and software component configurations,
operational policies, reporting policies, preservation activities, etc. . Each of
these introduce new aspects for consideration and potential differing mitigations.
Whilst each of the sub-attributes is linked in some way to the others, recovery
is unique in that it has more direct associations with failure behaviour, resource
use, detection and diversity.
Resource Use This is concerned with the interaction risks that arise due to the
resource requirements for safety and security, as well as conflicts in precedent.
For example, if a safety service requires more time and space on a component’s
CPU, then this can be used in an exploit to reduce performance of other
services by repeatedly calling on that safety service. This is just one example,
however a good heuristic to use when analysing this sub-attribute is: if there
is a limited resource (memory, time, processing, manpower, etc. ) and either
safety and security takes priority then these types of interaction risks are likely
to be present. Note that time is a sub-category of resource use, but it has been
listed on its own for consideration because the number of potential interaction
risks are numerous.
Detection This is concerned with interaction risks to do with detecting failure,
errors, faults and unsafe states for safety, and detecting intrusion, attacks, errors,
loss, unauthorised access, etc. for security. The mechanisms through which
detection is achieved may conflict for a system. For example, many intrusion
detection systems (IDS) use some form of machine learning for recognising
patterns, if the IDS misidentifies unauthorised actions then the response may
have an impact on safety. There are also more subtle interactions, such as if
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the logs used for recording health and usage data for safety are not correctly
encrypted then they are exposed to malicious actors39.
Diversity This is one word used for multiple concepts. Overall it is concerned with
the interaction risks that arise due to redundancy or variation in the system for
safety and security. For example, safety-related systems often use redundancy
and variation as a tactic to prevent failure, however this kind of diversity
adds complexity to the security policy because there are more vectors to cover.
Conversely, this applies to security diversity (defence-in-depth mechanisms)
creating barriers for safety, for example if an operator has several more steps
added to a safety process to verify their identity.
Timing As previously mentioned, this sub-attribute is has a strong relationship
to resource use, and in many ways can be seen as a specialised subset of its
interaction risks. This is mainly concerned with temporal interaction risks.
This may be in the form of real-time aspects such as worst-case-execution-
time, priority of service and heartbeats for both safety and security. However,
there are more subtle interaction risks that should be considered such as the
temporal co-occurrence of safety and security events/conditions that violates
independence assumptions gives rise to emergent risks. An example of this is
when modelling failure in a fault tree, there is the assumption of independence
and no representation of time, therefore a security threat might cause those
assumptions to be invalid.
Trust The final sub-attribute is a complex one as there are many conceptions of
what trust is in both safety and security. However, the main concern here is
understanding the interaction risks that arise due to confidence required for
communications, information, personnel, etc. This attribute, probably more
than any others in the decomposition, will need higher cognitive reasoning and
connection finding because many of the interaction risks relate to underlying
philosophies, ideas or things that are intangible. Unlike resource use, for
example, where data about performance can be collected from the system and
used in the analysis, trust can only be assessed via indicators e.g. a message
is trusted because it uses a certain protocol, a person is trusted because they
have an identification badge etc. However, these are indicators only, which
adds another layer of uncertainty and potential interaction risk.
The descriptions of the factors reveal that they are not independent, and rather than
being a convenient hierarchical tree, they are an interconnected web of characteristics.
Interaction risks can therefore arise across attributes and these must be considered.
For simplicity, the scheme does not cover the these cross-boundary risks, however, in a
similar way to performing analysis within the sub-attributes, complex inter-attribute
risks should be considered. For example the insider threat (Trust) creates significant
and numerous interaction risks due to the fact that they have the ability to alter
other attributes.
When considering inter-attribute interaction risks, it should be recognised that
the process is one of trade-off and negotiation, and not always zero-sum. Careful
39However, note that encrypting the logs might increase safety risk because of the additional
"barrier".
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deliberation, with the refined attribute scheme as a basis for discussions, is required.
Table 5.5 shows the sub-attributes in a scheme structure with a subset of common
conflicts and critical questions.
Whilst this scheme, with its sub-attributes, was developed for looking at safety and
security interaction risks, very few of the sub-attributes are specific to safety and
security. It is possible to use this scheme to reason about trade-offs between safety
and security and other attributes too.
Summary of Causal Patterns
In this section, one of the core contributions of SSAF was presented and discussed:
that of causal patterns. Previous approaches to co-assurance have looked at the
interactions mainly on the syntactic level using modelling structures and labels
"hazard", "risk", "threat", "vulnerability", etc. However this approach, whilst it helps
to structure thinking and communication, leaves the meaning of the connection
implicit. This hidden information then makes it difficult to analyse inter-domain
interaction risks in any depth.
The two types of causal patterns presented here allow for the combination of syntactic
and semantic approaches. The causal relationship link patterns encapsulate the
structures that can be used for condition-to-condition links. The attribute argument
schemes facilitate exploratory reasoning about interaction risks that may arise. Using
these two types of patterns, it is possible to identify and reason about a system’s
co-assurance argument is a more systematic way.
A small constraint of this approach is that these are patterns which capture only a
few key features by their nature40. There are also safety and security interaction risks
that do not easily fall into one of characterisations, particularly to do with intent.
Failure behaviour of a system is easier to understand because of the information
available via testing and verification. Failure of intent is a much wider problem that
must be reasoned about nonetheless. The TRM does not preclude reasoning about
these aspects, however intent is not a safety or security condition - it is one that
belongs to the development and assurance processes. Thus, further support for these
aspects is needed, and the SSAF Socio-Technical Model presents a solution.
40More information and they would be too specific, less information and they would be too








Table 5.5 Refined Attribute Scheme
Sub-Attribute Common Conflict Critical Questions
Communication
Intent for communication and goals divergent:
- information needed safety service arrives but is unverifiable
- safety communication is from untrusted path
Is the identity of the sender of importance?
Is this communication on an assumed trusted channel?
What level of integrity is required for safe operation?
Failure
Behaviour
Divergent paradigms for failure behaviour:
- fail secure mechanisms lead to availability issues for safety
- fail safe bahaviour exposes security-sensitive information
- fail safe behaviour leads to security issues for wider systems
- fail secure stop leads to denial-of-service or availability hazard
- degraded safety operating modes are less secure
What is fail safe behaviour for the {System}?
What is fail secure behaviour for the {System}?
Is there a failure or fault correction mechanism?
Recovery
Negative risk impact introduced by recovery mechanisms:
- safety logging/recovery may enter security exposed/insecure state
- security incident prevents safety service restart
- security recovery mechanism disrupts the availability of a safety service
What are the recovery behaviours for the {System}?
Is backward/forward recovery permitted or used?
What is the priority for recovery?
Resources
Availability compromised due to divergent resource policies:
- safety service does not take priority
- safety or security service does not have sufficient resource allocation
What are the resource requirements for safety/security?
How are shared resources allocated?
Detection
Divergent paradigms for logging faults and errors:
- safety logs reveal information that creates security vulnerability
- security logging and detection cause unsafe behaviour
What is the fault detection paradigm being used?
Are error codes and logs in use?
Are backdoors present?
Are duplicate messages likely to cause issue?
Diversity Redundancy allows new attack vectors from safety fall-backsDiversity allows unsafe state from security fall-backs
What diversity/redundancy exists in the {System}?
How is the functional diversity instantiated?
Is dynamic behaviour permitted?
Timing Safety timing exceeded due to security condition or mechanismCo-occurrence of events undermines temporal independence assumption
What are the timing assumptions?
On what assumptions is WCET41 based?
Is {System} synchronisation important for security
mechanisms e.g. certificates?
Trust
Divergent paradigms for required confidence
- safety service stopped because of untrusted person/info/process
- security and safety continue in untrusted context
What is the traceability of the information?
What is the provenance of the information?
How would the information be verified?
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5.5 Case Study: Infusion Pump Scheme Application
As useful as a new technique or approach may seem from its description, the value
added can always be better communicated through showing its application. That is
the objective of the section and the second part to the Insulin Pump case study. The
benefits to co-assurance of creating links and using the Refined Attribute Scheme
can best be demonstrated by application to a real-world system.
Method
The research for this case study was conducted primarily through the Assuring
Autonomy International Programme42. The SAM Demonstrator project43 lead by
Dr Mark Sujan seeks to improve the preparation, administration and management of
intravenous medication on hospital wards. It does so through the use of autonomous
technology including autonomous infusion pumps with artificial intelligence for
decision support and error checking.
The main focus of the Demonstrator is the socio-technical challenges of such as system,
however there are significant safety-security technical challenges of implementing
the system. During Summer 2019, assisted by two undergraduate interns Joseph
Anderson and Edward Martin44, Nikita Johnson conducted two workshops and
performed analyses that used principles from SSAF to investigate the interactions
between safety and security of the autonomous infusion pump.
For safety and security reasons, the details of the findings from these workshops and
the associated analysis cannot be made public45. However, parts of the results are
shown in part A of the Case Study (5.5.1). The essence of relevant findings46 has
been distilled and adapted to a generic example in part B (5.5.2).
Table 5.6 Method for Application of the TRM to an Infusion Pump
Application Case Study A Case Study B
Researcher Anderson Johnson
System Specific Generic
Inputs System documents, FDA guidance Hazard list and threats
TRM Adherence Weak Strong
Application Steps 1. Synthesise existing artefacts 1. Gather existing artefacts
2. Perform threat analysis 2. Code artefacts using Refined Scheme
3. Create links 3. Link artefacts
Output Link models List of interaction risks
42https://www.york.ac.uk/assuring-autonomy/
43Safety Assurance of Autonomous Intravenous Medication Management Systems (SAM) https:
//www.york.ac.uk/assuring-autonomy/projects/sam/
44Funded by the AAIP.
45The full report cannot be released because it contains sensitive information about a system used
at an NHS Trust Hospital ICU ward.
46Note that applying SSAF principles was one research goal of many with this work. Indeed, there
was a greater focus on understanding the security problem and more importantly communicating it
to non-technical stakeholders, as well as the training and education aspects.
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Table 5.6 succinctly captures the differences between the two parts of the case
study. In part A, Anderson was working with a specific system that fit into a larger
context (human processes, databases, central management system, etc. ), so it
would be challenging to focus on the interaction risks only because the impact could
propagate much further than the system under consideration. Input to the analyses
was existing system documentation, safety cases and guidance on cyber security from
the FDA [285]. For his application of SSAF, Anderson stated "Using ideas drawn
from the work of Johnson and Kelly on the SSAF framework the cyber attack paths
have been explicitly connected to hazards in the safety analysis to demonstrate the
relationships between cybersecurity and safety for the [autonomous infusion pump].
The SSAF framework has not been followed strictly for this case study, current
practices were preferred, but the importance of the framework was noted and efforts
have been made to exploit some of the expressive power of SSAF." [285, p 34-35]
For Part B, Johnson applied the Refined Attribute Scheme to a limited scope generic
system. The source of the artefacts is from the literature; a Hazard List from [214]
and a Threat List from [309]. Existing artefacts were purposefully selected in order to
simulate real-world working of industrial teams who perform the analyses separately.
There was a strong adherence to the TRM linking process.
Both parts apply SSAF TRM in different ways, but both have co-assurance links as
output. In part A, ad hoc models that were linked to the safety case were produced
and in part B a list of interaction risks for the insulin pump were produced. These
new artefacts could be used in a technical risk co-assurance argument as evidence of
management or to support other claims. The following sections provide some detail
about results of the individual parts.
5.5.1 Results Case Study Part A
The safety case was originally text-based and an operational safety case for the entire
ward. A safety case for the autonomous infusion pump (AIP) was created which
argued over each hazard, an example hazard claim is shown in Figure 5.20. This
corresponds to TRM Step 3 where arguments are formed in the individual domains.
Next, TRM Steps 2 and 3 activities were performed for security in the form of threat
and vulnerabilities analysis. Figure 5.21 shows the result of performing TRM process
Step 4: Linking using an ad hoc model.
There are four attack paths shown, each with modelled flows to one or more
hazards. Particular known vulnerabilities were included in the model. Interestingly,
assumptions were recorded in the models (the "clouds"). In co-assurance terms,
having the assumptions tethered to the parts of the analysis they affect means that
when change occurs it can be incorporated more easily into the assurance case.
Many of the attack paths incorporate some additional hazards specific to an autonomous
system such as H.08 Forced handover. However, H.02 Delivering Incorrect Treatment
appears in each of the attack paths shown. All four attack paths have different
vulnerabilities associated with it. The starting points of the attack paths range from
AP.02 "Attacker gains access to network" to confidentiality- and integrity-related
AP.06 "Modification or corruption of training data".
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Fig. 5.20 Safety Case Hazard Argument Example (Taken from [285, p 35])
What part A of the case study demonstrates is that the SSAF TRM models and
process do not need to be followed exactly or have perfect information to be useful.
Instead, a few principles such as synchronisation points, keeping disciplines separate
but coordinated and creating modelled links of the causal relationships were adopted
and quite effective at identifying interaction risks. Whilst these models are not
(yet) linked to co-assurance claims, it is reasonable to assume that a technical risk
argument could be created from them. The future management of co-assurance is
likely to be improved because of the reasoning these models capture.
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Fig. 5.21 Links using Attack Paths (Attack Paths taken from [285, p 38-41])
5.5.2 Results Case Study Part B
Part B took lessons learned from part A, and tried to fill the gaps. Namely, answering
the question - What does use of the argumentation schemes look like? As mentioned
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before, to simulate two different teams, artefacts that were already in the literature
were gathered. Figure 5.22 shows an infusion pump Hazard List from [214] and
Threat List from NIST Guidance [309]. Minimal modification has been made to the
artefacts, except for numbering the threats so that they can be referred to later in
the analysis. This corresponds to TRM process Step 2 and 3: Analysis in individual
domains.
TRM Step 4: Linking was then performed using the Refined Attribute Scheme as a
guide. According to their characteristics, each of the conditions in the artefacts were
coded47 with the sub-attributes from the schemes. Next, those codes were used as a
basis for creating cross-domain links. If a condition had Resource Use labelled then
it was linked to conditions from the other domain with the same attribute. Figure
5.23 shows the linking for Threat 4 to Hazards 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 because of the overlap
in attributes. At this point the links are bi-directional, however focus can be shifted
depending on the synchronisation goals.
Observing the number of links for a single threat, it is easy to imagine how there
might be an explosion in the number of links created for inter-domain analysis. This
is a process that uses human judgement, so whilst there might be numerous links for
analysis, they can be ordered into the most significant links based on the severity
of the source condition (for example, the severity of hazards) and analysed in that
order. This allows for time to be proportionally allocated to interaction risks that
are likely to have the highest impact.
Once the links are elicited, co-assurance claims and interaction risks can be established.
O’Brien et al. [309, p 15] state that based on NIST SP 800-30, several risks endanger
medical devices48:
• Infusion pumps and server components may be leveraged for APTs and may
serve as pivot points to cause adverse conditions throughout a hospital’s
infrastructure.
• Infusion pumps may be manipulated to prevent the effective implementation
of safety measures, such as the drug library.
• Infusion pump interfaces may be used for unintended or unexpected purposes,
with those conditions leading to degraded performance of the pump.
• PHI may be accessed remotely by unauthorized individuals.
• PHI may be disclosed to unauthorized individuals if the device is lost, stolen,
or improperly decommissioned.
• Hospital’s network may have improper third-party vendor connections
These are all, arguably, interaction risks because they are risks that originate in one
domain, propagate, and increase risk in another domain. It is possible to reach these
interaction risks through analysis of the existing conditions. For example, the first
47Synonmyous with "labelled". Code here is used in the sense of qualitative research where data
are often labelled as part of analysis.
48Abbreviations used: APT - Advanced Persistent Threats; PHI - Protected Health Information
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Fig. 5.22 Example Safety and Security Artefacts for an Insulin Pump
(Taken directly from [214] and [309] respectively))
point could be reached when considering Resource Use49. However, more importantly
49The infusion pump situated within the hospital network creates a new attack vector for Advanced
Persistent Threats which could lead to many of the Hazards in Figure 5.22
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Fig. 5.23 Sample Links Formed Using Refined Attribute Scheme
new interaction risks that were not listed in the guidance were found through analysis
with the Refined Attribute Scheme. Listed below are three new interaction risks:
• (T.04 → H.05) When considering failure behaviour and recovery, malware
infections could prevent data retrieval from the central repository. Currently
the hazard is Moderate, but this could be increased to Major because often
patients cannot be treated unless their patient histories are available.
• (T.06 → H.04) When considering failure behaviour, unintentional misconfiguration
of sensors could lead to the hardware being operated outside of its normal
operational profile. This in turn could lead to failure of the alarm which is a
Major hazard. It likely that hardware degradation rates were used in the safety
analysis, however it unknown whether this new risk introduced by a security
concern would have been indentified.
• (H.02 → T.01) When considering resource use, a moderate hazard of low battery
could motivate a targeted attack. The battery and battery management system
might not have been developed to the highest integrity level because the hazard
is moderate, but when taken in context of multiple connected infusion pumps
and battery management units (with potentially less security control), this can
be exploited through targeted attacks to disrupt operations
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The authors of the guidance did not make any claims to completeness of the risks
they presented, however the important point is that by using the TRM Refined
Attribute Scheme it was possible to identify and elicit more interaction risks. Using
the scheme as a guide prompted thinking and structured reasoning. This is likely
to be more effective when performed at a synchronisation point with teams who
are more knowledgeable about the system. They would be in a better position to
negotiate and made the trade-offs necessary for co-assurance.
Case Study Summary
The intent of this case study was to demonstrate the contribution that the TRM
Causal patterns make to co-assurance. In part A, use of an ad hoc model for linking
attacks and vulnerabilities with hazards and safety arguments was shown. The
important thing to note was that the TRM process was not strictly followed, however
even by adopting only the concepts of synchronisation points and condition linking
through modelling (syntactic links), co-assurance was more structured which would
enable more effective reasoning about interaction risks. In part B, the utility of
the TRM Refined Argument Scheme was demonstrated. A lightweight analysis
using existing artefacts from safety and security resulted in structured relationships
between domains (semantic links). This process enabled new interaction risks to be
discovered.
Even applying a portion of the TRM process, and using a subset of the core concepts
for analysis of limited systems, the benefits of this approach were demonstrated
through the creation of link models and elicitation of interaction risks. These were
necessarily limited case studies, therefore many important considerations were by-
passed (for example, the ontology was assumed in both cases). There are particular
challenges for co-assurance using the TRM process that are likely to manifest during
full-scale real-world projects. These are discussed in the next section.
5.6 Considerations & Concerns
There is a parallel between making an argument for use of a new approach and
creating an assurance case. The presentation of the SSAF TRM process and model
would be lacking if potential risks of its application were not identified and discussed.
That is the intent of this section. To examine the potential risks of adopting this
approach, and discuss considerations that would go some way to ameliorating them.
5.6.1 TRM Application Risks
1. TRM does not advocate unification of the safety and security processes,
therefore integration and synchronisation activities will need to be performed
in addition to current processes. This may lead to an increased workload and
more documentation to maintain. To mitigate this, an effective management
process needs to be implemented. This may be stand-alone or added to an
existing assurance management system.
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2. There is still a need for practitioners who understand both safety and security
to perform tasks such as agreeing on a dictionary of terms, etc.. This can be
mitigated by using collaboration and synchronisation tools that enable experts
from each domain to work better together.
3. SSAF TRM will only be as good as the practitioners who use it, and the context
in which it is used. Misuse may lead to problems like obscuring safety risks, and
a false sense of security. The reasons for misuse might range from inadequate
skills to intentional obfuscation to meet other goals e.g. to meet certification
criteria. This can be mitigated by making the co-assurance documentation as
clear and understandable as possible, including providing traceability. This
will enable audit of the links, interaction risks and co-assurance claims.
4. Assurance in both safety and security is heavily reliant on expert opinion,
therefore experts from the individual domains might find collaboration challenging,
especially reasoning with other people to meet a common goal when individual
goals might differ. Also standardising language used between domains is non-
trivial. This is not a risk that is unique to SSAF TRM, however through
creation of the shared ontology and synchronisation points, the aim is for the
co-assurance process to have structure and "scaffolding" for experts to work
together.
5. Related to the previous point is the risk that the TRM will contribute to the
proliferation of ontologies, processes and meta-models without adding sufficient
value. This is mitigated by ensuring that only necessary link models are created,
and that they are created in the context of already existing models e.g. referring
to either safety or security models from the link models as done in case study.
6. This solution deals primarily with the uncertainty associated with "known
unknowns", that is, interaction risks that can be extrapolated from existing
data, risk categories or elicited from other generalisations. There is difficulty
representing interaction risks that are completely unknown, as is the case with
some Zero-day exploits. By their nature they are not known so they cannot be
modelled but they have some effect on the safety and security of the system and
therefore should be accounted for in some way50. Again, this risk is not unique
to SSAF. The TRM process and model does present a partial solution in that
once unknown unknowns become known, the information can be incorporated
into existing models because they have been designed to be extensible.
7. The TRM was engineered with modern engineering practices in mind. Whilst
architecture frameworks and model-based development51 are very useful, they
are still relatively young in the field of systems engineering. It may be that
many systems that need to be co-assured are not using AFs and MDE or that
they use custom variations. There may also be a need for retrospective creation
of models. This risk is mitigated by the design of the TRM. Even though it is
based on these concepts and functions well in a modern development context,
it is still adaptable to processes and models that use other contexts.
50There a metaphor here of dark matter in physics, which does not interact with the electromagnetic
field so its difficult to detect, however it is believed to account for 85% of the universe. Its presence
is implied from other astrophysical observations.
51Or Model-Driven Engineering (MDE).
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These are not the only potential risks of applying the TRM. In addition to those that
are related to general co-assurance, there are more that relate to general assurance.
Despite the benefits of the TRM approach, the risks listed here capture some of
the reasons that might be barriers to adoption. Thus, some of these risks are
significant enough to warrant further discussion. Issues from Risks 1, 2 and 3 about
synchronisation, collaboration and tools are discussed in Sections 5.6.2 and 5.6.3.
Issues from Risks 3 and 4 about openness and the proliferation of ontologies are
discussed in Section 2.2.2. Lastly, issues from Risks 6 and 7 about model extensibility
and modern development practices are discussed in Section 5.6.4.
5.6.2 Synchronisation
Synchronisation or the idea of touch points between the two disciplines of safety and
security during assurance is a cornerstone of SSAF, but also a requirement of any
co-assurance approach. For unified approaches, the touch points are built in to the
process because of the tight coupling between safety and security analysis. For silo-ed
operations, there are very few synchronisation points between safety and security
which often results in a breakdown in communication and reduction in assurance of
the system.
In the context of co-assurance, synchronisation refers to the coordination of tasks
for the purpose of communication.52. Therefore, at its core, synchronisation is
about information exchange. Because systems development communication happens
through models53, it is necessary to use questions similar to those found in the
Zachmann Framework54 to understand the information needs at sync points. A
driver for the types of information are the goals (shared and individual) of the
disciplines.
TRM Steps 1, 4 and 5 described a process of linking. There may well be sub-steps
within those. For example sub-steps for Step 4 Linking, could involve:
(i) Identifying "interactions of concern" or interaction risks
(ii) Classifying interaction risks into three categories: conflict, potential and no
conflict
(iii) Choosing link type - linear, complex or emergent, then syntactic and semantic
(iv) Modelling the connections
(v) Associating link models with co-assurance technical risk claims
(vi) Reasoning about the interaction risks and claims e.g. identifying strategies to
remove, reduce or mitigate the risks
(vi) Repeat for all sync points
Note that this is one example of the steps needed to fulfil linking. This might
be changed and adapted (much like the ontology) according to the needs of the
system and the co-assurance process. It is the responsibility of the practitioners to
justify the steps in the link methodology, the number of synchronisation points, what
52For example, synchronisation occurs between the development process and safety and security
individually every time a model is exchanged for analysis.
53Model used in the broadest sense to include assurance reports, analysis models, conceptual
diagrams, etc.
54Who, what, when, where, why, how [].
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information is exchanged and the resulting arguments as part of co-assurance. It is,
therefore, natural and expected that they establish the sub-steps for linking55.
From the conceptual model of SSAF synchronisation in Chapter 4 it is clear that there
are several synchronisation points. The number is decided by multiple factors such
as regulatory requirements, the amount of resource available and importantly the
information dependencies of the analyses. The sync points co-ordinate co-assurance
efforts, however they do not require that there needs to be equal amounts of progress
in safety and security for them to work. If security risk analysis takes place months
after safety risk analysis, the TRM links provide a way to co-ordinate information
exchange and make sense of the link through time.
There are no rules for information handling at sync points. Depending on how large
the inputs to the link process (the number of safety risks and security concerns for
example), there is the possibility that linking needs to be prioritised. Good heuristics
and practice include, but are not limited to: using are the severity level of the source
of the interaction risk for working order, reducing shared decision making as much
as possible, co-locating shared information and decreasing options (e.g. guidewords)
where possible.
Guidance might be found in existing standards for synchronisation and information
exchange, however until the field of co-assurance matures it is likely that decisions
such as these will be made at organisation or project level. Therefore, the practitioners
co-assuring the system must understand their own goals, and how to co-ordinate
shared goals and information.
5.6.3 Argumentation & Negotiation
In Chapter 2, structured argumentation was described as one of the core concepts for
safety and security co-assurance. This is both the process of argumentation and its
output. The process is not a linear one because it involves some competing goals for
which resolutions must be found by working together. This creates an environment
of negotiation and trade-off.
The most frequent type of trade-off is of technical requirements. The Refined
Argument Scheme, reveals that there are times where safety and security conflict.
Therefore, trade-off decisions must be made by experts that will affect not only the
system under consideration but any wider systems that it is part of. Whilst some
parts of the co-assurance process can be automated, it remains an inherently human
process for this reason. Thus, communicating and documenting the decision and
trade-off reasoning is almost as important as analysing the risk conditions of the
system.
In [38], Rick Kazman tells the story of a well known compiler guru chasing down
the culprit of a very nasty and subtle bug in the compiler he had responsibility for
maintaining. After extensive sleuthing he discovered the ’jerk’ whose irresponsible
thought and programming led to the bug. It was him. He had no recollection of the
55This is analogous to standards providing the overall risk steps but it is the responsibility of the
the practitioners to provide the details of the risk process.
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code written eight years earlier. Kazman uses this story to emphasise the importance
of documenting reasoning because, as he puts it "documentation helps the poor
schmuck who has to maintain your code in the future, and that schmuck might very
well be you!" [38, p 330].
This same logic applies to co-assurance, and is possibly more important because
arguments are intangible and transient things compared to implemented systems. The
why must be recorded for the selection of conditions, for creating causal relationships,
for the elicitation of interaction risks, for the claims and inferences made during
co-assurance. It is only by being diligent in documenting all aspects of reasoning
that the robustness of the technical risk argument can be improved. Understanding
more about the argument allows for new information to be incorporated more easily.
Robustness of the technical risk argument can also be improved by the transparency
that the TRM process and resulting link models afford. By the very act of making
the co-assurance claims and the interaction risks explicit, it allows scrutiny of the
argument. Whilst this might not sound like something that is appealing, critical
review and audit are an essential part of regulation for a reason, they allow for
(independent) evaluation.
It is only through this process that mistakes or purposeful misinformation can be
identified and challenged before it poses a safety or security risk. By exposing how the
co-assurance case was constructed and the provenance of the link models, intelligent
checkers can verify and validate the argument.
The technical risk argument serves another important purpose. It separates the
interaction risks from the assurance and development processes. The sufficiency of
compliance arguments has long since been challenged, however some believe that
if the safety risk process and the security risk process are executed correctly then
the risks at their intersection are managed too. The falsity of this logic cannot be
stressed enough. In the same way as systems have a system integrator for individual
components to manage the interfaces, so too assurance needs an integrator to manage
risks at the interface of safety and security. The technical risk argument, by its
construction, forces those interaction risks to be dealt with in their own right.
The technical solution presented in TRM aims to go beyond just high level confidence
issue flagging or updates on measures. It provides a way to reason about the subtle
ways in which claims interact with each other. It is an improvement on preceding
methods because it makes it necessary to articulate claims in a standardised form.
This, in turn, allows practitioners to evaluate risk and impact at a deeper level which
does not obscure information. The solution formalises how system and assurance
models relate to each other, this creates the potential for greater understanding, and
possibly standardisation of the types of interaction risks and technical arguments
present in different application domains.
5.6.4 Advanced Considerations
Lastly, for the considerations, safety and security co-assurance does not happen in a
vacuum. It is necessary to understand developments in modern software and system
engineering practices to understand the impact on assurance processes. Just as an
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indication, many of the modelling techniques and analyses that are still in use today
are at least 20 years old (GSN and STPA), and some up to 60 years old (FTA).
Their age does not mean they are necessarily outdated, but it does mean that when
they were created many of the complexities of modern development practices did not
exist such as Agile development, Model-Driven Engineering and Systems-of-Systems.
Whilst existing techniques can be adapted, their limitations and constraints must
be accounted for. The TRM link models provide useful patterns to help with this
challenge. They allow practitions to understand artefacts and conditions that they
can link by using certain models.
The challenge of co-assurance is a difficult one. With multiple sources of uncertainty
and complexity whilst trying to manage the intersection of two emergent properties
of a system, it is important the reasoning is structured. The TRM provides and
extensible framework for this reasoning by defining core principles, and providing
additional information that can be adapted. Even if SSAF TRM is not used for
co-assurance, an approach that is highly adaptable but still has structure is needed.
Conclusion
The challenge of assuring both safety and security is not likely to lessen in complexity
or difficulty. Rather than over-simplifying and reducing the problem, SSAF TRM
proposes a novel way of looking at the problem. By embracing the complexity
and uncertainty, but doing so in a systematic, transparent and reasoned manner it
is possible to continue to manage both safety risk, security risk and their shared
interaction risks intelligently, and therefore improve co-assurance.
The TRM provides the structure for technical co-assurance through both a process and
model for creating inter-domain links. It is based on the paradigm of independent co-
assurance and the creation of synchronisation points where information is exchanged.
The information is primarily captured in causal relationship models, for which TRM
provides syntactic and semantic patterns.
The TRM presents a unique approach to solving the co-assurance challenge. It
recognises that there is unlikely to be a one-size-fits-all solution and so facilitates
the creation of multiple synchronisation points to meet the shared goals for safety
and security assurance during the lifetime of a system. The TRM’s utility was
demonstrated in two case studies which showed the application of the process, and
two different types of linking.
Even with the many benefits of creating an explicit technical argument that argues
over interaction risks, many aspects were mentioned that go beyond the technical
process. Responsibility, negotiation, tool support, document management - whilst
each of these significantly affect co-assurance of the system under consideration they
are not captured in the models. This means that technical risk argument alone is not
sufficient for co-assurance. The next chapter presents the second part of the SSAF -






The presentation of SSAF thus far has focused on the technical risk argument and
the models that support it. It is possible to stop co-assurance at this point, however
this would solve only the technical aspect of co-assurance, and not address any of
the socio-technical challenges discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.
Chapter Contributions. SSAF Socio-Technical Model aims to create a process for
systematically identifying each of these factors, analysing the effects and providing
recommendations where appropriate. In this way it is possible to manage, not
only the technical risk argument, but the socio-technical challenges of co-assurance,
thereby creating a more complete co-assurance argument.
6.1 Evolution of the STM
Even with the benefits of the SSAF Technical Risk Model, many the socio-technical
challenges discussed in Chapter 3 are still present such as understanding risk concept,
creating organisation assurance structure, practitioner competence, etc. In fact,
SSAF TRM with its consideration of only risk conditions and arguments relating to
those is only a partial solution.
Following Dijkstra’s Separation of Concerns [106] and the recommendations made
by Hawkins et al. [158] about keeping the confidence argument separate from the
risk argument, the TRM was developed in isolation in the knowledge that there
would be a second part of the framework that would be concerned with all of the
socio-technical issues that would challenge the technical risk arguments sufficiency
or validity.
However, there are more than thirty socio-technical challenges identified in this thesis.
Admittedly, some of children or refinements of bigger themes, however they each
provide some amount of detail for consideration during co-assurance. However it
would be impractical to expect safety and security teams to go through the list of
challenges one-by-one to consider and address them.
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The challenges needed some structuring in order to be useful. The hypothesis was
that with a clear structure, the socio-technical challenges could be systematically
addressed in smaller groupings and proportionately to the degree that the challenge
affected a particular project.
With the exception of some of the standards and architecture frameworks, such as
IET CoP [192], few of the approaches or guidance documents reviewed so far provide
any indication about how to go about structuring the challenges for co-assurance
as well as how they relate to each other. Thus, the literature was revisited to find
appropriate structures and conceptualisations for the purpose of simplifying and
structuring the socio-technical challenges in such a way that their utility could be
improved.
The following sections discuss these concepts, paradigms and tools before describing
how each of the puzzle pieces of the STM part of the framework fit together.
6.1.1 Decision Trees
Consider all the decisions that are necessary throughout the assurance lifecycle. There
are decisions that influence risk through changing the system design and operational
procedures. There are decisions that allow for certification or accreditation such as
systematic process to demonstrate attributes or selecting a tool for validation models.
There are decisions that govern the very mode of working such as those regarding
culture, cognitive models and socio-political positions1.
So in characterising the types of decisions that are present during the assurance
lifecycle we see that there is some order to the decisions. The precedence of decisions
is determined by level of abstraction, temporal order or significance of the decision.
For example, the governance policies of an organisation (and the implicit decisions
contained therein) are at a higher level of abstraction than the procedures at project
level, therefore the former is likely to constrain the latter.
Where a decision is considered very significant, this also determines precedence and
may in some cases outrank decisions at a higher level of abstraction. For example,
engineering activities on a project would usually be governed by the aforementioned
governance policies or standards, however if there are contractual obligations for the
delivery of a system, then the legal implications of not meeting the terms of the
contract are significant enough that the application of policies to that project might
be changed.
In all other cases, the default determinant of decision precedence is time. Decisions
from the present cannot influence decisions. Given decisions that are on the same
level of abstraction and have the same significance, the one that is made earlier
will influence the one that occurs later. For example, there are many choices in
modelling tools during risk analysis that change whether the model is text-heavy,
uses standardised notation, exports to other formats. If HAZOP is selected for safety
analysis, then constraints are put on what can be done with the results. If the risks
1For example, it matters whether it is a safety case for a weapons system or for an assistive robot
for the elderly. The ethical views promoted in an organisation or chosen by an individual affect the
assurance approach.
6.1 Evolution of the STM 117
in the HAZOP need to be incorporated into a UML-based system model then this
would require extra effort to put the HAZOP text into model form. This would less
likely to be the case if, for example, the risks were represented in an SACM model to
begin with where there is greater similarity between models.
The result of considering the precedence of implicit and explicit decisions that take
place during the assurance lifecycle is that a structure emerges. The characteristics
of this structure are that it is hierarchical, that decisions higher up in the structure
affect those with lower ranking, and the trade-offs that occur as a result of making
decisions constrain the choices available in the lower ranks too.
What has just been described can be conceptualised as a decision tree. The use of
this concept for assurance-related modelling and application is not novel, Ashokraj
et al. [30] have used decision trees for rapid quality assurance, Cramer et al. [82]
used decision trees for hazard analysis, and Rahman et al. [344] have used decision
trees as a security mechanism for classification in intrusion detection systems. What
is new is the application of the decision tree to the trade-offs during the assurance
process itself.
Like any tree model, decision trees are acyclical. They connect the decisions (parent
nodes) with the potential consequences (child nodes) through directed edges. The
path selected is determined by the trade-off at each decision point or node. Once a
decision has been made there is an implicit or explicit claim made. For example, in
the HAZOP example above, at the point of selecting HAZOP
– the decision was the type of risk representation to use text- or model-based
– one of the trade-offs was effort to record results during analysis versus effort
required to translate the results to a model later
– the implicit claim for this trade-off was that text-based analysis results would
be sufficient for the purposes for which they were required
Within a single domain, the effects of decisions and trade-offs are observable and
have an impact. However, it is when inter-domain assurance is considered that the
impact becomes more significant. It is important to understand the decisions that
would affect co-assurance so that activities that are required for co-assurance are not
unnecessarily constrained. In the HAZOP example, if it was important for the safety
risks to be model-based for linking to security, then the decision shifts from being an
inconvenience to a significant source of inter-domain uncertainty that could reduce
confidence in the co-assurance argument.
6.1.2 Confidence Claims
In Chapter 2 the concept of the confidence argument was discussed. There was
particular emphasis on the confidence argument concept introduced by Hawkins,
Kelly, Knight, and Graydon [158] which proposed an approach to systematically
reasoning about the asserted inferences, context and evidence to determine the
appropriateness and sufficiency of a risk argument. The advocated the separation of
these two types of reasoning (risk argument and confidence argument) because it
allows for clearer and more succinct arguments.
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There is an association between the claims in the decision tree discussed in the
previous section and the claims in the confidence argument for co-assurance. Figure
6.1 will be used to illustrate this connection. The figure shows a partial co-assurance
argument that makes a top-level claim about interaction risk: G1 claims The risk
of non-delivery of safety-related message {x} as a result of threat {y} is adequately
managed. This claim is supported by two solutions S1 which is the analysis of
scenarios for which non-delivery can occur which show that that condition cannot
be reached, the second is S2 the software protocol that prioritises safety-related
messages.
Fig. 6.1 Partial Co-assurance Risk Argument with Assurance Claim Points
In line with usage of assurance claim points (ACPs) introduced in [158], ACPs
have been added to the asserted inferences (ACP1 and ACP3), and to the asserted
solutions or evidence (ACP2 and ACP4). A new use of ACP is represented by ACP5.
The ACPs represent points in the technical risk argument where uncertainty can
cause confidence can be lowered. All the reasons for lowered confidence are assurance
deficits. It follows then that the confidence claims argue the absence of assurance
deficits.
Consider the set DC whose elements are all the available claims2 from the decision
tree. Consider another set CC made of all the confidence claims that can be
supported3 for a given technical risk argument. This means that CC ⊂ DC; that is
CC is a subset of DC.
The relationship between claims is that all supportable confidence claims necessarily
come from the set of claims available from the decision tree. Why this matters is
that confidence claims can therefore be restricted by the decisions in higher levels of
the tree, for example a confidence claim cannot be made about sufficient knowledge
of a practitioner if the company’s spending and hiring policy decisions are such that
an expert could not be employed. The effect on co-assurance is that there is the
2Some claims are not available because trade-offs made at earlier decision points.
3Note that confidence claims are restricted to those which can be supported.
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potential for greater uncertainty and lowered confidence if particular care is not paid
to reasoning about confidence claims.
Table 6.1 shows the claims associated with each ACP in Figure 6.1.
Table 6.1 Example of ACPs, Confidence Claims and Claim Types
ACP ID Confidence Claim Factor
ACP1 scenario analysis is complete enough to provide sufficient
support for claim G1
Analysis
ACP2 the knowledge of the practitioners who performed the
analysis was of a sufficient level for the results to be
accurate
Competence
ACP3 software protocols are appropriate to manage safety-
related communications on the network
Technology
ACP4 the communication protocol was implemented correctly
on the network
Technology
ACP5 this is the correct claim for the associated interaction risk Argument
Each of the ACPs and associated claims have had a Factor label assigned to them.
This provides an indication of what factor is influencing co-assurance confidence.
Considering all of the socio-technical challenges presented in previous chapter it is
foreseeable that for a real-world project there are likely to be dozens of factors affecting
co-assurance confidence. Without some sort of structure it may be challenging and
resource intensive to consider all of the factors that could potentially influence co-
assurance. Therefore a structure is needed to make the factors and their relationships
more understandable.
6.1.3 Socio-Technical Systems Model
In a similar fashion to the TRM Causal Model, the socio-technical factors that affect
co-assurance can be structured syntactically or semantically. Syntactic structuring is
concerned with naming the entities and describing the relationships between them.
Semantic structuring is concerned with the meaning of those relationships and the
impact that the entities have on each other.
There are many candidates for syntactic structuring of factors that affect co-assurance
such as Architecture Frameworks. For example, UPDM could be used to classify
factors according to the different views and viewpoints. The content of views and
the relationships between them are already defined as part of the standard, therefore
analysis of the factors is made simpler because of the implicit groupings.
However, UPDM was created for large scale systems architecture and development
and it presents several views that may have an unnecessary amount of detail for
co-assurance purposes. Using UPDM as a structure could result in a cumbersome
model for the socio-technical factors that could act as a deterrent for adoption by
practitioners. If the model is unwieldy and overly complex then practitioners are
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unlikely to commit limited resource to understanding the model in order to get the
pay-off of using it4.
As the factors under question are to do with socio-technical aspects of assurance, an
unlikely5 suitable model was found in literature relating to socio-technical systems
design. There is rich body of research literature about modelling socio-technical
systems although it is not always called "socio-technical system" design [41].
Fig. 6.2 The Interacting Variable Classes Within a Work System (From [56])
Bostrom’s 1977 [56] model from the Management Information Systems (MIS) domain
was selected for the purpose of organising co-assurance factors. The predominant
reasons for this are because of the simplicity and intuitiveness of the model. Figure 6.2
shows the original model. It consists of four elements (Structure, People, Tasks and
Technology) and relationships between them. This model was designed to counteract
conditions that limited the development of MIS such as designers holding implicit
theories about organisations and their members or designers having a static view of
the systems development process. There are very similar challenges experienced by
practitioners in relation to the assurance process.
For the STM some adaptations were made to the original model. One of the elements’
titles were changed such as Tasks to Process. This new label still captures the
same information as the original model, however it is a slightly more generalised
description. Another element was added to the model (Concept) because there are
some factors related to co-assurance reasoning that are not captured by any of the
other categories, for example co-assurance has many risk concepts and philosophies
that cannot be classified into the original model, but they remain an important
influence on the confidence argument.
The resulting model created by adapting Bostrom’s model [56] is shown in Figure ??.
Visually, it is akin to the TRM Causal model with Socio-Technical Factors being
analogous to Conditions, and Confidence Relationships akin to Causal Relationships.
There is also an interesting delineation between the types of Confidence Relationship
4This preference for lightweight solutions to co-assurance was observed with CRAF [31].
5From one perspective, it is likely because the model relates to socio-technical systems, however
it is unlikely because it is a model for engineering systems which was not previously applied to the
assurance process.
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Fig. 6.3 Simplified STM Influence Model
i.e. primary or secondary. This distinction is introduced as part of the STM to
account for the differences in the two types of factors. There are some factors that are
(i.) once removed from the technical risk argument such as practitioner competence,
information available, model type, etc. and (ii) other factors that influence the
primary confidence factors such as cognitive models, organisation governance policy,
and cost.
The distinction between primary and secondary confidence is an important one
because it allows for further separation of concerns, and is a recursive application
of the principle discussed in [158]. Having that separation lends an elegance and
simplicity to the three arguments that are now part of co-assurance: technical risk
argument, primary confidence argument and secondary confidence argument. This
separation is likely to make the models more understandable and also make it easier
to allocate work associated with creating the arguments.
6.1.4 Reasoning Tools
The socio-technical syntactic models are guided by the relationships in the STM
influence meta-model, this is parallel to what happens with the TRM and the causal
model. However, the model on its own does provide any further information about the
meaning of the connections between factors. This meaning becomes more important
to consider because they are socio-technical and so by their nature are less precise
than technical causal models, and the information from the relationships is more
likely to be used to guide qualitative judgements.
A example is that for technical risk it is possible to model attack vectors connected to
hazards using Fault Trees and Attack Trees. It is possible to monitor the operational
system and collect probabilistic information to populate the FTA-AT. There is some
epistemic uncertainty, but there are ways that can be reduced. The results of this
kind if analysis can then be used to make informed decisions about technical risk.
By contrast, consider the influence of organisation culture or a regulatory change
on the process of risk analysis. Whilst it is possible to collect data about the risk
process and perform statistical analysis over it, statistical significance is not aim here.
Because it is in the realm of the socio-technical there is a lot more uncertainty about
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the data, many more trade-offs to consider, and altogether much trickier decisions to
be made. These decisions are always often made by committees or boards rather
than one or a few analysts as is the case with technical risk analysis. Therefore, the
earlier statement that it is in fact more important to understand the meanings of
the influence relationships is reinforced for socio-technical factors.
What is needed is a clear way to guide reasoning. In a parallel to the TRM, the
concept of argumentation schemes has been adopted to help with reasoning about
the factors. In Chapter 5 the argumentation schemes were used to help practitioners
identify common conflicts and critical questions related to safety and security sub-
attributes. For socio-technical factors, the argumentation schemes help stakeholders
to identify common conflicts and critical questions about the factors in the influence
model. Again there is an element of recursive application of the same principles just
at a higher level of abstraction. Section 6.2.3 explores the schemes as well as the
socio-technical factors which they relate to in more detail.
As mentioned before, considering the factors moves from the engineering domain to a
domain of much wider scope with many more stakeholders which include, but are not
limited to, business managers, directors, clients, regulators, legislators, etc. So, too,
there is a shift from a position of (relatively) lower uncertainty in an engineered system
to higher uncertainty in a complex, dynamic, and open social system. Therefore it is
unlikely that one set of argument schemes alone will be as useful for socio-technical
reasoning as they were when considering the technical. Other concepts are needed to
manage the uncertainty and dynamic behaviour.
Two concepts have been borrowed from engineering and assurance management.
Those concepts are the Capability Maturity Model, and checklists. Incorporated into
the use of the influence model and argument schemes, the aim is for reasoning about
socio-technical factors to be simpler and more practical than it otherwise would be.
Capability Maturity Model (CMM)
The CMM is a software process maturity model developed by the SEI [327] with
assistance from the MITRE corporation [328, p 5]. It is a way of comparing software
process maturity across different organisations which originally had five stages of
1. Initial, 2. Repeatable, 3. Defined, 4. Managed and 5. Optimising. Each of
the stages have transitions between them. The idea is that an organisation or a
development project can be assessed to understand what level they are on, then the
requirements for transition to higher levels can be set. The CMM has been used
in multiple domains and applications such as security systems engineering [163], in
safety application [139], offshore organisational management [396], and cyber security
for railways [250].
However, in recent years it has been criticised because in some circles it is viewed as a
tool for keeping consultants in work. This is because the assessment and continuous
audit sometimes did not justify the time, effort or cost of performing those activities.
Another criticism is that the levels are too linear, and it becomes difficult to capture
the complexities of modern development processes, for example one team on a project
might be on level 5, but another might be on level 3. Process policy is such that it is
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impractical to have different process quality requirements for different different teams
on the same project, and even if this were possible who would monitor progress.
Even with this criticism, the underlying principle of establishing a baseline upon
which improvements can be made is a useful one for co-assurance. It is highly
improbably that each of the factors will have the same influence or that they will be
addressed at the same time, therefore the idea of progressive levels for the different
influences helps give greater context. For example, if company safety culture is at
level 5 optimising where there is a very good and proactive safety culture, but the
security culture is at level 2 and is still being improved, then explicitly reasoning
about the steps needed to define what a security culture and how to transition to
level 3 is a worthwhile endeavour. It also allows for the inevitable differences in
progress when managing the different factors. Addressing workforce competence
might be improved by a training course, however improving regulation in an industry
may take years and is far beyond the control of a single organisation.
Checklists
Checklists are something of a dirty word in some cyber security communities. NSCS
lists one of the reasons for discontinuing support for guidance documents IS1 and IS2
because some practitioners used the measures and controls listed in them in tick-box
exercises that had no demonstrable effect on security assurance. Instead NCSC aim
to move towards a more outcome-based approach to reasoning about security [117].
As with so many other things in assurance, context matters. It is not that checklists
are inherently bad, it is the way that they are used and whether or not they "short-
circuit" assurance reasoning that determines whether they are helpful or hurtful.
An example of positive use of checklists is given in Gawande’s seminal book The
Checklist Manifesto [143] where checklists introduced into operating theatres significantly
improved patient safety and reduced the number of malpractice suits brought against
the hospitals that used them. The checklists are used just before surgery to confirm
the presence and role of members of the operating team, and confirm the patient and
procedure taking place. Used in this way, as a prompt, encourages a more unified
team and better communication6.
It is this aspect that is valuable for co-assurance. Any tool that enables unification
of purpose and encourages communication is likely to improve co-assurance where
information sharing is so important. Therefore, the idea of using checklists as prompts
for practitioners will be adopted as part of the sTM model for the potential benefits.
The use of the argument schemes as prompts is discussed in Section 6.2.1 and its use
is demonstrated in Section 6.3.
6The use of checklists has been found to improve communication between nurses and surgeons,
and creating a better distribution of authority and power. For example, it creates the space for a
nurse to raise any issues before surgery and be listened too.
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6.1.5 Assembling the Conceptual Parts
The central outcome of using the STM is a structured argument about the socio-
technical factors and their influence on the co-assurance technical risk. Many existing
theories, concepts and approaches have been combined and applied in new ways in
order to enable this. The aim is for the socio-technical argument to be simple, clear,
manageable and, ultimately, help practitioners to improve co-assurance.
The concepts selected during the development of the STM ranged from applying
well-established concepts such as confidence arguments and argumentation schemes,
to more novel ideas such as using decision trees to conceptualise what is occurring
with the factors and their related claims.
Figure 6.4 depicts the intended outcome of the STM. It is a confidence argument that
is based on the technical risk argument that was the outcome of applying the TRM.
The confidence argument considers the reasons to have confidence in the claims,
asserted inferences and artefacts (context, evidence, assumptions) in the technical
risk argument. Support for the claims in the STM confidence argument comes from
both structured modelling of the Confidence Relationships between socio-technical
factors and from use of the STM argumentation schemes. The confidence argument
can then be represented in a model, or recorded as part of the safety and security
assurance cases for certification.
The underlying theory for the STM is quite complex, however its outcome is a
simple, clear argument with separated concerns. This is likely to contribute to the
improvement of co-assurance because the reasoning is explicit and therefore can be
removed, as well as the argument being a good vehicle for communicating information
between domains. The following sections describe the STM process, influence model







Fig. 6.4 STM Confidence Argument (showing Contributing Concepts)
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6.2 STM Process and Model
The role and function of the STM part of SSAF is qualitatively different to the role
of the TRM. There exist standards such as IET CoP [192] and ISO/DIS 37000 [201]
that communicate to organisations the best principles and practices for governing
co-assurance. Where TRM could make detailed recommendations about the handling
of interaction risks, STM is faced with greater and uncertainty and variance in the
socio-technical factors that influence co-assurance.
As such, the STM was designed more as a guide about how to reason about the
factors with fewer recommendations about what those factors should be. For example,
when considering governance, STM lists common conflicts for co-assurance with
widely-used governance models rather than dictating what policy should be. That is
left to the individual organisations and teams.
This may seem like shirking some of the most important tasks in co-assurance,
however the same problem is faced with security standardisation of safety-critical
systems. Whilst it might seem attractive to prescribe a security approach for safety-
related systems in order to contain the causal impact that security conditions have
on the safety of the system, there are some security concerns that are beyond the
scope and, indeed, enforcement power of safety7.
Given the objective of the STM to structure co-assurance reasoning about socio-
technical factors, the scope of the process, models and patterns has been purposefully
limited. Where judgements must be made between options, the STM aims to present
the options rather than promoting any one in particular. The process is divided into
phases instead of process steps (as was done with the TRM) because the aim is to
indicate which prompts are most appropriate in each phase rather than prescribing
steps. The STM is much more of a high-level guide to reasoning about socio-technical
factors compared to the TRM which, in some ways, aims to set a standard for
reasoning about technical risk. Stakeholders are encouraged to use the STM in the
context of current guidelines for assurance in standards and organisation policy, etc.
6.2.1 Process
Figure 6.5 shows the STM process. It consists of seven phases, five of which (Phases
1-5) correspond to the five steps of the TRM Processes. Practitioners can use the
process in a generative or evaluative manner. For generative use, factors in the
argument schemes act as guidewords (as with HAZOP or STRIDE) for reasoning.
Practitioners enumerate the claims necessary for confidence in the technical risk
argument in each of the phases. For example, in Phase 2 which deals with assurance
processes, claims might include claims about the sufficiency of the risk analysis
for alignment between safety and security, or the competence of the practitioners
performing the risk analysis.
7An example of this is enterprise systems that enable business capability for organisations that
develop and operate safety-related systems. A safety regulator such as EASA, at the moment, has
less enforcement power for security breaches that do not result in a safety impact.
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Fig. 6.5 STM Process Phases
The results from generating these claims should be recorded with some sort of
qualitative measure of their accuracy. This might be done using red, yellow, green
coding as done in [355]. A plan for improvement can them be created using CMM-like
levels.
Note that Phases A and B do not correspond to a specific step in the TRM process
as the other do. This is because the claims in these phases are more generalised and
are cross-cutting either at project level or governance level.
For evaluative use of the STM Process then a co-assurance artefact(s) is used as the
input to a Phase. The argumentation schemes are then used to code (or classify)
different socio-technical factors, and the sufficiency of claims related to those factors
can be reasoned about in a systematic way. This is the process that is followed in
the Case Study in Section 6.3. The input artefact can range from the co-assurance
technical risk argument, to policy documentation or even standards used by safety
and security. The outcome is structured reasoning about the relationships between
the factors and, ideally, any assurance deficits that must be addressed.
Table 6.2 shows a partial Zachman Framework [445] model for each of the STM
Phases, the role that is most likely to be performing the tasks during the phase, what
the purpose is and how it is likely to be enacted. The following provides further
detail about each of the phases:
Phase A
The objective of this phase is to set strategic guidelines and structure to support
alignment of safety and security at organisation level. This is to address silo’ing
occurring between the two domains. This can be instantiated through policy
guidance, business services or capabilities and culture. The confidence claims
made during this stage are predominantly secondary confidence claims.
Phase B
The objective of this phase is to coordinate resources, practice and knowledge
for co-assurance before a project begins. This is done so that alignment of
the two domains during the lifecycle of the system takes less effort because
mechanisms, processes and shared information structures have been established
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Table 6.2 STM Phases and Purpose
When Who What How
Phase A Director Considering and guiding strategic




Phase B Manager Facilitating alignment during the
lifecycle of a particular system
Ensuring resource availability
Phase 1 Practitioners Reasoning about shared goals and
concepts
Generative use of STM
models








Phase 4 Practitioners Creating shared co-assurance
artefacts with high confidence
Reasoning about confidence
in causal links
Phase 5 Practitioners Maintaining confidence in co-
assurance artefacts
Reasoning about confidence
of models and argument
beforehand. This phase is usually enacted by project managers, and is best
done before the project begins or very early in the lifecycle. There is the biggest
savings on cost when the systems are set up with co-assurance in mind, rather
than attempting to alter processes later in the lifecycle.
Phase 1
This phase corresponds to TRM Step 1 and is concerned with establishing
confidence in the process and outcome of creating a shared ontology, language
and establishing shared goals for co-assurance. The stakeholders with an interest
in the technical assurance of the system (safety and security practitioners,
systems and software engineers, application domain experts, etc. ) are the one
who will participate in this activity. To reduce resource overhead, reasoning
about confidence can occur at the same time as the technical risk aspects are
occurring. Confidence should be a consideration for co-assurance claims made
or artefacts generated.
Phase 2 - 3
Phases 2 and 3 correspond to the single-domain process and assurance argument
steps in the TRM. Here practitioners make confidence claims about the claims,
inferences and evidence in the single domain. This process does not differ
significantly from making co-assurance confidence claims, however with co-
assurance some specific considerations need to be made so that confidence in
later synchronisation activities can be maintained.
Phase 4
Arguably, this is the most important phase to make confidence claims because
it corresponds to the inter-domain linking step from the TRM. The entire
idea of independent co-assurance rests on the sufficiency and acceptability of
co-assurance claims made during this phase. If claims about synchronisation,
or correct interaction risk information are not credible, then there is little to
base the co-assurance argument on. Therefore, disciplined treatment of the
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assurance deficits for the claims relating to inter-domain links, models and
processes is required.
Phase 5
The final phase maps to the update step in the TRM. It is also a very
important phase to make confidence claims about the interaction risk update
mechanisms because the system’s through-life co-assurance and safety-security
synchronisation is based on how good the update models are. Confidence claims
should be made regarding the process for update and how new information is
handled when it is received.
The description of each of the steps referred to confidence claims in a very abstract
way, and no information was provided as to where these claims are likely to come from.
As part of the STM, a set of common confidence claims has been collated 8. The
claims were gathered from multiple sources including the socio-technical challenges
for co-assurance from earlier chapters, and existing standards and guidance. There
are over 100 claims in total so they will not be discussed individually here, however
the factor types and relationships will be discussed in the description of the influence
model (Section 6.2.2), and a simplified list of claims is presented in the socio-technical
argument scheme (Section 6.2.3).
6.2.2 Influence Model
Fig. 6.6 STM Structure with Influencing Factors
8Full list located in Appendix D.
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Figure 6.6 is the central model for the STM intended for use during the phases. It
consists of the five aspects discussed earlier - Conceptual, Sturcture, People, Process
and Technology. These have been refined into particular socio-technical factors that
relate to the socio-technical challenges identified in Chapter 3.
Conceptual assurance factors underpin the other four socio-technical factors. This
is because they fundamentally affect each of the other dimensions. For example, how
loss or risk is conceptualised affects the types of claims that can be made or the
mental models of the practitioners who will be analysing risk. Due to its abstract
nature, there are many factors relating to secondary confidence such as Cost, Culture
and Proportionality.
Structure and Process factors relate directly to co-assurance activities. For
example, the synchronisation aligns with TRM Step 4 linking, however the TRM
is concerned with information exchanged at synchronisation points and the STM
is concerned with questions and claims relating to the synchronisation points such
as whether there are enough, whether they allow for the correct information to be
exchanged, whether the right people can participate at the synchronisation point,
etc.
The last two dimensions are People and Technology. Competence is one of the
primary factors that affect confidence in the technical risk argument. If suitably
qualified and experienced people (SQEP) have not performed the analyses, then
there can be little confidence in the arguments that use the analyses as evidence.
In addition, the tools used such as a particular modelling environment may not be
sufficient for the purposes which it is used 9.
By explicitly modelling the socio-technical interactions that influence the technical
risk argument, understanding of the overall safety-security co-assurance requirements
improves. Through STM models it is possible to pinpoint where trade-off decisions
must be made in the assurance processes and define the procedures for these trade-offs.
An example is creating a model of the synchronisation points, then subsequently
discovering that there is no procedure for handling the impact of security patches on
the safety argument in a subset of cases. This situation could be left as it is, with low
confidence in the safety claims related to those patches, however a new procedure
could be put in to place to deal with that specific interaction. Thus, confidence in
the integration or alignment argument can be incrementally improved.
6.2.3 Argumentation Schemes
The STM Argumentation Scheme patterns are unique in that they encapsulate
knowledge about something that is desirably for co-assurance. Whilst principles and
good practice has been captured before, as with IET CoP [192], the argumentation
schemes go a step further to explore the reasoning behind why factors are important to
co-assurance. By using the critical questions paradigm from Walton’s argumentation
schemes [425], the framework is able to provide a rich structure to assist with the
9For example, an engineer modelling timing errors using a block diagram.
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reasoning about these factors, thereby addressing many of the challenges associate
with them10.
The following subsections provide a very brief description of what the factors are,
common conflicts that can occur when considering those conflicts and lists some of
the critical questions that prompt practitioners in their thinking.
The full list of claims can be found in Appendix D, however the essence of the
reasoning about the factors has been distilled here. Because they are describing
factors and questions, the following subsections run the risk of seeming mechanical.
However, the schemes have been distilled into only the most important information.
The subsections are also structured in such a way that the discussion about the
schemes occurs before their presentation for greater clarity and ease of reading.
6.2.3.1 Conceptual Schemes
The first set of factors belong to the conceptual category. As has already been
mentioned, the nature of conceptual factors is abstract therefore only one of the
seven factor schemes here relates to a primary confidence relationship. However,
practitioners should not be mistaken into thinking that factors which have a secondary
confidence relationship to the technical risk argument are less important. Secondary
factors have the potential to undercut all of the assumptions made about primary
factors and by association those made in the technical risk argument. It is therefore
necessary to understand the assurance deficits exist and systematically address them.
Even though some of the reasoning for Clutter, Cost, Culture, Proportionality and
Goals has been encapsulated in these schemes, that does not detract from the
difficulty in addressing issues that arise. In many cases, solutions of improvements
are likely to take months or years to fully implement and there is a long lag time
between an intervention and seeing the results. However, this should not discourage
practitioners from performing this analysis. It is because these issues are so complex
that the reasoning needs to be deliberate and documented so that change can be
tracked over time.
C1. Clutter – Secondary – Redundant processes or models that do not add to
co-assurance but utilise resource in managing them.
Common Conflict
There are redundant processes and models between safety and security
Critical Questions
• Are process steps being duplicated between the attributes?
• Is the same information being analysed in the same way?
10Note that many of these factor schemes were created specifically because they addressed an
identified socio-technical challenge.
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C2. Cost – Secondary – The cost associated with performing assurance activities
commensurate with the risk reduction
Common Conflict
The assurance activities and resources needed for one attribute are
disproportionate to another e.g. more tasks, analysis, etc.
Critical Questions
• Are the assurance activities balanced between the two attributes? See
also: Proportionality
C3. Culture – Secondary – The mindset, practices, philosophy and approaches to
co-assurance. Similar to safety or security culture of an organisation.
Common Conflict
Due to the uncertainty levels in security the culture (compared to safety)
may be a lot more flexible and expect change, even with good cyberhygiene,
etc.
Critical Questions
• What is the culture for the two attributes?
• What are the different perspectives on change over time? See also:
Temporal
C4. Goals – Secondary – The necessary shared goals for any joint activities that
are part of co-assurance.
Common Conflict
The lack of aligned goals is at the root of many points of divergence e.g.
which analyses are chosen, how assurance cases are presented, etc.
Critical Questions
• Are the goals presented aligned?
• At what level of abstraction do the goals diverge (if at all)? e.g. at
component level
C5. Proportionality – Secondary – The allocation of resources to co-assurance
activities commensurate with the severity of the concequences of interaction
risks.
Common Conflict
The assurance activities are not sufficient for the risk level or imbalanced
between the attributes e.g. a lower safety risk is treated before a higher
(uncertain) security risk.
Critical Questions
• How are resources for assurance activities assigned?
• Is there a process for correcting imbalances between the attributes?
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C6. Risk Concept – Primary – The cognitive models that practitioners hold about
risk conditions, causal models, and the propagation of risk.
Common Conflict
There may be conflict in the model of risk utilised e.g. safety uses ALARP
in many application domains, however there is no legal or regulatory
equivalent for security
Critical Questions
• What are the implications of the risk model used?
• Is the risk reduction method practical for both attributes?
C7. Temporal – Secondary – All co-assurance activities are bounded by time and
therefore need to be considered in its context.
Common Conflict
Goals, analyses, decisions, etc. are all at fixed times during assurance.
The interaction risk of these being out of sync between the attributes
must be explicitly addressed.
Critical Questions
• Are the dependencies of the processes and goals of the attributes
understood through time?
• Are any differences in considerations of time resolved? See also:
Information Needs, Synchronisation
6.2.3.2 Structure Schemes
The structure schemes contain some of the most important reasoning for co-assurance
because they address Responsibility, Communication and Governance. Conway’s Law
states that communication and products mirrors the organisational structure [79].
Therefore, the structure for safety and security teams must be consciously and
intentionally planned. It is unlikely that many interaction risks will be discovered
without clear and effective communication from both sides. This kind of structure
only comes about is there is support from the highest ranks within an organisation,
and it is supported by Governance policies.
A factor that is at the heart of co-assurance is Responsibility. Structure needs to
support the allocation, monitoring and accountability necessary for co-assurance.
This must be done explicitly to reduce uncertainty when action is needed.
S1. Communication – Primary – Communication of inter-domain information
Common Conflict
The means and content for communication is not made explicit
Critical Questions
• What organisational model is used for safety and security?
• If it is separate, have the points of communication been documented,
with communication content made clear?
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S2. Governance – Secondary – The policies, rules and procedures that provide
guidance on how co-assurance should proceed.
Common Conflict
It is difficult to resolve conflicts between goals at project-level if goals
higher up the organisational structure have not been resolved e.g. there
might be no incentive to work together
Critical Questions
• What shared goals and responsibilities are present at governance level
for safety and security?
• Does the organisational structure promote working together?
S3. Responsibility – Secondary – The state of having a duty to manage particular
interaction risks or perform particular co-assurance activities
Common Conflict
Allocation of responsibility for additional risks that arise from the
interaction between safety and security; an analogy is the systems
integrator being responsible for interfaces
Critical Questions
• Who is responsible for the interaction risks between safety and
security? (i.e. those risks that are propagated across domains)
6.2.3.3 People Schemes
There are many schemes that could have been created in reference to people. There
are many cognitive biases that occur in single-domain assurance that are likely to be
exacerbated for co-assurance. However, it is unlikely that these bias issues can be
bounded in such a way that the particular issues for co-assurance are established.
Therefore, only one scheme was created for people, and that is Competence.
Competence is comprised of the knowledge skills and behaviour required by practitioners
to perform co-assurance activities to a sufficient level. It is the basis of all tasks and
the default assumption when methodologies are selected. The lack of competence
has the potential to undermine significant sections of the technical risk argument
because much of risk reasoning is to do with expert judgement. There are many
frameworks available to understand competence, however for co-assurance the set
of skills, knowledge and behaviours is particular. It involves being able to listen,
understand and communicate effectively with a subject that is not the area of
expertise.
Without becoming moralistic, co-assurance demands that practitioners who participate
in its activities possess some of the rarer character traits such as openness, patience
and being comfortable with uncertainty or things that are not within control. It is
not often that a technical document refers to these kinds of traits in practitioners,
however co-assurance challenges reasoning in such a way that these traits become
necessary to perform tasks effectively.
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X1. Competence – Primary – The knowledge skills an behaviour required to enact
co-assurance activities effectively.
Common Conflict
Whilst there are similarities in process for safety and security, the
risk-specific knowledge and expertise required is often very different.
Practitioners performing analyses should be sufficiently knowledgeable
and skilled to perform the task
Critical Questions
• Is a practitioner being asked to reason about risk outside of the
primary domain? e.g. safety practitioner reasoning about security
• How are the deficits in knowledge of the other domain, or skills
ameliorated?
6.2.3.4 Process Schemes
The process schemes deal with the co-assurance process directly. Thus, they all have
primary confidence relationships to the technical risk argument. Challenges related
to each of the schemes Approach, Information Needs, Synchronisation and Trade-off
was discussed in the considerations and concerns for the TRM.
Deliberateness and discipline in reasoning about the co-assurance process itself is
needed because of the high levels of uncertainty present. The aim is to avoid that
uncertainty from being encoded in the artefacts that are produced thereby reducing
confidence in the overall technical argument.
Synchronisation points are a core idea in the SSAF framework. Currently, standards
do not provide a lot of guidance about how to go about establishing these synchronisation
points, therefore it is left to practitioners to do the majority of reasoning about how
many are needed, how frequently, whether they are occurring at the right time, if
the right information is being exchanged, and so on.
P1. Approach Primary – The approach to interaction risk management.
Common Conflict
This refers to the approach to the entire assurance process. For example,
if safety has the ALARP concept, then the approach will be driven by
establishing levels of risk then reducing it, however security’s approach
may be not to trust risk estimations as much because of the levels of
uncertainty
Critical Questions
• Is the underlying philosophy of the approach being used likely to
conflict with the other attribute?
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P2. Information Needs – Primary – The inter-domain information dependencies.
Common Conflict
Information required to perform a process task is unavailable e.g. safety
analysis requires all the threats that contribute to a hazard be included,
however threat analysis has not taken place
Critical Questions
• How well are the information dependencies between safety and security
articulated and understood?
P3. Synchronisation – Primary – The points at which information exchange
occurs.
Common Conflict
There may be a lack of synchronisation between the attributes in processes
leading to divergence in goals, requirements, etc.
Critical Questions
• To what extent are synchronisation points established and
documented?
• Are there a sufficient number of synchronisation points?
P4. Trade-off – Primary – The decisions to commit resources for co-assurance.
Common Conflict
Many aspects from individual domains may conflict such as goals,
requirements, controls, etc. Without a structured approach to resolve and
record these trade-offs there is a chance that the attributes will diverge
Critical Questions
• Is there a procedure and point in time for making trade-offs of goals,
resources, conflicts in requirements, etc. ?
• Are each of the trade-offs enumerated?
• How are trade-off decisions and assumptions recorded?
6.2.3.5 Technology Schemes
The final category of factor schemes is Technology. It contains predominantly
primary confidence factors such as Measure, Method and Model which all relate to
how interaction risk is instantiated, encapsulated or represented. It is understandable,
then, that the expressive power of each of these factors plays a big part in co-assurance.
If they are unable to capture the key information, then they are not fit-for-purpose
with co-assurance tasks.
The last scheme, Tool, is qualitatively different from the others. It is not often framed
this way, but the modelling tools, causal tools, and thinking tools that practitioners
use on a daily basis are analogous to the hammer, saw and chisel used by a carpenter
for example. Each has different properties and a particular function for which it is
best suited. It is possible to use tools beyond their intended purpose, however the
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results are likely to unacceptable. There is a need for practitioners to, first of all
know the intended uses and underlying models of the tools they use, and then to
have sufficient good judgement when selecting a tool for use during a co-assurance
task.
T1. Measure – Primary – The representation of interaction risk.
Common Conflict
Risk is measured and recorded in conflicting ways that cannot be reconciled
later, an analogy is recording the wrong units
Critical Questions
• Is the risk measure quantitative or qualitative?
• What assumptions underlie the measure of risk? See also: Risk
Concept
T2. Method – Primary – The procedures (and their underlying philosophies)
employed for co-assurance tasks.
Common Conflict
There may be a conflict in the steps taken to perform a method, e.g.
safety analyses only take into account the risk that could cause harm,
however security requires information about many more risks such as
confidentiality breaches
Critical Questions
• What are the assumptions of the method?
• Do the steps in the method contribute to reaching goals in both safety
and security?
T3. Model – Primary – The representation of the causal links between risks.
Common Conflict
Each model has underlying assumptions and constraints. Models from
one domain are not always sufficient for the needs from the other e.g. if
timing in an attack is important for security, then it is not enough to
provide a safety risk analysis based on a control structure model only
Critical Questions
• What are the underlying assumptions and constraints of the model?
• To what extent does the model satisfy needs from both safety and
security?
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T4. Tool – Secondary – A mental model, paradigm or implement for performing a
co-assurance function.
Common Conflict
Different intellectual, practical and modelling tools are used in each domain.
Often they are fine-tuned to one attribute over the other
Critical Questions
• Are the models, thinking and implemented support tools sufficient
for alignment of safety and security?
STM Scheme Summary
In this section, the argumentation schemes or the semantic patterns for reasoning
were presented. They use a similar form to the TRM Schemes, with Critical Questions
being the mechanism that prompts practitioners to identify assurance deficits. With
this knowledge and the factors that have been made explicit it is possible to create a
plan to improve confidence.
When creating the STM confidence arguments, a representation other than text
might be needed. The following section briefly discusses some of the socio-technical
modelling tools that can be used to capture reasoning about the factors in the STM
influence model.
6.2.4 Modelling Catalogue
Table 6.3 is a summary of some of the socio-technical modelling approaches found
in the literature11 Unlike the TRM modelling patterns where some attempt had
been made to apply existing approaches to co-assurance, none of the socio-technical
modelling approaches have been applied to co-assurance. They refer to the engineered
system instead. It is a novel aspect of the STM to collate the list of possible approaches
that could be used to represent influence relationships in a form other than text.
The utility of each of these modelling approaches to co-assurance is yet to be
established. In theory, however, the influence relationships can be captured in
modelled and more intelligently associated to other models that are co-assurance
artefacts by using SACM, for example.
The discussion of STM influence model, factor schemes and modelling patterns has
been very abstract, so it is difficult to demonstrate the utility of the model. In the
next section, STM will be applied in an evaluative manner to publicly available safety
and security guidance documents to reason about safety and security alignment for
nuclear assessment.
11Table D.1 in Appendix D has the full list of the approaches surveyed.
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Table 6.3 STM Modelling Patterns
Type Ref Description
General [41] STSD socio-technical systems design - premise that design should
take in to account both technical and social factors. rationale is to
align the technical solutions and mitigate risks that tech solutions
will not contribute to the goals of the organisation.
[434] Framework for organising STS information in an hierarchical form.
[287] Guide questions to assist walk-throughs to elicit STS requirements.
[69],
[298]
History of socio-technical modelling. Discussion on Socio-Technical
Systems Engineering approaches
[39] PDCA model of human factors in NASA.
[361] Presents a hierarchical model of existing infrastructure STS modelling
approaches.
[321] Infrastructure based on "hardware" and "software" models, very little
scientific modelling of the social dimensions. Current transformation
processes
Communication [345] Model of inputs outputs constraints and methods.
[86] Social commitment relation C(debtor, creditor, antecedent,
consequent) - debtor agent promises to a creditor agent that if
antecedent is brought about, the consequent will be brought about -
interactions. Originates from security domain - SecCo (Security via
commitments).
[115] Principles of risk analysis - describe understand predict and
communicate.
[119] Modelling socio-technical interactions in healthcare systems to create
robustness, so that if a human interaction is not as planned, but the
deviation is not an "error"; leading the treatment plan and medical
pathway to deviate, but this must not lead to error or inconsistencies.
Responsibility [380] Scenario selection often politically motivated, and not on the
frequency or severity. Responsibility delegation diagram [380, p.11].
Summary of concepts in the model of responsibility [380, p.8].
Security [223] Computer scientists look at computation for design, but this paper
tries to look at principled orperationalisation - formal models and
practical considerations of interactions based in the real world. Notion
of normative power - feature of organisations or individuals who are
empowered to do something. Linked to RBAC role based access
control.
[340] Attacks on STS are still mostly identified through brainstorming.
Formal approach to complement reasoning.
Temporal [63] Temporal modelling. Possible to model the consequences of failure,
impact of change and analysis of responsiveness. They use Newell’s
Time Scales of Human Action (Social, Rational, Cognitive and
Biological) [302].
Trade-off [142] Aim to help decision makers e.g. in petroleum domain-related system
decide which applications work permit applications to accept or reject
using FPTC.
[317] Managing conflicts between business policies and security
requirements.
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6.3 Case Study: Nuclear Assessment Principles
Due to the subject matter, socio-technical modelling and argumentation, a large part
of this chapter has been qualitative evaluation of existing socio-technical systems
factors, theory and argumentation. In some ways creation of the STM is analogous
to systems engineering. There were requirements for reasoning about factors that
influence technical risk, components were sourced in the form of existing theories,
and STM integrated those paradigms and applied them in a new way. The "system"
has been built. Now, all that is left is for it to be applied and to test whether it
fulfils its intended purpose. The engineered system analogy has its limitations, but it
also has the advantage of succinctly communicating the purpose of this case study.
The case study uses publicly available regulatory guidance documents12 to evaluate
the utility of the STM to reason about socio-technical factors. A better case study
would be from an industrial project with all the complexities of the real world, however
that is currently beyond the scope of this PhD project. An adequate substitute
test of the STM is to partially apply it to the ONR guidance as if they were an
organisation’s Governance policy documents13. The outcome of this activity will be
an analysis of the potential assurance deficits due to socio-technical factors.
The case study is structured in three parts: (i.) a description of the research method
is provided (Section 6.3.1), (ii.) a subset of the results from the applying STM are
discussed with examples (Section 6.3.2), and (iii.) the implications and evaluation is
discussed in the summary (Section 6.3.3).
6.3.1 Method
Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) Safety Assessment Principles guidance (SAPS) [313]
and Security Assessment Principles guidance (SAPS) [314] were used as the input data
for the method. The objective was to apply STM influence model and argumentation
schemes in an evaluative manner to assess how well aligned the two documents were
for socio-technical factors that affect co-assurance. The result of the analysis could
be used to improve alignment in the future or to generate conversation between the
different domains which is a step towards improving interactions. As regulatory
documents, the SAPS and SyAPS are distinct because they contain advice which
follows legal precedent. In many cases, if the principles are not followed then ONR
could potentially challenge a dutyholder.
The steps followed for the case study were to prepare the documents for analysis, the
text in both documents was coded14 (classified) using the argumentation schemes15,
then a qualitative comparative analysis was done on excerpts of texts from the
documents under the same classifications. Qualitative judgements were made with
regards to how well aligned the two documents were along the axes (provided by the
schemes). Note that there is a challenge to external validity of this case study due to
12ONR Safety Assessment Principles and Security Assessment Principles.
13In actuality, Governance documents are likely to include many of the same topics covered in the
ONR Guidance documents.
14Research software NVivo was used to record the themes and factors in the .pdf documents.
15Which were presented in Section 6.2.3.
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the fact that I performed the steps16. However, this is not a limiting factor because
what is being assessed is the utility and applicability of the STM, not generalisability.
In addition, except for the judgement step, all other steps could be repeated exactly
by another researcher or practitioner.
Altogether, there were over 100 pages of safety and security general, functional and
regulatory assessment principles to review and code. Some of the most interestin
parts of the analysis are presented in the next section.
6.3.2 Results
Figure 6.7 shows a summarised view of some of the results from the STM analysis.
The principles were placed in two major groups: (i.) principles where there was
significant overlap in socio-technical co-assurance factors with the other document,
and (ii.) and principles which were silent on at least one of the socio-technical
factors.
Fig. 6.7 Comparison of ONR Security (SyAPS) and Safety (SAPS) Assessment
Principles
Not surprisingly there was significant overall for many of the principles because the
SyAPS document was modelled off the SAPS document. However, even with this
similarity there were some impactful differences. Five of these are discussed next.
16The researcher who created the framework and has an intimate knowledge of the workings of
the schemes.
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Conceptual Similarities
Table 6.4 Conceptual Similarity
ONR SAPS [313] The purpose of the Safety Assessment Principles (SAPs)
1. The SAPs apply to assessments of safety at existing or proposed nuclear
facilities. This is usually through our assessment of safety cases in support
of regulatory decisions. The term ‘safety case’ is used throughout this
document to encompass the totality of the documentation developed
by a designer, licensee or duty-holder to demonstrate high standards of
nuclear safety and radioactive waste management, and any subset of this
documentation that is submitted to the Office for Nuclear Regulation
(ONR).
ONR SyAPS [314] The Purpose of the Security Assessment Principles
2. The Security Assessment Principles (SyAPs) apply to assessments of
security arrangements defined in security plans as well as the control of
Sensitive Nuclear Information (SNI) held on and off nuclear facilities.
The term ‘security plan’ is used throughout this document to encompass
the totality of the documentation produced by a developer, licensee or
other dutyholder to demonstrate high standards of nuclear security.This
includes, for example, site security plans, transport security plans,
Transport Security Statements (TSSs) and temporary security plans
and any subset of this documentation that is submitted to the Office for
Nuclear Regulation (ONR).
The first major difference for co-assurance is can be seen in the excerpts in Table
6.4. These passages are located in the sections of the document that describes the
purpose of the guidance. SAPS refers to the safety case and SyAPS refers to the
security plan. From the text it is clear that there is some conceptual overlap between
the two documents, however what is not clear is where the similarities end or how
aligned the two documents need to be. This might cause issues for a dutyholder who
may have to produce two completely independent documents for the same regulator.
Worse, it is unclear how to resolve any conflicts that arise between the documents, for
example if there is a conflict in operating procedures (safety says to stop and security
says to continue or the other way round). This is the first difference discovered using
STM schemes.
Risk Concept Treatment
The second significant difference identified during STM analysis is related to risk
concepts in the documents. SAPS has a strong emphasis HSE guidance and the
HSW Act. As such, SAPS defines risk as "the chance that someone or something is
adversely affected by the hazard" with a emphasis on duty of care to the individual,
and use of approaches such as ALARP. SyAPS does not follow the same approach.
There is a greater emphasis on operational management of risk rather of facilities
and there is no duty of care to the individual. This may have implications when
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considering safety harm that might occur to people as a result of a security concern.
Responsibility and ownership for these kinds of risks is unclear from the guidance
documents.
Proportionality Considerations
SAPS explicitly acknowledges the need for a proportionate response to risk early.
SyAPS discusses proportionality for facilities built to earlier standards and ageing,
but is silent in the document about new facilities. The assumption can be made
that the stance and the principle is the same for new facilities. Both standards
do not elaborate on what a proportionate response is. This is likely contained in
other standards and documents, however the final decision if the risk treatment was
adequate is made by the assessor. There is an additional impact on co-assurance
because of the lack of clear definition of what is proportionate. If different definitions
are used in safety and security, then coordinating co-assurance tasks to handle
interaction risks because more difficult be an element of negotiating more resource
may be needed.
Table 6.5 Proportionality Considerations
ONR SAPS [313] Proportionality
. . . ONR’s Enforcement Policy Statement (Ref. 5) that the requirements
of safety should be applied in a manner that is commensurate with the
magnitude of the hazard. Therefore, the extent and detail of assessments
undertaken by dutyholders as part of a safety case, including their
independent assessment and verification, need to be commensurate with
the magnitude of the hazard and associated risks.
ONR SyAPS [314] Proportionality
1.7.5 Facilities Built to Earlier Standards
26. Inspectors should assess security plans against the relevant SyAPs
when judging if a dutyholder has demonstrated that legal requirements
and regulatory security outcomes have been met and risks have been
proportionately managed and mitigated. The extent to which the
principles ought to be satisfied must also take into account the age
of the facility or plant. For facilities designed and constructed to earlier
standards, the issue of whether suitable and sufficient compensatory
security measures have been implemented will need to be judged plan by
plan.
1.7.7 Ageing
28. As a facility ages, some security measures may become degraded and
dutyholders may argue that making improvements is not cost effective.
The short remaining lifetime of the facility may be invoked as part of the
security plan demonstration. However, this factor should not be accepted
to justify the facility not achieving a proportionate security outcome or
maintaining an appropriate posture and compensatory security measures
may be required.
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Regulatory Approach
Both SyAPS and SAPS state that they are "designed to support regulatory assessments
throughout thelifecycle of nuclear facilities". The go on to delineate the different
stages of the lifecycle and state that different principles are applicable in those stages.
What they do not provide guidance for is inter-domain synchronisation. There is
guidance for the individual domains for each stage, however there may be a challenge
for the dutyholder to coordinate activities required by the different parts of ONR if
they do not communicate with each other.
Approach
The last of the factors that will be discussed as part of this STM application case study
is Approach. Table 6.6 shows an excerpt from SAPS. It proposes a complementary
approach to treatment of safety and security with regards to measures and controls.
SyAPS, however, is silent on what should happen in these circumstances. Again,
the assumption can be made that the principle is reciprocated if not document,
however if it is not then this might be challenging for co-assurance because it is a
uni-directional flow of information.
Table 6.6 Measure
ONR SAPS [313] Approach
157. Where the safety functions might be affected by security
considerations, the design process should seek to treat safety and security
in a complementary manner (see paragraph 39). The process should aim
to ensure that the measures designed for one will also serve the interests of
the other. In particular, safety and security measures should be designed
and implemented in such a manner that they do not compromise one
another.
6.3.3 Summary
In this case study, the STM influence model and argumentation schemes were used
to evaluate the degree of overlap between the ONR assessment principles form safety
and security. There were many factors for which there was overlap, however there
were some factors for which the principles were silent.
For example, legislation dictates the need for response and forensics in the even of
an incident in both domains, however the protocols for incident response have not
been explicitly explained in the SAPS or SyAPS. If there is a conflict in procedures,
this would likely not have been discovered beforehand, it is only through reasoning
about the socio-technical factors that the difference was identified.
There are a few other differences worth mentioning such as the idea of "longevity of
protection" in safety, but no real equivalent in security; there is also the difference in
the preference for prevention compared to PDCA application. There is significant
ethical overlap in the need for trustworthy dutyholders, practitioners, operators, etc.
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however, this is only made explicit in SyAPS. The last significant difference is the
idea of the invidual in safety. It is not often that individual security loss is treated in
the same way as if it was a safety loss. The reasons for this are many and complex,
but are mainly dictated by legislation applicable in the UK.
Compared to new standards (IET CoP [192], IEC/TR 63069:2020 [191], etc. ) STM
is the only co-assurance approach the provides guidance and prompts for reasoning
about inter-domain interactions. Whilst there is a need for high-level guidance, there
is a more urgent need for practical guidance that practitioners can use to guide their
thinking on projects. The case study has demonstrated the utility of the STM for
evaluating and reasoning about socio-technical factors. Further evaluation of the
framework takes place in Chapter 7.
Chapter Conclusion
In the previous Chapter 5, the Technical Risk Model was prosed as a solution
for reasoning about inter-domain causal risk models and creating a technical risk
argument. The advantages of using the TRM were demonstrated, however there are
multiple factors that went beyond technical considerations which affect co-assurance
(these were discussed in Chapters 2 and 3). Another approach was needed to address
the socio-technical factors that affect assurance.
The STM process and models were proposed in this chapter as solution to the socio-
technical problem, STM combines theory and concepts from diverse disciplines such
as argumentation and socio-technical systems design. The result is a process that is
executed in phases (five of those phases co-ordinate with the TRM process), together
with three models: the influence model which is a meta-model of the socio-technical
factors and their relationships to each other, the argumentation schemes and the
socio-technical modelling patterns.
There have been many innovations in the creation of the STM, from the combination
of existing practice in new ways to the application of approaches to new settings.
The result is, hopefully, a model that enables practitioners to better reason about
socio-technical factors and evaluate their confidence in co-assurance. As with the
TRM, not all parts of the STM need to be applied in order for it to be useful. The
ONR case study demonstrated this, when only the argumentation schemes were used
to evaluate the Safety and Security Assessment Principles guidance.
Whilst the case studies that have been presented thus far have been useful for
illustrative purposes and demonstrating utility of the parts of SSAF, more support is
needed to show that this is a valuable solution to challenges in co-assurance. Much
like an assurance case, further evidence to support the claims in this thesis are needed.








The preceding three chapters introduced the overall structure of the Safety-Security
Assurance Framework (SSAF), proposed the Technical Risk Model (TRM) process
and patterns, and presented the Socio-Technical Model (STM) process and schemes.
In this chapter we aim to evaluate the SSAF. Due to the size and scope of the
framework, it would not be possible to evaluate SSAF on a full-scale industrial
project within the constraints of this research. To address this, the evaluation has
been divided into three parts, each looking at an aspect of evaluation. The intent is
to provide a compelling argument and evidence for the validity and utility of the
framework.
Chapter Structure. To this end, the chapter is structured in four sections. Section
7.1 presents the evaluation strategy and the approach used, Section 7.2 outlines the
threats to internal and external validity of the framework. Section 7.3 presents case
studies that seek to evaluate components of SSAF and address some of the validity
concerns. Finally, Section 7.4 discusses the hypothesis, and the chapter concludes
with a summary and findings from the evaluation.
7.1 Evaluation Approach
Figure 7.1 shows a simplified argument for the evaluation of SSAF. It consists of two
primary strategies which are: addressing threats to validity, and an argument about
the confirmation of the hypothesis. The first leg of the overall evaluation argument
can be further divided into two parts: identifying the threats to validity for SSAF
and arguing that they have been addressed. This distinction is made because there
is the implicit assumption that the threats have been sufficiently identified. Section
7.2 discusses the method and results of analysing the threats. Section 7.3 provides
some evidence to support the claim that the threats have been addressed.
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Fig. 7.1 SSAF Evaluation Argument
7.2 SSAF Threats to Validity
There is an intentional similarity between the threats to validity approach in Figure
7.1 and the risk-based arguments discussed throughout the thesis. Threats to validity
are treated as "thesis risks". A semi-structured, HAZOP-like risk analysis was used to
elicit validity threats in three categories (i) relating the research process (ii) relating
to the research output (SSAF as an artefact) and (iii) relating to the external validity
of SSAF. Guidewords were derived from literature on evaluating of qualitative and
quantitative research, and included prompts such as:
• {researcher bias, information bias, approach limitation, ..} for research threats
• {practicality, model assumptions, element assumptions, novelty, sufficiency,
completeness, ..} for eliciting artefact threats, and
• {reliability, repeatability, generalisability} for eliciting external validity threats
Tables 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 show some of the results from the analysis. The primary
threats in each category are:
(i) threats to internal validity (research approach) – related to the bias towards
safety, justification for the foundational models and the sources of information/data
(ii) threats to internal validity (SSAF as an artefact) – the process or model
instantiation were impracticable, or based on incorrect assumptions, and that
the model links were incorrect
(iii) threats to external validity – the SSAF approach could not be applied outside
the domain that it was developed in or that practitioners/engineers/researchers
would not understand it sufficiently to be able to apply it.
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Table 7.1 Threats to internal validity - SSAF Research
ID Threat Addressed by
TIV1 Bias towards safety Research is largely from a safety
background, therefore there is a strong
conceptual influence on the framework
which can be seen in the use of assurance
cases and argumentation. However, for
the linking - the framework is designed to
give equal weight to security-informed
safety and safety-informed security.
TIV2 Selection bias for
exploratory research
(projects and case studies
may have been self
selective and willing to
engage, specialist sources
of data)
The sources of information that informed
the creation of the framework may have
unintended bias, however due to the
refinement process (revisiting the
literature) and application to many
different projects, this bias is iteratively
identified and eliminated.
TIV3 Inclusion bias in models
due to selection of
sources
Similar to previous (TIV2), sources may
have had unconscious bias, however the
case studies and model refinement
systematically reduce it by searching for
new attributes for links and adding to the
framework.
TIV4 Justification for selection
of organising schemas
(Bostrom, Kriaa)
Possible to have chosen different base
models for STM and TRM link types,
however this representation is clear and
can incorporate new elements without
breaking that causal models as
demonstrated through the case studies.
Note that each of the threats to internal validity (TIVs) are addressed through diverse
approaches with different types of evidence to support the claims. For example,
threats relating to bias (TIV2−3) are addressed through arguing about the research
method and the use of model refinement to discover and remove bias; whereas threats
related to SSAF process and models (TIV5−6) are addressed through case studies
and worked examples. Threats to external validity (TEV1−2) are addressed through
workshops, application of SSAF to case studies in multiple domains, and independent
researchers/practitioners using SSAF concepts and processes.
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Table 7.2 Threats to internal validity - SSAF Artefact
ID Threat Addressed by
TIV5 Process is impracticable Process demonstrated as practicable for
multiple small case studies. TRM process
more easily adapted. STM requires more
expert judgement and understanding.
Further validation needed for larger
projects.
TIV6 Model-based assumption If the system-under-consideration is not
model-based it does not preclude the use
of SSAF, however there may be additional
challenges for establishing synchronisation
points and standardising updates for the
system.
TIV7 TRM and STM model
attributes (i) do not
capture interaction risks
(ii) capture too few risks
(iii) capture imbalanced
risks
1. Do capture risks as shown in case
studies 2. Understanding coverage of
interaction risks is a universal
co-assurance problem, not just for SSAF,
more empirical studies required to get
data about coverage and completeness
levels 3. May be imbalanced between
safety and security, or within one of the
categories; more research required about
the kinds of risks expected in each
category to determine if there is an
imbalance. SSAF provides a reasonable
structure to begin to explore this
question.
TIV8 There is insufficient
novelty in the link
patterns
1. Link patterns may be seen as not more
value than the underlying method used,
however describing the nature of the
connection is important. To understand
change to interaction risks, one must
reason about the connections themselves.
TRM link patterns provide a first step of
characterising the links.
Too few links are
provided
2. Unique contribution of SSAF to
perform a meta-analysis on the linking
models and capture them in a
co-assurance argument. All SSAF link




3. The meta-analysis of the link type may
be seen as unnecessary, however it is of
utmost importance because (i) allows
safety and security to communicate the
type of link (ii) allows the teams to
identify common issues with linking using
a particular model (iii) makes the links
explicit therefore they can be reasoned
about and referred to in the co-assurance
case.
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Table 7.3 Threats to external validity
ID Threat Addressed by
TEV1 Reliability and
repeatability of results
Demonstrated that it is possible to use
the concept of TRM linking in multiple
domains. The use of guideword-like
prompts to elicit socio-technical factors
and interaction risks similar to existing
methods therefore it is reasonable to
assume that an independent analyst
would be able to perform the steps.
TEV2 Generalisability Application to many case studies
demonstrates a degree of generalisability.
7.3 Evaluation Evidence: Case Studies
Ideal evaluation of SSAF would involve a longitudinal study of application of both
the TRM and STM within the context of real-world industrial projects in multiple
domains. Due to the constraints of this research, this form of evaluation is not
possible, therefore a divide-and-conquer approach has been adopted with several
types of evidence to support the evaluation of parts of SSAF. The predominant
evaluation approach is the use of case studies. Yin [438] defines the scope and features
of a case study as:
1. A case study is an empirical method that
– investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the "case") in depth and
– the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly
evident
2. A case study
– copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many
more variables of interest than data points, and as one result
– benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide
design, data collection, and analysis, and as another result
– relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a
triangulating fashion
Figure 7.2 shows the procedure Yin [438] advocates for multiple case studies. Figure
7.3 shows the adaptation of this procedure to use case studies as a means of evaluating
aspects of SSAF. The approach can be viewed in three phases:
• Define and design - the case studies are designed to answer evaluation
questions related to one aspect of SSAF. The research protocol for collecting
the data is defined.
• Prepare, collect and analyse - the research protocol is executed e.g. worked
example, workshops, interview, etc. . Data is then collected and analysed to
produce initial findings for the case studies.
• Analyse and conclude - the findings are aggregated and analysed to draw
cross-case conclusions about the three SSAF aspects under consideration: STM
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schemes, TRM process and TRM links. Finally, the approach concludes by
considering the implications for the overall framework.
Fig. 7.2 Multiple Case Study Procedure (from Yin [438])
The following sections will discuss the case studies for each of the SSAF aspects -
STM schemes, TRM process and TRM links. Each section contains a summary of
the purpose, methods, and results of the case studies. Further detail can be found
in Appendix ??. The main purpose is to evaluate parts of the framework, however
some results did influenced the underlying SSAF models, this exploratory aspect is
discussed further in the findings. Table 7.4 provides an overview of the evaluation.
Some case studies gave partial evidence for SSAF’s external validity i.e. it could be
used by independent researchers or stakeholders in a new application domain.
Table 7.4 Table showing SSAF Case Studies for Evaluation
Evaluating Case Study Purpose ValidityExp Eval Int Ext
STM Schemes ONR ✓ ✓ ✓ □
IET ✓ ✓ ✓ □
TRM Process EULYNX ✓ ✓ □
Forensics ✓ ✓
TRM Links/Schemes IEC61508vsCC ✓ ✓ ✓








Fig. 7.3 Approach to SSAF Evaluation Case Studies
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7.3.1 Evaluating the STM Schemes
The purpose of this multi-case study is to establish the usefulness and completeness
of the STM Schemes that consider socio-technical factors for co-assurance. Two case
studies are used to evaluate them:
• Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) - safety and security inspectors
from ONR need to understand the interaction of the two attributes in order to
assess co-assurance at their licensee sites. The experiences and judgement of
the inspectors is used as a proxy for applying SSAF to a real-world system.
• IET Code of Practice: Cyber Security and Safety - the is new guidance
based on principles for co-assurance. STM schemes are used to analyse
comments to elicit trends and next steps for the document.
This case study has three research evaluation questions:
RQ.1 Is the semantic model for STM valid? (STM argumentation schemes)
Are they the right attribute decompositions? Do they cover (many significant)
attributes that one might consider during the alignment process? Can they be
applied to a domain different to the one that they were developed in?
RQ.2 Is the process feasible in the context of real-world development and
operation of a system? Do the STM critical questions elicit gaps (in
confidence) between safety and security?
RQ.3 Can new attributes be incorporated into the semantic models of the
STM? Are there any new attributes that were not included in the models?
Can new attributes and connections be added to the existing models?
Fig. 7.4 Method for STM Scheme Case Studies
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STM Case Studies Method
Figure 7.4 shows the method steps for the cases studies to evaluate the STM schemes.
For each of the case studies there are three overarching phases:
• Phase 1 Static Analysis for Context - here the primary researcher1 analyses
context documents for the case studies. For the ONR case study it is the
SAPS [313] and SyAPS [314] guidance documents; for the IET case study the
Code of Practice for Cyber security and safety [192] is analysed2.
• Phase 2 Engagement and Analysis of Stakeholder Data - this phase
consists of two steps for each case study. The first is to collect data from
stakeholders - ONR data comes from workshops with 12 safety and security
inspectors, IET CoP data comes from 611 comments from the final public
review of the guidance before release. Step two in this phase is to analyse and
code3 the data using the STM scheme factors shown in Table 7.5.
• Phase 3 Findings and Conclusions - in this final phase of the STM
scheme case studies, findings from both case studies are collated and cross-case
conclusions are drawn.















The threats to validity of these case studies centre around the involvement of the
primary researcher (PR) in each phase. The PR developed the STM schemes and
performed the static analysis and coding of the data, therefore few claims can be
made about the generalisability of the coding process. However, there is a degree of
independent input and influence due to the involvement of independent stakeholders
such as the ONR inspectors and data from a public review of the IET CoP.
1Note that the primary researcher will be used to refer to the researcher who developed SSAF.
2These guidance documents are reviewed in Chapter 3.
3Coding is a qualitative research term used here to mean classification or categorisation.
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Results and Findings from STM Case Studies
Full results from these case studies can be found in Appendix Section E.1.
ONR Summary Findings. Figure 7.5 shows a diagrammatic representation of
the results of using the STM Schemes as a guide to identify co-assurance gaps for
the ONR Safety Assessment Principles guidance (SAPS) [313] and the ONR Security
Assessment Principles (SyAPS) [314]. There was significant overlap in the ONR
guidance for several STM Scheme attributes such as approach, culture, competence,
governance and some risk concepts. However there was little or no overlap on
STM Schemes that related to trade-off decisions, proportionality, synchronisation
or communication. For example, the SAPS have the concept of ALARP (as low
as reasonably practicable) for risks, however SyAPS did not explicitly mention the
approach to risk acceptance.
Fig. 7.5 STM Schemes Evaluation Results for ONR SAPS/SyAPS
The initial analysis shown in Figure 7.5 was used to prompt discussion between the
12 inspectors at the ONR workshop. The data from the workshop conversation was
collected and coded (details in Appendix E.1). Several interesting findings emerged
from the workshop:
Conceptual Differences there were several conceptual differences between the safety
inspectors and the cyber security inspectors. For example, security inspectors
tended to be more accepting of a higher degree of epistemic uncertainty due
to the presence of an intelligent adversary. The risk acceptance process for
security at licensee sites also tended to involve an additional step of establishing
a risk appetite for security which is divergent to safety where clear guidance
is often provided.
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Structure Differences it was stated that security risk processes tended to be more
prescriptive and process based, however there was an acknowledged need to
move to a more goal-based regime. Changes in security tended to be more
rapid with several security laws being introduced in recent years that have an
impact on licensee sites such as the NIS directive, and in some cases GDPR.
People Differences a major point of divergence between safety and security inspectors
was the perspective on responsibility and the idea of a responsible person.
For safety this concept tended to be well defined, with clear owners for particular
safety cases, however for security this was less clear and in many cases the
person who had to execute a security plan was not the same person who
authored it. This raised some questions about accountability in the case of
something going wrong
Process and Tools Difference for security there was an additional aspect to risk
management of threat hunting and having a proactive stance towards gathering
threat intelligence. Whilst gaining knowledge to improve safety is also a
priority, the process of gaining that knowledge tended to be more passive. In
the discussion about tools for communicating safety and security arguments,
there was an acknowledged difference between a licensee safety case which
tends to be more goal-oriented and a security plan which tends to be more
process-oriented.
As well as data from the conversation, several questions were asked in the workshop
and follow-up questionnaire that asked questions directly about SSAF. The feedback
for the Framework was predominantly positive with inspectors stating that SSAF
would help co-assurance through "Increased activity between cyber and safety" and
"Primarily by assuring that there are regular ’touch points’ to ensure alignment".
Some of the challenges identified for the SSAF approach were that it was dependent
on the communication skills of the practitioners using it, and that it had the potential
to add additional workload to small projects. As improvement to SSAF, inspectors
suggested a possible simplification of models and "more clarity on the interaction
between the factors used in the model and potential trade-offs".
IET CoP SummaryFindings. The full analysis of the 600+ public comments can
be found in Appendix E.1. A summary of the Code of Practice Analsyis using the
STM Schemes as guidewords is:
Risk comments discussed potential conceptual and governance risk models with some
advocating for a particular approach. Risk appetite was mentioned several
times with the need for decision support for security mentioned. Similar the
ONR study, some IET CoP comments discussed the concept of ALARP for
security and some viewed it as quite controversial. Another topic elicited by
the STM schemes is the risk concept of likelihood and quantification of security
risk - there were proponents and opponents for the idea.
Trade-off and Decision-making after risk concepts, decision-making and trade-off
was the next most frequent topic. There were several comments stating that
more guidance is needed as to where these trade-offs occur and understanding
how to make bi-directional trade-offs was also a concern (especially when
considering if safety should always take precedence). The influence of board-
level decision makers on co-assurance was also stated.
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Responsibility and Accountability there is currently a gap in legal and regulatory
guidance with respect to responsibility attribution and accountability for co-
assurance. From the comments, it emerged that one of the roles of the IET
CoP guidance was to set precedent and best practice related to this challenge
as it has the potential to influence people’s thinking.
Terminology and Ontology many commenters suggested that the inclusion of an
ontology in the CoP would be beneficial to use as a baseline for co-assurance
activities, especially as a communication tool with stakeholders who have the
task of balancing the two attributes such as engineers.
STM Schemes Cross-Case Findings. The research questions for these case
studies were RQ.1 Is the semantic model for STM valid? RQ.2 Is the process feasible
in the context of real-world development and operation of a system? RQ.3 Can new
attributes be incorporated into the semantic models of the STM?
The case studies have demonstrated the utility of the STM schemes for analysing
socio-technical factors of co-assurance. Whilst there were some attributes not covered
in the schemes that appeared in the data (such as risk appetite and responsible
person), the STM influence model is flexible enough to incorporate them as new
factors. The Schemes were applied to a general case with the IET CoP and the
Nuclear domain with the ONR workshops, both of which are different domains to the
one that SSAF was developed in, therefore there is at least a degree of generalisability
to other domains. Whilst neither of these cases were a real-world project case study,
the feedback of the experienced ONR inspectors can be used as a proxy for aspects
of real world application. The overall reception of SSAF tended towards the positive,
with its value as a tool to connect safety and security stakeholders recognised.
7.3.2 Evaluating the TRM Process
The purpose of this multi-case study is to establish the practicality of following the
TRM process, particularly the steps to establish or refine synchronisation points
(TRM Steps 1 and 4). Two case studies are used to evaluate the TRM process:
• EULYNX Rail Interlocking - European project to standardise rail interlocking.
Case study to understand synchronisation points for security and safety.
• Forensic Synchronisation Points - the literature focuses on synchronisation
points and information exchange during system development. This case study
investigates synchronisation points post cyber incident using the processes
outlines in HSE guidance [48] and ISO/IEC 27043:2016 [207].
This case study has two research evaluation questions:
RQ.1 To what extent do TRM Steps 1 and 4 allow for synchronisation to
existing processes? TRM 5-step process is based on a new development
where sync points can be defined early, to what extent can it identify sync
points for existing processes? Can it help to identify any co-assurance gaps?
RQ.2 To what extent do TRM Steps 1 and 4 generalise to new application
domains? The processes was developed in the aerospace domain, can it be
applied to rail and forensics? Are there any refinements to the steps?
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TRM Process Case Studies Method
Figure 7.6 shows the method steps for the case studies to evaluate the TRM process.
All steps for these case studies were performed by the primary researcher. For each
of the case studies there are three phases:
• Phase 1 Analysis of Existing Processes - this step involves gathering
information about the existing processes that will have synchronisation points
added to them. For EULYNX this is the Safety Process and for Forensics
it is the processes in HSE guidance [48] and ISO/IEC 27043:2016 [207]. In
addition, documents and guidance that provide further contextual information
are analysed during this phase e.g. rail standards for EULYNX case.
• Phase 2 Establishing Sync Points - during this phase synchronisation
points are added to the processes based on the information needs of safety and
security. Annotated models are created to capture the synchronisation points.
• Phase 3 Findings and Conclusions - this phase captures lessons learned
and findings from the process of creating the sync points for the two cases.
Overall findings and conclusions are drawn about the TRM process.
Fig. 7.6 Method for TRM Process Case Studies
Threats to validity for these case studies include the fact that the primary researcher
performed all the steps, therefore trade-off and negotiation was simplified. This is
unlikely to be the case for a real-world context. In addition, synchronisation points
were established, however there was very little feedback regarding their utility - for
the Forensics case there was no feedback, for the EULYNX case, the head of safety
for the project confirmed that the analysis is informative, however involvement from
security is needed.
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Results and Findings from TRM Process Case Studies
Full details of the results from these case studies can be found in Appendix E.2.
Results and Findings from EULYNX Case Study. For this case study, using
the TRM Process, security synchronisation points were added to a model of the safety
process model from the EULYNX rail interlocking document. Several synchronisation
points were identified:
1. The first synchronisation point occurs during creation of the system (safety)
assurance plan creation where safety and security should establish shared goals
and terminology to inform the plan.
2. The second sync point links output from the system security process (risk
activities) to the system safety assurance process.
3. These bi-directional sync points relate to safety identifying high value assets and
informing security, as well as providing detail to security about the consequences
of asset loss as a result of the safety risk assessments.Security also makes
contributions to hazard notes.
4. and 5. These sync points involve security updating hazard information based on
risk analyses performed by security.
6. This last sync point is bi-directional and involves security providing evidence to
safety of controls to manage hazards, and safety providing compliance evidence
for security models.
Using one high level document and rail standards to understand best practice and
the artefacts that are outcomes of risk assurance activities, it was possible to identify
synchronisation points using the TRM Process. Further detail is needed, however
if specific link models are to be decided. There was also insufficient information
available to reason about the trade-offs that would need to be made at each of the
synchronisation points. However, even with this limited knowledge of assurance
activities it was still possible to provide meaningful information to progress co-
assurance.
Forensics Case Study Findings. To understand if the results from the EULYNX
study could be replicated, the method was repeated for a forensics example. From
the two forensic processes used - safety forensic process from [48] and security forensic
process from [207] - seven synchronisation points were identified using the TRM
process (further detail can be found in Appendix E.2). The sync points involved:
• triggers from security when an incident occurs or new threat intelligence is
discovered
• joint identification of system artefacts that need to be investigated
• joint sharing of cyber and safety investigation information, and
• feedback through other channels for wider dissemination of risk knowledge
TRM Process Cross-Case Findings. Whilst application of the TRM Process
to both case studies was straight-forward, it is unclear how real-world teams would
collaborate at these synchronisation points as there was insufficient information for
both cases to form a plan for joint activities. As a point of improvement for the TRM
Process, an explicit step for defining joint activities could be added, for example,
the creation of a co-assurance plan. However, even with the limited information for
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both cases, valuable (potential) points of interaction were identified which can be
validated and refined later.
The research questions these case studies are seeking to address are: RQ.1 To what
extent do TRM Steps 1 and 4 allow for synchronisation to existing processes? RQ.2 To
what extent do TRM Steps 1 and 4 generalise to enw application domains? The
linking steps in the TRM Process (Steps 1 and 4) were straight-forward to implement
and allowed for synchronisation points between safety and security to be defined.
The information available for both cases was insufficient to determine if there were
any gaps using TRM. The TRM Process could be applied to a rail safety assurance
process and a general forensic process therefore there is moderate support for the
TRM Process generalisability to other domains.
7.3.3 Evaluating the TRM Links and Schemes
The purpose of these case studies are to evaluate the utility of the TRM Link Patterns
and establish the usefulness of the TRM Attribute Schemes. Three case studies are
presented in this section - one performed by the primary researcher, and the other
two performed by independent researchers. The case studies to evaluate the TRM
Links and Schemes are:
• IEC 61508 vs CC Requirements Linking - this case study uses the TRM
process and attribute schemes to link the functional requirements in IEC 61508
and Common Criteria. The requirement links are then captured in a model.
This case demonstrates the utility of the schemes.
• SAM Demonstrator Risk Linking - this case uses a TRM Link pattern to
connect attack paths to hazards for an autonomous infusion pump example. The
result is a set of combined safety-security link models. This case demonstrates
application of the link patterns by an independent researcher4.
• CERIUM Framework Links - this case uses SSAF linking concept to join
cyber security attributes to desirable security assurance principles from the
standards. The purpose of this is to demonstrate the flexibility of the SSAF
concepts even within a single domain.
These case studies aim to address the following research evaluation questions:
RQ.1 Can the TRM Links and Schemes be applied to link safety and
security requirements?
RQ.2 Can the linking approach be applied by independent researchers?
How reliably can independent researchers use the link patterns to identify
links? Are the resulting links useful? Do they reveal new information about
safety-security interactions?
RQ.3 To what extent can the TRM Links be applied to a context different
from the one in which it was developed?
4Independent researcher is one who has not been involved in the development of SSAF.
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IEC61508 vs CC Case Study Method
Figure 7.7 shows the steps for the IEC61508vsCC requirements linking process.
Safety functional requirements are gathered from IEC 61508 standard and security
functional requirements gathered from Common Criteria in the first steps. These
requirements are analysed and broadly categorised according to CIA5 properties.
The TRM attribute schemes are then used to semantically link safety and security
requirements, and refine the connections. Next, TRM Link Patterns are used to
syntactically represent the links. The result is a model with connected safety and
security nodes that represent the requirements. The final step discusses the findings
from the TRM linking process and drawing conclusions.
Fig. 7.7 Method for TRM Link Case Study
Threats to validity include the use of requirements from standards - these may not
be representative of requirements for a real system. There may also be many more
requirements to consider which would make linking more resource intensive. For
the semantic links, the judgement of the primary researcher was used to create the
connections, therefore there may be some bias because the PR understands in great
detail the intent of the links.
SAM and CERIUM Case Studies Method
The process steps followed for these case studies is shown in Figure 7.8. It is almost
identical to the steps followed for the IEC61508vsCC Case Study (Figure 7.7). The
main difference is that all the processes steps except the final one are carried out by
two separate, independent researchers who were not involved in the development of
SSAF. The steps are:
• Step 1 Analysis of context documents - for the SAM case study, these
are policy documents from NHS Derby, system models of the infusion pump
and standards relating to medical devices; for the CERIUM case study these
5Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability.
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are standards and documents related to security assurance and deception
technologies.
• Steps 2 and 3 Create links and Link Models - for both case studies this
step involves using TRM link patterns to create connections security-to-safety
for SAM and threats-to-assurance for CERIUM.
• Step 4 Findings and Conclusions - for this last step, the primary researcher
analyses the models generated from the case studies to elicit findings about
application of the TRM links.
Fig. 7.8 Method for TRM Link Independent Case Studies
There is a degree of external validity for these case studies as the linking for two
of them were performed by researchers who did not develop SSAF. However, the
reliability of linking results between researchers6, and generalisability to new domains
is partial because the researchers were trained on the TRM process by the primary
researcher.
Results and Findings from the TRM Link Case Studies
Full details of the results from the IEC61508vsCC, SAM, and CERIUM cause studies
can be found in Appendix Section E.3.
Findings from the IEC61508 vs CC Linking using TRM Schemes. The
TRM Attribute Schemes with {Resources, Timing behaviour, Failure behaviour,
Detection, Recovery, Communication, and Trust} were used to code functional
requirements from the IEC 61508-3:2010 [187] and ISO 15408-1 [195]. Once coded,
the requirements from one domain were linked to the requirements of the other domain
using the code groups i.e. all safety requirements related to Timing behaviour were
linked to all security requirements related to Timing behaviour. Examples of Timing
behaviour requirements that were linked are:
6TRM Link Models could be applied to form interaction links between safety and security.
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safety requirement - maximum response to events
safety requirement - guaranteed maximum time
security requirement - time stamps
security requirement - state synchrony protocol
These and the other attribute links were captured in a BBN model. Figure 7.9
shows the conceptual linking of requirements using TRM Links for Resources and
Timing Behaviour. The main idea is that when requirements from either domain
are updated e.g. there is a violation or the requirement is not met, then analysts
know which requirements from the other domain are affected. For co-assurance one
would go further and make claims about the specific links. TRM Links could be
further improved by creating schemes for inter-attribute links, for example capturing
non-obvious causal relationships between Trust and Confidentiality requirements to
Resource use and Timing behaviour requirements. However, even though there is
little complexity with the links identified, they add value to co-assurance by creating
semantic associations between safety and security.
Fig. 7.9 Concept Model for IEC 61508 vs CC Requirement Linking
SAM and CERIUM Case Study Findings. The SAM Demonstrator case study
used TRM Link Patterns for attack-to-hazard to linking attack paths to hazards for
an autonomous infusion pump. The CERIUM case study used the TRM Linking
concept to link security deception artefacts such as honeypots, decoys and canary
files to security assurance principles from the ISO27K standards. Both these case
studies were performed by independent researchers. Whilst only a small part of the
TRM was used in both cases (TRM syntactic linking), the links created demonstrated
that the model can be applied to diverse domains, and there is some support for
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reliability of results as it was possible for the independent researchers who were not
involved in the creation of SSAF TRM to create new links. For the CERIUM case
study, a new pattern could be defined because this is not inter-domain linking, rather
specifying links within security. This increased link knowledge may be useful for
co-assurance - further work is needed to understand the significance of single domain
links on co-assurance links.
TRM Linking Cross-Case Findings. The evaluation questions that these TRM
Link case studies seek to address are: RQ.1 Can the TRM Links and Schemes be
applied to link safety and security requirements? RQ.2 Can the linking approach
be applied by independent researchers? RQ.3 To what extent can the TRM Links
be applied to a context different from the one in which it was developed? The
IEC61508 vs CC Linking demonstrated that it was possible to use the TRM Schemes
to semantically link requirements from safety and security. Further work is needed to
understand more subtle links between requirements that require more reasoning from
experts. Both the SAM case study and the CERIUM case study were performed
by independent researchers in diverse domains (healthcare and threat intelligence),
which supports the reliability of the TRM Linking concept and that it is someone
generalisable. Further research will seek to validate that linking can be performed
by industry practitioners.
7.3.4 SSAF Case Studies Summary
Table 7.10 summarises the findings from all of the case studies and provides an
outline for points of improvement for SSAF. The main findings indicate that SSAF
Process and Models fulfil their intended purpose to assist in defining links between
safety and security for co-assurance.
Further research is needed to validate the attributes in the SSAF schemes, and to
add more detailed steps to the process steps. However, feedback from regulator
workshops indicate that the existing attributes are helpful for eliciting co-assurance





Table 7.10 Findings Summary
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7.4 Hypothesis Discussion
In this section, we discuss the impact of the evaluation on the hypothesis with the
aim of confirming or rejecting it:
Using a framework that explicitly considers both technical risk
and socio-technical factors results in a more robust safety-security
co-assurance argument.
From the Introduction, the terms provided are:
framework - processes and models for co-assurance
technical risk - product of likelihood and severity of negative consequences occurring
socio-technical factors - factors that support technical risk assurance such as knowledge,
assurance activities, structures, tools, etc.
explicit consideration - systematic process and defined models for representing and
reasoning about inter-domain relationships between safety and security
co-assurance argument - structured reasoning (claims, arguments, and supporting
evidence) about the risk interactions between safety and security
more robust - co-assurance argument and reasoning stable over time
The utility and application of the STM Schemes, TRM Process and TRM Link Models
have been discussed through the case studies in the previous section. Robustness in
engineering and design has been extensively discussed in the literature [29, 72? , 401].
For this evaluation, Kitano’s definition of robustness will be used [241]7: "Robustness
is a property that allows a system to maintain its functions despite external and
internal perturbations ... A system must be robust to function in unpredictable
environments using unreliable components".
The main features of this definition are that the system maintains its function despite
perturbations or variations from internal and external sources in an unpredictable
environment. Taking the argument as the system of reasoning, whose function is to
provide compelling support that a system is co-assured, factors that would cause
variation are:
internal variation caused by changes in
– conditions or causal relationships e.g. new threats
– artefacts or evidence models e.g. updated or new link model
– claims or inferences e.g. new strategy for co-assurance and linking
– arguments - this would occur if, for exmaple a new vulnerability undermined
an entire safety argument (e.g. Zero-day exploit)
external variation caused by changes in
– co-assurance structure, people, process, tools
– concepts, language or philosophy of co-assurance
To demonstrate that SSAF improves co-assurance robustness, ideal evidence would
include empirical studies on multiple real-world projects, comparing the use of the
approaches reviewed in Chapter 3 to SSAF in quasi-experimental conditions8. Due
7This definition of robustness is derived from engineering and is applied to the study of fail-safes
in Biological systems.
8For example, two teams doing co-assurance, one using SSAF, one using another approach.
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to the constraints of this research project that is not possible, therefore an argument
will be made based on the identified limitations of the existing approaches and the
findings from the evaluation case studies. Table 7.6 shows a comparison between
SSAF and the capabilities of some approaches reviewed in Chapter 3 to support
co-assurance. [✓] indicates that the capability is present, [□] indicates that it is
partial and [–] indicates that it is absent.








SSAF ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
STPA-based ✓ ✓ □ □ –
FMEA-based □ ✓ □ □ –
FTA-based ✓ ✓ □ □ –
DDA ✓ ✓ ✓ □ □
SafSec ✓ – ✓ □ ✓
IET CoP □ – □ ✓ ✓
DO-326A ✓ □ ✓ – ✓
Process - Nearly all the co-assurance approaches have a defined process, however
there is some variance in the detail provided about how to link safety and
security. For example, SSAF provides distinct linking (TRM Steps 1 and 4)
whereas some approaches such as STPA-based and FMEA-based have implicit
linking through the use of STRIDE. Some standards and guidance documents
do propose a partial co-assurance process with information flowing mainly from
one attribute to another e.g. security-informed safety approach of DO-326A.
Link Models - Model linking of safety and security is the main focus of many
existing approaches. SSAF captures the link models in the syntactic patterns
which are based on these models. For the standards however, some do have
information about how to instantiate links, however many present principles
(e.g. IET CoP) and process (e.g. DO-326A) rather than link models.
Co-assurance argument - Technical/Socio-technical - SSAF is the only co-
assurance approach that explicitly encourages claims to be made about both
technical risk and socio-technical factors for safety-security. Some approaches
deal with technical risk, but have only an implicit technical argument (e.g.
STPA-based, FMEA-based, FTA-based, DO-326A), some have an explicit
technical argument but only partially consider socio-technical factors and the
confidence argument (e.g. DDA and SafSec), and some are based on socio-
technical principles (e.g. IET CoP has technical approaches in the annexes).
Temporal - this refers to the ability of the approach to handle change to risk, models
and argument over time. Some are based on snap-shot analyses which produce
an artefact at one point in time during the system development lifecycle
(STPA-based, FMEA-based, FTA-based), whilst others do provided some
synchronisation points or principles for synchronisation (e.g. DO-326A and
IET CoP respectively). SSAF provides a conceptual model for synchronisation
points which explicitly consider information exchange at different points during
a system’s life.
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There are several threats to the validity for this analysis, including that it is based
on secondary evidence9 and that the primary researcher conducted the comparison
10. However, a small claim to improved robustness can be made based on identified
issues of existing approaches. SSAF was intentionally developed to incorporate new
assurance information in an uncertain environment through its processes, link models
and arguments. Without each of the capabilities in Table 7.6, perturbations of
safety-security risk during a system’s lifetime is likely to easily undermine the overall
co-assurance argument11.
Even though further validation and empirical investigation is required to confirm
the hypothesis, this analysis provides a rational basis for improved co-assurance
argument robustness using SSAF.
Conclusion
This chapter presented a multi-legged approach to evaluating parts of SSAF which
consists of case studies to evaluate the STM Schemes, TRM Process and TRM Links,
as well as an argument to support confirmation of the hypothesis based on analysis
of existing approaches.
Key findings from the evaluation indicate that SSAF does add value and is helpful for
co-assurance as it structures thinking, inter-domain modelling and communication.
The existing SSAF models need further validation however, and it is likely that this
validation will reveal refinements or extensions to the models.
9Based on literature as opposed to practical application.
10Several biases may be present such as confirmation bias, selection bias, etc.
11For example if a link model changes, but there is no explicit representation of the technical risk




The intent of this thesis is to present a novel approach to co-assurance and argue
that it improves risk reduction to enable safer and more secure systems. The
preceding chapters have (i) discussed the challenges of co-assurance, (ii) presented
the Safety-Security Assurance Framework (SSAF) to address these challenges, and
(iii) evaluated parts of the framework through case studies and argumentation. This
chapter contains a summary of the most significant parts of SSAF, a discussion about
the thesis contributions, and lastly, considerations about further work and the overall
purpose of co-assurance.
8.1 SSAF Summary
Figure 8.1 depicts the core components of SSAF. They are the Conceptual Model1,
the Technical Risk Model (TRM)2, and the Socio-Technical Model (STM)3. The
following section will revisit some of the features or elements of these components:
Conceptual Model Elements
• V-model - this is the primary conceptual model for co-assurance. It takes
the form of the V-development lifecycle to match activities in system
development and in safety and security assurance. The model helps
to guide thinking and is not meant to be a prescriptive model of how
co-assurance functions in the real-world.
• Synchronisation points - these are part of the V-model and represent
the points at which safety and security need to interact throughout the
lifetime of a system. This includes pre-system activities such as governance
and strategy activities, as well as through life processes such as design,
development, deployment, maintenance and decommissioning. SSAF
does not advocate a particular number of sync points, rather it assists
practitioners with the reasoning about internations e.g. how many, when,
what information should be exchanged etc.
1Conceptual Model discussed in Chapter ??.
2TRM presented in Chapter 5.
3STM presented in Chapter 6.
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Fig. 8.1 Summary of SSAF Components
• Independent co-assurance - this is a new paradigm that contrasts existing
approaches to co-assurance such as integration and unification. Independent
co-assurance is a much wider concept that is based on keeping the
disciplines separate but aligned. This is to benefit from the advantages
and efficiencies of having the individual disciplines, whilst minimising
divergence that could lead to increased risk. Independent co-assurance is
reliant on safety and security engineers communicating to establish shared
objectives, activities and points of interaction. To do this effectively,
resource needs to be committed to establishing the interaction points.
Technical Risk Model Elements
• TRM process - this the process by which the synchronisation points
are instantiated. This five step process provides an overview of the
activities that are required for co-assurance. Step 1 is to establish a
shared understanding, ontology and sync points, Steps 2 and 3 allow the
disciplines to work separately on assurance activities, Step 4 is about
creating inter-domain links and reasoning about the interaction risks, and
Step 5 is about iterating through the linking process and improving the
co-assurance argument. This process is meant to complement existing risk
management standards in each domain.
• Causal model - this is a conceptual model that represents the condition-
to-condition linking required for co-assurance. It consists of types of
conditions e.g. threat, hazard, etc. and the relationships that they have
to one another e.g. emergent, linear, complex, etc. . The purpose of the
model is to provide the theory of interaction for SSAF and define the links
that will be reasoned over in the co-assurance argument.
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• Risk argument - the co-assurance technical risk argument is the primary
justification for safety-security alignment. It is risk-based i.e. it identifies
interaction risks then makes claims that those risks have been addressed
or managed through co-assurance requirements. The claims and argument
are supported by link models.
• Link patterns - there are many approaches to representing the links
between safety and security. Some of these link models and approaches
were reviewed in Chapter 3. The TRM generalises the types of link
models in these approaches to form link patterns. These contain syntactic
information about what is being connected, the nature of the relationship
and the model type used to represent the link.
• Argument schemes - these are semantic patterns of reasoning about the
links. Where the link patterns assist with modelling, the schemes help
to identify the types of co-assurance claims to established and common
conflicts that occur. The schemes use sub-attributes and critical questions
to guide reasoning.
Socio-Technical Model Elements
• Socio-technical confidence argument - the technical risk argument is at
the core of co-assurance, however there are factors that affect co-assurance
that are beyond the scope of technical claims and models of risk. The
socio-technical argument is concerned with reasoning about those factors
that would support risk management for co-assurance.
• Influence model - in a similar way to the TRM capturing risk interactions
in the causal model, STM captures the factor-to-factor relationshps in an
influence model. The factors fall into five broad categories (Conceptual,
Structure, People, Process, Tools) but can be divided further into sub-
factors (such as risk concept, regulatory structure, competence, etc. ).
The influence relationship (primary or secondary) describes the type of
confidence relationship the factors have to the technical risk argument.
For example, competence of the practitioners performing a risk analysis is
primary confidence, and the legislative framework that they must work
within affects secondary confidence. It is important to consider both
these types of relationships because they both have the power to affect
co-assurance and undermine or underpin the technical risk argument.
• Socio-technical schemes - similar to technical risk schemes, socio-technical
schemes are reasoning patterns that capture the semantic links between
influence factors. They are intended to help engineers and practitioners
identify gaps between the domains so that they can be resolved, thereby
increasing confidence.
SSAF aims to provide a process and models to support safety and security co-
assurance throughout the life of a system. It enables this through explicit consideration
of interaction risks within the technical argument. This consideration is needed
for co-assurance because the interaction risks are such that they could undermine
claims in the single-domain assurance arguments. Once the technical risk argument
has been established, SSAF also enables reasoning about socio-technical factors to
manage uncertainty and increase confience. This aspect is important because, due
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to the intelligent adversary, it is unlikely that security risks can be eliminated or
managed to the extent often expected in safety.
Whilst there are many theoretical and practical components to SSAF, and each of
the components play an important role on its own, the essential parts required for
co-assurance are synchronisation points, the links and the technical risk argument.
These are minimum necessary elements to make compelling co-assurance claims for
a system. The next section discusses the contributions made through the research
and development of SSAF.
8.2 Thesis Contributions
Within the scope of this research, several theoretical and practical advancements in
knowledge have been made. This section outlines the core contributions of the work.
8.2.1 Conceptual and Theoretical Contribution
One of the principal contributions to knowledge of this research is the underlying
theory and concepts of the framework. These relate to the construction of the
framework, SSAF artefacts, as well as the reasoning tools presented.
Together with the co-assurance V-model, the concept of independent co-assurance
presents a paradigm shift for practitioners, engineers and researchers. Previously,
the conceptions of safety and security alignment ranged from siloed assurance
approaches to integrated and unified risk processes. Independent co-assurance
is not prescriptive, and offers a new way to think about and define interaction
between the two attributes. It encourages explicit consideration about inter-domain
communication, synchronisation points and identification of interaction risks at those
points. This information is usually assumed or hidden in dedicated analyses. All
interaction models have their benefits and deficiencies, independent co-assurance
obliges stakeholders to reason about and justify their particular approach rather
than assuming it.
Another significant conceptual contribution is the use of the engineering concepts
of separation of concerns and recursion in the development of the co-assurance
framework. The TRM and STM are designed in such a way that they mirror each
other, that is, they both use structured arguments that make claims about links at
different levels of abstraction. The benefit is that these are concept that are familiar
to engineers, and so should encourage greater understanding and easier adoption of
the framework on real-world engineering projects.
8.2.2 Co-Assurance Technical Risk Contribution
The SSAF Technical Risk Model presents another principal contribution. The
process, causal model, link patterns and argument schemes capture different elements
of knowledge needed for co-assurance of technical risk. Existing approaches often
consider just one aspect, such as standards that are process-oriented or analyses that
8.3 Further Work 177
rely on model representation only. The TRM brings all of these aspects together
in a structured way and defines the relationships between them. The technical risk
argument has claims concerning interaction risks that are represented by syntactic
link models (contained in the patterns) and elicited using the semantic argumentation
schemes. Whilst work is still needed to further validate and improve on this structure,
its very existence is a contribution. It facilitates systematic thinking about technical
risk co-assurance through multiple phases of a system’s lifecycle.
8.2.3 Co-Assurance Socio-Technical Contribution
The final principal contribution of the framework is the Socio-Technical Model theory
and artefacts. Technical co-assurance is significantly impacted by factors that are
not often captured in technical risk analysis processes or models. STM contributes
an influence model that defines some of the factors, and provides argumentation
schemes with critical questions about common conflicts between safety and security
co-assurance to help stakeholders systematically reason about the socio-technical
factors. Whilst there is need for further research about the factors in the influence
model, the STM systematises knowledge about the socio-technical challenges and
conflicts that can exist between safety and security during co-assurance in a way
that has not previously been done.
Contributions Summary
The purpose of this research is to create a practical framework for co-assurance of
system safety and cyber security. Diverse research and evaluation methods have
been adopted for development of the framework to ensure that the it is based on
strong fundamental principles and underlying theory. Through this process, gaps in
knowledge have been identified and addressed through SSAF. The novel concepts
and approach of SSAF present a fundamental shift in thinking about co-assurance.
This paradigm shift has already had significant influence through research output,
partial application on a national defence project and inclusion in an international
code of practice. In this section, the contributions of SSAF have been presented,
however through this research, further work and ways forward have been identified;
the next section discusses these.
8.3 Further Work
This section discusses the opportunities identified during research for this thesis.
These opportunities support the claim that the contributions and benefits of this
research extend beyond the thesis:
Tools for Co-assurance
Whilst there is a strong theoretical basis for SSAF and its models, the fast
changing field of co-assurance needs practical tools to help analysts, practitioners
and engineers to more easily adopt and benefit from this approach. Ideally,
a tool implementation would provide assistance with semantic construction
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of the arguments, and allow for a degree of automation e.g. instantiating
link information during run-time using model weaving. This is vital when
considering the co-assurance needs that will emerge for complex systems or
large systems-of-systems.
Standardisation
To further assist practitioners and engineers, technical standards capturing
validated link models and technical arguments are needed for the advancement
of co-assurance as a field. Existing standards that discuss process or principle
for co-assurance make a very good start, however during this research the need
for practical, technical guidance on risk co-analysis, developing co-assurance
arguments, co-assessment and trade-offs was identified.
Improving Causal and Influence Models
The scope of this research limited the number of causal and influence factors
that could be investigated and evaluated. Core research is needed to add to,
refine, and improve the causal and influence models. These form the basis for
practical guidance and standardisation, therefore further research to validate
them would be beneficial.
Workflow, Decisions & Dialectics
SSAF proposes a process, synchronisation points and common conflicts for
co-assurance, however the framework is silent on how to make the trade-off
decisions, negotiate requirements, reach agreement or co-evolve arguments.
Each of these areas constitutes a significant amount of research on its own.
However, establishing a "co-assurance" workflow, defining synchronisation
triggers and stopping criteria, understanding the decisions that must be made,
and modelling the dialectical process between safety and security would be of
great benefit.
Responsible Person, Risk Acceptance & Accountability
From the workshops, and research involving industry a common theme and
challenge was recurring: how to define responsibility and accountability for
co-assurance. Both domains have their own processes and accepted standards
for risk acceptance and it is a challenge to bring these technically together.
However, even when this is done successfully, there remains a question about
what happens if things go wrong - who is responsible when an incident occurs,
especially if it causes death or injury. Fundamental research is needed about
how to apportion responsibility, and models for accountability in a co-assurance
context.
Training & Education
SSAF presents several shifts in thinking and approach. Whilst this knowledge
and skills to perform co-assurance may be increased through experience, there
is an immediate need to train and educate system safety and cyber security
practitioners about co-assurance. Particularly what the differences are to
single-domain assurance, why a slightly different approach is needed, and
what competencies are needed for co-assurance. A core piece of research for
co-assurance is identifying this knowledge and these competencies.
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SACM modelling Structured Assurance Case Metamodel [359] is a UML standard
for modelling structured arguments. It combines aspects of GSN and CAE
modelling approaches with new features such as capturing claim states4,
inference modelling and artefact modelling. This modelling standard offers
greater expressive power to support model-based reasoning, therefore capturing
co-assurance argument patterns that conform to this standard would be
beneficial. This would allow for potentially easier updates during operation
and connection with artefacts in the individual domains.
Concluding Thoughts:
Co-assurance as Right Reasoning in Acting
The Thomistic philosophy on prudence offers insight for co-assurance. It is defined
as "right reason applied to action" and has three parts [384]:
• Taking counsel - which involves inquiry and discovery
• Judging discoveries - this is an act of the speculative reason
• Command - which is about applying to action the things counselled and judged
Applied to co-assurance, Counsel represents understanding information from the
other domain (knowledge sharing) and investigating the impact of inter-domain
risks (through analysis and assessment).Judging captures the practitioners’ need to
evaluate claims and evidence and make trade-off decisions related to risk. Finally
Command captures the need for action based on reasoning.
Unlike some approaches that consider only one element or a snapshot of risk, the
Safety-Security Assurance Framework presents a holistic approach to supporting
through-life co-assurance. SSAF provides the structure for discovery (causal and
influence models), assists in identifying points where decisions must be made
(synchronisation points), and helps practitioners to take reasoned action for co-
assurance through arguments and process. SSAF supports reducing overall risk for a
system, helps to minimise loss throughout its life-time, and assists stakeholders in
achieving a prudent approach to co-assurance.








This Appendix contains additional information for Chapter 2.
A.1 Technical Risk
A.1.1 Classification of Risk
There is different risk associated with the potential danger of different activities or
energy systems, for example, being struck by a meteorite, stung by a mosquito or
electrocuted by a wrongly wired appliance [393]. Risk has been classified in several
ways to represent these differences. Common differentiators include:
Perspective
Risk can be categorised by the person(s) that it applies to e.g. an individual
or an organisation. Perspective also applies to the domains to which the
stakeholders of a system belong [148, 288].
Amount of Knowledge
Another classification of risk is by the amount of knowledge that we posses about
the risk. According to the FAA Risk Management Handbook risk can be further
divided into the subcategories of identified, unidentified, acceptable/unacceptable
and residual. Table A.1 shows each of these risks.
Type of Risk
Within an organisation there are several types of risk such as schedule and
budget. For technological systems, we are interested in the technical risk which
is the uncertainty that a product or solution will satisfy technical requirements
and the resulting consequences [61]. Technical risk is where assurance risk is
most evident during system development and procurement [16]. It applies to
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Table A.1 FAA Risk Management Handbook Types of Risk [11]
Types of Risk
Total The sum of identified and unidentified risks.
Identified Risk that has been determined through
various analysis techniques.
Unidentified Risk not yet identified - some unidentified
when an incident occurs
Unacceptable Risk that cannot be tolerated by the managing
activity. This is subset of the identified risk
that must be eliminated or controlled.
Acceptable Acceptable risk is the part of identified risk that
is allowed to persist without further engineering action.
Residual This is the risk remaining after the system safety
process. Residual risk is the sum of acceptable risk
and unidentified risk - the total risk passed on to the user.
the whole system including the software, hardware, human factors, interfaces
and operating environment.
A.1.2 Measuring Risk
For complex systems it is computationally intractable to calculate all risk accurately
before a system is built [268, 25]. In some cases assurance data is available from past
systems. However, this data will not produce an accurate result for the new system
unless the system and environment are virtually identical, as it has been shown that
even small changes can substantially alter risk involved [112].
One approach that is extensively used within engineering is to represent the risk of
an event as the product of the likelihood of the event occurring and the severity of
the consequences of the event. In practice the likelihood is given as a probabilistic
measure, thus giving:
Risk(A) = Probability(A) x Severity(A)
Whilst this representation has many advantages, such as giving engineers the ability
to easily incorporate numerical values for probabilities into design and assurance
models, there are limitations to this approach that are currently being addressed,
but remain unsolved [81, 353, 25]. These limitations include estimating human
errors during accident conditions, quantifying digital software failures and, often, the
incorrect assumption that risks are probabilistically independent [25].
A definitive probability-based measure that would stand up to scientific rigour, as it
does in the natural sciences, is impossible in the context of safety-critical systems
because extremely unlikely, serious events such as nuclear reactor accidents cannot be
validated. Validation would require for probabilities as small as 10−7 per reactor per
year to be tested; minimally that would mean building 1,000 reactors and running
them for 10,000 years to get the failure rate [427].
A.1 Technical Risk 185
With such limitations, why are probabilistic risk representations still used? Uncertainties
in system assurance risk exist independently of whether probabilistic risk assessment
(PRA) is performed. The availability of risk measures will better inform decisions
that must be made regarding the system [25], especially if the confidence in the
accuracy is provided and is commensurate with the criticality of the application.
A.1.2.1 Probability
There are three ways to calculate probability that are used in the safety critical
domain:
De Moivre-Laplacian Model
This is a normal approximation to the binomial distribution. It is based on
the idea that probability is inherent in objects e.g. a true die has the inherent
probability of 16
th on landing on one face [334].
Frequentist
This interpretation view probability as associated with events, or more clearly,
presents probability as a statement of how often an event type occurs if the
events are repeated many times [334].
Bayesian
The Bayesian approach gives probability as a statement of rational or normative
beliefs [84] i.e. beliefs formed on account of reasons and evidence. The estimate
is updated when new evidence becomes available.
For events that are repeatable and frequent, it is possible to estimate a risk probability
that is close to the actual distribution. However, when looking for harmful effects
of events it is neither desirable nor, in many cases, legal to frequently repeat these
events. Therefore, in the safety-critical domain "we must be Laplacians or Bayesians"
[255].
Even as Laplacians and Bayesian the notion of probability for very rare events can be
problematic due to the lack of data. As a result, some industries, such as aerospace,
prefer designs which can plausibly argue the risk level on the basis of design and
construction [255]. However, this approach might not be applicable to large, complex
SoS [102] where individual components can be systems that cannot be constructed
or tested in the same way that an aircraft wing can, for example.
A.1.3 Safety Risk
Safety risk is the likelihood and severity associated with a hazard, i.e. the potential
for a system or component to cause injury or harm. Safety risk assessments are
performed to ensure that system will not cause harm when deployed. These are often
mandatory for systems that are to function within a safety-critical domain such as
civil aviation where systems and sub-components must be certified before they are
allowed into service.
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Risk assessments are based on the identification and reduction of risk, usually by
decreasing the likelihood of an event occurring. The steps for safety risk assessment,
as provided by the IEC Advisory Committee on Safety [202], are shown in the
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Risk Assessment Process [202]
Data: System information
Result: Safety assurance argument
identify hazards;
while residual risk is intolerable do
estimate risk;
evaluate risk;
reduce risk where intolerable;
validate and document reasoning along with evidence
It can be seen clearly from this representation that safety risk estimation, evaluation
and reduction form the core of the assurance process. Typically, safety risk assessment
makes systematic use of available system information for hazard identification. Table
A.2 shows some of the techniques used during the risk assessment process and whether
they are Strongly Applicable, Applicable or Not Applicable to the relevant stage.
We will review the highlighted techniques in greater depth in Section ?? ??
It is important to note that the classification that a hazard receives is subjective.
However, impractical classifications or classifications that deviate from normative
industry values might need further justification.
Ladkin [255] gives an analysis of the abrupt flight termination in Ukrainian airspace
of the Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 (MH17) in July 2014 due to a large number of
high-energy objects colliding with the aircraft. It is argued that the traditional safety
risk analysis to assess possible security threats such as the one experienced by MH
17 cannot be that of IEC Guidelines [202], we will discuss the reasons for this in the
next section.
A.1.4 Security Risk
We discussed making an argument based on design and construction. This is greatly
affected when an object is designed to cause the structure of a system to fail and is
constructed with similar principles to execute that function.
The Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 (MH17) example from the previous section was
not officially a security issue [255], however it demonstrates a key difference between
safety and security analysis: How to assess the probability of a rare targeted security
event that has a great impact on safety?
To begin to answer this question, the presence of an attacker and the possibility of
the rare event must be known i.e. there exists a security risk that an aircraft will be
shot down by a ground-based missile,etc. .
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Brainstorming SA NA NA NA NA
Structure or SA NA NA NA NAsemistructured interviews
Hazard and operability SA SA A A A
studies (HAZOP)
Structure What if? (SWIFT) SA SA SA SA SA
Scenario Analysis SA SA A A A
Root Cause Analysis NA SA SA SA SA
Failure mode effect analysis SA SA SA SA SA
Fault tree analysis A NA SA A A
Event tree analysis A SA A A NA
Cause-consequence analysis A SA SA A A
Human reliability analysis SA SA SA SA A
Bow tie analysis NA A SA SA A
Markov analysis A SA NA NA NA
Monte Carlo simulation NA NA NA NA SA
Bayes nets NA SA SA A SA
Ladkin outlines the security factors affecting the risk analysis for Malaysian M17
[255]:
• It was observed that hostile military engagements were taking place in the
area.
• The area in which those engagements were taking place, or to which they could
plausibly spread is curcumscribed.
• A hoped-complete list of hazardous events occurring through hostile military
acts to commercial aviation flying in open civil airspace was enumerated.
• Scenarios leading to those hazardous events were constructed.
• The plausibility of each scenarios was assessed.
• Plausibilites were ranked. First, plausible-implausible. Then, more plausible-
less plausible.
• A discrete decision was made based on those plausibilities: use the airspace/don’t
use the airspace.
Up to Step 3, the IEC documents on engineering risk follow a similar process under
hazard identification, then method diverges. It is not practical to use traditional
risk analysis models to order causes hierarchically in subsystems as the nature of an
attack does not require this. Nor is it practical to use traditional analysis methods
to model abstract possible futures, as these events are temporal scenarios with actors
performing actions according to motivations and reasons [416].
188 Foundational Concepts for Co-Assurance
When we have to consider, as part of our analysis and risk measure, the personal
and organisational goals, motivations, resources,etc. it has been observed we are
no longer in the domain of probabilistic assessment which is based ultimately on a
notion of a random variable whilst goals are not random, they are purposeful [440].
For example, the probability that a WWW server suffers a surfeit of incompletely-
formed TCP handshaking packets are generally low [416]; however the probability
becomes very high to almost certain if the server is target of a DDoS attack [255].
This difference is not probabilistic. Instead it is concerned with some specific
agent’s purpose and resources at a point in time. Far from being a probabilistic
random variable, it becomes an almost-Boolean environmental variable: is the system
currently subject to DDoS attack, or not?
To determine appropriate security risk level applied the assessment process has a
new requirement to identify probability and impact of security breaches. This leads
us to the security representation of risk:
Risk(A) = Threat(A) x V alueofAsset(A) x V ulnerability(A) [416]
Like safety assessment, there are many approaches to security risk assessment. The
qualitative techniques provide the magnitude and consequences of security incidents
and their likelihood of occurring. These techniques are often based on hypothetical
incident scenarios and use the best guess informed opinions of subject experts [416].
This means that the more input received during a system’s security risk assessment
from a range of experts, the better the analysis should be.
The advantages of the qualitative approaches are that the information extracted is
usually easy to understand across an organisation as opposed to complex technical
formulae. These approaches also produce very useful high-level analyses for areas
that might need further assessment. The limitations of these approaches are that
they are predominantly manual processes and are heavily reliant of experts.
Quantitative approaches to security risk analysis are more formulaic and therefore
require more information [392]. This is practical where historical data is available.
Where the frequency of an attack is known and losses are in numerical terms,
quantitative approaches are good and will give an concrete numerical risk measurement.
As well as providing numerical measures, another advantage of these approaches is
that the process can be used iteratively. However, the approaches are based on the
assumption that historical data is available and they require that comprehensive
system records are kept, which is impossible for some large, complex SoS.
This approach to risk assessment has come under criticism because it relies on the
subjective best-guess of experts rather than formally trying to predict future events
based on statistical evidence [230]. This form of risk assessment is still an important
instrument for ensuring the security of systems because it systematically classifies
and treats risks.
Figure A.1 shows an example of a security decomposition of risk which includes
multiple contributors to loss event frequency such as threat capability, contact and
action; and for magnitude of the loss it includes primary and secondary loss factors.
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Fig. A.1 FAIR’s risk decomposition (Taken from [373, p 183])
A.1.5 Risk Reduction
Given risk measures, after overcoming the challenges of measuring safety and security
risk, the next step in the assurance process would be to aggregate them in a meaningful
way, then to reduce the resulting risk level. The representation, aggregation and
propagation of a unified security and safety risk measure is discussed in Chapter ??
??. In this section we will discuss methods for reducing the risk value.
The ’as low as reasonably practicable’ (ALARP) approach to risk management is
an iterative process by which the residual risk of a system is estimated and, if it is
above an intolerable level, is incrementally reduced until it reaches a value below
the intolerable threshold [160]. Thereafter the iterations of risk reduction continue
until the costs of lowering risk further are grossly disproportionate to the benefits of
change in the risk of the system. Figure A.2 shows ALARP in diagrammatic form,
popularly referred to as ’carrot’ diagrams. A risk level for a system or component
usually has to be argued as ALARP to certification bodies or regulatory authorities.
There is evidence that, since the early 2000s, these organisations are showing an
increasing trend for using ALARP [292].
It has been stated that "system safety emphasises building in safety, not adding
it on to a completed design" [268]. Indeed, for safety-critical systems, safety has
traditionally been the predominant assurance risk to be lowered from early on in the
system development process.
Optimal risk has been synonymous with safety risk reaching the point at which it can
be argued as ALARP. However, with the introduction of another variable, security,
achieving optimal risk becomes a trade-off activity that aims at minimising the sum
of all undesirable consequences [295]. The challenge has emerged to incorporate
security, as well as safety, early on in the development of safety-critical systems.
System safety now emphasises building in safety and security.
The probabilistic chain-of-events models of risk and hazards has been criticised as
not taking into account indirect, non-linear relationships in the complex system
and has an emphasis on failure events. For example, accidents due to design errors,
systemic failures or dysfunctional interactions among non-failing components are
often overlooked [267].
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Fig. A.2 The Health and Safety Executive’s ALARP Model [351]
In addition to this, initiating events in the probabilistic event chains are assumed to
be mutually exclusive, which is often not the case for complex SoS [393, 391].
From the critical review and discussion in this section it has been shown that safety
and security risks can be complex in themselves, and this is usually not taking into
account the dependencies and interactions of the risks [77]. The next section will
explore further the idea of confidence its relation to the risk measure.
A.2 Structured Argumentation
A.2.1 Toulmin Argument Model
When discussing layout of an argument in his book The Uses of Argument, British
philosopher and educator Stephen Toulmin [408, p 87] states "An argument is like
an organism. It has both a gross, anatomical structure and a finer, as-it-were
physiological one". He goes on to present, arguably, the most widely-used non-
mathematical argument structure, shown in Figure A.3.
It consists of seven elements (including the inference). The claim is the conclusion
of the argument and the equivalent to the top-level claim of safety or security in
assurance. The grounds are the evidence to support the claim through an asserted
inference. Note that the inference is an implicit claim of appropriateness and
sufficiency of the grounds to support the claim. Because the inference is making
a claim, the warrant (another claim, but one that is secondary to the main claim)
provides the basis for making the inference. The backing consists of facts or evidence
to support the warrant. Toulmin was not an advocate for absolutism, which is
reflected in the inclusion of the qualifier in argument structure which provides
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Fig. A.3 Toulmin Model of Argument
some variability in the strength of the inference1. Lastly, there is the rebuttal or
counter-claim that takes a negative position to the claim.
This model has been used in diverse disciplines from jurisprudence and political
commentary to economics and educational AI. Why it is important for assurance,
and more specifically co-assurance, is that it captures the atomic elements of the an
argument and provides clearer understanding of their relationships.
It is often not a requirement to understand these elements in a single domain2;
however it becomes more important to understand which element is the subject when
looking at co-assurance instances of conflict. For example, the epistemic uncertainty
introduced by a security risk undermines asserted inferences in the safety argument3,
or a safety requirement prevents a security claim from being true4.
A.2.2 Argument Schemes
Argument patterns come in many forms. Douglas Walton, a preeminent researcher
in informal argumentation [422], has captured some of the most common reasoning
patterns that people use and encapsulated that knowledge in argumentation schemes [423–
425]. Argumentation schemes consist of three parts, the argument strategy that is
being employed5, the premises and conclusion that is being made, and crucially, the
critical questions that challenge different parts of the argument. During his life’s
work, Walton has enumerated tens of argumentation schemes such as those contained
in [425]. What this means for co-assurance, as it is a form of argumentation, is that
the underlying reasoning patterns and strategies can be elicited too.
1The equivalent of this would be the inclusion of words such as "acceptably" or "sufficiently" in
an assurance argument.
2The discovery of counter-evidence and investigation of counter-claims is encouraged as best
practice in assurance, but is not a requirement in the way that making claims about risk currently
is [149].
3For example, where safety assumes that hazard likelihoods have been adequately calculated,
when in actuality they are incorrect because a threat increases some of the likelihoods.
4For example, if a there exists a security claim of "only authorised users accessing a system", but
safety availability requirements are such that authentication would take too long and therefore is
not allowed.
5For example, Argument from Consequences or Argument from Expert Opinion.
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In safety, Yuan and Kelly [442] have extended these patterns and developed a set of
safety specific argumentation schemes. Greenwell, Knight, Holloway, and Pease [153]
also uses the idea of patterns but in their negative context by identifying common
fallacies in safety arguments. Figure A.4 shows some of fallacies identified in their
work.
Fig. A.4 The safety-argument fallacy taxonomy (from [153])
A.2.3 Graphical Modelling of Arguments
Natural language text is often used to represent assurance arguments, and is
sometimes perferred6 [170]. However, there are multiple tools available for representing
arguments in models assurance. Three of these tools or model representation are
Goal Structuring Notation (GSN), Claims Argument Evidence (CAE), and an OMG
modelling standard Structured Assurance Case Metamodel (SACM). The notations
for the first two are shown in Figure A.5.
SACM is a UML-style standard for argumentation. It was created by, amongst
others, the creators and maintainers of both GSN and CAE. It consists of five
packages for structuring arguments. The argumentation, artifact7 and terminology
packages are possibly the most revolutionary in the standard. This is because they
enable SACM to have much more expressive power than its predecessors. Figure A.6
6Holloway [170] argues that model representation of arguments allows for poor sentence structure
and a less coherent argument than full written text arguments for some people.
7Note that artifact is a USA spelling, artefact will be used throughout the thesis except when
referring to standards.
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Fig. A.5 GSN and CAE argument modelling notations
shows the Artifact Package which has many more elements that GSN is capable of
expressing without extension. For example it is possible to link assurance artefacts
(e.g. hazard list) with the activity that generated it (risk analysis), as well as the
people and the techniques that were used. This is an extraordinary feature when
considering co-assurance and the need to communicate additional information about
risk. Without this model capability, it would be necessary to rely on text annotations
to incorporate this information.
Figure A.7 shows the mapping of some GSN elements to their counterparts in the
SACM Argumentation Package8. The advantage of this package is that it explicitly
models the assertions such as AssertedInference. This allows for multi-legged
arguments and counter-arguments to be expressed in SACM in a way that is not
practicable in GSN. This is important for co-assurance because there are likely to be
conflicting claims between safety and security.
SACM could be applied to all of the examples discussed in the following chapters,
however the important point for discussing co-assurance is the ability to explicitly
reason about inferences and relationships between artefacts. Whilst SACM has
immense expressive power, for simplicity and clarity of explanations, an augmented9
version of GSN shall be used in the thesis when discussing arguments.
Argument Characterisation
There are multiple ways to understand an assurance argument. Depending on the
frame of analysis, different properties are revealed. Table A.3 shows some of these
lenses in the "Distinction" row, and the corresponding argument characteristics.
The last two characterisations in Table A.3 of claim type and argument construction
are interesting distinctions because they related to the form of the argument. Bishop
and Bloomfield [47] discuss the different types of argument based on whether the
8Mapping of CAE to SACM at https://www.adelard.com/asce/choosing-asce/standardisation.html.
9Augmented GSN refers to the additional annotations alongside standard GSN objects.
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Fig. A.6 SACM Artifact Package (Adapted from [359])
Fig. A.7 Mapping GSN to SACM (Adapted from [1])
claims are deterministic10, probabilistic11 or qualitative12. Depending on the claim
type, the level of appropriateness of a technique or approach changes. This is
important for co-assurance when determining approach or attempting to reconcile
elements of individual domain arguments e.g. attempting to understand the impact
of a probabilistic argument on a qualitative one.
Goodenough et al. [150, 151] present an innovative, if not novel, approach to defeasible
reasoning. Rather than the most common approach of enumerating risks and creating
claims to address those risks and then going in search of evidence to support the
claims, they propose eliminative induction whereby all the defeaters to a claim are
identified, then evidence is sought to support that the defeater has been eliminated.
10The truth/falsity of the claim can be determined through predetermined rules as with formal
proof of compliance to specification.
11The claims use quantitative statistical reasoning.
12The claims are based on compliance rules that have an indirect link to desired attributes.
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Table A.3 Assurance Argument Characterisation
Distinction Attribute Structure Claim Type Construction
Argument Safety Risk Deterministic Enumerative
Charateristics Security Compliance Probabilistic Eliminative
Dependability Confidence Qualitative
The example provided in [151] is that of determining whether a lightbulb will switch
on. For traditional enumerative induction we look for statistical significance and
trends i.e. the light switches on several times before; for eliminative induction, all
the defeaters are identified such as no power, faulty socket, faulty lightbulb, etc.
and evidence is sought to eliminate those defeaters thereby increasing confidence.
This form of argument construction may counterbalance confirmation bias when
constructing arguments.
The Structure characterisation comes from [156]. Hawkins, Habli, and Kelly [156]
state that "amongst [commonly used] standards there are many differences in terminology,
concepts, requirements and recommendations . . . However, there are a small (and
manageable) number of common software safety assurance principles that can be
observed both from these standards and best practice". These have been named the
4+1 principles for software safety assurance.
A.3 Engineering Concepts
In "The Practice of Argumentation", Zarefskey [446] highlights the role of language,
style and presentation when making arguments. He states that except for logic
and mathematics, which have content-free symbols to represent reasoning, other
domains have language as an "intrinsic part of the argument’s substance" [446, p 209]
and that it is critical to understanding the argument. Zarefsky goes on to describe
characteristics of language that are important such as linguistic consistency (precise
vs fuzzy) and definitions (neutral vs persuasive) [446, p 209-210].
In engineering, almost twenty years ago as part of an SEI Technical Note, Firesmith
[132] asserted that the similarities between safety and security outweigh their
differences, therefore he created a unifying ontology for requirements engineering (part
of which is shown in Figure A.8) to satisfy the main goals of improving communication
and using information models to clarify similarties and differences.
Indeed, before and after Firesmith’s Survivability model, there have been multiple
attempts to create unifying taxonomies and ontologies both within the invididual
disciplines of safety and security, and between them. Examples of this are Laprie et al.
[258] taxonomies for faults, and the work from the Data Safety Initiative Working
Group13 [34] which aims to create a universal ontological standard of risk. The
similarities in non-specialist language have also been discussed; for example, many
European languages have the same work for safety and security and the meaning is
clarified from context [307].
13The DSIWG is Part of the UK’s Safety-Critical Systems Club.
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Fig. A.8 Information Model for Survivability Engineering (Taken from [132, p 36])
This is in-line with Zarefsky’s stance that language plays a key role, and that both
the context within which the ontology will be used, and the context for particular
definitions and relationships matter. To give an everyday example: Differences
between apples and oranges may not matter when considering fruit that is edible by
most humans. However, if one has a severe citrus allergy then the distinction could
be the difference between life and death.
So, too, the context and use of the ontology matters. Firesmith’s model can be
used for creating system requirements that are easily understood by engineers on a
project. Van Der Meulen [417] defines common safety terms with the aim of unifying
language in safety science. The DSIWG model can be used as a basis for unifying
language of particular international standards.
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Furthermore, there are models in use that are intentionally ambiguous so as to
"permit parties with divergent interests and views to agree on an outcome while doing
so for widely different reasons"14 [446, p 223] as with Nordland [307] definitions of
safety and security15. Each of the models has their limitations and it is important to
understand what those are, and how they align with stakeholder goals before using
them.
14Sometimes referred to as strategic imprecision, is likely to play a significant role when bringing
together divergent views from safety and security
15[307] define safety as "the inability of a system to affect its environment in an undesired way"




This Appendix contains details from the literature and challenge reviews discussed
in Chapter 3.
B.1 Approaches to Safety and Security
B.1.1 Bowtie Analysis
The first approach that has been widely used for safety and security co-analysis is
Bow-Tie Analysis. This risk analysis technique was initially developed in the Oil
and Gas domain to inform safety cases [93] and was informed by fault trees, event
tress, cause-consequence diagrams and barrier thinking [88]. It is so called because
the shape of the analysis graph. Figure B.1 shows an example of the analysis output
that consists of five types of information: Risk, the loss event in the centre of the
graph, is the subject of the analysis. This can be a safety risk (hazard) or a security
risk. The elements on the left of the Risk are the elements that potentially lead to
the event, and the elements to the right of the Risk are the outcomes that follow
the event. The potential causes, shown as Contributors can be safety faults or
failures, and security threats or vulnerabilities. Prevention Mechanisms for both
domains are often in the form of barriers or controls. Recovery Mechanisms for
both domains are often mitigations to limit the negative outcomes of the loss event.
Finally, the Outcomes are the negative consequences which we wish to prevent;
for safety this is harm, injury or environmental damage and for security it can be
anything from loss of reputation to financial loss.
Adaptations of Bowtie for Co-Assurance.
There have been several adaptations of Bow-Tie Analysis applied to both safety
and security. Abdo et al. [7] propose the use of the use of bow-tie analysis with
an extended version of attack tree analysis to address cyber security vulnerabilities
introduced by connecting systems in process industries. They use a global industrial
risk definition that include scenario descriptions of undesireable events caused by
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Fig. B.1 Bow-Tie Analysis Diagram (adapted from [93])
both safety incidents and security breaches. Their model also includes the notion of
likelihood of occurrence and severity of consequences.
Bernsmed et al. [46] use bow-tie diagrams to visualise and analyse security risks. The
primary goal is to reduce the occurrence of analysts failure to identify cyber attacks
as contributing factors to safety impacts because they often work independently
using different tools. They demonstrate their approach which uses red, amber, green
indicators on the bow-tie diagram on a maritime case study.
For cyber-physical systems, Yang et al. [437] propose an approach to systematically
manage safety and security using the bow-tie method. Their approach involves attack
route modelling, safety and security prevention modelling, and variable analysis to
quantify overall risk. They present a conceptual framework for harmonised safety
and security risk representation in a bow-tie model.
McLeod and Bowie [289] apply a Bow-Tie approach to analysis in a healthcare
setting. They use it to structure the threats, degradation factors, safeguards and
consequences for patient care. Whilst security is not explicitly mentioned, in a case
study they refer ’authorisation levels’ for making changes to the patient database as
a safeguard so this indicates that there is some conception of security contributors
to patient safety.
In a controlled quasi-experiment, Meland et al. [291] tasked security experts and
security graduate students with the analysis of a security misuse case using bow-tie
analysis. They found that using this approach that the students’ identification of
security risks were similar to the experts. However there was some differences for
the barriers as the student group identified more preventative requirements and the
experts had a more balanced approach to prevention and recovery.
Benefits of Bowtie for Co-Assurance.
Even though it originates in safety engineering, the Bow-Tie approach is particularly
suited to co-analysis because it allows for the representation of different sources,
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outcomes, and barriers of risk events regardless of the engineering domain. The
non-complex diagrammatic representations also allow non-specialists to understand
the linkage between safety and security even with very little training [291]. The
approach is also very amenable to customisation to fit the application needs, such as
the addition of RAG indicators in [46] and [437].
Observations & Limitations of Bowtie for Co-Assurance.
Even though bow-tie analysis presents an easy-to-understand representation of links
between safety and security, its simplicity limits its application. For example, it does
not easily capture the evolution of causes over time, rather it assumes a sequential
occurrence. It would be very difficult to capture emergent or complex causes using
this technique. This analysis method also makes the assumption of independence
of sources of risk and outcomes. It would be very difficult to represent complex
dependencies.
Bow-Tie analysis is highly dependent on the expertise of the practitioners performing
the analysis to understand the system, sources, outcomes, inter-linkages, barriers
and to establish what a loss event is. Defining what a ’loss event’ or ’risk’ is in a
co-engineering environment is non-trivial [7]. Finally, as there are no standards to
guide the analysis, there are a range of subtle differences in representation which
make it difficult to assess whether one attribute takes precedence (security sources
lead to safety risk in [289]), or the sufficiency of the models generated [93].
B.1.2 Guidewords
In safety and security assurance there is a strong reliance on semi-structured
generative analysis techniques e.g. structured brainstorming. Although there are
more advanced modelling approaches for risk analysis, one of the primary source of
knowledge about risk, the system and the application domain is still the cognitive
models of the engineers and stakeholders. The process of risk engineering, particularly
identifying risks in an unknown and multi-dimensional space, is an act of creative
discovery for which the human brain appears especially geared to handle.
Structured brainstorming offers a lightweight approach to elicit some of this knowledge,
especially in the early phases of a system’s lifecycle or where there is a lot of
uncertainty. The general steps for criteria-based brainstorming are: 1. Prepare
guidewords 2. Assemble the team 3. Define background and purpose 4. Identify risks
5. Assess risks 6. Propose actions
Both safety and security have used approaches based on key words to guide risk and
deviation analysis. In this section, we critically explore three guideword approaches
(shown in Figure B.2) and their adaptation for co-analysis.
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Fig. B.2 Guideword Approaches for Co-Analysis
B.1.2.1 FMEA
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), and its extension Failure Modes Effects
and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), is a bottom-up, forward-search analytical method
developed in 1949 as a U.S. Military Procedure in the MIL-STD-1629 standard
[310]. It has the declared purpose of studying "the results or effects of item failure
on system operation" and it ranks the identified failure modes "according to the
combined influence of severity classification and its probability of occurrence based on
the available data" [310]. FMEAs systematically consider all the effects of component
failure and then generalises them into failure modes. MIL-STD-1629 [310] provides
guidance on how the FMECA should be performed and risk classifications in the
form of criticality levels.
FMEA can be used qualitatively or quantitatively, given mathematical failure rate
models. Based on the knowledge of one or more practitioners, and past experience of
similar systems, the FMEA procedure results in a table that contains the following
information [95]: 1. the way each item fails 2. the cause of these failures 3. effects of
the failures 4. the severity of consequences 5. detection of failures 6. safeguards and
controls.
Adaptations for Safety Analysis.
Since its inception, it has been adopted and utilised by many industries as one of the
core safety analyses in their assurance processes. Application domains include engine
systems [436], automotive [85], healthcare [73] and manufacturing automation [18].
Card et al. [65] introduce the SWIFT approach which aims to make better use of
detailed information from FMEA by performing structured "what if" analysis on
high-level processes in a healtchare setting. Standards and guidelines have also
been released for FMEA in several safety-critical application domains: general -
IEC 60812:2018 [185], automotive - AIAG FMEAAV:2019 [12], shipping - ABS
FMEA:2018 [8], and aerospace - ARP 5580 [28]. Normative FMEA guidelines do
not focus on system analysis, but on overarching process management considerations
such as systematic documentation of outcomes and recommendations.
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FMEA Adaptations for Co-Analysis.
Schmittner et al. [363] introduce the notion of vulnerabilities into FMEA analysis to
create an FMVEA approach for co-analysis of intelligent cooperative vehicles, and
Chen et al. [70] use FMVEA-based security analysis on a rail example. Schmittner
et al. [362] further extend FMEA to consider the vulnerability cause-effect chain, and
to create a unified model that interweaves safety and security concerns for the same
system. They present a taxonomy of vulnerabilities, lists of threat agents and threat
modes (STRIDE), threat effects and attack probability. The resulting model consists
of an extended process that includes security steps and the FMEVA cause-effect
chain in Figure B.3.
Fig. B.3 FMEVA cause-effect chain (from [93])
Silva et al. [376] present an approach to information security risk management that
uses FMEAs and analyses five security system dimensions: access, communication,
infrastructure, management and development. Whilst the underlying philosophy of
failure modes and the FMEA causal model is used, there is no direct relationship to
safety engineering. "Information safety" is referenced several times [376] however its
meaning appears to differ significantly to system safety definitions of harm. Li et al.
[270] use a similar approach with security dimensions for FMEA to understand the
information security risk for a smart city.
The simplicity and effectiveness of utilising FMEA to reason about cause-effect
relationships means that it can be applied to diverse operating scenarios. Lin [271]
addresses the limitations of the Risk Priority Number (RPN) for quantitative FMEA
and propose a cost-consequence model to represent safety and security for SCADA
systems. In contrast, Berkley [45] use FMEA to analyse physical security and implicit
safety impact for a nightclub, and use behaviours and situations as the unit of analysis.
Whilst elements of physical security have an impact on safety, the intent in [45] is to
use FMEA primarily for security analysis.
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Benefits of FMEA for Co-Assurance.
From the diverse set of examples discussed in the adaptations for co-analysis section,
it is clear that FMEAs flexibility is an advantage. It is possible to use FMEA-based
analysis in a variety of contexts with a varying amount of detail and still achieve
reasonable results. Another advantage is that FMEA analysis can be performed by a
single analyst or a team [95].
This method also standardises analysis input and gives a clear systematic process
which promotes uniformity and enables better communication, therefore an overall
improved safety process [77, 185]. The identified component failures are documented
in a readable format. As the method is widely applicable to human and technological
system failure modes, it is possible to incorporate analysis of human factors into the
assurance process from an early stage. FMEA mitigates costly design changes by
identifying assurance risks and design mistakes early.
Observations & Limitations of FMEA for Co-Assurance
Even with the advantages of a unified safety, security FMEA model and process,
Schmittner et al. [362] recognise several drawbacks - such as the constraint of analysing
single causes which could be of particularly concern for security when considering
multi-stage attacks and advanced persistent threats (APT). [362] also recognise the
need for data about attack frequency for the probability variable in their model.
Subriadi and Najwa [398] studied the consistency of results between two teams
performing the same FMEA process. They state that for following the FMEA gaps
can occur along several dimensions such as knowledge, training, failure history, people
and time. In addition, they identified several weaknesses associated with each FMEA
step such as difficulties in finding potential root causes of risk, difficulty evaluating
risk and understanding the scale criteria, the approach is time-consuming and subject
to human bias and duplicate entries [398] . Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S)
[95] guidance identifies further limitations of the approach:
• for a large system the approach can be boring and repetitive due to being
bottom-up, and more than one FMEA may be required for a system with many
modes of operation
• the benefit is dependent on the experience of the engineers or practitioners
• FMEA is based on a hierarchical representation of the system, and does not
easily fit to Human Factors as it has been optimised for mechanical and electrical
equipment
• they state that perhaps the worst drawback is that "all component failures
are examined and documented, including those which do not have any significant
consequences". This may result in significant amounts of unnecessary documentation.
B.1.2.2 HAZOP
Created in 1964 in the chemical industry, Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) is
a qualitative technique for the structured and systematic examination of a planned
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or existing system [183, 242]. The process involves a multi-disciplinary team using
guidewords (such as omission, commission, early, late, too much, too little) to produce
a list of system hazards. Similar to FMEAs, HAZOP identifies modes of a process.
The difference is that the assurance team then investigate all deviations from normal
behaviour whereas FMEAs look at the failure modes [77]. Figure B.4 shows a generic
HAZOP process:
Fig. B.4 HAZOP process (from [337])
HAZOP Adaptations for Co-Assurance.
HAZOP has been used as an approach to reason about deviations in many safety
and security contexts. At an organisational level, Broadleaf Capital International
Pty Ltd [60] suggest HAZOPs can reveal information such as: unclear authorities,
too little supervision, gaps in communication, insufficient skills and capabilities and
reduced morale. Adhitya et al. [9] use a HAZOP approach to analyse risks in the
supply chain. Whilst this is not explicitly safety or security oriented, identifying
risks in the supply chain is a concern for both attributes and this offers a promising
approach at reasoning about this high-level process.
For security hardware and software analysis Daruwala et al. [87] present a new
structure for HAZOP guidewords that includes security elements in the analysis,
such as actor, action, object and condition. [87] state that this approach is a more
rigorous approach to effective product security.
Srivatanakul et al. [383] applies HAZOP analysis on UML use cases to elicit functional
security requirements. The resulting analysis tables contain information about the
cause, effects, threats involved and provide recommendations. Although the approach
would not be appropriate for security problems [383], this approach does present a
useful and systematic way to reason about security causation.
Winther et al. [433] presents a modified HAZOP analysis to a security context
for safety-critical systems. They observe that there is often inadequate emphasis
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placed security analysis, possibly due to the lack of safety-compliant security
methods. Guidewords augmented with security threats, attributes and components
are systematically reasoned about to understand the contribution to safety risk.
Although this approach has promise for smaller systems, Winther et al. [433]
acknowledge that the approach could become tedious without adding threat knowledge
if several components were to considered e.g. different locations, transfer, etc.
Mansoori et al. [283] apply HAZOP to a network security experiment to understand
and reduce the number of potentially confounding variables. The case study measures
IP tracking behaviours using a honeypot and so if bias were to be introduced it
would produce an invalid analysis. This application makes no explicit mention of
safety, rather is a general approach that can be applied to many types of systems.
Raspotnig et al. [347] introduces the Combined Harm Assessment of Safety and
Security for Information Systems (CHASSIS) approach for eliciting joint requirements.
Schmittner et al. [364] discusses the CHASSIS method for automotive safety and
security. It consists of two steps - the first to elicit functional requirements and the
second to elicit safety and security requirements. A HAZOP-like process is used
for this latter step. For a case study some findings were that CHASSIS depended
more on expert knowledge than FMVEA and elements of the analysis were not
reuseable, but that dynamic systems were more easily analysed by CHASSIS than
FMVEA [364].
Dürrwang et al. [114] propose the Security Guideword Method (SGM) based on
HAZOP and the automotive standard ISO 26262. SGM consists of seven steps the
inputs at each stage stated. The objective is to elicit security requirements and
compliance with ISO 26262.
Primary guidewords that are used to get information (probe, scan, read) and
secondary guidewords (flood, authenticate, spoof, modify and bypass) are two features
provided by Wei et al. [426] for HAZOP-based security risk analysis, and Foster [138]
introduces Vulnerability Identification and Analysis (VIA) which is a HAZOP-based
structured approach to deviation analysis of security protocol requirements, and
assists in the elicitation of new security requirements.
Benefits of HAZOP for Co-Assurance
The advantage that this method provides is that it gives a thorough examination
of the system and deviations in a systematic way. The multi-disciplinary team is
able to work together and use their cumulative expert knowledge to identify more
complex effects of deviations. HAZOP is also applicable to a wide range of systems,
processes and explicitly considers the causes and consequences of human error [77].
[337] states that the advantages of HAZOP are rooted in the fact that 1. it is helpful
when confronting hazards that are difficult to quantify 2. it can capture hazards
rooted in human performance and behaviours 3. by structuring expert knowledge, it
can capture hazards that are difficult to detect, analyse, isolate, count, predict, etc.
Additional advantages of using HAZOP include the fact that it is widely used, so the
limitations are more understood than may other approaches, and the team approach
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is useful to encourage communication across disciplines in organisations thereby
potentially allowing for risks to be managed earlier in the system lifecycle [96].
Observations & Limitations of HAZOP for Co-Assurance
As with FMEA, because HAZOP relies on systematically analyse a single node
against a set of guidewords, the process can be time consuming. In addition this
method is often expensive due to the requirement for an expert team. For detailed
analysis for the system, high level documentation of the system is needed. Also due
to its reliance on expert judgement, HAZOP may not necessarily challenge any of
the incorrect assumptions about the system or the design and so this method may
not consider wider system issues.
There are additional limitations in that the analysis process is not conducive
to considering interactions between different parts of the system, or considering
deviations in different combinations.
Even with the many benefits of the security adaptation for HAZOP, Wei et al. [426]
recognise one of the largest problems of the approach - creating a threshold for
combinations of deviations and stopping criteria when the analysis has reached a
"sufficient" level of completeness. There is the possibility that the analysis could create
a state explosion with the number of nodes, events, deviations and consequences.
Baybutt [43] performs an extensive critique of the technique along several axes, which
include:
Weaknesses relating to people 1. it is a heuristic approach, that does not use
algorithms which presents a weakness because there is a limit to how systematic
the approach is 2. there is a focus on team brainstorming - however humans need
time to process and make connections, HAZOPs are usually considered complete
after each day of study, so there is little time for introspection on previous
sessions and making connections 3. the structure provides a false sense of
security 4. complexity - there is a high degree of detail often needed therefore it
is difficult to assess incompleteness 5. meaning of terms - some participants may
confound terms, or use terms that are not accessible inexperienced participants;
often reaching a consensus is difficult.
Weaknesses relating to design intent 1. coverage of the design intent - due to
its reliance on using system nodes as a unit for analysis, there is a reliance on
conceptual models and system definition, and a defined scope 2. identification
and meaning of parameters - there is also a question of how to interpret
particular parameters related to nodes, and a knowledgeable team is required.
Weaknesses relating to deviations and guidewords 1. generation of deviation
- often a checklist approach is used to selecting parameters, therefore teams
may not consider those deviations related to parameters not on the checklist
2. inductive/deductive starting point counterintuitive - deviation (follows from
initiating event) as shown in Figure B.5. The initiating even is then reasoned
about before considering the consequences. This may introduce confusion for
those unfamiliar with the approach 3. multiple, compound, propagation of
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Fig. B.5 Role of deviations in HAZOP (from [43])
deviations and repeated deviations 4. when using the standard seven words,
there may be difficulty recognising deviations, or more guidewords may be
added that are sub-deviations of the standard set.
B.1.2.3 STRIDE
In a similar way to safety guideword approaches that are based on failure modes
and process deviations, one of the most adopted security guideword approach -
STRIDE - is based on guidewords that are representations of attributes that are
the opposite of the security attributes we aim for i.e. authenticity, integrity, non-
repudiation, confidentiality, availability and authorisation. The guidewords are
Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service and
Elevation of privilege. STRIDE analysis provides a lightweight analysis for considering
security threats and sources that could lead to unwanted consequences.
STRIDE was created by Loren Kohnfelder and Praerit Garg [244]1. This framework
and mnemonic were designed to help engineers developing software to identify the
types of attacks that software tends to experience. Shostack [374, p 62-64] states
that STRIDE is not for looking for threats, but to enumerating the ’things that
might go wrong’, the exact mechanisms for how things might go wrong are factors
that are often considered after this analysis. Table B.1 provides examples of the
threat definitions, the properties violated, typical targets and examples [374].










Table B.1 The STRIDE Threats (From [374])
Threat Property Violated Threat Definition Typical Victims Examples
Spoofing Authentication Pretending to be something or




Flasely claiming to be Acme.com, winsock.dll,
Barack Obama, a police officer, or the Nigerian
Anti-Fraud Group
Tampering Integrity Modifying something on disk,
on a network, or in memory
Data stores, data
flows, processes
Changing a spreadsheet, the binary of an
important program, or the contents of a databse
on disk; modifying, adding or removing packets
over a network, either local or far across the
Internet, wired or wireless; changing either the
data a program is using or the running program
itself
Repudiation Non-repudiation Claiming that you didn’t
do something, or were not
responsible. Repudiation can
be honest or false, and the key
question for system designers
is, what evidence do you have?
Process Process or system: "I didn’t hit the big red
button" or "I didn’t order that Ferrari." Note
that repudiation is somewhat the odd-threat-out
here; it transcends the rechnical nature of the
other threats to the business layer.
Information
Disclosure
Confidentiality Providing information to




The most obvious example is allowing
access to files, e-mail or databases, but
information disclosure can also involve file-
names ("Termination for John Doe.docx"),








A program that can be tricked into using up all
its memory, a file that fills up the disk, or so




Authorisation Allowing someone to do
something they’re not
authorized to do
Process Allowing a normal user to execute code as an
admin; allowing a remopte person without any
privileges to run code
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Adaptations of STRIDE for Co-Analysis
From the literature, automotive is the safety-critical domain that seems to have
adopted STRIDE the most. STRIDE analysis is incorporated into both unified and
aligned processes for many automotive risk management approaches. For example,
Strandberg et al. [394] propose a four-phase security enhancement methodology (start,
predict, mitigate, test) that uses STRIDE and other risk assessment techniques to
inform threat modelling, and mitigations. SAHARA (Security-Aware Hazard and Risk
Analysis Method) is an automotive HAZOP-like analysis for structured brainstorming
with additional guidewords for security developed by Macher et al. [278]. Figure B.6
shows the conceptual overview of this unified approach. An interesting aspect is the
calculation of the threat level which is similar to criticality calculations for safety.
Fig. B.6 Conceptual overview of the SAHARA method (from [277])
From the aerospace domain, Baron et al. [36] apply STRIDE and other risk modelling2
to understand and manage cyber threats and attacks for what they call "Internet
of Wings". Whilst Kaur et al. [231] use STRIDE as part of a full security risk
management process for a nuclear power plant. After STRIDE analysis, Kaur et al.
[231] further propose a process for quantifying the security risk to help a variety of
stakeholders including designers, developers and consumers to understand security
requirements.
Preschern et al. [339] extend safety architectural patterns to include security considerations
by applying a STRIDE approach, then structure the threats using GSN. Whilst the
concept of representing STRIDE threat analysis in an argument is promising because
it would potentially allow for greater linkage between safety and security, the structure
developed in [339] does not seem to follow convention for safety argumenation e.g.
GSN strategies are used as goals "Strategy: TLS channel is used to transmit data" [339,
p3]. This difference, if left unaddressed, may ultimately obscure links between the
domains.
2For example, to manage consequences discovered through the use of STRIDE, use DREAD
analysis (see Section B.1.2.4).
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Kaneko et al. [229] apply the STRIDE model to a widely adopted safety approach
(STPA Analysis) on a smart grid case study. Through the STPA-Sec(+STRIDE)
approach the procedure for performing threat analysis is made explicit. De Souza
et al. [89] also apply STRIDE as an STPA extension to identify security loss scenarios
and requirements. With this approach scenarios were discovered that would not have
been reached with standard STPA.
Khan et al. [238] positions STRIDE as a lightweight threat modelling tool for cyber-
physical systems. This approach simplifies the task of threat analysis and allows
analysts to prepare better for security threats during the design phase and to identify
vulnerabilities is a more timely manner during operation.
Finally, Plósz et al. [335] propose a combined risk assessment process that combines
the safety failure assessment (FMEA) with the security threat analysis (STRIDE) in
order to achieve a combined risk analysis. The stated advantages of this approach
include the reduction in effort because commonalities are handled together, issue
awareness is raised sooner and the combined analysis supports multidimensional
decision making [335]. However, the approach description appears to be silent on
the question of how often and when the combined threat/failure catalogue should be
updated.
Benefits of STRIDE for Co-Assurance
A clear advantage of STRIDE is that safety guideword-based techniques map easily
to it. This results in practitioners from both domains being able to work together
directly using shared concepts and terms in a combined approach.
The generality of the guidewords also enables use in diverse application domains. It
is a lightweight technique that allows practitioners to reason about security threats
early on in the system’s development. With the complementary use of other threat
assessment techniques, STRIDE can provide a unified semi-formal language for
communication of threats, threat levels and consequences.
Observations & Limitations of STRIDE for Co-Assurance
One of the biggest drawbacks is related to STRIDE’s flexibility in interpretation.
LeBlanc [260], one of the creators of the approach, comments that there is very little
scientific basis for the approach and the level of rigour may be lacking. This leads to
challenges such as difficulty in classifying threats [373, p64], repetition of threats or
vulnerabilities in multiple classes, difficulty determining stopping criteria, and no
objective measures of completeness and sufficiency of the threats analysed.
Macher et al. [278] mentions an additional limitation - that the SAHARA method is
geared towards automotive, early in the system development and for a single car. For
identification of fleets of cars and remote attacks, "SAHARA threat quantification
scheme is lacking in terms of measures for damage potential and affected users" [278].
Whilst this is an automotive example, the same reasoning can be applied to any
system-of-systems.
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As well as poor handling of size and complexity, similar to HAZOP, STRIDE does
not handle change over time well. Often an analysis must be redone, as incremental
changes are very difficult within this approach. One must often consider dependencies
and effects from scratch when new information is present.
From a competence perspective, there is the implicit assumption that all the experts
on the team performing the analysis have the same or a similar level of skill, however
an imbalance in the risk analysis may be captured as a bias towards one or the other
discipline depending on the training and experience of the analysts. This method is
also time and resource intensive [373].
Another challenge for using STRIDE is that Repudiation is on a different level of
system abstraction than the other guidewords. Repudiation threats appear on the
business layer of the system and are above the network layer [373, p68]. This may
cause a problem for interpretation and placing of mitigations e.g. if logs do not exist
from a business logic perspective, then logs cannot be analysed on the network layer.
B.1.2.4 DREAD
DREAD is another threat analysis technique, like STRIDE, that was developed at
Microsoft. The name is an acronym for the guidewords used during the analysis.
DREAD is composed of [54]:
• Damage potential - the severity of the consequences of a threat or vulnerability
being exploited
• Reproducibility/Reliability - forensic analysis is often a requirement for security
incidents, reproducibility indicates the degree to which the incident or threat
can be recreated
• Exploitability - refers to factors required to reproduce an exploit
• Affected users - refers to the number of people affected by a threat
• Discoverability - is determined by the ease-of-identification of the threat
Scores on a scale of 1 to 10 can be determined. Bodeau et al. [54] state that DREAD
goes beyond threat modelling to risk assessment as part of the systems development
lifecycle. Macher et al. [279] use DREAD to supplement the SAHARA approach to
establish a risk priority number (RPN)3 for threat classification.
LeBlanc [260], one of the creators of the approach, has commented that "Neither
[STRIDE nor DREAD] were developed with any real academic rigor, and from a
scientific standpoint, neither of them tend to hold up very well", and Shostack [372]
further states that the approach is often dependent on the beliefs of the analysts
who often do not consider the costs, benefits or issues that using this approach
might generate. However, even with these issues, DREAD seems to be useful in
industrial contexts, especially as a way of including threat analysis into the systems
development lifecycle.
3Analogous to quantitative FMEA RPN.
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B.1.2.5 CRAF
The Cyber Risk Assessment Framework (CRAF) was developed by Asplund et al.
[31] to address the integration of safety and security for cyber-physical systems.
[31] identify the challenge for co-engineering that there is a lack of easy-to-use
mappings between safety and security to consider both attributes early on in a
system’s development, and therefore few approaches to prevent costly conflicts later.
Fig. B.7 Cyber Risk Assessment Framework linking Security to Safety (from [31])
The framework as shown in Figure B.7, consists of several elements such as [31]:
• Threat source - these are the threat actors and can be individuals, groups,
organisations or nation states
• Threat types - these are the threats found in STRIDE analysis
• Vulnerabilities - these are inadequacies in assets
• Information assets - these are the items of value and where the linking of safety
and security occurs
The CRAF process has four steps: 1. Single domain risk assessment (security)
2. Communicating a decision 3. Raising conflict, and 4. Resolving conflict. Conflict
between safety and security is identified by using the mapping included in CRAF that
is derived from SCSC DSIWG [368] guidance and NIST SP 800-53:5 [306] standard,
shown in Table B.2
Of the approaches reviewed thus far, CRAF is the only approach that explicitly
makes the bridging between safety and security using the guidewords. Together
with the process steps, the approach provides safety and security engineers with a
clearer semantic guide of the kinds of threats that must be communicated to the
other domain. CRAF therefore facilitates systematic flagging and conflict resolution
based on updates to the information assets.
Two limitations of the approach are that it currently only focusses on security-
informed safety, and has a strong focus on information security rather than cyber.
The links may also need further validation and evaluation for completeness and
appropriateness.
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Table B.2 Data Security to Safety Mapping (from [31])



































For this thesis, graphical models are structured models that consist of nodes and
edges. In addition to these fundamental elements, the types of graph that will be
considered have various properties such as directed, acyclic, boolean, safety, security,
causal or consequence. Safety approaches that are in this categorty include fault
trees and event tress, security approaches include attack trees and threat tress, and
there are general models that can be used for safety or security such as Bayesian
Belief Networks. The following sections will explore the underlying causal models
and representations of these models further, as well as providing detail about any
adaptations for co-assurance, benefits and limitations.
B.1.3.1 Fault Trees
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is one of the most extensively used safety analysis methods.
It is a backward search analytical method that starts at a consequences (a top level
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event) and derives the events that would lead to that state [357]. The process is
guided by explicit construction principles and rules. The engineer performing the
analysis systematically and iteratively determines the immediate causes of (fault)
conditions in a system until some elementary condition is reached [123, 357]. The
result of this analysis is a hierarchical structure of conditions connected by disjunction
and conjunction logic gates.
Fig. B.8 Fault Tree Analysis Steps (from [419])
The FTA process uses the steps shown in Figure B.8 to recursively identify faults,
break them down into their causal contributors, and then represents them in a
directed acyclic graph with nodes connected by AND and OR gates. Figure B.9 gives
an example of Fault tree events and logic gates. The resulting models have assumed
independence between each of the causes. If done correctly the fault tree will be
asymmetrical due to the nature of the process. However, many analysts do not follow
the process and rules exactly, and use the approach in a flexible way to suit the
application.
FTA defines the concept of failure space or a view of the system that exemplifies
causal dependencies between abnormal and undesired conditions [123, 274, 357].
One of the key elements of FTA is that it gives a clear notation for capturing and
modelling causal relationships after systematically assessing the design [274]. Further
analysis methods such as cut set identification can then be applied to the Fault Tree
to find the critical chains for particular events [419].
Adaptations of Fault Tree Analysis
Even though it was originally intended to support reasoning about hardware reliability,
Fault Tree analysis has been extended to many applications including software and
human factors. Two of the most adopted variations or alternates are security Attack
Trees (reviewed in Section B.1.3.3) and Event Trees (reviewed in Section B.1.3.2).
FTA has also been successfully applied to many industries including, but not limited
to oil and gas transmission [444], chemical process plants [354] and other high-hazard
industries [419]. However, FTA is not a hazard analysis technique, it is a root-cause
analysis method that has the capability to find non-failure modes that contribute to
top events [123].
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Fig. B.9 Fault Tree Example of Hot Water Heater Explosion (from [420])
B.1.3.2 Event Trees
Event Tree Analysis is a forward search approach to discovering pre-incident conditions
and the post-incident outcomes of a safety loss event occurring e.g. the consequences
of an accident. It uses boolean logic to qualitatively reason about the paths from event
to an outcome, and allows for quantitative assignment of probabilities and severity
given historic or test data. The objective of the analysis is often to understand the
consequences in order to put recovery and resilience plans in place such as controls,
operational procedures or barriers4.
Tsai et al. [410] present an approach for the automated generation of fault trees to
increase efficiency of causal analysis as shown in Figure B.10. This approach is based
on a formalised scenario specification5 so it is possible to use the approach at any
stage of the development including during early system design.
4This is similar to what is represented on the right-hand side of the Bowtie diagram.
5ACDATE model - Actors, Conditions, Data, Actions, Timing and Events.
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Fig. B.10 Example Event Tree (from [410])
To improve event tree reasoning, tool support exists for the resulting models.
Jankovsky and Denman [213] developed a Dynamic Event Tree (DET) extension for
the ADAPT dynamic probabilistic risk assessment tool which can be used on high
performance computers to "reduce the burden on the analyst and allow insights to be
discovered more quickly".
[75] and [94] list multiple advantages such as the ability of event trees to capture
multiple failures in a clear logical structure, or highlighting weaknesses in protective
systems pre-incident. However, there exist significant limitations to this approach
too: [75] observe that pathways and initiating events must be discovered or foreseen
by the analysts, event probabilities are difficult to find and only one initiating event
is considered at a time; and [94] identifies that it is not efficient for combinatorial
consideration of events, nor is the approach effective at identifying systematic failures
and consequences due to the independence assumption.
B.1.3.3 Attack Trees
Attack trees (AT) provide simple and unambiguous semantics to represent threats
during security analysis [286]. The Attack Tree, introduced by Schneier [366, 367], is
a graphical structured tree notation where nodes represent attacks. The root node is
the global target of the attacker and the child nodes are iterative refinements of the
sub-goals needed to achieve the global target. Figure B.11 demonstrates an example
of an attack tree for opening a safe. The AT nodes have been annotated with whether
special equipment is required and cost, therefore allowing further analysis of least
cost paths or most effective paths.
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Fig. B.11 Annotated Attack Tree (from [366])
Adaptations of Attack Tree Analysis
Much like the extensive use of fault trees, attack trees have been extended and applied
to many contexts. Kordy et al. [249] extend attack trees to include mitigations against
some of the identified attack vectors. Attack-Defence Trees (ADTs or ADTrees) were
created as a tool to model and defend against the non-static, ever increasing number
of attacks on valuable systems by graphically representing defensive countermeasures
on attack trees [246, 247]. Figure B.12 shows the key features of ADTrees which are
refinements of the attack goals and countermeasures or defence nodes that prevent
paths between goals [247]. The bank example uses counter-measures such as 2-Factor
Authentication to protect unauthorised access to bank accounts using a password.
Causal security analysis techniques are very similar to the techniques used for safety.
The threat logic tree, created using fault trees as a template, model the threat vectors
of a system using logic operations [430]. There have been many models based on
the same logic and paradigm making attack trees/threat trees the most widely used
graphical security models. Some examples are:
• Threat Trees [118, 261, 284, 312, 400]
• Fault Trees for Attack Modeling [386]
• The Attack Specification Language for ATs [403]
• Extensions on Attack Trees [248, 360, 366]
Application domains for these modelling methods include vehicular communication
systems [13, 164], internet related attacks [272, 403], secure software engineering
[227] and socio-technical attack modelling [33, 122, 350].
AT Observations, Benefits & Limitations
As with the other approaches based on trees, attack trees offer some benefits for
security analysis. Their systematic process and structured representation of threats
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Fig. B.12 Example of an ADTree: an attack on a bank account [246]
and attacks allows practitioners to understand the goals of the attacker including
the attacks that they are most likely to stage. As part of a larger risk management
strategy, attack trees are a valuable tool for communicating and reducing risk.
In addition, the structure enables modularisation of the analysis models thereby
increasing their utility and allowing multiple to collaboratively work on the same
system.
However, similar to the other tree approaches too, attack trees make several assumptions
about independence, the system and about risk. For example, it may be less credible
to accept the independence of nodes with the presence of an intelligent adversary. In
many cases it is difficult to validate these assumptions, so they must be explicitly
recorded along with the analysis mode. Similar to FTA, the dependencies between
goal nodes of the AT are not always clear. This ambiguity may lead to the incorrect
analysis or misidentification of attack paths therefore creating vulnerability in the
system. This also limits the precision of the best defensive strategies [246].
Another constraint of the approach is that ATs currently do not represent the
motivation of the attacker. This may be an important factor when analysing security
for safety-critical systems because there may be a strong incentive for the attacker
to cause harm e.g. the politcal motivation with the Stuxnet incident [71, 126].
Dillon-Merrill et al. [107] highlights several other challenges for AT in research and
inindustry:
• There is difficulty eliciting probability data for quantitative ATs from expert
data (e.g. avoiding biases) and intelligent adversary data (e.g. estimating
capabilities, motivations, resources, etc. )
• There is a need for software tools to support the development of large trees
• There is a need to improve collaborative risk analysis, share resource and
expertise and improve the overall risk management process, and finally
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• There is a need for new ways to compare risk between hazards.
B.1.3.4 Combined Trees
A key difference in modelling safety and security is the intent of the actors [440].
It is a challenge to integrate models without a uniform likelihood for the nodes or
path traversal. However, there has been research into combing tree approaches. For
example, creating a quantitative security risk analysis method for integrating cyber
attack within fault trees [140] as shown in Figure B.13.
Fig. B.13 Integrated Fault Tree and Attack Tree (from [140])
A similar technique is the Failure-Attack-Countermeasure (FACT) Graph that aligns
security artefacts and analysis with those of safety and includes countermeasures [358].
Figure B.14 shows the process where a FACT artefact would fit in. Note that it
forms the central point of interaction between safety and security, therefore if an
aspect cannot be captured well in the graph, it is unclear where this information
should be represented. Safety also seems to take precedence in this process.
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Fig. B.14 FACT Graph: Merged ISA84 and ISA99 lifecycles (from [358])
Fovino et al. [140] use integrated Fault and Attack Trees to consider the interaction
of malicious deliberate acts with random failures quantitatively. As part of the
modelling considerations [140] state that joining the two trees is not a negligible
role because each attack tree may be composed of smaller attack trees, all with side
effects that impact safety
Kumar and Stoelinga [254] present a attack fault tree (AFT) formalism to represent
both safety and security. This approach uses both qualitative and quantitative
metrics to establish most likely paths, cost of failure, and expected impact within
given time and budget constraints.
Kim et al. [239] propose an approach for using cyber attack trees to identify human
engineering attacks or errors for nuclear power plants. The proposed approach focuses
on inter-domain attributes such as unavailability. The resulting model combines
human error induced by a cyber-attack into regular fault trees [239] to analyse failure
scenarios.
Steiner and Liggesmeyer [389] propose an approach for combining attack trees and
component fault trees to understand the influences of security of safety. They
demonstrate the qualitative and quantitative approach to analyse an automatic
cruise control system. They further expand on this approach in [388] and [390].
Benefits of Combined Trees
The first benefit of the tree approach to safety and security is the unambiguous
semantics of the methods to represent both faults and threats. This provides a
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common "language" for analysts to use to communicate and create shared understanding
about the different types of system risk.
The tree approach employs Boolean logic or logic gates so the graphical representation
is simplified. It is arguably easier to identify the links between nodes than attempting
to understand text in a HAZOP for example. Although techniques such as HAZOP
and FMEAs can be used in a complementary manner with tree approaches. There is
also the possibility of automating the generation of some parts of the tree given a
standard information framework.
In addition, although tree approaches are highly structured, there remains enough
flexibility for analysis of human interaction and physical phenomena which is
particularly effective for complex systems which have many interactions and interfaces [77].
Observations & Limitations of Combined Trees
Ortmeier and Schellhorn [315] formalised the representation of fault trees in order to
rigorously reason about model attributes such as completeness. Their findings were
that formal fault tree proofs were easy, however it can be time consuming step because
of the need to find adequate generalisations and the right inductive argument; another
finding of their work is that formalising FTA nodes is difficult i.e. transforming
informal understandings of even simple systems into formal representations [315].
There is also an implicit assumption of system decomposability and that the components
can structured hierarchically. This top-down Tree construction based on knowledge
about the structure of the system and interaction of subsystems has several drawbacks [53]:
• Coherency - determining how system models relate to design
• Plausibility - relating cut sets to design
• Accuracy - assessing the numerical thresholds
• Completeness - determining if all minimal cut sets have been found
In addition, some causal events are not bound, and the options may be too voluminous
for analysis using Trees, alternately important scenarios may be missed [267].Tree
structures also do not easily allow for cumulative failures, domino effects or conditional
failures to be modelled and they are usually represented as static models which do
not address the time dependencies associated with some hazards [77, 357]. However,
Vesely et al. [419] ascribes the limitation on fault trees to represent phase-dependent
failure not to the approach itself, but to the tool support that allows analysts and
engineers to have this temporal information.
Magott and Skrobanek [281] state that standard fault trees cannot express time-
dependent behaviour and propose an approach of fault trees with time dependencies
(FTTDs) and a new version of timed state-charts (TSCs) to augment this analysis.
The result is formal TSC models that capture safety controller behaviour, objects
and people.
This analysis method gives more accurate results for hardware components than
it does for the human ones, however there is no convenient way of denoting the
error margin differences or the components from which values have been created.
Thus, uncertainties of the leaf nodes are aggregated and propagated through the
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structure to higher levels. Due to its use of quantification, this analysis method may
lead to the incorrect assumption that all failures can be quantified or made into a
Boolean, which is clearly not the case for some system functions that involve human
interaction.
Also, people do not follow the process steps, principles and rules. This is a
large limitation because one of the biggest benefits of any Tree approach is its
“systematicness” i.e. being able to understand what the analyst was doing at the
time of analysis, in this way it is possible to review not only the output but also
pick up procedural mistakes that were made during the analysis and identify where
incompleteness in the model exists.
Finally, these methods suffer from similar limitations to FTA, where it is difficult
to model dependency. This may lead to misidentification of attack paths which
undermine the analysis. The independence assumption for combined fault-attack
trees is less credible when considering factors such as entropy and an intelligent
adversary.
B.1.3.5 BBN
Due to the complexity of current system architectures, the need to explicitly model
dependency, and the requirement to create assurance models when there is a high
level of uncertainty there has been in increase in the use of alternative analysis
methods to traditional safety analysis (i.e. FTA).
One such alternative is Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN). BBNs are directed acyclic
graphs whose nodes represent variables and arcs represent direct causal relationships
between nodes [57, 145]. Compared to FTA, a major advantage of using BBN is that
it allows for the strength of dependency between variables to be modelled using the
conditional probability tables associated with each node [407]. There has been much
research in mapping Fault Trees to BBNs [57, 294], Figure B.15 shows one example
of this.
According to conditional independence and the chain rule, BBNs represent the joint





where Pa(Ai) are the parents of Ai in the BBN [303]. When using BBN for evaluating
system safety, nodes at the highest level model the likelihood that components will
exhibit the errors of omission, commission, timing or value.
The BBN’s main application in accident analysis is as an inference engine using
system data (usually operational) to update the prior occurrence probability of events
given new data or evidence E:
P (U |E) = P (U, E)
P (E) =
P (U, E)∑
U P (U, E)
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Fig. B.15 Mapping FT to BN [237]
This can be used as probability prediction P (accident|event), or probability updating
P (event|accident) [341]. During early design analysis, machine learning of past
project data is suggested as a means of initialising these probabilities [57, 145].
Adaptations
Bayesian Belief Networks (BNN) have been applied to the confidence problem in
numerous studies [97, 128, 275, 435, 449]. The steps that engineers follow to use
BNN for confidence evaluation are shown in Table B.3. Like the proponents for other
confidence methods, proponents for the BBN approach prefer quantified sources of
data over qualitative sources.
Littlewood and Wright [275] use the term safety arguments as a basis for discussing
their approach using BBN and explicitly cite the MoD Defence Standard 00-56
[385], which suggests that the networks are meant to mirror the logical safety
argument structure [? ]. In the example provided they model the correctness
of the specification and verification conclusion amongst other variables. The
paper investigates the effects of diverse evidence rather than the validity of the
BBN technique, therefore they make use of artificial likelihood values [275].
Denney et al. [97] suggest a BBN that mirrors the assurance argument where each
node represents confidence in a claim from the argument structure. Confidence
is qualitatively classified with a value of very low, low, medium, high and very
high. To evaluate confidence and to specify the conditional probabilities for
intermediate claims the authors rely on expert judgement.
Bobbio et al. [52] represent fault trees in Bayesian Networks and that additional
modelling and analysis power can be gained because of the several restrictive
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Table B.3 Bayesian Belief Network for Confidence [152]
1. Create a Bayesian network with nodes representing assurance
evidence claims.
2. Populate the network with probabilities reflecting confidence
in the evidence and the level of assurance claims.
3. Compute the the uncertainty at the highest level
(using software tools).
assumptions implicit to FTA can be removed to expand the number and type
of dependencies in the model.
Benefits The ability to explicitly represent dependencies of events has already been
discussed as an advantage over Fault Trees. In addition to this, BBN structures
generally offer more flexibility for analysis. The networks can fit a wide range of
accident scenarios and early design evaluation of safety measures [237]. This largely
due to the network’s ability to perform abductive reasoning on uncertain models.
Constraints Fault trees have been applied to safety assessment almost since the
inception of safety engineering and so have been extensively researched and tested.
Whilst there has been a lot of research regarding safety and BBN, comprehensive
testing for applicability for accident consequence analysis, mitigation implementation
and decision making is still required [237].
Another barrier to the adoption of BBNs in system assurance is often the lack of clear
guidance in the standards [301]. Even stronger disadvantages exist when considering
prescriptive standards that provide clear steps to certification that do not easily
allow for the BBN method.
Although the BBN assurance confidence method is plausible, BBN rely predominantly
on the probability tables and the availability of accurate, prior probability information.
This information might be impractical to obtain in some instances of large complex
SoS.
Observations & Assumptions. There is an assumption that the root nodes
of the BBN are conditionally independent and that the nodes on lower levels are
conditionally dependent only on their direct parents [52] which may not be true




STPA (Systems Theoretic Process Analysis) is a hazard analysis technique developed
by Leveson [266] in the ’90s and early ’00s. Rather than using a linear chain-of-
failure causal model, Leveson reframes the safety problem using systems theory. The
underlying premise is that any system (electronic, biological, or socio-technical) can
be modelled in a hierarchical control structure, such as the one shown in Figure B.17.
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Fig. B.16 Correctness BBN Template [301]
Safety, as an emergent property of the system, is therefore engineered into the system
by imposing constraints of behaviour. In this way, safety becomes a control problem.
STPA has two main steps (i) Identifying inadequate control that leads to an unsafe
state, and (ii) Deriving the causes of the unsafe control identified in step (i) [267,
p 213]. Young and Leveson [440] extend STPA to create STPA-Sec by considering
insecure control actions on the structure in addition to unsafe control actions. STPA-
Sec considers additional causes of losses due to security, and is what they call
a strategic top-down approach. They argue that traditional security approaches
use bottom-up tactics that consider mainly those factors that are related to the
physical system, for example network intrusions, and not wider cyber aspects of the
system [440].
Adaptations
[375] applied stpa-sec to autonomous mining, considered stakeholder beneficiary needs
and put the stakeholder value network in a control structure, then superimposed
impact of cybersecurity on each of the flows with high medium low - regulator,
investors, dealership, etc then used control structure to look at operational control
[308] applied a systems-theoretic approach to stuxnet. state "the intent of our
analysis is show whether the STAMP methodology, in particular to CAST, could
have discovered the hazards that led to the centrifuges break down in the Stuxnet
case. If those hazards were identifiable using STAMP, its recommended mitigations
could have been applied in the design phase to prevent the same hazards to happen in
new or current systems." tampered control algorithms in controller, incorrect inputs,
unauthenticated communication channels
[402] propose Systems-Theoretic Likelihood and Severity Analysis (STLSA) which
combines desirable characteristics of both component-centric FMVEA and system-
centric with a focus on function control actions and incorporates semi-quantitative
risk assessment. severity and likelihood rated on ordinal scale 1-4 and demonstrate
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Fig. B.17 A standard control loop (adapted from [267, p 66])
efforts on railway example. used schmitters adaptations, inclusion of reachability
and uniqueness
[405, 406] compared STPA-sec to FMVEA and CHASSIS in an empirical study
for autonomous vehicles. To improve stpa-sec used a combination of methods and
attempted to start with security and used that as a base point. complements stpa
with other approaches to fill gaps e.g. bpmn (though superficial treatment) attack
trees
[282] address the need for top-down security requirements in a notional space system -
design-level engineering considerations and architectural-level security, found that the
abstract functional structure allowed for alternative solutions to be readily considered
"The point of STPA-Sec is not to dictate the security requirements based solely
on the STPA-Sec analysis but to facilitate a security discussion during the early
development phase where key decisions are made instead of asking security engineers
to “secure” an architecture after the fact where costs are high (and in some cases
unachievable)."
[19] combines stpa with attack defence trees for explicit consideration of threats to
"strengthen system analysis" from the extention of the process with attack modelling
earlier work by [439]. use the steel mill attack as an example, other than looking at
the same example it was unclear what the traceability is between the models and
goes agains the initial ethos of the approach
[441] extends stpa from the perspective of data flows, applicable to info flow systems
for in-vehicle diagnostic software update systems; emphasis on shifting from threat-
oriented approaches
[371] propose extension that identifies security incidents in parallel with safety
accidents and hazards; some of the authors went further to show process model for
stpa and stpa-sec in the context of the hara/tara of iso 26262 and J3061. Implies
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that there are points in the system where the two attributes could come together
but doesn’t actually give details of how to resolve conflict if for example there is a
conflict between safety control and security structure, process is quite linear too and
on the same timescale, present as a unified method
[228] considered different risk appetite and capabilities of healthcare systems in
emerging nations - limited resources, rising demand and rapidly evolving organisational
structures. found that needed additional methodological structure where significant
shortages of trained analysts - integrated NIST controls into STPA-Sec - Picture




Fig. B.18 ATAM Process Overview and Outputs (from [234, p 7-8])
The Architectural Trade-Off Analysis Method (ATAM) [233] is a human-centric
process for identifying risks early in the SDLC. It requires the software architects
designing the system to gather and establish how a particular architecture satisfies
given quality goals, and how the attributes trade off against each other. Typically,
this process takes place over four days [370]. This method is resource intensive and
is usually most applicable during the design stage.
To address the challenge of having two quality attributes to optimise, there exist
structured techniques for understanding the trade-offs inherent in software-intensive
systems, such as the Architecture Trade-off Analysis Method (ATAM) [234]. ATAM
was designed as an evaluation tool for system architectures. It involves a nine-step
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process of gathering experts and stakeholders to qualitatively analyse the trade-off
between system dependability attributes, including safety and security [233]. This
method allows stakeholders of a system to iteratively reason about and improve the
risk posed by candidate architectures.
[224] states " The software architecture .. is the structure of the system components
and the relationships among them." ATAM from DoD Joint National Integration
Center (JNIC)
B.1.5.2 DDA
Dependability Deviation Analysis (DDA) is a multi-attribute analysis method
developed by Despotou [99]. The process has seven stages – shown in Figure B.19.
The core steps are i. Identifying Concerns, ii. Identifying Applicable Deviations, iii.
Defining Traceability of Effect and iv. Defining a Dependability Profile. It is assumed
that for two of the stages – Identifying Issues and Defining Suitable Deviations –
existing templates will be reused, however Despotou does provide a description of
what is entailed.
The identification of concerns stage corresponds to identifying loss for STPA-Sec,
however instead of control flows system tasks are used as a unit of analysis. It
recognises the subjectivity of the stakeholders’ requirements needs allows a space
for negotiation. Method was used to identify potential failure conditions from the
perspective of each quality attribute [103].
Adaptations Case studies of this methodology have been effective for complex
systems [100]. It applies modular GSN argumentation notation and methodology to
establish arguments supporting satisfaction claims for dependability requirements.
This produces a partitioned dependability specification argument with safety, security
and performance components - all connected to the trade-off argument.
Despotou extended the methodology surrounding DDA to include vital aspects of
dependability engineering and argumentation to create the ecosystem of methods
shown in Figure B.20. Trade-Off Method (TOM) and Factor ANalysis and Decision
Alternatives (FANDA) are methodical ways for establishing bounds of acceptability,
handling conflicts and managing rationale of decision choices between the argument
(GSN) and system design.
B.2 Standards and Guidelines for Safety and Security
B.2.1 General
These standards are only general in that they have been adapted and applied to many
different industries. In the case of the IEC standards these come out of industrial
control, with best practice being modelled in the standard. This however does has its
limitations - as we will see the conceptual models from the industrial control domain
have been embodied in the standard and thus, how assurance is handed. Such is the
230 Review Analysis
Fig. B.19 Overall Stages of the DDA (from [99, p 104])
case with the idea of boundaries and perimeters. However, this may not hold true
for software and for security. This will be explored in the following section.
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Fig. B.20 Overall Stages of the DDA (from [100, p 104])
B.2.1.1 IEC 61508
IEC 61508, titled Functional safety of E/E/PE6 safety-related systems is a commonly
adopted7 safety standard which was last released in 2010. Not only did its creation
require input and coordination of multiple industry, academic and governmental
organisations across several countries, but the resulting documents total over six
hundred pages divided across seven parts. Figure B.21 depicts the structure of the
standard. Each of the parts is contained in its own document. Parts 1, 2 and 3 are
the core parts needed to follow the standard.
Part 1 contains a description of the overall framework and general requirements. It
is supported by Part 4 which provides definitions and abbreviations, Part 5
which provides example methods for risk and integrity level determination, and
Part 1 Annexes which contain further detail on specific assurance requirements
related to documentation, management and assessment.
Parts 2 and 3 contain requirements specific to the realisation phases for the system
under consideration at both system level (Part 2) and software level (Part 3).
These two parts are supplemented by Part 6 and Part 7 which provide (i)
further guidelines on the application of Parts 2 & 3, and (ii) an overview of
techniques that can be used respectively.
Philosophy and Risk Analysis
The introduction of every part of 61508 states “If computer system technology is to
be effectively and safely exploited, it is essential that those responsible for making
6Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic
7It is acknowledged that this is highly subjective, however many members of the safety community
recognise the value of the standard and have adapted it to several domains.
232 Review Analysis
Fig. B.21 Overall framework of the IEC 61508 series (from [186, p 11])
decisions have sufficient guidance on the safety aspects on which to make these
decisions.” [189, p 7]. This makes it clear that the general philosophy followed
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in the standard is to aide decision makers to make decisions about safety risk 8.
The framework considers every part of the system lifecycle and aims to encourage
a consistent and rational technical policy for the elements of systems, and total
combination of systems making up safety-related systems.
The standard adopts a risk-based approach, although it does contain many procedural
elements in it. It is not necessarily prescriptive, however it suggests that if the
requirements stated in the standard are not followed, strong justification would be
needed to explain why. Two fundamental concepts in risk approach of the standard are
the safety function which is a function that maintains the system in a ’safe state’, and
safety integrity level (SIL) which is a probability-based measure of how satisfactorily
the safety function is performing within a given period of time. The risk approach
that IEC 61508 advocates is built around risk (hazard) identification, establishing
safety requirements (functional and SILs) to address the risks, and allocation of the
requirements to safety-related systems and other reduction measures.
IEC 61508 has three objectives for hazard and risk analysis 9: determine the hazards
in all modes of operation and for "reasonably foreseeable circumstances", determine
the event sequences leading the the hazards, and finally for each system, determine
the risks associated with the hazards. The specific steps for consideration during
risk analysis 10 include determining [186, p 28]:
1. Hazards and components that contribute to them
2. The consequences and likelihood of the event sequences leading to hazards
3. The tolerable risk for each hazardous event
4. Measures to address the hazards, and
5. The assumptions made during the analysis (for example demand rates, equipment
failure rates, credit for operational constraints or human intervention, etc. )
When considering these risk analysis steps in the context of safety’s interaction with
security, several questions emerge. Namely, are some of these steps even possible
when considering the amount of uncertainty security concerns are likely to introduce
to the system? can a determination of likelihood be made for security concerns that
contribute to safety be made with the same level of confidence? and how to resolve
the situation where the assumptions made for safety are invalidated due to security?
Each of these questions captures some of the issues with the IEC 61508 approach to
co-assurance.
Treatment of Security
Security concerns are explicitly mentioned in three clauses in the overall document11[186].
The first mention states that the standard requires consideration of malevolent and
8The framework has an expansive view of who decision makers are. They can be found at multiple
levels - from assesors and management through to programmers.
9Objectives subclauses 7.4.1.1 through 7.4.1.3
10As stated in subclause 7.4.2.10
11Part 1 Clauses 1.2 (Scope of the standard), 7.4 (Hazard and risk analysis) and 7.5 (Overall
safety requirements).
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unauthorised actions during risk analysis, that specific precautions may be necessary
to prevent unauthorised persons adversely affecting the system, and that it does
not specify security policies or how to meet them. In essence, the inclusion of these
points makes safety practitioners aware of the need to include some security aspects
in their analyses, but does not communicate how or when exactly this should be
done.
Requirements subclause 7.4.2.3 states that hazards shall be determined under all
reasonably foreseeable circumstances including misuse [186, p 27]. IEC 61508 classes
reasonably foreseeable misuse as "use of a product, process or service in a way
not intended by the supplier, but which may result from readily predictable human
behaviour". Whilst this definition covers many human factors and benevolent errors,
its coverage of intentional and malevolent actions seems superficial. It is unlikely
that the amount of effort required to prevent trusted operators who make mistakes
from misusing the system will be comparable to the effort required to prevent nation
states from mounting advanced persistent attacks on the same system. By grouping
all of those incidents under the same banner some of the detail required to address
the risk proportionally is lost.
Requirements subclause 7.5.2.2 states that "If security threats have been identified,
then a vulnerability analysis should be undertaken in order to specify security requirements"
with a reference to the guidance provided in IEC 62443 series [186, p 29]. Part 4 which
is the standard’s glossary does not contain a definition of threats or vulnerabilities,
and so it is left to the safety practitioner to determine what a threat or vulnerability is,
and if it is present. This is likely to cause problems in creating a clear understanding
with security because, unlike other terms used, it is not explained.
Fig. B.22 Safety integrity levels - target failure measures for a safety function operating
in high demand mode of operation or continuous mode of operation (from [186, p
34])
This problem is illustrated when looking at the subclauses related to the analysis
steps 12. Table B.22 shows the integrity levels and target failure measures per
operating hour. For the highest level (SIL 4) the requirements says that the system
can only fail ≥ 10−9. In layman’s terms, that would be the equivalent of two
completely independent systems running without that failure for just over a year.
When this is taken in the context of system failure due to an attack it makes it
clear how difficult the task is, especially considering zero-day attacks where the
vulnerabilities are unknown until they are exploited. It would be near impossible to
12Subclause 7.4.2.10 and 7.6.2.9.
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ensure this type of failure rate in any meaningful way in the presence of a targeted
attack.
Even though IEC 61508 says that it was "conceived with a rapidly developing
technology in mind; the framework is sufficiently robust and comprehensive to cater
for future developments" [189, p 7], those future developments are unlikely to have
covered the pace and volume of security vulnerabilities are that are discovered in
systems. Another major flaw in the 61508 approach when considering co-assurance
is that the standard does not have an explicit consideration of security failure modes.
The only two failures in the failure model are systematic failures and random failures
which are not fully representative of security failure which deals more with motivation
and intent rather than static reliability figures or software bugs, even though each of
those can be exploited.
Even if security failures were grouped together with systematic faults, the standard
says it "sets requirements for the avoidance and control of systematic faults, which are
based on experience and judgement from practical experience gained in industry" [189,
p 8] - for many novel security vulnerabilities and attacks they are unknown to the
experts so there is not the option to draw on past experience to make accurate
judgements or to include security-related requirements in the standard.
Application Sector Adaptations
In IEC 61508 it states that the framework "enables product and application sector
international standards dealing with safety-related systems to be developed within the
framework of this standard – should lead to high level of consistency (underlying
principles, terminology etc) within and across application sectors; this will have both
safety and economic benefits" [189, p 7]. Figure B.23 depicts several standards that
are based on IEC 61508.
Whilst each of the drawbacks discussed in the previous section do not appear to be
insurmountable, the fact that a similar philosophy to IEC 61508 have been used
throughout several safety-related application domains means that they are likely to
have very similar limitations for safety and security co-assurance.
Now that the points of conflict have been established for security-informed safety
in, arguably, the most widely used safety standard, the next section analyses the
co-assurance problem from a security perspective in order to identify the limiting
factors in security standards’ approaches.
Fig. B.23 Standards that are inspired by IEC 61508 (from [378])
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B.2.1.2 Common Criteria
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CC) [66], together
with its complementary document Common Methodology for Information Technology
Security Evaluation (CEM) [67] are two of the most widely adopted security standards.
Their objective is to ensure that [78]
• Products can be evaluated independently and rigorously to determine if they
have particular security properties for assurance
• There is standard documentation to define the criteria and evaluation methods
for certifying technologies, and
• The certificates generated from the tests are recognised by signatories of the
Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement [78].
Structure.
CC v3.1 Release 5 is structured in three parts:
Part 1: Introduction and general model - this document provides the terms and
conditions used throughout the standard, the target audience, representations
of the Target of Evaluation (TOE)13, Security Target (ST)14, and the general
model for sufficiency of countermeasures and correctness. Also contained in
this document is the definition of Protection Profiles15, their evaluation targets
and how to specify a PP. Figure B.24 shows the contents of the definition of a
ST. Parts 2 and 3 provides the functional and assurance requirements for this
to be tailored.
Fig. B.24 Security Target contents (from [66, p 65])
13TOE - set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied by guidance [66].
14ST - implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific identified TOE [66].
15These are particular configurations of requirements for specific technologies.
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Part 2: Security functional requirements - provides security functional requirements
and can be used for and formulating functional specification for TOEs. It
structures the requirements in a hierarchical structure of Classes-Families-
Components. An example is CLASS FCO Communication with two families:
FCO_NRO Non-repudiation of origin and FCO_NRR Non-repudiation of receipt.
Other Classes include Security Audit, Cryptographic Support, Identification
and Authentication, Security Management, Privacy, Resource Utilisation, etc.
. Figure B.25 depicts how the requirements are structured in the document.
Requirements are Functional elements and can be customised for particular
systems.
Fig. B.25 Functional Requirements Structure from CC (from [66])
Part 3: Security assurance requirements - provides guidance about determining
required levels of assurance, interpreting assurance requirements and determining
assurance approaches. It provides seven Evaluation Assurance Levels:
EAL 1 functionally tested
EAL 2 structurally tested
EAL 3 methodically tested and checked
EAL 4 methodically designed, tested and reviewed
EAL 5 semiformally designed and tested
EAL 6 semiformally verified design and tested
EAL 7 formally verified design and tested
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Process & Argument.
CC does not advocate a specific process or workflow even though it does contain some
steps that one would expect to take during the design, development and assurance
of a system. The structure of the classes, families and requirements in Figure B.25
makes the standard very outcome-based, with different objectives or goals to reach.
Safety-Security Interactions.
Paragraph 221 in [66] states that "Many owners of assets lack the knowledge,
Fig. B.26 Evaluation concepts and relationships (from [66, p 42])
epxertise or resources necessary to judge sufficiency and correctness of the countermeasures,
and they may not wish to rely solely on the assertions of the developers of the
countermeasures. These consumers may therefore choose to increase their confidence
in the sufficiency and correctness of some or all of their countermeasures by ordering
an evaluation of these countermeasures." Figure B.26 demonstrates the relationships
between these concepts. Whilst CC is not application domain-specific this clause has
implications for sasfety critical systems, because it acknowledges that owners of a
system may not have the expertise to assess desired properties. This reasoning can
be applied between the safety and security disciplines. Therefore what is needed is a
way to understand the evaluation of risk inter-domain.
Ankrum and Kromholz [23] investigated the proximity of the CC to a security case,
and found that some objectives were missing e.g. some components do not provide
objectives in their description. In addition to the similarities of EALs with SILs,
Weinstock et al. [428] states that CC has elements similar to a security case (although
a security case is a more general framework). CC provides good context to provide
justification for a security case and assurance [428].
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B.2.1.3 IET CoP
The IET Code of Practice Cyber Security and Safety [192] is a Guidance document
commissioned by the UK National Cyber Security Centre. Its primary objective
is to provide shared principles for safety and security. The guidance was written
by the IETs Technical and Professional Networks for Functional Safety and Cyber
Security. The intent is to promote and improve good practice for co-engineering
and co-assurance of system safety and cyber security. The Guidance employs a
security-informed safety approach over the lifetime of a system. The key messages
include [192]:
• the CoP was written for both practitioners and managers
• divergence and conflict between the two disciplines requires the business to
"make a conscious risk-based decision"
• risk-based approaches are mostly complementary across the two disciplines
• the CoP aims to capture best practice, and there is likely a need to modify
existing practices
Structure.
The document is structured in four main parts; first there is an introduction to the
document and the challenges at the intersection of safety and security. Then shared
management principles, technical principles and guidance on applying the code is
given. Finally, the Annexes contain further information and examples of techniques
and measures. Figure B.27 shows the structure of the document and the information
relating to it.
Fig. B.27 IET CoP Document Structure (from [192, p 10])
Process & Argument.
The guidance does not provide an explicit workflow for aligning safety and security,
although it does discuss organisational structures and the types of processes that
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would need to be enacted for the alignment. The standard is based on principles
shown in Figure B.28 which relate to technical and management aspects such
as accountability, governance, competence, proportionality, engineering, and risk
management. One of the most informative parts of the guidance is Annex D which
provides indicators of good practice in line with the principles and a mapping to
the NCSC Cyber Assessment Framework (CAF). Whilst these indicators are not as
established as Means-of-Compliance in standards, they would allow practitioners and
managers to understand some of the properties of good practice in more concrete
terms.
Fig. B.28 Shared Principles for Safety and Security (from [192, p 21])
Safety-Security Interactions.
The guidance highlights several challenges for the alignment of system safety and
cyber security, namely:
• reasonably practicable risk reduction and ALARP is not defined for security,
but plays a large part for safety
• there is a lack of common language, and often a perceived conflict in goals
• that the disciplines have both overlapping and differing engineering perspectives,
for example a security engineer may have a focus on the intent or capability of
a malicious actor
• there is a tension between maintenance for safety and cyber security, as well as
tensions between the dynamic nature of security and safety’s need to keep the
system stable
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B.2.1.4 SafSec Approach
SafSec was developed as a standard [110] and guidance [109] to combine safety
and security certification in a complex environment such as Integrated Modular
Avionics (IMA) and Advanced Avionics Architectures (AAvA). SafSec Guidance aims
to complement existing standards for safety and security rather than replace them. It
provides a goal-based, modular and incremental approach to the common assurance
and certification of safety and security. For the safety aspects it is dependent on
Defence Standard 00-56 and for security aspects it is dependent on Common Criteria.
Figure B.29 shows a concept diagram of the integrated approach to certifying
dependability attributes, which include safety and security. The intent is to reduce
effort and cost through unified risk management and modular certification.
Fig. B.29 Shared Principles for Safety and Security (from [338, p 3])
Structure, Process & Argument.
The SafSec Standard is structure in five parts. The firs two parts provide context
information about the background and scope of the standard. An explanatory
model that discusses concepts, terminology, argument structure and "sufficient"
dependability is then provided. The last parts provide requirements for the argument
structure (GSN-based) and informative annexes. The Standard is centred around
minimising Loss which it defines as "A state of the system that has the potential to
lead to an undesired external effect". Figure B.30 shows the key components of the
SafSec Method.
Safety-Security Interactions.
Figure B.31 shows the process and output for establishing sufficient dependability
of safety and security in the SafSec unified process. The process identifies loss,
determines the criticality of that loss and whether the dependability objective has
been met, if yes the the risk is argued about in a modular case, if not then the
process follows a loop of determining the most cost effective means of reducing risk
and meeting the dependability target.
Whilst this process is unified, the SafSec Method does acknowledge the need for
activities to be performed within a single engineering domain. For example, the
standard provides a process leading up to the process of defining Dependability
Specification in Figure B.31. This pre-unification process consists of identifying losses
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Fig. B.30 SafSec Method (from [338, p 4])
and their impacts, determining their causes and setting Dependability Targets [109,
p 101].
Alexander et al. [17] observe that the SafSec method "provides a specific process to
exploit [commonalities between safety and security] . . . It does not, however, address ..
cultural, epistemic and economic challenges". Lautieri et al. [259], one of the primary
authors of the standard, states that the framework helps to reduce the time, cost
and effort associated with certification through modular arguments and reuse.
The SafSec Coherence Study [127] sought to consolidate work done from SafSec,
IAWG Modular Certification, and Dependability Cases (DDA approach) to "improve
efficiency by understanding the extent of commonality of these three similar areas" [127,
p 1]. Some of the findings from the study were particularly interesting, for example,
SafSec had little support for trade-offs [127, p 47] which is a fundamental part of
co-engineering and co-assurance.
B.2.2 General Security
Whilst the following standards relate to cyber security of information security solely,
they have been adopted for the assurance of many safety-critical systems. An
overview of the single-domain security standards is provided here to understand the
overviews before looking at application domain-specific and integrated safety-security
standards.
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Fig. B.31 SafSec Sufficient Dependability Process (from [109, p 31])
B.2.2.1 ISO 27K-Series
ISO/IEC 27000:2020 [204] is the Standard the provides an overview and the vocabulary
for the ISO 27K-family of standards. The standards provide processes and requirements
for managing information security at several points in a systems’ lifecycle. ISO/IEC
27000:2020 [204, p 11-12] defines an Information Security Management System (ISMS)
as a set of "policies, procedures, guidelines, and associated resources and activities
collectively managed by an organization, in the pursuit of protecting its information
assets . . . It is based on a risk assessment and the organization’s risk acceptance levels
designed to effectively treat and manage risks". The family of standards seems to
have a business focus, with the mention of business assets and objectives. This may
not always be relevant or applicable for safety-critical applications.
ISO/IEC 27000:2020 [204] presents and overview of ISMS which requires:
• identification of information assets and their associated information security
requirements
• assessment and treatment of information security risks
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• selection and implementation of relevant controls to manage unacceptable risks
• monitoring, maintenance and improvement of the effectiveness of controls
associated with the assets
Fig. B.32 ISMS Family of Standards
Figure B.32 shows a subset of the ISO 27K-family of standards and their relationships.
These standards cover:
ISO/IEC 27000 - Overview and vocabulary
ISO/IEC 27001 - Requirements - for the organisation, leadership, planning, support,
operation, performance evaluation and improvement.
ISO/IEC 27002 - Code of practice for information security controls - controls for IS
policies, organisation of IS, human resource, asset management, access control,
cryptography, and physical, operations, and communications security; as well
as controls for system acquisition, supplier relationships, incident management,
business continuity and compliance
ISO/IEC 27003 - Guidance - on leadership, planning, support, operation, performance
evaluation and improvement
ISO/IEC 27004 - Monitoring, measurement, analysis and evaluation
ISO/IEC 27005 - Information security risk management
ISO/IEC 27006 - Requirements for bodies providing audit and certification of
information security management systems
ISO/IEC 27007 - Guidelines for information security management systems auditing
Figure B.33 shows the risk management process from ISO/IEC 27005:2011 [206]. It
follows a Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle typical to security. An element that is significantly
different to safety are the activities at the decision risk points, particular in relation
to risk acceptance. The implementation guidance on risk acceptance (ISO/IEC
27005:2011 [206] Clause 10) states that: "In some cases the level of residual risk may
not meet risk acceptance criteria because the criteria being applied do not take into
account prevailing circumstances. For example, it might be argued that it is necessary
to accept risks because the benefits accompanying the risks are very attractive, or
because the cost of risk modification is too high. Such circumstances indicate that
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Fig. B.33 Information Security Risk Management Process (from [206])
risk acceptance criteria are inadequate and should be revised if possible . . . decision
makers may have to accept risks that do not meet normal acceptance criteria". Risk
acceptance criteria for safety-related systems are often more stringent and subject
to regulatory and legal oversight, therefore it is unlikely that managers would be
able to make this kind of a justification. This may be a point of conflict in the risk
management processes, or there may be a need for one attribute to take precedence.
B.2.2.2 NIST SP 800-Series
The US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) have released several
documents in the NIST Special Publication (SP) 800 series which aims to share
information about topics related to security. The express aim of the NIST 800-series
is to "address and support the security and privacy needs of U.S. Federal Government
information and information systems", however many of the NIST SPs have been
adopted more widely for security risk management in safety-critical contexts. Some
of the applicable standards are:
NIST SP 800-12 - An Introduction to Information Security - presents an overview of
information security, the roles and responsibilities of personnel, and information
about threats, vulnerabilities, risk management, assurance and security policy;
as well as discussing some control families
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NIST SP 800-30 - Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments - provides information
about the risk assessment process and key concepts
NIST SP 800-53 r5 - Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and
Organizations - provides an overview of the fundamentals of security controls
and security controls
NIST SP 800-82 r2 - Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security - provides
application domain-specific information about risk management, security program
development and deployment, architecture and ICS controls
In addition to the NIST SP 800-series, NIST have released a Cybersecurity Framework
for Critical Infrastructure [305]. They state that the Framework is "not designed to
replace existing processes; an organization can use its current process and overlay
it onto the Framework to determine gaps in its current cybersecurity risk approach
and develop a roadmap to improvement". To this end, the NIST Framework
provides functions, categories and informative references to supporting standards
and guidelines. Figure ?? shows the Functions and Categories.
Fig. B.34 Functions and Categories from NIST Cyber Framework
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B.2.2.3 NCSC CAF
The UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) released the Cyber Assessment
Framework (CAF) [300] to "improve the security of network and information systems
across the UK, with a particular focus on essential functions which if compromised
could potentially cause significant damage to the economy, society, the environment,
and individuals’ welfare, including loss of life". This was partially in response to the
NIS Directive16 and the need to protect Critical National Infrastructure (CNI).
The framework is structured around 14 principles with indicators of good practice
(IGPs) associated with demonstrating that the principles have been achieved. NCSC
expressly state that the CAF IGP tables are not exhaustive, guaranteed to apply
verbatim to all organisations, nor are they checklists [300].
The predecessor standards to CAF were HMG IA Standards No. 1 and 2 [68]. They
provided comprehensive requirements for risk assessment, risk management and
accreditation through consideration and qualitative assignment of levels to risks. An
example is the use of Business Impact Level (BIL) tables that denote the level of
outcome impact. For example, the category "Impact on life and safety" has seven
BILs from BIL 0 - none, to BIL 6 - lead directly to widespread loss of life [68, p 47].
However, the IS 1 and 2 standards were removed. [116] states that the reason for
the withdrawal is because they "created a culture where compliance with mandatory
risk management process became more important than really understanding (and thus
effectively managing) risk" and that application of the standards had increasingly
become a checklist exercise.
Instead, the NCSC encourages use of outcomes, objectives and principles in the
CAF for which there are indicators of good practice. The Objectives and Principles
are [300]:
Objective A: Manging security risk - A1 Governance, A2 Risk management, A3
Asset management, A4 Supply chain
Objective B: Protecting against cyber attack - B1 Service protection policies and
processes, B2 Identity and access control, B3 Data security, B4 System security,
B5 Resilient networks and systems, B6 Staff awareness and training
Objective C: Detecting cyber security events - C1 Security monitoring, C2 Proactive
security event discovery
Objective D: Minimising the impact of cyber security incidents - D1 Response and
recovery planning, D2 Lessons learned
B.2.3 Aerospace
ARP 4754A [27] is the standard used most extensively for the development of
aircraft and systems. It provides the processes for development planning, safety
assessment, requirements cature, validation and verification, as well as for assurance
and certification. The standard also provides the ARP4754A Process [27, p 21]
which outlines interaction between safety and a V-model system development process
16EU Security of Networks & Information Systems Directive provide legal footing to ensure
Member States have frameworks for cyber resilience.
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(at aircraft level). Whilst the standard does discuss safety requirements and the
assignment of Development Assurance Levels (DALs), it is very process-oriented
with the objectives being written in terms of process completion. The standard also
defines roles and responsibilities for assurance activities.
DO 326A [108] is a security standard that provides an airworthiness security process,
fundamental concepts, aircraft modification and information about airworthiness
activities. It was developed to complement the process in ARP 4754A [27]. Figure
B.35 shows the points of information exchange between the safety process, system
development and security risk assessment. The flow of information is predominantly
from safety to security with very few feedback paths to safety through the system
design, and no direct links from security to safety. Baron et al. [36] propose a
trustworthiness design and development models based on the DO-326A process
model; they include multi-level STRIDE and DREAD analyses to fulfil the security
assessment steps in order to generate requirements.
Fig. B.35 Aircraft Certification Process (from [108])
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B.2.4 Automotive
Table B.4 Automotive Standards for Safety and Security
System Safety Cyber Security
ISO 26262 (standard) J3061 (guidance)
PAS 21448 (SOTIF) ISO 21434 (standard)
PAS 1885 (principles)
PAS 11281 (connected)
Table B.4 shows the main standards for safety and security in the automotive domain.
For safety there are two documents - the ISO 26262 standard is for risks related to the
electrical and/or electronic system (E/E) and PAS 21448 is for Safety of the Intended
Function (SOTIF) [382] which deals with the safety risks associated with the intent
of the system behaviour, as well as its situational awareness, environmental factors
and some instances of foreseeable misuse. As reasoning for this distinction, SOTIF
[382] states that "For some systems, which rely on sensing the external or internal
environment, there can be potentially hazardous behaviour cause by the intended
functionality or performance limitation of a system that is free from faults addressed
in the ISO 26262". When considering safety and security co-engineering this may
have implications for consideration of context and ensuring that security is aligned
both with ISO 26262 and SOTIF. Figure B.36 shows the 10 parts of ISO 26262 and
their activities. The standard is a domain-specific application of IEC 61508 so has
many similarities such as processes for management of safety (Part 2), development
phases (Parts 3-7) and supporting guidance (Parts 1, 8-10).
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Fig. B.36 ISO 26262 Overview (from [198])
There are several standards that must be considered for automotive cyber security:
J3061 - Surface Vehicle Recommended Practice: Cybersecurity Guidebook for
Cyber-Physical Vehicle Systems [211] - this provides guidance on the identification
and assessment of cybersecurity threats, and cybersecurity design for vehicles
throughout the system lifecycle. It provides a relationship between system safety
and cybersecurity, as well as guiding principles and processes for each lifecycle phase
and overall cybersecurity management. In addition, the appendices contain further
guidance on analysis techniques, templates for work products, controls descriptions
and test tools. Figure B.37 shows a comparison between J3061 for cybersecurity and
the ISO 26262 safety standard. There are several points of interaction and overlap,
however potentially not all of the significant interactions are captured in the standard.
J3061 has been widely adopted, with improvements and developments when applying
it; for example, Steger et al. [387] develop metrics to support structured analysis.
ISO/SAE DIS 21434 - Road Vehicles - Cybersecurity Engineering [197] - this standard
is still under development, and is a collaboration between ISO and SAE. The intent
is to use some of the principles and activities in J3061 in the standard to address "the
cybersecurity perspective in engineering of electrical and electronic (E/E) systems
within road vehicles. By ensuring appropriate consideration of cybersecurity, this
document aims to enable the engineering of E/E systems to keep up with changing
technology and attack methods". The framework aims to provide a common language,
policies and processes to manage risk and foster a cybersecurity culture. The
process and structure mirrors that of ISO 26262. Skoglund et al. [377] analysed the
potential synergies between safety and security as part of the AMASS - Assurance and
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Fig. B.37 Comparison between SAE J3061 and ISO 26262 (from [26])
Certification of CPS [20] Project to support the synergies between safety and security
shown in Figure B.38. Cui and Sabaliauskaite [83] discussed potential interactions
for safety and security for autonomous vehicles, and using FACT graphs to model
both attributes.
PAS 1885:2018 [323] is guidance sponsored by the UK Department for Transport,
and presents a set of principles for connected vehicles. The principles relate to
security ownership and governance, risk management, incident response, supply-
chain, defence-in-depth, management throughout the system lifetime, storage of data,
and resilience. Figure B.39 shows the holistic approach to security that incorporates
both technical and socio-technical elements. A related specification is PAS 11281:2018
[322] which provides guidance on policy, process and management of safe and secure
design for connected and autonomous vehicles.
B.2.5 Defence
Together with guidance found on ASEMS (Acquisition Safety & Environment
Management System) [92], Def Stan 00-56 [90] is the UK Defence standard for
system safety. Its stated purpose is "support acquisition organisation delivery of
[Equipment, Services, Logistics and Support] (ESL&S) by setting Safety Requirement
on Contractors that enable procurement of Products, Services and/or Systems (PSS)
that are compliant with safety legislation and regulations.. the intent is that compliance
with these requirement will place MOD in a position to discharge its obligations
with regard to the management of Risk to live associated with the in-service use of
PSS" [90, Clause 0.1]. The implications for safety and security are that a sufficient
risk management process is required and there is a large focus on Supply Chain. This
standard mentions security directly several times e.g. "11.3.3 The Contractor should
ensure that cyber security is considered where security breaches may be a contributory
cause of a hazard". It also references JSP 440 [226] The Defence Manual of Security
which has several parts to deal with different aspects of security for a system:
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Fig. B.38 Co-engineering of automotive safety and security (from [377])
Part 1 Introduction - provides an introduction, information on threats and vulnerabilities,
security organisation, risk management, assurance and training
Part 2 Protective Security Policy - gives guidance on the prinicples and objectives
of security
Part 3 Personnel Security - discusses policies and controls for personnel, as well as
the National Security vetting process
Part 4 Asset Marking and Controls - for classification, handling and management of
assets
Part 5 Physical Security - has a directive and guidance about physical security
Part 6 Information Security - provides guidance on organisation and information
assurance policies
Part 8 Communications and ICT Security - provides guidance on networks and ICT
systems
JSP 440 [226] is very extensive in its coverage of several aspects of security, and takes
a holistic approach by considering physical, human, cyber and information aspects
of security. Additional guidance exists for UK defence supply chain cyber security
from the Defence Cyber Protection Partnership (DCPP) [59]. However, what is
unclear is the exact interaction between safety and security standards/guidelines,
when information must be exchanged, and what this information should be. The
risk management processes can be used as a basis for the interaction between safety
and security in a defence context. Figure B.40 shows the process steps for safety risk
management.
The US system safety defence standard is MIL-STD-882E [293] which has the
purpose of identifying the DoD approach to "eliminating hazards, where possible, and
minimizing risks where those hazards cannot be eliminated". It has eight elements of
the system safety process which includes identifying risks, assessing risk, identifying
mitigations, reducing risk, accepting risk and managing risk through the system
life-cycle. Whilst there is no explicit requirement on cyber security, as part of risk
reduction the DoD expects all acquisitions to adhere to the Cybersecurity Maturity
Model Certification (CMMC) [415] which organises processes and cybersecurity best
practices by domain. Sources for the CMMC include some NIST SP 800 standards
and the NIST Cybersecurity Framework. Both of these (UK and US) safety-security
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Fig. B.39 PAS 1885 Approach to security (from [323])
defence regulatory landscapes are very large which may preclude smaller suppliers
because they do not have the assurance resource. These are two examples, although
it is likely a similar scenario for other countries’ defence standards landscapes.
B.2.6 Forensics
For both safety and security there are multiple standards and guidance documents
for post-incident risk management and forensic activities. Examples include guidance
such as NIST SP 800-61[74] standard for organising a computer security incident
response capability and handing an incident. Understanding and learning from
incidents is also an important aspect for both disciplines. Figure B.41 shows the
overall process for learning from incidents involving E/E/PE systems released as
guidance by the UK Health & Safety Executive. It consists of eight processes
each with their own steps, that cover everything from reporting and prioritising
incidents to proactive interpretation and detailed assessment in order to notify the
supply chain. This process has a lot of overlap with the digital investigation process
schema presented in ISO/IEC 27043:2016 [207] which includes readiness processes,
initialisation processes, acquisitive processes (for digital evidence) and investigative
processes. Even though there is significant overlap there is no harmonising standard
that discusses what information should be shared for both safety and security.
A question of timescales and forensic requirements also exists because the legal
obligations may differ. Significant challenges also exist around the question of
responsible disclosure versus secrecy for security, how to detect incidents in the
presence of an intelligent adversary and the infrastructure for recording incidents
nationally and internationally.
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Fig. B.40 Def Stan 00-56 Risk Management Process (from [431])
B.2.7 Healthcare
Unlike sectors such as aerospace, automotive or rail - healthcare does not currently
have international standards for cyber security. This is likely due to socio-political
factors which mean that regulation and governance of healthcare is at a regional or
national level. However, there are general security and privacy laws that apply such
as GDPR and the NIS Directive.
In 2018, the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA)
released guidance on functional requirements for a potential ICT security certification
schemes for the health sector. The guidance discusses assets, threats, and security
requirements for healthcare services and products such as Internet of Medical Things
devices [124]17. The guidance has a strong emphasis on proportionality - "assurance
level of certification should be linked to the risk associated with the concrete product
or service", and it provides requirements related to multiple aspects of the system
such as design, data and privacy, technical and organisational [124, p 17-19].
Figure B.42 shows a conceptual flow of governance, programs and controls in
healthcare that is based on constant measuring to assess cybersecurity at all
levels [240]. However, the authors state that measurements are not sufficient, because
if there are incorrect governance-level objectives to begin with, then there will be a
failed security program.
17Medical devices, semiconductors and electronic services are all within the scope of this guidance.
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Fig. B.41 Process for Learning from Incidents (from [48])
Fig. B.42 Conceptual Illustration of Security Governance (from [240])
Regions
Figure B.43 shows results from a 2018 HIMSS cybersecurity survey, which found that
most US healthcare providers used general frameworks for managing cybersecurity
such as NIST [161]. In addition, the 2020 survey found that significant security
incidents from scam artists and cyber criminals were the norm particular those that
involved phishing, malware and human engineering [162]. The increasing number of
attacks is particularly a problem for legacy systems that were in use at 80% of the
organisations surveyed [162]18.
The UK National Health Service (NHS) has released several Security Standards or
requirements that are expected of all NHS digital, data, and technology services [412].
The objective is to achieve these Data Security Standards through the Data Security
18Legacy systems include unsupported enterprise and operating systems such as Windows Server
2008, Windows 98, and Embedded legacy operating systems
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Fig. B.43 Security Frameworks used in Healthcare (from [161])
Protection Toolkit which supports requirements for GDPR and NIS. The Data
Security Standards from the NHS guidance are [412]:
Standard 1 - all staff shall ensure that personal confidential data is handled, stored
and transmitted securely, whether in electronic or paper form
Standard 2 - all staff must understand their responsibilities under the Data Security
Standards, including their obligation to handle information responsibly and
their personal accountability for deliberate or avoidable breaches
Standard 3 - all staff complete annual security training that is followed by a test,
which can be re-taken unlimited times but which must ultimately be passed.
Staff are supported by their organisation in understanding data security and in
passing the test
Standard 4 - personal confidential data is only accessible to staff who need it for
their current role and access is removed as soon as it is no longer required.
All access to personal confidential data on IT systems can be attributed to
individuals
Standard 5 - processes are reviewed at least annually to identify and improve
processes which have caused breaches or near misses, or which force staff
to use workarounds which compromise data security
Standard 6 - cyber-attacks against services are identified and resisted and NHS
Digital Data Security Centre security advice is responded to. Action is taken
immediately following a data breach or a near miss, with a report made to
senior management within 12 hours of detection
Standard 7 - a continuity plan is in place to respond to threats to data security,
including significant data breaches or near misses, and it is tested once a year
as a minimum, with a report to senior management
Standard 8 - no unsupported operating systems, software or internet browsers are
used within the IT estate
Standard 9 - a strategy is in place for protecting IT systems from cyber threats
which is based on a proven cyber security framework
Standard 10 - IT suppliers are held accountable via contracts for protecting the
personal confidential data they process and meeting the Data Security Standards
These standards, which are closer to requirements or principles, have a focus on the
strategic approach to cyber security. However, many may seem impracticable (such
as Standard 8) when considering the current state of healthcare digital services and
their capabilities.
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The International Medical Device Regulators Forum (IMDRF), which continues
the work of the Global Harmonization Task Force (GHTF)19, released guidance on
the Principles and Practices for Medical Device Cybersecurity [290] which includes
guidance on pre-market risk management and post-market considerations for medical
devices. The guidance has the objectives of global harmonization, total product
lifecycle risk management, shared responsibility and information sharing [290].
Medical Devices
ISO 14971:2012 [194] is an international medical device safety standard that contains
requirements and process for risk management, risk analysis, risk reduction and
control, and evaluation of overall risk. It consists of nine parts with several informative
annexes containing the rationale for the requirements and additional information
about the risk process. Figure B.44 shows the risk process diagram which is applicable
to all stages of the medical device lifecycle. In addition to process requirements, the
standard discusses the requirements for roles and their responsibilities such as top
management, the competece of personnel, etc.
Fig. B.44 Schematic Representation of the Risk Management Process (from [194])
19Members of GHTF include European Union, United States, Canada, Australia and Japan.
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Whilst ISO 14971:2012 [194] does not explicitly require a safety case, it does have
a requirement for a risk management file which provides traceability for the risk
analysis and evaluation, as well as implementation of controls and assessment of the
acceptability of residual risk.
Fig. B.45 Relationship between Security and Safety Risks (from [6])
AAMI TIR 57:2016 [6] is a technical information report modelled from the process in
ISO 14971 applied to security for medical devices. The report contains guidance on
the process and controls for security. The relationship that the standard identifies
between safety and security is shown in Figure B.45 which shows an overlap, with
only some security risks contributing to safety impact. In Annex D, questions to
help identify medical device security characteristics are listed for manufacturers to
help them explore the risk. AAMI TIR 57:2016 [6] also identifies several differences
between medical device security and conventional IT security, such as [6, p 17]
differences in access - emergency access is possible for medical devices; product
lifecycle - there is flow of new products for conventional IT but medical devices can
be used for decades; and conventional IT systems often have vast and expandable
computing resources, but medical devices are sometimes limited or power-constrained.
Figure B.46 shows the three parts that AAMI TIR 57:2016 [6] recommends for security
risk assessment: identifying and managing threats, vulnerabilities and impacts.
Fig. B.46 Security risk assessment process (from [6, p 25])
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ISO/IEC 80001-1:2011 [208] is a standard for the roles, responsibilities and activities
associated with risk management for IT devices. It defines responsibility agreement
as "one or more documents that together fully define the responsibilities of all relevant
stakeholders" [208, clause 2.21] and responsible organisation as "entity accountable
for the use and maintenance of a medical IT-network" [208, clause 2.22]. There
is an emphasis on the human aspect of risk management and assurance, however
MacMahon et al. [280] state that reported barriers for the standard are the lack
of drivers to motivate top management to implement the standard, and a lack of
alignment between the biomedical engineering and IT teams within hospitals. For
the complementary standard that contains controls ISO/IEC 80001-2-2, Anderson
and Williams [22] found that many of the controls have significant gaps, however the
standard does present an effective baseline for cyber security.
The US Food and Drug Administration state that they are working "aggressively to
reduce cybersecurity risks in what is a rapidly changing environment" [137], and they
state that the responsibility is shared between the FDA, manufacturers, providers,
hospitals, patients, researchers and other government agencies. In 2020, FDA Center
for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH) released a discussion paper to propose a
framework with best practices for communicating with patients about cybersecurity
vulnerabilities of their medical devices [325]. It contains easy-to-understand principles
such as keept it timely, relevant and simple, as well as ways to discuss risks and
uncertainty. As with all their guidance, the US Food and Drug Administration aim to
consider the "least burdensome approach" [133, 134] for regulation of medical devices,
therefore they aim to include the least burdensome way to comply with science-based
and legal requirements. The FDA has released several guidance documents relevant
to safety-security risk for medical devices:
• [133] provides general principles that are applicable to cyber security for OTS
devices that are networked. It contains guidance on the requirements to address
security for networked OTS devices. It is in a question-and-answer format
and has 10 questions about patching devices and the need for FDA review in
relation to patching. They state that "review is necessary when a change or
modification could significantly affect the safety or effectiveness of the medical
device" [133, Question 7]. They state that all software design changes should
be validated (including patches), and that security patches do not usually need
to be reported [133, p 5].
• [134] is premarket guidance for medical software devices. They provide levels
of severity of consequences such as life threatening, permanent impairment of
a body function or permanent damage to a body structure which determines
a device’s Level of Concern [134, p 4] - major, moderate, or minor. This
system is similar to Software Integrity Levels, and DALs in aerospace. However,
they recognise that obtaining documentation for software of unknown pedigree
(SOUP) may be difficult, but state that the hazard analysis should encompass
risks associated with it [134]. In addition they recommend that software design
takes into account the liabilities and capabilities of interfaces and networked
software [134].
• [136] is postmarket guidance for the cyber security of medical devices. It
provides definitions of patient harm, exploit, threat, vulnerability and controls.
It also provides principles for cyber security and maintaining safety and essential
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performance. The guidance contains an adapted plan-do-check-act model of
identifying elements and systematically addressing them to control the risk of
patient harm i.e. maintain an acceptible level of residual risk [136, p 19]. They
define patches and security updates as device enhancements which generally
do not need to be reported.
B.2.8 Industrial Control
Industrial control is perhaps one of the application domains where the most work
has been done to create standards to align safety and security. This may be due
to industrial control systems (ICS) controlling much of national infrastructure such
energy, manufacturing, services, etc. Therefore the need to understand the impact
of security on safety is more urgent because of the scale and severity of potential
consequences. IEC 61508:2010 [189], the safety standard that has been adapted
for application to many domains, was originally developed for ICS and the process
industries, however it encapsulates many best practices that are essential to safety
assurance therefore the wide adoption.
IEC 62443
Fig. B.47 IEC 62443 Standards, Technical Reports and Specifications for IACS
(adapted from [5])
IEC 62443 is the security counterpart to IEC 61508 and is comprised of a series of
standards, technical reports and specifications. Figure B.47 shows the documents in
the standard. It draws on general security standards such as the ISO27K-series and
it consists of thirteen parts [5]. Figure B.48 shows the current status of each IEC
62443 document and the hierarchical flow for their use. [190] states that types of
systems that IEC 62443 covers can be articulated using different perspectives such as
functionality, systems and interfaces, criteria based on activities, and criteria based
on assets. The series provides a range of standards and technical reports to support
security assurance using each of those perspectives at multiple layers of system
abstraction. It recognises security challenges such as employing COTS technologies,
remote monitoring and increased visibility of IACS. IEC 62443-1-1 [190] also makes
the distinction between IACS and general purpose ITS, that is where ITS prioritises
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Confidentiality, Integrity then Availability, IACS prioritises Availability/Integrity
then Confidentiality. It uses the risk model proposed by Common Criteria [195]
and defines three types of assets - physical, logical (informational) and human. It
follows the PDCA model for security for handling both passive and active threats.
As well as technical discussion about the IACS system, IEC 62443-1-1 [190] provides
an introduction to the organisational and governance aspects of the standards and
guidance which deal with security policies and procedures.
Fig. B.48 IEC 62443 Status and Hierarchy of use (from [5])
IEC TR 63069
IEC/TR 63069:2020 [191] is a short Technical Report released by the same Technical
Committee responsible for IEC 6150820. It consists of eight parts which deal with
aligning safety and security for IACS. First differences in terms and definitions between
the safety standard IEC 61508 and the security standard 62443 are discussed, the
guiding principles, lifecycle recommendations (including incident response) and risk
assessment considerations are provided. A few of the most significant differences
identified between safety and security include:
• safety is defined in both standards, but security is not explicitly defined for
IEC 61508
• risk is defined as the combination of probability and severity of harm for
safety, and for security as the "expectation of loss expressed as the probability
that a particular threat will exploit a particular vulnerability with a particular
consequence" - the predominant differences is the consequence of the loss or
harm causes
The fundamental model for safety and security that IEC/TR 63069:2020 [191] uses
is that of Safety-related analysis being performed withing a Security perimeter. This
is reflected in the points of interaction shown in Figure B.49 which show safety
informing security of safety details, and conflict resolution during design, however no
flow of information from security to safety at the risk assessment stage. In relation to
trade-off analysis, the technical report states that "While such a clear guideline [for
trade-off analysis] is impossible for all domains, the trade-off process defined should
20IEC Technical committee TC 65: Industrial-process measurement, control and automation.
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contain some guidance on what to consider for the trade-off analysis, for example if
there are priorities, responsibilities for the trade-off decisions and the requirement to
document the result and reason for the decision" [191, clause 7.2]. Whilst this is a
sound recommendation, the guidance does not provide further detail on this point.
Fig. B.49 TR 63069 Safety and Security Risk Assessment (from [191])
There are several researchers and industrial critics of the security perimeter approach
adopted by TR 63069. Ladkin et al. [256] argues that there are necessary and
important steps that are not made explicit in the TR 63069 process. Ladkin writes
that the process can be reduced to the following steps:
"The parts in parentheses are actions which need to be performed, but are not necessarily
explicit in the document.
1. (Do a [Security Risk Analysis (SRA)]. Formulate cybersecurity requirements on the
basis of the SRA, and cybersecurity measures to assure the cybersecurity requirements
are fulfilled.)
2. Define a [Security Environment (SE)] (= the collection of formulated cybersecurity
measures).
3. Perform a (safety) [Risk Analysis (RiskAn)] assuming that cybersecurity is assured.
4. (Then follow the rest of your system development based as usual on the results of that
RiskAn.)
Steps 3 and 4 have some of us say that this approach is very wrong-headed. It is only
reasonable to assume in your RiskAn that cybersecurity is assured if indeed you have made
some attempt to ensure that this is so. But there is no suggestion,anywhere, that your SRA
has to be evaluated for completeness! Just assuming your SE suffices, without making an
explicit effort to check it, is inappropriately rash."
ISA TR 84.09
ISA TR 84.00.09-2017 [193] is another IACS technical guidance document for aligning
cybersecurity to the safety lifecycle. It is produced by ISA and interactions between
safety and security for management, risk analysis, design, installation, operation,
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modification and decommissioning of a system. ISA TR 84.00.09-2017 [193, p 11]
states that "Without addressing cybersecurity throughout the entire safety lifecycle, it
is not possible to adequately understand the relative independence and integrity of
the various layers of protection that involve instrumented systems, including [Safety
Instrumented Systems (SIS)]", Figure B.50 shows an overview of the process and
interactions that they recommend which are linked to the NIST Framework.
Fig. B.50 Cybersecurity Integrated with Process Safety Management (from [193])
HSE IACS
In March 2017, UK HSE released Operational Guidance 86 [174] on the cyber security
of industrial automation and control systems (IACS). The document contains best
practice and guidance on process and requirements for duty holders to comply NIS
regulations. HSE OG-86 [174, p 3] "represents the [HSE] interpretation of current and
developing standards on industrial network, system, and data security, and functional
safety in so far as they relate to major accident workplaces and relevant sectors of
operators of essential services" therefore the document is based on two principles: i)
protect, detect and respond and ii) defence in depth (organisational, protective and
detect/respond countermeasures). Figure B.51 shows the risk process in OG-86.
HSE OG-86 [174, p 9] states that "Appropriate cyber security risk management can
only be achieved if the definition of the countermeasure requirements and the on-going
management of the countermeasures is completed in a systematic way" therefore the
guidance recommends the use of a Cyber Security Managment System (CSMS) based
on the following principles [174, p 10]:
• managing security risk - which includes governance, risk and asset management
and supply chain
• protecting against cyber attack - which includes protection policies, access
control, data and system security, resilient system and staff training
• detecting cyber security events - monitoring and proactive discovery
• minimising impact - response and reovery and lessons learned
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Fig. B.51 Process for Management of Cyber Security on IACS (from [174, p 8])
To achieve these principles, requirements are defined relating to each. Also provided
are definitions of responsible person and specifying requirements to third parties
for supply chain management. The guidance uses the Purdue Enterprise Reference
Architecture (PERA) model21 to represent the different layers of cyber security
protection, as well as providing threat scenarios and technical countermeasures in
Annex tables. This guidance is very extensive and refers to other industry standards
such as IEC 61511 and IEC 62443, however what is missing is the direct links to
safety impact or how to instantiate those links.
IACS Security Summary
Whilst there has been a lot of progress to integrating safety and security for IACS,
there is a trend for system safety to take precedence which may not always be the
case. There is also a acknowledged need for trade-offs in the standards and technical
documents reviewed. Knowles et al. [243] states that there are still gaps, however,
such as "the availability of a comprehensive and robust set of security metrics essential
21This model is used by ISA-99 and is a concept model for ICS network segmentation dived over
5 levels.
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for organisations to meet various business objectives" - these related to modelling
objectives, evaluating compliance and risk posture, resolving subjectivity of risk
assessment. The paper discusses maturity models for security, and ascribes the lack
of maturity models to the precise nature of safety risk analysis [243]; a model for
functional assurance metrics as an example approach to combining multiple standards
and frameworks for cyber security of ICS is also provided (shown in Figure B.52).
Fig. B.52 Functional Assurance Metrics (from [243])
B.2.9 Maritime
The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1974 [379] is
the most important treaty concerning the safety of merchant ships. It consists of a
set of requirements over 14 chapters. There is a long tradition of maritime safety,
with the first version of SOLAS being adopted in 1914 [379]. In 2017, IMO released
MSC-FAL.1 [296] with the purpose of providing "high-level recommendations on
maritime cyber risk management to safeguard shipping from current and emerging
cyberthreats and vulnerabilities". The systems which the recommendations apply
to include bridge systems, access control, communication, cargo handling, etc. In
the guidance, it is stated the vulnerabilities can result from "inadequacies in design,
integration and/or maintenance of systems, as well as lapses in cyberdiscipline". The
guidance follows the PDCA cycle with Identify-Protect-Detect-Respond-Recover
listed as the four main functional elements for cyber risk management [296]. Also
referenced in the guidance is ISO 27001 requirements and the NIST Framework.
In the same year, IMO Maritime Safety Committee adpoted MSC.428 [297] which
provides "high-level recommendations for maritime cyber risk management that can
be incorporated into existing risk management processes and are complementary to the
safety and security management practices established by this Organization" and which
encourages "Administrators to ensure that cyber risks are appropriately addressed
in safety management systems". Both of these guidance documents have a focus on
People, Process and Technology.
The IET has released a Code of Practice for the Cyber Security of Ships [2] which
discusses Maritime Security Regulations, as well as provides guidance on developing
a cyber security assessment (CSA), developing a security plan (CSP) and the socio-
technical factors of managing cybersecurity. The appendices also provide additional
detail about understanding cyber security and threat groups for maritime, risk
acceptance process and supply chain security [2]. The guidance considers several
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sub-attributes of security shown in Figure B.53 which has been adapted from Boyes
[58] work on Cyber-Resilient Supply Chains.
Fig. B.53 Attributes of Cyber Security (from [2])
In 2019, several ports in Europe worked with ENISA to produce extensive guidance
on Port Cybersecurity [3]. This code of practice has information about the regulatory
landscape, port infrastructure, taxonomies of port assets and cyber threats, as well
as information about policies, practices and technical measures [3]. The guidance
lists several cyber security challenges which include [3]:
• lack of digital culture in the port ecosystem i.e. conservative stakeholders and
cyber not considered a priority
• lack of awareness and training regarding cybersecurity
• lack of time and budget allocated to cybersecurity
• lack of human resources and qualified people complexity of the port ecosystem
due to the number and diversity of stakeholders taking part in port operations
e.g. up to 900 for the biggest ports
• need to balance business efficiency and cybersecurity
• legacy systems and practices
• lack of regulatory requirements regarding cybersecurity
• difficulty tracking latest threats
• technical complexity of port IT and OT systems
• IT and OT convergence and interconnection
• supply chain challenges
• strong interdependencies between port systems and servcies, and external
services from other sectors
• new cyber risks introduced as part of digital transformation of ports
In 2020, ENISA released further guidance on risk management for port cyber
security [4] which includes information about identifying cyber-related assets and
services, evaluating cyber threats, identifying security measures and assessing cyber
security maturity.
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B.2.10 Nuclear
For the Nuclear sector, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has released
several key Safety Standards which "provide the fundamental principles, requirements
and recommendations to ensure nuclear safety" [176]. Safety Standard SF-1 [178]
contains 10 fundamental safety principles which include:
• Principle 1 Responsibility for safety
• Principle 2 Role of government
• Principle 3 Leadership and management for safety
• Principle 4 Justification of facilities and activities
• Principle 5 Optimization of protection
• Principle 6 Limitation of risks to individuals
• Principle 7 Protection of present and future generations
• Principle 8 Prevention of accidents
• Principle 9 Emergency preparedness and response
• Principle 10 Protective actions to reducing existing or unregulated radiation
risks
The standard gives guidance and elaborates on each of the principles, for example
Principle 1 states that "The prime responsibility for safety must rest with the person
or organization responsible for facilities and activities that give rise to radiation
risks" [178, p 6]. In addition, there are several safety requirements standards, specific
safety requirements and general safety guides that elaborate on the principles, such
as Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety [180] requirements.
For security, IAEA has released the Nuclear Security Series which "provides international
consensus guidance on all aspects of nuclear security to support States as they work
to fulfil their responsibility for nuclear security" [177]. It is comprised of four types
of publications - Nuclear security fundamentals, recommendations, implementation
guides and technical guidance. The Security Fundamentals guidance [179] has 12
elements which are:
• Essential Element 1: State responsibility
• Essential Element 2: Identification and definition of nuclear security responsi-
bilities
• Essential Element 3: Legislative and regulatory framework
• Essential Element 4: International transport of nuclear material and other
radioactive material
• Essential Element 5: Offences and penalties including criminalization
• Essential Element 6: International cooperation and assistance
• Essential Element 7: Identification and assessment of nuclear security threats
• Essential Element 8: Identification and assessment of targets and potential
consequences
• Essential Element 9: Use of risk informed approaches
• Essential Element 10: Detection of nuclear security events
• Essential Element 11: Planning for, preparedness for, and response to a nuclear
security event
• Essential Element 12: Sustaining a nuclear security regime
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Note the differences to safety where the responsibility lay with a person or organisation.
In the Security Series there is also a strong bias towards physical security, however
Specific Safety Requirements standard for new reactors SSR-3 [181] does have the
requirement: "Requirement 90: Interfaces between nuclear safety and nuclear security
– The interfaces between safety and security for a research reactor facility shall be
addressed in an integrated manner throughout the lifetime of the reactor. Safety
measures and security measures shall be established and implemented in such a
manner that they do not compromise one another". This acknowledges that safety
and security must be aligned but does not provide guidance on how this is to be
achieved. Requirement 17 – Consideration of objectives of nuclear security in safety
programmes in Specific Safety Guide 48 for Ageing Management of Nuclear Power
Plants [182] explicitly requires that "The operating organization shall ensure that the
implementation of safety requirements and security requirements satisfies both safety
objectives and security objectives" and that " Safety and security measures shall be
designed and implemented in such a manner that they do not compromise each other.
The operating organization shall establish mechanisms to resolve potential conflicts
and to manage safety–security interfaces".
At national level, many countries have their own guidance for safety and security.
For example, the UK Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) has released the Safety
Assessment Principles (SAPS) [313] for Nuclear Facilities which contains several
fundamental principles and safety principles for leadership, regulation, engineering,
protection, fault analysis, radioactive waste management, and decommissioning. To
complement the SAPS, ONR also released the Security Assessment Principles for
the Civil Nuclear Industry [314] which also contains fundamental security principles
as well as principles for regulation, responsibilities of the state, lifecycle application
of SyAPS, security delivery principles, and security plan principles.
In addition to IAEA standards and national standards, there are international
standards for software of nuclear power plants, such as BS EN 60880:2009 [62] which
provides guidance on information security aspects.
B.2.11 Rail
In the rail sector, the CENELEC EN 5012X standards are the main safety standards.
They are:
EN 50126-1:2017 – Railway Applications - The Specification and Demonstration of
Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety (RAMS) - Part 1: Generic
RAMS Process
EN 50126-2:2017 – Railway Applications - The Specification and Demonstration of
Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety (RAMS) - Part 2: Systems
Approach to Safety
EN 50128:2011 – Railway applications - Communication, signalling and processing
systems - Software for railway control and protection systems
EN 50129:2019 – Railway applications -Communication, signalling and processing
systems - Safety related electronic systems for signalling
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The 2020 Amendment 2 of EN 50128:2011 [121] added the statement "This European
Standard does not specify the requirements for the development, implementation,
maintenance and/or operation of security policies or security services needed to meet
security requirements that may be needed by the safety-related system. IT security
can affect not only the operation but also the functional safety of a system. For IT
security, appropriate IT security standards should be applied" which therefore excludes
discussion about security interaction points within the standard, possibly making it
more difficult for practitioners to understand the correct points of interaction.
In order to address this potential issue, TS 50701:2021 [409] the standard for Railway
Applications Cybersecurity is currently awaiting approval and publication. From
a review of a public consultation draft, the intent of the TS is to provide further
guidance on cybersecurity activities during the Railway System Life Cycle. TS
50701:2021 [409] provides information about system specification, system definition
and high-level risk assessment, detailed risk assessment, creating system-specific
security requirements, as well as assurance, acceptance, maintenance and operational
considerations. A major advantage of this standard is its adaptation specifically to
rail with requirements descriptions, details and notes for railway.
Even with the advancements with rail cybersecurity, the 2020 Railway Cybersecurity
report from ENISA highlights several challenges such as [125]:
• low cybersecurity awareness in the section
• difficulty reconciling the safety and security worlds due to competence, training
and awareness
• digital transformation of railway core business e.g. IoT added without the
correct procurement structures
• dependence on supply chain for cybersecurity
• geographic spread of railway infrastructure and legacy systems
• the need to balance security, competitiveness and efficiency









Safety-Security Assurance Framework (SSAF) STM Argument Schemes 
 
Guide Factor Common Conflict Critical Questions 
Conceptual 
Clutter There are redundant processes and models between safety and 
security 
- Are process steps being duplicated between the attributes? 
- Is the same information being analysed in the same way? 
Cost The assurance activities and resources needed for one attribute 
are disproportionate to another e.g. more tasks, analysis, etc. 
- Are the assurance activities balanced between the two attributes? 
See also: Proportionality 
Culture Due to the uncertainty levels in security the culture (compared 
to safety) may be a lot more flexible and expect change, even 
with good cyberhygiene, etc. 
- What is the culture for the two attributes? 
- What are the different perspectives on change over time? 
See also: Temporal 
Goals The lack of aligned goals is at the root of many points of 
divergence e.g. which analyses are chosen, how assurance 
cases are presented, etc. 
- Are the goals presented aligned? 
- At what level of abstraction do the goals diverge (if at all)? e.g. at 
component level 
Proportionality The assurance activities are not sufficient for the risk level or 
imbalanced between the attributes e.g. a lower safety risk is 
treated before a higher (uncertain) security risk. 
- How are resources for assurance activities assigned? 
- Is there a process for correcting imbalances between the 
attributes? 
Risk Concept There may be conflict in the model of risk utilised e.g. safety 
uses ALARP in many application domains, however there is no 
legal or regulatory equivalent for security 
- What are the implications of the risk model used? 
- Is the risk reduction method practical for both attributes? 
Temporal Goals, analyses, decisions, etc are all at fixed times during 
assurance. The interaction risk of these being out of sync 
between the attributes must be explicitly addressed. 
- Are the dependencies of the processes and goals of the attributes 
understood through time? 
- Are any differences in considerations of time resolved? 
See also: Information Needs, Synchronisation 
Structure 
Communication The means and content for communication is not made explicit - What organisational model is used for safety and security? 
- If it is separate, have the points of communication been 
documented, with communication content made clear? 
 
Governance It is difficult to resolve conflicts between goals at project-level if 
goals higher up the organisational structure have not been 
resolved e.g. there might be no incentive to work together  
- What shared goals and responsibilities are present at governance 
level for safety and security? 
- Does the organisational structure promote working together? 
Responsibility Allocation of responsibility for additional risks that arise from 
the interaction between safety and security; an analogy is the 
systems integrator being responsible for interfaces 
- Who is responsible for the interaction risks between safety and 
security? (i.e. those risks that are propagated across domains) 
People 
Competence Whilst there are similarities in process for safety and security, 
the risk-specific knowledge and expertise required is often very 
different. Practitioners performing analyses should be 
sufficiently knowledgeable and skilled to perform the task 
- Is a practitioner being asked to reason about risk outside of the 
primary domain? e.g. safety practitioner reasoning about security 
- How are the deficits in knowledge of the other domain, or skills 
ameliorated? 
Process 
Approach This refers to the approach to the entire assurance process. For 
example, if safety has the ALARP concept, then the approach 
will be driven by establishing levels of risk then reducing it, 
however security’s approach may be not to trust risk 
estimations as much because of the levels of uncertainty 
- Is the underlying philosophy of the approach being used likely to 
conflict with the other attribute? 
Information Needs Information required to perform a process task is unavailable 
e.g. safety analysis requires all the threats that contribute to a 
hazard be included, however threat analysis has not taken place 
- How well are the information dependencies between safety and 
security articulated and understood? 
Synchronisation There may be a lack of synchronisation between the attributes 
in processes leading to divergence in goals, requirements, etc 
- To what extent are synchronisation points established and 
documented? 
- Are there a sufficient number of synchronisation points? 
Trade-Off Many aspects from individual domains may conflict such as 
goals, requirements, controls, etc. Without a structured 
approach to resolve and record these trade-offs there is a 
chance that the attributes will diverge 
- Is there a procedure and point in time for making trade-offs of 
goals, resources, conflicts in requirements, etc? 
- Are each of the trade-offs enumerated? 
- How are trade-off decisions and assumptions recorded? 
Technology 
Measure Risk is measured and recorded in conflicting ways that cannot 
be reconciled later, an analogy is recording the wrong units 
- Is the risk measure quantitative or qualitative? 
- What assumptions underly the measure of risk? 
See also: Risk Concept 
Method There may be a conflict in the steps taken to perform a method, 
e.g. safety analyses only take into account the risk that could 
- What are the assumptions of the method? 
 
cause harm, however security requires information about many 
more risks such as confidentiality breaches  
- Do the steps in the method contribute to reaching goals in both 
safety and security? 
Model Each model has underlying assumptions and constraints. 
Models from one domain are not always sufficient for the 
needs from the other e.g. if timing in an attack is important for 
security, then it is not enough to provide a safety risk analysis 
based on a control structure model only 
- What are the underlying assumptions and constraints of the 
model? 
- To what extent does the model satisfy needs from both safety and 
security? 
Technology Different intellectual, practical and modelling tools are used in 
each domain. Often they are fine-tuned to one attribute over 
the other 
- Are the models, thinking and implemented support tools sufficient 
for alignment of safety and security? 
 
Note 1 These schemes (patterns) were designed to analyse organisations and projects, so some may need significant adaptation when applied to standards 
Note 2 Security refers to Cyber security, and safety refers to System safety 
Note 3 Domain, attribute, quality attribute and discipline all used to refer to safety and security 
Note 4 There may be many more examples of the particular factor than those described 
Note 5 Interaction risk – refers to the additional risk and impact that is propagated between safety and security; both in the system under analysis, and in the 
assurance processes used to assure the system 
Note 6 For any questions or feedback, please contact Nikita Johnson using email nlj500 <at> york.ac.uk 
Stage Pre Ont Proc Arg Sys Comp Upd Description
Co-assurance Claim (Socio-Technical Considerations) Type Gen Man S1 S2 S3 S4a S4b S5
1 There is a way of identifying and mitigating the sources of critical information miscommunication Approach Assurance risk identification process
2 Complementary standards are used for co-assurance Approach
Policy and project level decisions to use compatible assurance processes is required. If they are not explicitly linked, 
then those links must be determined beforehand
3 Governance process is sufficient for integration Approach The governance framework for the organisation supports co-assurance activities
4 Managing scale and complexity, understanding of complex interactions Approach Co-assurance should fit within a robust organisational and project level approach to managing complexity
5 The approaches used are appropriate to the phase/level of abstraction Approach
Related to the assurance surface. The goals and intent of using an approach is suited to the phase or abstraction level 
which it is applied to. In addition, complementary approaches should be selected
6 The PDCA loop is appropriately closed Approach
The process for incorporating actions of the system is clear across both domains e.g. an action from a security 
perspective can be used as feedback in safety
7 The integration is extensible to consider other attributes that affect safety-security Approach
Processes and tools selected for co-assurance should support alignment and not be so restrictive that information that 
is significant and valuable is discarded - for example if a modelling tool does not allow for representations of certain 
types of relationship it should be changed for one that does have the desired level of expressive power.
8 The way that teams currently work has been considered, the transition mapping is clear Approach
There is an understanding of the differences between the work-as-imagined and work-as-done. The alignment 
approach adopted takes into account these differences.
9
Epistemic uncertainties that have been “designed out” by adoption of a quantitative measure are 
addressed Approach
Where a formalism has been made such as quantifying risk, a clear process for understanding and explicitly recording 
epistemic uncertainty must be in place. For example combining risk measures and having a log of assumptions.
10 Systematic process for deciding when to work in either domain and when to improve single risk Approach
An approach should be in place that indicates to pracitioners when a risk should be handled in a single domain, when it 
should be handed to the other domain and when to work on it together
11 Duplicates have been minimised as far as possible Clutter
This includes duplicates in processes, models, information, etc. To reduce complexity and clutter, obsolete items or 
tasks are removed
12 The safety, security and development teams are not separate Communication This is project by project
13 There are standardised models to minimise cross domain miscommunication Communication Process and structured needed at organisation level e.g unified policy
14 It is practical for the practitioners to use the prescribed communication methods Communication The tools, documentation, models used are not burdensome
15 Expert knowledge models are accessible beyond the domain it orginates from Communication This is for knowledge sharing. Practitioners will not understand if there is not the structure, understanding or models
16 There are common channels and language for communicating about risk Communication Project by project - a common dictionary based on the standards being used
17 Use of language is standardised enough to facilitate communication Communication
Communication on different levels for different goals - regulatory, organisational and project. For project this should be 
documented.
18 There are sufficient domain experts from both domains Competence For the analyses that are to be performed there are enough competent experts to perform the method
19 Known cognitive biases that affect interaction are effectively handled Competence Identify the specific biases per stage and have a plan to address these
20 Practitioners are competent to perform this integration Competence Specific competencies are identified per method and practitioners skills compared against.
21 Ad-hoc expert knowledge sharing is justified Competence
Where experts are used for knowledge sharing, context, their assumptions and goals must be provided. This 
information must be made available if there are changes
22 Expert knowledge is utilised in an appropriate way Competence
For each co-assurance task where expert knowledge is needed, an analysis is performed beforehand to determine that 
the practitioner whose knowledge is being used is sufficient and appropriate
23 The resources costs of obtaining the evidence to support an integration claim are not disportionate Cost A sustainable way of collecting, analyse and updating co-assurance information and evidence should be in place
24 Cultures for both attributes sufficiently established Culture Mindset towards safety and security set at a high level
25 Conflicting values have been identified and addressed e.g. openness vs. security through obscurity Culture Conflict points in values for a particular project are identified early on
26 Integration process/modelling choices are made appropriately and justified Decision Process for identifying integration choices, and reasoning for selecting an approach or model provided
27 There is mapping between the two characterisations of risk for integration Governance
The domains within an organisation must not be so silo'ed such that there exist numerous barriers to information 
sharing and the assurance cost of alignment is inflated.
28 Uncertainty associated with interaction risks is managed Governance
There is a cultural, structural and methodological mechanism for handling uncertainty introduced by interactions. 
Whether this is training, ensuring correct communication paths or keeping lists of assumptions. At each level 
interactions must be able to be managed.
29 Mismatch between manpower is addressed in the processes Governance
If there is a mismatch between the number of skilled pratitioners needed to perform synchronisation tasks then this is 
considered and addressed, for example a big ratio difference between safety practitioners and security practitioners
30 Agile does not affect information needs of integration Info Needs This is part of synchronisation. Making sure that processes for system, safety and security have sync points
31 Factors affecting the availability of cross-domain information are identified and addressed Info Needs
Planning for synchronisation points by managing the factors that would increase the chance that co-assurance 
information was not available
32 If something is missing from a decision, it is recorded, so when it is available it can be implemented Info Needs
Similar to the requirements ticketing, decisions that affect co-assurance are recorded. Especially in the case where 
some information is not available
33 Model based does not affect information needs of integration Info Needs
The risk of a model-based approach interfering with the information needs of co-assurance have been explicitly 
addressed
34 There is no significant lost information Info Needs Information goals for safety and security for a process or model are maintained through multiple levels
35 There is sufficient information transferred Info Needs An understanding of completeness of co-assurance information is established e.g. heuristics for a model
36 Challenges have not been disregarded to unify Info Needs
Information about challenges or co-assurance issues that could not be solved at a point in time are not discarded 
because they did not fit an argument. These are stored and/or expalained as part of the co-assurance case
37 Individual domain practices are sufficient for co-assurance goals Info Needs
Where co-assurance goals place a requirement on existing assurance practice, these needs must be identified and 
satisfied
38 Qualitative are not being used for domains beyond their capabilities Measure
Qualitative and quantitative meathods have their limitations. Whichever is selected, its limitations have been taken in to 
account
Stage Pre Ont Proc Arg Sys Comp Upd Description
Co-assurance Claim (Socio-Technical Considerations) Type Gen Man S1 S2 S3 S4a S4b S5
39 Quantitative measures have been used for sensitivity analysis Measure
Quantitative representation has many limitations when used for more than sensitivity analysis. If this is not the case, 
then it use needs to be justified
40 Measures have been appropriately mapped Measure
Understanding that using numerical representation is treating a qualitative aspect as more formal. Understanding that 
there are differences between qualitative measure across domains.
41 Methods are clear about what co-assurance claims/requirements can be made and which can’t Method For the co-assurance process and argument, it is clear what claims selected methods can be used as a basis for
42 There is a model and process for risk propagation Method There is a model and supporting process that delivers sufficient information about risk cross-domain in a timely manner
43 Updates to risk during operation are acceptably managed Method There is a minimum acceptable standard for updating risk cross-domain that is adhered to.
44 Probability is used only for appropriate applications Model
The use of hard measures is justified, with reasoning provided about the appropriateness of specific asignations to 
achieve that probability
45 The limitations associated with text based representations are addressed Model
Where a text-based representation has been selected, sufficient justification is provided for using this. Text can be 
difficult to parse and therefore difficult to do cross-domain propagation of impact
46 An good conceptual model has been selected to represent the two Model
Vital to the communication and argumentation processes is a clear conceptual model that gives details about how a 
particular organisation or team communicates about shared concepts. This model should be established as early as 
possible.
47 Argument structures support the integration of the attributes Model
For example a process argument structure and a risk-based outcome structure cannot be easily combined because 
they are talking about different things.
48 The argument in either domain is sufficiently understood to assess impact Model
Work must be done in the individual domains to understand the impact of risk and the claims that are being made. 
During the alignment process conflict between claims is likely to arise and a good understanding of the single 
assurance case will help with defining what the joint case looks like and resolving conflict.
49 The types of uncertainty are characterised in a useful way Model
In the early stages of a project, it is important to understand the ways that risk can occur and characterise them in 
simple and clear terms in order to be understood by non-experts. This is particularly important when trying to link 
conditions.
50 There are standardised models Model There exist standardised models that can be referred to for alignment.
51 There is sufficient previous data to understand interactions Model
Sources of information regarding the possible links and their nature should be accumulated before the interactions are 
modelled.
52 Uncertainty about risk is systematically and adequately recorded Model
At each stage a log of the assumptions and uncertainty that exists is recorded so that it can be resolved when more 
information is available.
53 What constitutes a joint model is defined Model
Models are created with particular goals and values in mind. Minimum criteria must be created to assess whether a 
model meets both safety and security goals.
54 The shortfalls of the security model do not have a disproportionately negative impact on safety Model If there is information that is important to safety, then this should be represented in security models
55 The shortfalls of the safety model do not have a disproportionately negative impact on security Model If there is information that is important to security, then this should be represented in safety models
56 Characterisations are reasonable, justified and related e.g. likelihood, severity Ontology Evidence for creating particular links is required e.g. from standards or from a particular meeting
57 There is a common ontology Ontology
Fundamental to communication and interconnecting claims across domains is having a common understanding of the 
terms used for the arguments.
58 There is a shared dictionary of risk terms Ontology There should be a written and stored dictionary that can be easily accessed by stakeholders in the alignment activities.
59 There is a common ontology and technical mapping between safety and security Ontology
This is integral to the ability to communicate and negotiate/lower risk. There must exist a shared language and 
uncerstanding of linkages between conditions.
60 Amount of dedicated process for alignment Proportionality
Consideration has been made about the amount of extra work and temporal constraints required by alignment. People 
resource and technical support should be in place to support the alignment strategy. It is impractical to have an close 
alignment strategy but insufficient expertise to support it for example.
61 Measures control risk proportional to the magnitude of the risk itself (Zakaszweska, 2016) Proportionality The resource used to mitigate and control risk is commensurate with the level of risk
62 The integration is proportional to the risk e.g threats with many resources and motivation Proportionality
In the case that one domain has high impact risk that is likely to propagate, the risk should be treated with the same 
level
63 The resources of performing a method are not disproportionate to the co-assurance requirement Proportionality
Use of resources for co-assurance should be justified according to the requirement. If the integration risk is low then 
lots of resources should not be used to analyse, mitigate, monitor the risk when they could be used for other assurance 
activities in single domains
64
Time, competence, level of evidence and level of assurance are proportionate to the level of 
itneration risk Proportionality Resources should be allocated wisely, commensurate with the risk present
65 Conflicting requirements have been identified and addressed Requirements Stage specific. There should be a process for identifying conflicting safety and security requirements on the system
66 There is a process for recording possible requirements conflicts Requirements
Once a requirements conflict has been identified there should be a way to input it in to a shared database to be 
addressed e.g. Ticketing system. Responsibility and a process for addressing these conflicts should also be 
established.
67 Authority and responsibility of integration is defined and is balanced Responsibility
Responsibility for resolving conflicts or negative impact between safety and security, and deciding action is likely to 
change throughout the system lifecycle. These responsibilities and actions should be explicitly documented as part of 
the alignment plan.
68 The correct/appropriate/trustworthy causal models have been used between the two attributes Risk
An analysis is only as good as its underlying causal model. Ensure that factors that would affect the use of a chosen 
model have been addressed.
69 It is clear what constitutes a joint representation of risk Risk Strategies and philosophies of joint risk should be reached before attempting to create an aligned model or argument.
70 Safety risk has been adequately characterised for integration (severity x likelihood) Risk Correct model for risk should be selected with respect to the required integration.
71 Security risk is not oversimplified Risk
Analysis and alignment processes start with sufficient information and do not throw away significant security risk 
information in order to make the analysis work.
Stage Pre Ont Proc Arg Sys Comp Upd Description
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72 Risk is acceptably propagated between safety and security Risk
This is in regards to the mechanism or process by which risk is updated in the individual domains. There should be 
sufficient confidence that the proopagatin will happen correctly
73 Practitioners are aware of the capabilities and resources of attackers w.r.t. safety risk Security For example documented threat levels in general and for the system. People with competence to read them.
74 Practitioners are aware of the target and motivations of potential attackers w.r.t. safety risk Security Tools and models needed to see where this can undermine the arguments
75 Damage from cyber attacks is adequately evaluated for the purposes of integration Security Adequate needs to be defined that is acceptable to both safety and security.
76 Particular attacks related to the integration are well understood e.g. cyberterrorism Security Attacks motivated by safety impact are well understood for the system and communicated.
77 Indicators for attack likelihood are reasoned and decomposition is clear (e.g. access and opportunity) Security Threat motivation traceability is clear; especially when there is a safety motivation for an attack
78 Security risks with an indirect safety impact are actively identified and addressed Security
There are several security risks, such as those to confidentiality, that do not have a direct impact on safety. These must 
be identified and reasoned about withing the given system
79 Implications of benevolent operator vs intelligent adversary handled Security
Even though conditions might be reached by both safety and security routes, it is important to consider if the 
adversarial aspect of security has an impact e.g. muptiple cause failures being more likely than for safety.
80 Model of security is reasonable for the application domain e.g. security perimeter Security
Trade-off decision concerning which security concept and strategy will be used. This will ultimately affect the ways in 
which the attributes and their arguments can be aligned.
81 Security harm established sufficient for integration Security
Definitions of what a security loss are established and sufficiently stable that they can be compared to safety loss 
implications. Without a relatively stable definition of security loss co-assurance trade-offs cannot be made.
82 Security risk has been adequately characterised for integration Security
As well as knowing what security loss is, it is important to have clear indicators of when this has happened so that it 
can be identified.
83 The information dependencies for co-analyses have been identified and addressed Synchronisation Understanding the information dependencies, co-assurance risks related to these and addressing them
84 Predictive measures are clear and justfied Synchronisation The models for prediction are well modelled or documented. The basis for the prediction is provided.
85 Measures of risk are not lossy Synchronisation
Where a co-assurance approach creates a measure, the goals for each attribute for that approach must be met e.g. no 
required information thrown away.
86 The link between safety and security is not obscured as possible Synchronisation Where safety and security are linked it is done exclitly and with justification.
87 The semantics of the integration method are unambiguous enabling better understanding Synchronisation What information is being shared should be explicit from the model.
88 Where techniques are applied from a single domain, their limitations have been counterbalanced Synchronisation
Techniques from a single domain have particular goals. Before being used as a medium for synchronisation, the 
limitations of an approach must be explicitly addressed or mitigated.
89 Differences in maturity of the analyses are addressed Synchronisation
This is a synchronisation risk. If a strategy for mismatches between the two assurance processes is not explictly 
created, the co-assurancemay be incorrect 
90 There is a reasoned approach to identifying major updates Synchronisation
There is a systematic way to determine whether a change triggers an update or a sync point. Particularly relevant when 
vulnerability updates are made to security
91 Reduction (divide-and-conquer) methodology used at synchronisation Synchronisation
This is a cross-cutting concern. There are limitations to using this approach to synchronisations, but it can also make 
co-assurance manageable. As a result a systematic way of dividing is used in each abstraction context
92 Model divergence is kept as minimal as possible Synchronisation
A major synchronisation risk is the divergence of models - conceptual and documented. Processes, tools and 
structures should identify and support the synchronisation points and reduce divergence
93 The interaction risks has been systematically and traceably identified Synchronisation The risks at the interaction points identified have been identified and reasoned about
94 There are physical meetings to integrate the two attributes Synchronisation
Physical meetings imply better ad-hoc communication. The claim here is thatphysical meetings are benefitial when 
establishing an ontology to integrate the attributes.
95 The attribute processes are not completely independent, they are no silo-ed Synchronisation
At an organisational/governance level, policies must be put in place to prevent lack of communication across domain 
boundaries. These policies will influence structure, culture and the way in which teams assure systems.
96 Alignment processes are not mismatched Synchronisation
Where there is a co-assurance requirement for the two domains to exchange information, effort must be made to 
ensure that this is possible and not constrained by differences in assurance stage, for example
97 Mutual update when significant change happens Synchronisation
Update when change happens should be a feedback look between the domains rather than a one-way flow to ensure 
better reasoning about the impact
98 Processes are sufficiently synchronised Synchronisation There are a sufficient number of synchronisation points to meet the information needs for co-assurance
99 Subtle interactions are modelled and accounted for Synchronisation
During the process for identifying interaction risks, extra effort should be committed to identifying risks that are not 
obvious such as confidentiality-related security risks having an impact on safety risks
100 Synchronisation activities take place at the correct time Synchronisation
Many single-domain assurance activities rely on information from synchronisation points to increase confidence. Effort 
must be made to ensure that the synchronisation activties occur when they are needed.
101 This integration point is bi-directional Synchronisation
There is often a focus on security-informed safety, however safety must inform security of concerns that are likely to 
affect security risks
102 There is sufficient time allocated to perform required co-analyses Temporal Project pre-planning. Allocating resources and resolving any deficits
103 Artefacts and information are available for cross domain analysis Temporal Once Synchronisation points are established, the required information must be available.
104 Relevant information is provided in a timely manner to influence engineering Temporal
Temporal requirement on information - that it's available for the engineering decisions that use it e.g.  safety or security 
requirements that drive a particular architecture
105 Workflow tools are extended to handle both (Schmittner, Althammer, & Gruber, 2015) Tool
Tools that support both attributes should be available and configured for their intended use. Failing to ensure this could 
lead to information bottlenecks.
106 There are appropriate tools and mechanisms to reconcile safety and security requirements Tool
The tools selected to represent the safety and security requirements should enable consideration of those requirements 
together
107 The different types of trade off are understood – inverse proportionality Trade-off The pivot points are identified and documented so that there is an awareness when trade-off decisions are made.
108 The heterogeneity of safety and security philosophies, princples and standards has been addressed Trade-off Some specific pivot points to trade off for a project
109 There is an accepted cross domain definition of risk Trade-off There should be some kind of understanding of how risk from the invidual domains relates to each other.
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110 From a security perspective information that needs to be kept hidden is Trade-off
Information hiding is a valid and effective strategy for security. In the SoE and during assurance security information 
must be kept hiden unless it is required for co-assurance
111 Know which takes precedence in which situations Trade-off Understanding which attribute should be prioritised at various stages
112 Conflict resolution and negotiation process is transparent Trade-off
Conflict between the attributes will inevitably arise. It is important that there is a clear process for resolving these issues 
for fast and consistent co-assurance
113 Conflicts of concerns are identified, and resolved systematically and reproduceably Trade-off
Where a conflict arises, the details are recorded with objections. If there is a change later in the system lifecycle, 
assumptions and reasoning must be available to understand why one choice was made of another
114 Impact of trade-off decisions is monitored for impact and the results incorporated in a timely fashion Trade-off
Trade-offs should be documented with assumptions and expected outcomes. Whether these outcomes occur should be 
monitored and compared against the documented expectations. This iterative update cycle helps to ensure that the 
decisions are validated and the action taken is correct. 
115 Security does not hinder safety where the consequences are disproportionate Trade-off
Where there is a big impact to safety risk, it should take precedence in the analysis. There should be a procedure for 
determining precedence
116 The trade-off decisions and choices are clear and all options are valid and available Trade-off
When reasoning about the governance of co-assurance, the scope of decision making and trade-off options are 
understood
117 Trade off made systematically traceably and transparently Trade-off The trade-offs that affect co-assurance are explicitly recorded for traceability and understanding
118 Conditions are linked correctly and appropriately in the models Understanding This addresses cross-domain causal links which should be both syntactically and semantically correct.
119 Cyber-physical interactions are understood enough to facilitate integration Understanding
Understanding of engineering causal interactions and the effects in the real world in order to create an accurate model 
for integration.
120 Domain specific considerations of the integration have been made (Kriaa et al., 2015) Understanding Knowledge surrounding what is required in a single domain in order to integrate, and articulate in alignment meetings.
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Fig. D.1 Socio-Technical Interactions.
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Table D.1 Socio-Technical Modelling





Structured Responsibility Model. Responsibility modelling tool for risk analysis e.g. to support
contingency planning in the event of civil emergencies. Constructing these models allows






Temporal Framework. Utilises the concept of Time Band Modelling to create formal
representations of relationships (Mappings) between Bands, Activities, and Events using
Clocks and Precedence Relations to describe Behaviours.
Dobson
[111]
Structured Challenges the view of security of at the time that focussed on defining security in terms
of access to resources. Proposed new paradigms that elaborated on existing work to gain




Structured Responsibility defining Role in ORDIT model. "Need-to-Know" security policy comprised
of things people needs to do, things to know and things to record for subsequent audit.
Sommerville
et al. [381]
Structured Information Requirements. Focus on deriving information requirements for systems that




Formal Security Socio-Technical Modelling. Tool and formalism for security evaluation of
Socio-Technical Physical Systems (STPSs) that addresses the limitations of preceding
techniques, i.e. providing attack feasibility instead of likelihood, or oversimplistic
representation of likelihood of a subset of attacks.
[252] Structured Static and Dynamic Security Metrics. Layered view to classify measurements using the
Security by Consensus (SBC) model.
[15] Structured Socio-Tech Model of Supply Chain. Two part model with STS and SBC models.












Structured Goal-Oriented STS Security Requirements modelling using concept of social commitments.
Maps high-level organisational abstractions to design. Automated reasoning support using
STS-ml (security requirements modelling language).
Safety [142] Semi-
Formal
CONCERTO-FLA tool for failure logic analysis in socio-technical systems. Based on
FPTC and MTO (Man, Technology and Organisation) - Human Factors conceptualisation
that orginates in Sweden.
General
[411] Simulation Socio-Technical Simulation. NetWatch developed as a multi-agent simulation to model
socio-technical interactions of People, Knowledge, Resources, and Tasks. Defines a




Informal Creativity Workshops using RESCUE (Requirements Engineering with Scenarios for a
User-Centered Environment.Although, they do not state what happens to the ideas once






Semi-strucutred modelling method (SeeMe) to represent concepts to be developed,
evaluated and improved with Socio-Technical Walkthrough (STWT). Gives capability to
represent contingency, explicit incompleteness, multiplicity of perspectives and
meta-relations.
[418] Formal Formal modelling to manage conflict management during requirements elaboration.
Divergence patterns and heuristics are specified. Three-level view of where inconsistencies
can occur - process, product and instance.
Integration Bygstad
et al. [64]




Structured Supply Chain Modelling. Supply chains as complex adaptive systems modelling using
three simulation paradigms on macro- and micro-level processing considering the
characteristics of STS, such as heterogeneity, emergence, co-evolution, etc.
gen [421] quantified Large-scale data-driven method for modelling STS. Relies on connecting nodes via




gen [316] Modelling social elements and relations within as system (not just using them as
contextual information as is done in IEEE Std 1220-1998). Defines relations between
social and technical elements of a system.
[21] Modelling STS for UK transport sector energy pathways. What-if scenario-based analysis
to reduce car travel and halve energy demand. Highlights the trade-off between
technological fixes and demand reduction.
gen [304] simulation STS Co-evolution modelling method based on agent interactions and rules. The aim is to
help decision makers understand the impact of change in the future.
[321] Agent-based model to analyse the complex dynamics of, and understand change on large
STS. An example of the introduction of small-scale, localised technological systems into
pre-existing, crentralised systems of German wastewater treatment is given.
safety [37] Using the Safety Modelling Language to specify barriers at different levels. Behaviour of
the barriers is then investigated using a Petri Net-based formal description technique.
gen [434] simulation A framework for agent-based STS analysis. Uses Business Process Modelling Notation and
Hybrid Queue-based Bayesian Networks in a three layered view to analyses behaviour,




walkthrough Scenario walk-through approach to generate STS requirements. Applied the
CREWS-SAVRE scenario approach to naval traffic management system for BAE Systems,




structured Bow-Tie style risk analysis of safety barriers to prevent a hazard and mitigate
consequences. Bayes Net example is provided of a propane tank explosion, determining





structured Hazard Modelling that considers Intent and wider facters such as Method and Constraints

















Formal Flow logic-based analysis of social aspects of a system to enable inclusion in formal
analysis. Example provided of theft of cake from a bakery.
gen Patel [324] Structured Role Activity Diagrams for processes within the UK NHS. This is a process driven
approach in contrast to most data-driven requirements elicitation approaches. Elicit
important roles and interactions in the STS.
gen Rasmussen
[346]
Strutured Cross-disciplinary Framework to model socio-technical interactions across several levels of
abstraction.




Framework and Process for combining both conceptual models and computational




Mixed STEAL Framework (Socio-TEchnical Attack AnaLysis) provides a reference model and
procedural methodologies for modelling security human-computer interactions.
gen Wilson
et al. [432]
Structured Distributed Cognition Tool for system ergonomics (STS)
data Coakes and
Coakes [76]
Structured Information system data model that reflects competing and conflicting data from multiple
perspectives and stakeholders. Initial model coded from ethnographic research to ensure it
was based on accurate data.
gen Baxter et al.
[40]
Structured Design Knowledge Reuse Framework. Based on modelling processes, tasks and product
model interactions; and reuse "patterns".
gen [171] Structured Transparency Model as an STS Requirement. Information Transparency underlies and
influences other social requirements such as privacy, trust, collaboration and non-bias.
Transparency modelling is proposed as a way of explicitly capturing requirements for
transparency and information needs.
gen Aydemir
[32, p.82]
Structured Meta-model for risk analysis in STS. Description of the relations between goals, anti-goals,
risk, cost, reward and other features.

Appendix E
SSAF Evaluation Case Studies
E.1 STM Scheme Case Studies
The purpose of these case studies is to evaluate the SSAF STM factors for eliciting
and analysing socio-technical factors that would affect co-assurance.
E.1.1 ONR Workshop Results
The objective of this evaluation case study is to use the expertise and experience
of the workshop participants to evaluate parts of SSAF and to validate some of the
reasoning that went into its creation. This section is structured in three parts: the
workshop approach is provided, then the results are presented, finally the significance
of the results is discussed.
ONR Case Study Approach
Workshop details:
Date - Two workshops were held remotely in October 2020
Participants - 12 safety and security inspectors from Office for Nuclear Regulation
(ONR) (balanced between the disciplines)
Duration 8 hours total
Format - Workshops run over two consecutive days
Method 1. Preparatory work before workshop: Analysis of SyAPS and SAPS
principles documents using STM Schemes to establish overlap or gaps
2. Day 1: Present SSAF and small exercise on applying TRM Process
3. Day 2: TRM Process recap, STM presentation, then discussion about
SAPS/SyAPS results
4. Present questionnaire for completion after workshop
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ONR Coding Results & Findings
Figure E.2 shows a chart of the most frequent codes and their percentage in the data.
There were 85 coded references from the data. Comments about responsibility have
the highest coverage at 15%, closely followed by 12% of codes about the framework
itself - SSAF. The reason for this is because there were several direct questions about
the utility, benefits and limitations of SSAF as an approach. The chart only shows
individual categories for each bar. Figure E.3 shows more meaningful groupings
according to the SSAF influence model - conceptual, structure, people, process tools.
In this Hierarchical map, we see that the category with the most codes is Conceptual,
then Process, People, Structure and Tools. Two additional categories are in the map
- SSAF and ONR - these codes relate to comments either about SSAF or about
how ONR works specifically. Figure E.1 shows the process followed for coding and
analysing the socio-technical themes using the SSAF STM factors. The written
analysis is presented after the graph data from coding.

















Fig. E.3 ONR Treemap of Factors Discussed
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The following explores the results and findings from the workshop data (workshop
notes) in more depth:
Conceptual
1. Uncertainty - the nature of uncertainty for security is difficult to manage
and has implications for the Security Plan. It is epistemic uncertainty
associated with an intelligent adversary that makes estimating security
risk challenging. This also influences the security risk appetite - because
assessors are unable to predict the future, they are reliant on multiple
system assumptions about when and how an attack will occur
2. Trade-off - there is difficulty judging when licensees have adequately
addressed the safety-security balance. There are currently no measures
for "what’s appropriate
3. Control - related to the level of epistemic uncertainty and the reliance
on assumptions, it is difficult for security practitioners and engineers to
account for risk that is out of their control e.g. if a security plan makes
them responsible for a plant security
4. Terminology - having a shared language and terminology is imperative
for working together. Language shapes how ideas are communicated and
can limit or facilitate what the two disciplines agree on
5. Security - this relates to the maturity of the security assurance approach.
Unlike safety which is mature, cyber security process and justification are
still evolving. The problems introduced by this pace of change are further
compounded by the fact that it is not possible to protect all assets at all
times. In addition, it is difficult to control what cannot be tested, which
has negative implications for threat intelligence.
6. Defence - There is a strong role for testing in creating "hardened" or
protected assets. There is also the notion of network segmentation to
try and protect assets and reduce the attack surface. The capabilities to
implement or enact these mitigations is the defence posture. This often
differs from safety where shutting down is usually the default solution.
Security favoured more strongly the idea of defence-in-depth, and incident
layers of protection.
7. Co-assurance - it was recognised that system safety and cyber security
could not always protect assets in the same way even if they had common
goals to achieve e.g. preventing access to centrifuges. For co-assurance
to work, first and foremost there must be a shared understanding and
terminology. This allows the two domains to reconcile objectives and
"bridge the gap". SSAF works as a practical realisation of those shared
objectives. However, there are some reservations about security assurance
before looking at co-assurance. Not having strong security processes in
place is seen as "putting the cart before the horse".
8. Risk Concept - It was acknowledged that safety and security are very
similar at a high level and they are trying to achieve the same thing.
However, there are some fundamental differences when it comes to specific
conceptions related to risk:
– ALARP - safety works with the ALARP principle, however security
uses a different mindset because the probability of an attack with
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the right capabilities, resources and access is 1. There is currently no
basis for ALARP in security, therefore it would be difficult reconcile
with safety or demonstrate that the ALARP objective has been met
for security.
– risk appetite - for safety, ALARP is often defined, however for security
how much risk someone is willing to accept is often defined by the risk
appetite. Safety is a contributor to risk appetite - one must articulate
the importance of an asset for it to be given proper weighting during
security analysis.
– risk acceptance - alongside risk appetite is risk acceptance. For co-
assurance, there is a need for a framework of shared assumptions
within which the decision of "X is reasonable" can be made. For safety,
reasonable-ness is determined by societal objectives and definitions of
harm, however there is still a grey area for security.
– loss - the opaqueness related to security harm is because "loss" has not
been clearly defined in any standards, but down to an organisation.
For example, if a licensee lost volatile information it is difficult to
determine if that is harm.
– risk calculation - for security, we use the CIA attributes for prioritising
and understanding threats. There are wider goals for security such as
business continuity. For safety on the other hand, the formula that is
often used is frequency x consequence.
– proportionality - for safety, ALARP does mention effort, however for
security it is difficult to judge sufficient effort, and determine what
happens if an attack occurs.
Structure
For ONR, structural elements to support co-assurance are very important.
Understanding the legal, regulatory, organisational and societal constraints
informs the approach to regulation and inspection. There are important
ambiguities related to structure such as who owns risk overall (in a non-safety
business enterprise it would be the CEO) and to what extent ONR can govern
the enterprise sections of the licensee sites. Other concerns related to structure
that were discussed are:
1. Regulatory framework - there is a move for security to be less prescriptive
and more proactive and goal based, however there is still a steep learning
curve and, to inspectors, it seems that the outcome approach is a "cat
and mouse game"
2. Legislative framework - e.g. NIS Directive for continuity of service
obliges security and its effect on resilience to be considered. However,
there is still a lack of suitable legislative frameworks aligning safety and
security, therefore deriving good governance policies is difficult. There
are questions about the equivalence or relationships between different
safety and security laws such as GDPR, HSWA 1974, Event Protection
Act etc. There is particular need for definition of someone who is legally
responsible.
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3. Organisational strategy - defining responsibility, allows for a strategy
about ownership and accountability. It will also allow inspectors to be
able to assess the co-assurance competence on licensee sites.
People
1. Responsibility
– ownership and accountability definition is still a very big question
– there is a big difference in approach from safety to security because
for safety responsibility is clearly defined. In order to work in a more
joined up way this must be resolved
– often responsibility = blame
– there is difficulty understanding security for sites - a vehicle MOT
example was used: a person takes their car to the mechanic because
they are the expert and they assess to see if the car meets all the
requirements for roadworthiness. The analogy was drawn for security
- safety would expect the security experts to know about potential
threats, but safety are still responsible.
– there must be the notion of a named "responsible person" and ownership
of the risk
– there is also a challenge because security plans are for the entirety of
a site, whereas there are safety cases for multiple plants and a site
case. For security, plants may be using security justification which
they did not create.
2. Mindset - the outlook of inspectors seemed to be a very important part of
building a shared understanding. Learning the mindset and the approach
of the other domain is seen as a way to build a joint culture of co-assurance.
Process
1. Risk assessment - for security there is the concept of threat hunting
and having a proactive stance to seeking out threat intelligence. Whilst
there is an element of this for safety, it is a lot more passive in this aspect
for risk assessment. Another important difference is that the judgement
about the acceptability of risks during assessment is determined by risk
appetite.
3. Development - there are implications for development and deployment
of systems when considering safety and security together. For new builds
is it easier to engage with the licensee because there are regular meetings
with many stakeholders, but this may not be the case for more established
sites where there are less frequent inspections unless an incident occurs.
5. Resilience - there is a legal requirement for both safety and security for
there to be a process to support resilience for systems and sites.
Tools
Whilst not explicitly a tool - assurance cases for safety and security were
discussed as a tool for communication and justification i.e. demonstrating
acceptable risk to both safety and security inspectors. Security has the Security
Plan which contains process information and reasoning about the security
strategy. Safety has Safety Cases which contain the safety argument. There is
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a difference between the domains as to who creates and fulfils the requirements
in the Safety Case and Security Plan.
ONR considerations
There was a recognised need for ONR inspectors to be more aligned on safety
and security at a regulatory level and to cooperate more on inspections. This
alignment would also allow for knowledge and experience sharing, and enable
greater reconciliation in regulatory approaches. One large concern remained
around the enforce-ability of security or safety inspectors on licensee sites - it
was unclear the boundaries of their power e.g. with relation to the enterprise
systems on sites.
SSAF feedback
Inspectors found SSAF "very helpful" and "very useful". It allowed them
to establish a common terminology and have a structured discussion about
different factors. Inspectors did find it unclear how some of the trade-off
decisions would be facilitated in practice with the framework. The primary
benefit identified was the ability of the framework to get people to work together
to form shared objectives, goals and perspectives. This clarity of common
objectives did not help with how to address them e.g. "I understood all of
the tech challenges, but now want to know how to address them". The open,
transparent synchronisation process was seen as a major advantage over other
approaches because it was seen to encourage consistency for co-assurance.
ONR Questionnaire Results
The results below were the responses collected from the online forms:
What specific concerns do you have about co-assurance?
• Ensuring collaboration between the different disciplines. Main concern that it
could be missed.
• Shared goals, the assumption that the other discipline just needs to do it our
way
• Safety analysis looks at bounding cases and ways in which these can be
established and simplified through physical changes. Security appears to
focus on detailed analysis that does not necessarily focus on the outcomes,
many of which may be similar in effect, but places less emphasis on simplifying.
These differences, coupled with these analyses being done at different times
results in quite different outcomes.
• A mis-perception of what cyber security actually is by safety specialists
• Cultural and understanding
• Language & terminology differences (e.g. CS&IA interpret risk as the hazard
whereas C&I have a clear delineation between hazard and risk), clarity of
common goals, lack of clarity of what good looks like (relevant good practice).
• Levels of resource, coordination and skill sets to be able to achieve it
Are there particular risks?
• Lack of security or security measures impacting safety.
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• Lack of integration means lost opportunities; conflicting goals
• What we see in practice - safety inspectors challenge more strongly than security
inspectors. This results in active regulation on the safety side, but less evidence
of this on the security side.
• Contradictory messages to dutyholders and gaps in risk understanding The
belief either is more important than the other
• Yes, from a regulatory perspective we do not target the correct areas and/or
are not efficient in how we regulate.
Could you provide further detail about the commonality between safety
and security (or lack of commonality)?
• Basic terms and goals are shared, but there is often an assumption that the
others do (or should) think just like we do, or alternatively just leave it up to
us
• As evidenced by the discussion (e.g. what does hazard mean), safety and
security have differences in the way concepts are expressed, and how objectives
should be met. For example, safety work in a top down way (i.e. identifying
the hazards, and how these should be mitigated), as opposed to security that
approach cyber security in a bottom-up way (i.e. what devices are incorporated
into the system and how can these influence security).
• So many safety and security standards are very similar in context and intent.
It is the language that is very different
• Language - CS&IA interpret risk as the hazard whereas C&I have a clear
delineation between hazard and risk. Even the definition of cyber security
is contentious. The concepts are more aligned than the language. From a
regulatory perspective we are both now working to a goal setting regime leading
to more aligned concepts.
What kind of information would you expect to see in a technical risk
argument?
• claims - what is necessary to achieve safety/security, demonstration that key
principles and objectives are met, a suitable and repeatable process has been
implemented, visibility of the results and its completeness
• Clearly stated claims, arguments and evidence, properly referenced and self-
consistent that covers both safety and security in a holistic way, recognising
the need for security documentation to be separated because of its security
classification.
• For cyber security, as with safety, we would expect a claims, arguments and
evidence case to be presented in the form of a security plan. Where we usually
find security plans lacking is in the evidence section. How seeking assurance
on security posture is more challenging than validating reliability claims for
safety systems.
• Depends on the system
• From a safety perspective I would expect to understand the hazard (unmitigated)
including the likelihood and consequence of the hazard being realised (i.e. the
risk). I would then seek to the engineering justification as to how it has reduced
the potential risk to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) which is the
legal basis on which ONR enforces.
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In what ways will SSAF TRM help co-assurance?
• Increased activity between Cyber and Safety.
• All communication is good - but needs to be prompted by some sort of framework
• Primarily by assuring that there are regular ’touch points’ to ensure alignment.
However, for this to be effective, communication needs to be effective, and the
two groups need to focus on the right things at each point. Also it is necessary
for the touch point timings to be appropriate, according to the phase of the
design. How will this work if much of the design is in place already, and if only
small modifications are possible?
• It emphasizes the point that the disciplines are different but it’s important to
understand the importance of each others discipline. It provides a framework
to allow that to happen with more structure than at present.
• If you use one another language you will start to understand what is being
said.
• From a temporal perspective it will provide clarity as to when each group
should be engaging which will aid with regulatory effectiveness.
• It provides a means of structuring dialogue and ensures both disciplines are
given appropriate attention
In what ways will SSAF TRM hinder co-assurance?
• Not sure
• If it becomes an end in itself rather than a means to achieve joint objectives
• As discussed during the session, unless it can be proven to be effective, and
better than another activity that produces the same output, then it is potentially
utilising resources, and preventing further work because managers think this
work has been done.
• It has the potential to add too much overhead to smaller projects.
• Can only improve things (may slow the project as differences are resolved)
• The v-model is very familiar for C&I inspectors and we often regulate incorporating
this model. I’m not sure whether CS&IA (again linking to concepts) utilise
the v-model in the same way?
What recommendations would you make to ONR for guidelines on the
technical risk argument for safety and security?
• We generally refer to relevant good practice rather than write it ourselves,
but we do set out the principles and objectives we expect it to meet. If the
SSAF were published we could use it as an example of how to achieve good
communication and shared goals.
• I would recommend that the technical risk arguments clearly and consistently
cover both safety and security, seamlessly. ONR could provide some high level
guidance, but I’m aware that the security professionals in the licensees will
likely need considerable training to help them to understand what constitutes
compelling evidence!
• None as we are non-prescriptive. The duty holder needs to select how they will
demonstrate their arguments.
E.1 STM Scheme Case Studies 299
• We need to have a defined clarity of language and to be able to link the risk
argument back to our core regulatory function (e.g. on the safety side - reducing
risks ALARP).
• That we establish clear, high level guidance around our expectations for
technical risk arguments that show how safety and security risks have been
considered and how (with an appropriate means of coassurance) - and that
dutyholders/licensees are able to demonstrate how this outcome has been
achieved
How useful did you find the STM factors?
• IT might be better to group the factors to focus thinking around them rather
than to just list them.
• It’s too complex. It may be an interesting model but it feels too academic and
as an operator I am sat wondering just how it would be used in practice (and
whether it would be well received). Simple delivered is better than complex
design
• help framing the discussions
• The structured process outlined earlier should benefit both safety and security
practitioners.
• Based upon the comprehensive coverage of the socio-technical factors
• It seems to have all the right features though I am not quite sure of how they
relate/interact in practice
• It forms a starting point to structure co-assurance, but as it is new I am not
convinced on completeness.
What additional factors would you have liked to see in the structure?
Why?
• Simplification and recognition of existing cyber and information methodologies
which are fairly mature, well established and work
• More clarity on the interaction between the factors used in the model and
potential trade-offs.
• Potentially something around common situational awareness at least at a basic
level (ensuring safety and security participants have a baseline understanding
of potential security threats and safety hazards (this may already be captured
under cognition?)
E.1.2 IET CoP Comments Review
This case study aims to provide insight into the themes returned in the comments
from the review release of the IET Code of Practice for Cyber Security and Safety
using STM Schemes. The IET CoP presents 16 shared principles for safety and
security. Note that this analysis was performed over a draft version of the guidance
and therefore many of the observations from this report might already have been
addressed in the revision before release.
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IET CoP Case Study Approach
Each of the 611 comments underwent a qualitative review using the SSAF STM
guidewords. Table E.1 shows a subset of the guidewords from the sTM Schemes. The
comments were coded using the guidewords and the critical questions that accompany
them. The intended output is threefold:
(i) understand which comments could contribute to improvements in the next
issue of the CoP
(ii) understand the ‘most useful’ parts of the existing materials (from the view in
the comments)
(iii) evaluate the coverage of the STM factors/guidewords















IET CoP Case Study Results
The list of STM scheme guidewords were utilised to evaluate the CoP. In addition
to these broad codes, several other codes emerged from the data (comments):
{Abstraction, Assurance Case, Co-assurance, Conflict, Lifecyle, Means of Compliance,
OEM, Precedence, Response, Supply Chain}. Figures E.4 and E.5 show the hierarchy
of the codes and the percentage coverage (occurrence) in the comments. The following
section discusses some of the most popular codes (frequently occurring).
IET CoP Case Study Discussion
Risk
1. Comments discussed the conceptual and governance models for risk, with some
advocating safety as another impact domain for security
2. Risk appetite for security was mentioned at least 8 times in reference to security.
This does not usually seem to be a common decision for safety as this is usually
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Fig. E.4 IET CoP Comments Coding
dictated by standards or legislation, however risk appetite is the foundation of
security risk analysis
3. The concept of ALARP for security was a controversial one (with at least 7
comments). Many argued that there is no basis for ALARP in security which
considered other negative outcomes rather than just safety, and for which
economic cost was a factor
4. If an ALARP approach is preferred for the two, it was suggested that a worked
example for security be included in future releases of the document
5. Another controversial discussion was held around likelihood (and especially
quantification of likelihood) for security. The need for considering the role of
quantification and future estimates of security threats/attacks was encouraged
by multiple comments
6. One commenter had very strong views on quantification of security risks to
understand uncertainty and m[e ]better decisions (quoted the UK Government’s
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Fig. E.5 Hierachy Chart of IET CoP Socio-Technical Factors
AQUA book). The CoP does not currently advocate a quantitative approach,
however it might be useful to include consideration of this in the next issue,
with clear analysis of the limitations and constraints of this approach
Trade-Off and Decision Making After conceptual models of risk, trade-off was
the most discussed theme in the comments. The trade-off was not always at the same
level of abstraction and there may be a need for detailed discussion about different
types of trade-off between safety and security in the future.
1. Related to Synchronisation and Lifecycle understanding exactly where the
trade-offs are likely to occur
2. Understanding the trade-off bi-directionally for safety and security, as it was
viewed that the document had a safety slant
3. Trade-off happens for security across several domains, one of which is safety, it
is suggested if the CoP is equally balanced for safety and cyber security then
some guidance on how to handle multiple domain trade-offs should be discussed
4. There was an emphasis on the decision making that happens at board-level as
this influences the rest of the hierarchy
Responsibility and Accountability Whilst this area is mired in controversy
because of the lack of a legal or widely-accepted framework, it was clear from many
of the comments that one of the roles that the CoP plays is setting a precedent for
responsibility and accountability because it has the potential to influence people’s
thinking on the subject.
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1. It was mentioned that there are no models for understanding and allocating
responsibi[ty] (especially to third parties or through the supply chain)
2. It is unclear, even though the risk processes for safety and security are similar,
who is responsible for many parts of the inter-domain risk activities e.g. is it
the safety engineer’s responsibility to tell security about the value of an asset
or is it the security engineer’s responsibility to see cross-domain information?
3. The role of the organisation and structures for responsibility of inter-domain
risk was mentioned as a very important factor as they are currently not in
existence
4. Even within a single domain (security) risk owners may not be the same
5. The need for a legal or regulatory framework for accountability when an incident
occur
• s as a results of inter-domain risk was brought up many times in the comments
– this might be a more fundamental challenge for safety and security than the
scope of the CoP, however attention should be called to it otherwise attempts
to co-assure safety and security might fail before they have started
Terminology and Ontology Very much related to the Conceptual category the
mentions of models connecting conditions in safety and security domains were
numerous. Even though a glossary of terms is provided in the CoP there seemed to
be a fundamental mismatch between the reading of the document based on prior
assumptions about the meaning of terminology.
1. Terms such as risks (safety and security), threats, faults, attacks, etc should
have their definitions included in the document or use existing standards as a
baseline that can be adapted by organisations that use the CoP
2. The relation of safety and security to other quality attributes would be useful
for systems and software engineers. These engineers are often balancing
multiple competing interests from multiple stakeholders and understanding how
safety/security maps to attributes such as Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability,
Resilience, Reliability, etc (or a more modern breakdown of attributes) would
assist with the trade-off decisions that they make.
Direct Feedback on IET CoP These are points that were made specifically for
improvement of this document as opposed to thinking about safety and security
interactions in general. These were not related to the STM Schemes, however they
provide valuable insight into the needs of the stakeholders who would use this kind
of guidance.
1. The need for guidance on interactions on all levels was reiterated, it was
suggested that the aims and objectives of the document be expanded
2. There was a request for more real-world examples of safety and security
engineering challenges to be enumerated in future editions
3. There were several comment about the scope of the guidance, which stated that
the document was uneven in tone with a strong focus on high-level management,
and if the CoP claimed to be holistic then it should include more aspects of
the management of individual products/services/assets
4. Many wanted more practical advice of how to instantiate many of the principles
listed. Annex D was quoted as the core part of the Code of Practice
304 SSAF Evaluation Case Studies
5. Linked to Trade-Off and Synchronisation it is suggested that the more detail is
provided for activities between safety and security throughout the lifecycle
IET CoP Conclusion
Whilst this is a subset of the codes found in the comments, it is reflective of the
most recurring themes and therefore most likely to add value for future issues of the
CoP. The guidance provides very sound principles for advancing interaction between
safety and security, especially at higher levels in organisations, however it appears
that there are more fundamental problems for safety-security interactions that either
are beyond of the scope of the document (such as legal and regulatory frameworks
for accountability where an interaction risk causes and accident) or interactions that
have not been covered in detail in this guidance.
E.2 TRM Process Case Studies
The purpose of these case studies is to evaluate application of the SSAF TRM process
steps.
E.2.1 EULYNX Synchronisation Points
Due to the level of abstraction of the EULYNX Process document, technical risks
and their implications on security will only be briefly covered. Note that this analysis
is based on a document that was released in January 2019 and therefore issues raised
might already have been resolved in subsequent versions.
EULYNX Case Study Approach
SSAF TRM Process was applied to the EULYNX project. In particular
• The concept of synchronisation points was used to establish links between the
safety assurance process and security
• A subset of the STM guidewords were used to analyse the process document
to identify potential co-assurance gaps
EULYNX Results & Discussion
The EULYNX Assurance Process is a risk-based process with foundations in solid
safety principles. This perspective presents many useful conceptual models (such as
how risk should be calculated), however there are some limitations when considering
co-assurance. The assumptions made in the safety analyses might be undermined
by a fundamental difference from the safety perspective. The following subsections,
discusses differences that might create challenges for co-assurance:
Conceptual.
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Fig. E.6 EULYNX Safety Argument
1. The document sets a good precedent for recording assumptions as these will
be key during interactions and trade-off/negotiation.
2. Hazard definition – “A condition that could lead to an accident. A Hazard sits
at the boundary of the system under consideration”. By this definition it might
be interpreted that a vulnerability is a “security hazard”, however there are
some vulnerabilities that do not lead to harm and the process of discerning
those differences is unclear.
3. It is assumed that the safety risk model used is likelihood x consequence,
however a determination of likelihood for security concerns that contribute
to safety might be impossible (if they are unknown) or have a high degree of
uncertainty even if they are provided.
Structure.
1. As EULYNX spans over several countries and organisations the communication
structure tends to model the organisational structure. This becomes a co-
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assurance risk when explicit provision for inter-organisation or cross-cluster
communication is needed. Understanding what information to communicate, to
whom and when is a foundational concept for co-assuring safety and security.
2. The regulatory structure also influences the approach to co-assurance. Because
it is up to individual projects to instantiate the framework, it is difficult
beforehand to provide details of the approach.
People
• The assurance process document is currently silent on the subjects of co-
assurance competence, responsibility and accountability. This may because it
is beyond the scope of the document. However, to ensure that co-assurance
activities are performed to a satisfactory level an explicit representation of the
skills required from those participating in co-assurance activities should be
made available for project use. In addition, responsibility should be explicitly
assigned. Accountability is a more complex topic when considering a project
such as EULYNX because there is no guidance currently (legal or regulatory).
It is recommended that discussions about accountability are held ‘early and
often’ to understand what the implications of risk propagation.
Figure E.7 shows an annotated EULYNX Assurance Process Model annotated with
a few (possible) synchronisation points with security. The six points of security-
informed safety are discussed below, however it is worth noting the bi-directional
nature of communication and sync points. Identification of high value ‘assets’ based
on safety analysis needs to be communicated to security for incorporation into their
risk analyses. This is the same when there is an update to a hazard, this would
model safety-informed security i.e. understanding the possible intent of threats based
on the negative consequences of a safety incident.
The Sync Points are as follows:
1. At this stage it is imperative that shared goals and terminology are established
including the sync points throughout the process. This is to set expectations
and allocate responsibilities for co-assurance tasks
2. Understanding the security process and policies in reference to the Assurance
process allows for early detection of conflict. The trade-off can be made when
the cost of resolving the conflict is relatively low compared to later stages of
development
3. From the identification of assets in earlier stages it is possible for security
engineers to communicate the contribution to safety risk (hazards) from security
concerns.
4. In addition to communicating the contributions, it is recommended that a
model (with inter-domain links) is set up at this stage. This model can be used
to update the impact of security on safety (especially during operation when
new vulnerabilities and threats are likely to present themselves).
5. In-depth analysis of security concerns that lead to a hazard i.e. detail of the
causal path from security to safety is communicated
6. This sync point is about closing the loop between safety and security and
providing evidence that a security mitigation has been put in place to prevent
that causal path from safety and security. Note that mitigations might include
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Fig. E.7 EULYNX Safety Process with Synchronisation Points
responses if there is a breach of security. This analysis included a high-level
representation of what information would need to be shared for co-assurance.
More detailed analysis using CENELEC safety and security standards, as
well as examples real-project requirements would be needed to provide further
technical detail of the information exchanged.
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EULYNX Conclusion
Whilst the EULYNX System Assurance Process contains many good principles from
a safety viewpoint, additional information needs to be provided to understand how
security information is incorporated in the safety process. There is complexity added
to the safety process because it is for the interaction points of the system (safety
process for integration); when discussing further interaction points i.e. between safety
and security, there is the opportunity for much more uncertainty to be introduced
therefore a clear understanding and mitigation plan for these “interaction risks” must
be put in place, for example in the form of a co-assurance plan.
E.2.2 Forensics Synchronisation Points
As context for the case study, there are two concepts to note:
(1) incident processes are used as the vehicle for incorporating threat intelligence
into existing processes. This means that the definition for incident encompasses
discovery of something with the potential to cause harm, including threat
intelligence.
(2) As the focus for the case study is synchronisation, existing incident processes
for safety and security are used. Figure E.8 provides an overview of the safety
and security incident processes.
Further detail of the process steps can be found in the guidance documents [48] for
safety and [207] for security. To limit the scope of the case study, both processes
were adapted slightly. This is an overview of their steps:
Cyber Security Process.
For this process, the objective is understanding what the threat means for the system
in terms of exposure, attack vectors, vulnerabilities, exploits, what systems pose
the biggest risk. It consists of three primary phases - Initialisation, Acquisitive and
Investigative [207, p 6-7]. Initialisation Phase (steps 2-4) this class of steps deals
with the initial commencement of digital investigation. Acquisitive Phase (steps 5-6)
this class of steps deals with the physical investigation of the case where digital
evidence is identified and handled. Investigative Phase (steps 7-8) this class of steps
deals with uncovering potential digital evidence.
Further detail about the security incident process steps includes:
1. Cyber Incident in Operational Context - new threat intelligence or new
vulnerability
2. Incident Detection - avenues for discovering, classifying and describing the new
intelligence
3. First Response - e.g. disconnecting equipment and triggering a safety response
4. Planning and preparation - creating strategy for later in the investigative
process
5. Evidence Identification and Collection - identifying evidence pertaining to the
threat intelligence and collecting it in a manner that maintains integrity
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6. Evidence Transportation and Storage - preserve info integrity and chain-of-
custody, store in correct place
7. Evidence Analysis - using established techniques, testing hypotheses
8. Reporting - updating cyber risk justification, etc.
System Safety Process.
The safety incident process consists of eight steps adapted from [48]. These are:
1. Incident Reporting - staff reporting an incident or this is performed automatically
in some instances
2. Incident Prioritisation - prioritise according to severity of safety consequences,
environmental consequences, economic loss or loss of assets, excessive frequency
of incidents, many installations and novelty
3. Incident Characterisation and Investigation - to perform this analysis there is
a need for sufficient knowledge and expertise about the domain, consequences,
operation and maintenance, equipment. The tasks in this step are data
gathering, reconstruction, analysis, making recommendations
4. Incident Repository - this is storing information in a manner that will be useful
for future applications
5. Detailed Assessment - an in-depth assessment of the criticality and impact of
the incident
6. Proactive Interpretation and Analysis - trend analysis, establishing proportions
of different incidents, zonal analysis for hotspots, and staff training, and finally
7. and (8) are the external Dissemination and Listening Functions - this is
information sharing to prevent recurrence, rectify defects, and improve processes
in supply-chain.
Both of these processes are preceded by readiness planning and development, however
these are beyond the scope of this case study. In the following subsection we explore
synchronisation points for CTI between these processes.
SSAF TRM Step 1: Ontology & Synchronisation Points
The first step is to reach a consensus on ontology and terminology to enable inter-
domain communication. It is not necessary to combine all terms, instead it is possible
to define separate "safety risk", "security risk", "incident", and "threat intelligence"
as long as the definitions are documented and there is clarity of expression. This
process step is important because it allows for discussions to align views and resolve
some of the conceptual co-assurance challenges mentioned in Section ??. The output
is a joint dictionary of terms. Also in this step is establishing the synchronisation
points that trigger what information should be communicated between domains.
SSAF Synchronisation Points.
The synchronisation points in Figure E.8 are:
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Fig. E.8 Synchronisation Points between Incident Processes. (Left: Safety Process [48];
Right: Security Process [207]; Numbered: SSAF Synchronisation Points)
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Sync 1 - CTI triggers the creation of a safety incident report containing information
about the new potential for harm from a cyber perspective.
Sync 2 - Safety classifies the severity of the potential for harm and informs cyber of
the result for planning.
Sync 3 - Security identifies which system artefacts and data are needed to investigate
the threat further. Data is collected if there are no conflicts with safety, and the
evidence is then shared with safety.
Sync 4 - Relevant cyber information and evidence is added to the safety repository.
Trade-off is made between sharing information for transparency in safety and hiding
information to maintain security.
Sync 5 - Safety and security now perform detailed analyses and assessments, both
jointly and separately to understand the impacts of the new threat intelligence. This
is an iterative step and may require several refinements. The outcome is a decision
on the impact and actions to take.
Sync 6 - This is ongoing reporting related to this threat intelligence incident to
enable trend identification.
Sync 7 - This is the feedback step where information about this threat incident is
used to inform future actions for this system, or the intelligence is disseminated more
widely through other reporting channels e.g. sector or national reporting.
SSAF TRM Steps 2 & 3: Single-Domain Assurance
For this case study, two individual processes were selected from a standard and best
practice guidelines. This might not always be the case, therefore Steps 2 and 3 exist
to enable the development of process steps and argument within a single domain
that will inform the joint analysis at the next synchronisation point. Single-domain
activities may reveal the need for fewer or more synchronisation points, changes in
ontology and terms, or new risk information that needs to be addressed in an joint
manner.
SSAF TRM Steps 4 & 5: Link and Update
Steps 4 and 5 are concerned with the ongoing tasks of creating links, refining models
and developing the co-assurance argument. The co-assurance argument for this
case could be captured in a report that clearly sets out the claims, assumptions,
justification and evidence for the decisions made about actions related CTI. Figure
E.9 shows an example of evidence. It is an SSAF Link artefact based on bowtie
modelling for interaction risks related to resource utilisation. The co-assurance
argument for CTI related to this artefact would make claims about the sufficiency of
system controls to prevent new threats invalidating any of the security requirements.
If a new threat did invalidate the security requirements, through the SSAF link model
in Figure E.9 a safety action is triggered for safety resource requirements invalidation.
Further analysis would reveal the impact, thereby creating an effective and timely
update mechanism between safety and security. The two domains can then work
together to implement both short- and long-term risk reduction solutions [216] after
identifying the link.
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Fig. E.9 Example Artefact: SSAF Link Model for Resource Requirements.
Observations
Although this is a highly constrained case study, it does reveal some valuable
insights. The first is that this example is about new threat intelligence affecting one
interaction risk for one system. For an increased number of threats and interaction
risks, prioritisation from both safety and security is imperative to manage the
potential state explosion. The usefulness of this process would be greatly diminished
if too much information was shared thereby precluding meaningful analysis and
decision-making.
An advantage of the SSAF approach is that it provides a systematic process, so whilst
there is some variability, there is the possibility for the steps and resulting artefacts
to be assessed independently, which is an improvement on some highly subjective
joint approaches. It is possible for the safety-security interactions, link models and
incident processes to vary from project to project, but the SSAF generalised concept
of creating synchronisation points to facilitate actionable CTI holds.
Whilst this approach may yield valuable information about the nature of threats and
future trends, it may be difficult to justify the cost of CTI in a safety-critical context
as those are often resources that could be used to improve system safety mitigations,
for example.
Finally, there is a need for standardisation in this area. Although SSAF’s systematic
process enables some objective assessment, there is still the need for CTI-specific
co-assurance standards to inform engineers and practitioners about best-practices
and requirements for their industry or application.
Forensics Conclusion
Maintaining a solely reactive posture towards cyber threats is no longer sufficient to
make a compelling argument for the safety of a system. This is due to the fact that
safety-critical systems are increasingly networked and exposed to new threat vectors
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and attackers. The safety assurance established during development is unlikely to
hold for the entirety of operation. Therefore, a proactive stance must be assumed
with respect to cyber defence to maintain an acceptable level of safety risk.
SSAF TRM was applied to safety and security incident processes in order to establish
synchronisation points for cyber threat intelligence. The intent is that the link models
and synchronisation points enable identification of issues earlier, and for there to be
a more dynamic, bi-directional feedback model between the attributes, instead of a
snapshot analysis that would need to be repeated each time new information was
introduced.
SSAF not only offers an opportunity for safety and security practitioners and engineers
to communicate better, thereby addressing some of the technical and socio-technical
challenges of CTI, but allows threat intelligence to be incorporated into risk analysis
in a systematic and ongoing way.
The ultimate goal of this approach is to bridge the gaps between safety and security
that may lead to unacceptable levels of risks, and to inform decisions and actions for
a more proactive approach to cyber threats in safety-critical systems.
E.3 TRM Links Case Studies
The purpose of these case studies to to evaluate the application of SSAF TRM Link
patterns and schemes. The IEC 61508 case study was done by the primary researcher;
the SAM Demosntrator case study and the CERIUM framework linking were done
by independent researchers.
E.3.1 IEC61508vsCC Link Model
Work from this case study has previously appeared in [222]. The intent of this case
study is to apply part of the TRM to well-recognised standards to demonstrate
utilty and validate internal consistency and correctness of the model. The section
is structured in three parts: the approach is described, the results presented then
they are discussed. By the end of this case study, the aim is for more detail to be
revealed about the functioning of TRM.
IEC 61508 vs CC Case Study Approach
IEC 61508:2010 [189] is arguably the most widely adopted safety standard. It has
been adapted to multiple domains including healthcare, rail, automotive, aerospace,
and nuclear. It consists of seven parts that define the safety process for a system.
This is justification for its selection for this case study. The software design and
development (software architecture design) requirements found in Table A.2 [187, p
48] were selected for this case study.
Common Criteria is a widely adopted security standard that has been adapted across
many types of systems in many domains, including some that are safety-critical. It
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Fig. E.10 Process for Evaluating TRM using IEC 61508 and Common Criteria
consists of three parts. For this case study, functional requirements from Common
Criteria Part 2 were selected.
One of the main contributions of SSAF TRM is the explicit modelling of and reasoning
about the causal relationships that exist at different synchronisation points. This
is encapsulated in Steps 1, 4 and 5 of the TRM Process. The objective of this case
study is to demonstrate how this process functions, emulate how industrial system
requirements could be linked, and show how the links could be implemented on a
project. Figure E.10 shows the process steps followed for the case study.
The following is a brief overview of the case study steps. The results section explains
the models and categorisations in more detail. Step 1 — Ontology Using 27 functional
design requirements from IEC 61508 (found in Part 3 Annex A Table A.2) and 21
functional requirements from Common Criteria Part 2 – commonalities and general
categories were identified.
Steps 2 & 3 — Requirements Categorisation. These steps were performed independently
within each domain, with respect to either safety or security. The ontology and
categories established in Step 1 were used to categorise the requirements according
to type. In addition, a state machine was created to explain the impact on safety in
the absence of a safety argument (further detail in Section 5.2).
Step 4a — Category Refinement. Once the requirements had been through initial
categorisation, the categories were jointly refined further which resulted in 7 types
of requirements. These were mapped to four states in a state machine that showed
which requirements were violated. The four states were St0 None, St1 Resource &
Timing Requirements Violated, St2 Failure Behaviour Requirements Violated, St3
Communication Requirements Violated.
Step 4b — Graphical Representation. Using the refined categories, requirements
from safety and security which were in the same categories were linked to each other.
These links were then modelled as a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN).
Step 5 – Dynamic Update and Impact Propagation. The leaf nodes of the BBN are
the security classes of requirements from Common Criteria. A practitioner provides
details if a security requirement class has been violated or not. The BBN then
outputs the probabilities of being in state St1, St2 or St3
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IEC 61508 vs CC Case Study Results
Fig. E.11 Safety Requirements State Machine
Figure E.11 shows the state machine that was output from TRM Steps 2 and 3. Note
that a state machine was created instead of modelling the process and arguments
contained in the two standards and linking them because of the limit on resources
for the case study1. Therefore the state machine is used as a proxy for the reasoning
that would have occurred in a single domain. This is not a disadvantage, in fact, it
shows the flexibility of the TRM in that not all steps need to be applied to the letter
all of the time for it to work.
The state machine in Figure E.11 consists of four states. S0 where no safety
requirements have been violated, and three other states where at least one safety
requirement from the IEC 61508 set was violated. Transitions occur according to
the type of safety requirement that has not been satisfied, for example not satisfying
requirement “13a Guaranteed maximum time” would transition to state S1. To
return to S0 the violation would need to be resolved. The states were formed by
grouping the seven requirements types in groups which were highly cohesive, i.e.
{Re-source Use and Timing}, {Failure Behaviour, Failure Detection, Recovery}, and
{Communication and Trust}.
Figures E.12 and E.13 show the model of the causal links that were established during
the linking process in TRM Step 4. E.12 provides a summary conceptual model
to communicate the content and structure of the BBN. E.13 shows the real-world
implementation of the BBN in the GeNIe modelling tool.
The leaf nodes of the BBN are the requirements classes taken from Common Criteria.
The driving concept that makes this model successful, is the idea that multiple
security requirements belong to classes in Common Criteria, therefore if any of the
1Modelling the implicit arguments in IEC 61508 and Common Criteria could reasonably take
several months.
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Fig. E.12 Conceptual Model of the BBN
security requirements are violated during operation for example2, it can be input
into the BBN leaf nodes. The impact then propagates through the classes and
related safety requirements to the safety output i.e. the impact report which is the
probability of being in a particular safety state.
As knowledge is contained in the state machine about how to transition back to
a state where no safety requirements have been violated, it is now possible for a
safety practitioner to take the output impact report from the BBN, and use that to
determine the state, then resolve the issue more efficiently without needing to know
specific information about the security requirements.
This model would be most useful during operation where security violations can
occur at a fast rate. However, the model has some utility during the requirements
phase to reason about impact in a manner similar to sensitivity analysis.
Table E.2 shows the data from the connections. In the table, each safety requirement
and security requirement that has the same characteristic has a link created in the
2This information can be collected from in-service attack distributions and vulnerability
information.
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BBN. In addition to the group links, more subtle connections are created to model








Table E.2 Results from Requirements Analysis: 61508vsCC
Ref Title Group C I A Code
A2.14 Static resource allocation Resources – – – Resources
A2.15 Static synchronisation of access Resources – – – Resources
FRU_PRS Priority of service Resource Utilisation – – ✓ Resources
FRU_RSA Resource allocation Resource Utilisation – – ✓ Resources
A2.13a Guaranteed maximum time Timing behaviour – – – Timing behaviour
A2.13b Time-triggered architecture Timing behaviour – – – Timing behaviour
A2.13c Maximum response to events Timing behaviour – – – Timing behaviour
FPT_SSP State synchrony protocol Protection of the TSF – ✓ ✓ Timing behaviour
FPT_STM Time stamps Protection of the TSF – – ✓ Timing behaviour
A2.3a Failure assertion programming Failure Detection – ✓ ✓ Failure behaviour
A2.4b Graceful degradation Fault handling – – ✓ Failure behaviour
A2.5 Artificial intelligence - fault correction Fault handling – ✓ – Failure behaviour
FPT_FLS Fail secure Protection of the TSF – ✓ ✓ Failure behaviour
FRU_FLT Fault tolerance Resource Utilisation – – ✓ Failure behaviour
A2.1 Fault detection Failure Detection – ✓ – Detection
A2.2 Error detecting codes Failure Detection – ✓ – Detection
FPT_RPL Replay detection Protection of the TSF – ✓ – Detection
FPT_TST TSF self test Protection of the TSF – ✓ ✓ Detection
A2.3f Backward recovery Recovery – – ✓ Recovery
A2.3g Stateless software design Recovery – – ✓ Recovery
A2.4a Retry-fault recover mechanisms Fault handling – – ✓ Recovery










Ref Title Group C I A Code
FCO_NRO Non-repudiation of origin Communcation ✓ ✓ – Communication
FCO_NRR Non-repudiation of receipt Communcation ✓ ✓ – Communication
FPT_ITT Internal TOE TSF data transfer Protection of the TSF – ✓ ✓ Communication
FTP_ITC Inter-TSF trusted channel Trusted Path/Channels ✓ ✓ – Communication
FTP_TRP Trusted path Trusted Path/Channels ✓ ✓ – Communication
A2.10 Backward requirements traceability Traceability – ✓ – Trust
A2.11a Structured diagrammatic methods Methods – ✓ – Trust
A2.11b Semi-formal methods Methods – ✓ – Trust
A2.11c Formal design and refinement methods Methods – ✓ – Trust
A2.11d Automatic software generation Methods – ✓ – Trust
A2.12 Computer-aided design Methods – ✓ – Trust
A2.8 Trusted elements Traceability – ✓ – Trust
A2.9 Forward requirements traceability Traceability – ✓ – Trust
FPT_ITI Integrity of exported TSF data Protection of the TSF – ✓ – Trust
FPT_TDC Inter-TSF TSF data consistency Protection of the TSF – ✓ – Trust
FPT_TEE Testing of external entities Protection of the TSF ✓ ✓ – Trust
FPT_TRC Internal TOE TSF data replication consistency Protection of the TSF ✓ ✓ – Trust
A2.3b Diverse monitor techniques - independence Diversity – ✓ – Diversity
A2.3c Diverse monitor techniques - separation Diversity – ✓ – Diversity
A2.3d Diverse redundancy Diversity – ✓ – Diversity
A2.3e Functionally diverse redundancy Diversity – ✓ ✓ Diversity
A2.6 Dynamic reconfigurations Diversity – ✓ – Diversity
A2.7 Modular approach Methods – ✓ – Modular
FPT_ITA Availability of exported TSF data Protection of the TSF – – ✓
FPT_ITC Confidentiality of exported TSF data Protection of the TSF ✓ – –








Fig. E.13 TRM Link Model Example in BBN
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IEC 61508 vs CC Case Study Discussion
The quality of this implementation of SSAF is dependent on the quality of the links
i.e. between the safety requirements from IEC 61508 and security requirements
from Common Criteria. The links were determined by sorting them in to cohesive
groups. If performed on an industrial project, the group categories could be decided
beforehand, practitioners could classify the artefacts in each domain separately;
subsequently link tables can be created.
Deciding the Causal Relationships
The TRM argumentation schemes and the logical cohesion between the groupings of
safety and security requirements were used to create links across domains.
Deciding on group categories is a non-trivial task. As discussed in previous chapters,
unified methodologies such as security-informed fault trees usually specify the syntax
of how artefacts should be linked, but not the semantics, e.g. linking the top event
of an attack tree to the base event of a fault tree. This TRM Case Study goes some
way to demonstrating a solution to the question about the semantics of causal links.
In this case, expert judgement, experience and concept cohesion were used to make
the groupings.
It would have been possible to create links with less complex reasoning behind them,
such as linking all safety and security requirements per component; however, the aim
of co-assurance is to argue about the management of interaction risks using these
links, therefore a more structured and strategic approach (using TRM argument
schemes) was needed for link creation. This approach has the added advantage that
it can be examined, contested and possibly repeated if necessary.
Handling Information from TRM Links
In the TRM process there exists the assumption that the argument structures for
each attribute are known or that they can be discovered. In addition, there is the
assumption that the artefacts (e.g. analysis models used for evidence) are somehow
linked to the argument (e.g. safety case) and the TRM model. So when a change
occurs, impact can be traced from the TRM model to the claims in the argument3.
However, modelling the argument structures for Common Criteria and IEC 61508
was beyond the scope of this case study which is concerned mainly with the creation
of causal links. Instead, a state machine was presented as a way to understand the
security impact on safety.
By construction, the states communicate to the safety practitioner which types of
safety requirement have been violated. This allows safety practitioners and decision
makers to respond to change more effectively because they are not required to reason
about security requirements to understand impact. Knowledge about particular
states and how to transition is encapsulated in the model. This approach enables
resources to be applied proportionally to the impact. For example, from a safety
3Links such as these could be captured in SACM, for example
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perspective, moving to a state where an availability-related requirement has been
violated (St2) is probably of more immediate concern than if a confidentiality-related
requirement has been violated (St3).
There are, of course, a few limitations to using the state machine for the purposes of
determining impact. The first is the assumption that the transitions modelled are
possible and accurate; that is, once a safety requirement has been violated then a
suitable and timely resolution can be found to transition back to state St0 where there
are no violations. This is unlikely to be true in all cases. However, even if transitions
are not possible it is still important to capture the reasoning and assumptions in a
systematic way.
Another limitation is the simplicity of the model. Only four states were modelled
for comprehensibility, but many more states could be captured with many more
complex transitions. States could be included to represent multiple violations,
partial violations, etc. This would risk a possible state explosion that would be
counterproductive to the aim of using the model to enable practitioners to understand
impact and for them to know what to do next.
Although there are limitations with this approach to handling impact, this state
machine is understandable, would help practitioners to respond proportionally and
is sufficient for the purposes of demonstrating what to do with results from TRM
linking.
This case study has demonstrated how the SSAF Technical Risk Model could be
applied to real-world requirements. Its success is predicated on the creation of links
between the two domains. The TRM Link Schemes were used to guide reasoning
about the links. The results are that, whilst there is an increase in overhead to create
the TRM links, during operation time and effort is saved because practitioners in
each domain are informed about the impact in their own domain without necessarily
having to consider conditions or events from the other domain. This case study has
only investigated aspects of the TRM. The next section explores further aspects of
the TRM and the use of the STM via a series of workshops.
E.3.2 CERIUM Framework Link Model
Figure E.14 shows a framework developed for security deception technologies. CERIUM
[336] was developed as part of a Masters-level project. One of the core prinicples of
CERIUM are the links between properties and platforms. This is an extension of the
inter-attribute links from SSAF TRM.
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Fig. E.14 CERIUM Security Links
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